Mrs M Mnyama v The Commissioner Of Police Of The Metropolis: 2300788/2022

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Case No 2300788/2022

Between

Mrs M MnyamaClaimant

The Commissioner Of Police Of The MetropolisRespondent

Before

Employment Judge Sudra

Ms. E. Banton (instructed by Counsel) for respondent

Date 1 October 2025

JUDGMENT

The unanimous decision of the Tribunal is that the Claimant’s complaints of,(i) Harassment related to disability is not well founded and is dismissed.

(ii) Harassment related to age is not well founded and is dismissed.

REASONS

Relevant Law

[1]These written reasons are being provided following a request from the Claimant made on 10th October 2025. An oral judgment was delivered on 1st October 2025.

[2]The Claimant began Acas early conciliation on 11th January 2022 (‘Day A’) and was issued with an Acas early conciliation certificate on 25th January 2022 (‘Day B’). On 25th February 2022 the Claimant presented her ET1 claim form. The Respondent defended the claims by way of an ET3 and Grounds of Response on 28th March 2022 and a further Grounds of Response on 22nd October 2022.

The Issues

[3]The Claimant’s complains of:(i) Harassment related to disability (s.26 Equality Act 2010 (‘EqA’)); and

(ii) harassment related to age (s.26 EqA). The parties had agreed a final List of Issues which was contained within the Case Management Order of Employment Judge Krepski [55], of 30th March 2023, and is as follows: ‘The Issues 44. The issues the Tribunal will decide are set out below.

The Issues

[1]Time limits 1.1 Were the discrimination made within the time limit in section 123 of the Equality Act 2010? The Tribunal will decide:1.1.1 Was the claim made to the Tribunal within three months (plus early conciliation extension) of the act to which the complaint relates?

1.1.2 If not, was there conduct extending over a period?

1.1.3 If so, was the claim made to the Tribunal within three months (plus early conciliation extension) of the end of that period?

1.1.4 If not, were the claims made within a further period that the Tribunal thinks is just and equitable? The Tribunal will decide:1.1.4.1 Why were the complaints not made to the Tribunal in time?

1.1.4.2 In any event, is it just and equitable in all the circumstances to extend time?

[2]Disability 2.1 Did the claimant have a disability as defined in section 6 of the Equality Act 2010 at the time of the events the claim is about? The Tribunal will decide:2.1.1 Did s/he have a physical or mental impairment: anxiety and depression?

2.1.2 Did it have a substantial adverse effect on her ability to carry out day-to-day activities?

2.1.3 If not, did the claimant have medical treatment, including medication, or take other measures to treat or correct the impairment?

2.1.4 Would the impairment have had a substantial adverse effect on her ability to carry out day-to-day activities without the treatment or other measures?

2.1.5 Were the effects of the impairment long-term? The Tribunal will decide:2.1.5.1 did they last at least 12 months, or were they likely to last at least 12 months?

2.1.5.2 if not, were they likely to recur?

[3]Harassment related to disability (Equality Act 2010 section 26)3.1 Did the respondent do the following things:3.1.1 In an occupational health referral of 20 August 2021, Ms Slevin stated that the Claimant “finds it hard to cope with any form of management or change and the behaviour that follows and form of supervision is untenable”; and

3.1.2 At the meeting on 2 November 2021, Ms Slevin said that she “saw no evidence that the Claimant was happy at work”.

3.2 If so, was that unwanted conduct?

3.3 Did it relate to disability?

3.4 Did the conduct have the purpose of violating the claimant’s dignity or creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for the claimant?

3.5 If not, did it have that effect? The Tribunal will take into account the claimant’s perception, the other circumstances of the case and whether it is reasonable for the conduct to have that effect.

[4]Harassment related to age (Equality Act 2010 section 26)4.1 Did the respondent do the following things:4.1.1 At the meeting on 2 November 2021, Ms Slevin told the Claimant that she should seriously consider retirement which was repeated in the meeting minutes dated 4th November 2021; and

4.1.2 On 20 January 2022, Mr Noar told the Claimant that she should consider retirement as this would allow her more time to spend with her grandchildren.

4.2 If so, was that unwanted conduct?

4.3 Did it relate to age?

4.4 Did the conduct have the purpose of violating the claimant’s dignity or creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for the claimant?

4.5 If not, did it have that effect? The Tribunal will take into account the claimant’s perception, the other circumstances of the case and whether it is reasonable for the conduct to have that effect.

[5]Remedy for discrimination5.1 Should the Tribunal make a recommendation that the respondent take steps to reduce any adverse effect on the claimant? What should it recommend?

5.2 What financial losses has the discrimination caused the claimant?

5.3 What injury to feelings has the discrimination caused the claimant and how much compensation should be awarded for that?

5.4 Has the discrimination caused the claimant personal injury and how much compensation should be awarded for that?

5.5 Did the ACAS Code of Practice on Disciplinary and Grievance Procedures apply?

5.6 Did the respondent or the claimant unreasonably fail to comply with it?

5.7 If so is it just and equitable to increase or decrease any award payable to the claimant?

5.8 By what proportion, up to 25%?

5.9 Should interest be awarded? How much?’ ’ Preliminary Matters 4. At the outset of the Hearing we discussed the List of Issues with both the Claimant and Respondent; they agreed that the List of Issues accurately captured the Claimant’s claims. 5. The Tribunal also explored timetabling with the parties and was content that the evidence and submissions would be completed within the allotted Hearing days.

Preliminary Matters

[6]The Claimant confirmed that as reasonable adjustments, questions would need to be clear and concise and that extra time may be needed to read documents. The Claimant was assured that these adjustments would be made and that she may request extra breaks if needed more frequently than scheduled. As it transpired, the Claimant did require additional breaks and this was accommodated. When the Claimant became upset during evidence we asked her if she was okay to continue and only continue when we were satisfied that the Claimant was comfortable.

[7]As it was apparent that the Claimant easily became emotional, we explained to her that, whilst the Respondent’s witnesses were being cross-examined by her husband, she could choose to go to the waiting room if she became upset and did not require our permission to do so. Procedure and Documents

[8]We had before us:(a) An agreed Hearing bundle consisting of 895 pages1;

(b) a cast list and chronology from both the Claimant and Respondent; and

[9]We also had written witness statements from: For the Claimant(i) The Claimant;

(ii) Benjamin Mnyama; 1 The Claimant’s bundle had pages missing so the Employment Judge gave the Claimant his paper bundle (which was unmarked and unannotated) to use as he was utilising an electronic bundle and did not require a paper version. For the Respondent

(iii) Jane Slevin;

(iv) Andrew (‘Andy’) Daws; and

(v) Sarah Brown2.

[10]We heard live evidence from the Claimant, Mr. Mnyama, and Ms. Slevin. After the mid-morning break, on day two at around 11.13am, Mr. Mnyama stated that he had ‘no questions for any more witnesses’ and wanted to proceed to submissions. We explained that this was the Claimant’s opportunity to question the Respondent’s witnesses and put her case. Mr. Mnyama stated that he felt ‘violated and threatened’ because the Employment Judge had said that the Tribunal had read documents and he had been stopped from asking questions. The effect of not cross-examining the Respondent’s witnesses was explained to Mr. Mnyama but he said that he was ‘100% certain’ that he did not want to ask questions and wanted to proceed to closing submissions. Mr Mnyama was asked if he was ‘absolutely certain’ and he replied ‘yes.’

[11]The Claimant and Respondent made oral and written closing submissions at the conclusion of the evidence.

[12]We notified the parties at the outset of the Hearing that we would only read documents that we were specifically referred to and would only read documents referred to in witness statements insofar as they were relevant. Relevant Findings of Fact

[13]The following findings of fact were reached by us, on a balance of probabilities, having considered all of the evidence given by witnesses during the Hearing, including the documents referred to by them, and taking into account our assessment of the witness evidence. 2 Ms. Brown attended via Witness Order upon application of the Respondent.

[14]Only findings of fact relevant to the issues, and those necessary for us to determine, have been referred to in this judgment. It has not been necessary, and neither would it be proportionate, to determine each and every fact in dispute. We have not referred to every document we read and/or were taken to in the findings below but that does not mean it was not considered if it was referenced to in the witness statements/evidence and considered relevant.

[15]Whilst the Claimant was employed by the Respondent for circa 37 years the facts of this case are not complicated and the factual matrix is largely agreed. Therefore, in the interests of proportionality and in keeping with the Overriding Objective, we have confined our findings of fact to matters in dispute and those relevant for us to reach a fair determination of the complaints. Employment

[16]The Claimant was employed by the Respondent, as a crime researcher, in January 1987 and her employment terminated upon her retirement on 30th April 2024. At the material times the Claimant was line-managed by Jane Slevin (Detective Sergeant) and joined Ms. Slevin’s team in June 2019.

[17]In or around 2005/2006 the Claimant was diagnosed with depression and anxiety disorder. The Respondent accepts that the Claimant had the impairment of depression and anxiety disorder at all material times as per s.6 EqA.

[18]By August 2017, the Claimant had had considerable time-off work due to illness and had exceeded the Respondent’s ‘trigger points’ for sickness absence management. As of 9th August 2017 the Claimant had been absent from work, due to illness, over five periods in the previous 12 months totalling to more than 60 days. Due to the high level of the Claimant’s absence the Respondent placed her on an Informal Management Action (‘IMA’) monitoring period.

[19]In 2019 the Claimant was inclined to apply for partial retirement and on 26th July 2019 wrote to Ms. Slevin in the following terms, ‘Dear Jane, Thank you for my return to work today. I have thought about your suggestion about working less days. I would like to apply for partial retirement from 28th November when I will be 60. I would like to work Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday if possible and would be flexible if you were short at work. I will fill the forms in and submit them to you. I hope you will consider my application.’

[20]The Claimant semi-retired in November 2019 and worked part-time on a threeday-week pattern. Soon after, the country was gripped by the COVID-19 pandemic and went into national lockdown in March 2020. Between July 2019 and April 2020, the Claimant’s sickness absence from work continued and she accrued 32 days off-sick from work. As the Claimant had again exceeded the amount of the Respondent’s reasonable levels of sickness absence HR asked Ms. Slevin if it would be appropriate to place the Claimant on IMA. On 22nd May 2020 Ms. Slevin decided not to process the Claimant via IMA due to the unprecedented times but advised that she would monitor the situation. This was a reasonable and compassionate decision by Ms. Slevin. The Claimant had further periods of sickness absence in June and August 2020.

[21]On 13th July 2021, the Claimant attended a meeting with Ms. Slevin, Andy Daws (Detective Inspector), and Colin Murray. The Claimant was accompanied by her trade union representative Sarah Brown. It was agreed at the meeting that the Claimant would have a stress risk assessment and be referred to occupational health (‘OH’) for assessment.

[22]On 18th August 2021 the Claimant went on sick leave with psychological disorders and remained off-work until 7th January 2022.

[23]Ms. Slevin completed an OH referral for the Claimant on 20th August 2021 and within the referral stated that, ‘Margaret (the Claimant) suffers with anxiety and depression. After preparing to complete a Stress Risk Assessment and a meeting in relation to a change in work practices [Civilian staff going on carms] certain matters were highlighted. it is clear Margaret finds it hard to cope with any form of management or change and the behaviour that follows any form of supervision is untenable for all parties. This is affecting the office environment but also for Margaret who suffers panic attacks due to anxiety after discussions about basic roles and responsibilities. It was also identified Margaret gets anxious coming into work as she has a feeling of coming into the Lion`s Den`. Margaret enjoys sharing events in her life but has become very withdrawn and quiet having previously being a vocal member of staff. She also stated she feels she doesn`t fit in and feels isolated.’ (Our emphasis).

[24]The Claimant attended an OH assessment on 20th September 2021 and OH stated that the Claimant was not currently fit to return-to-work and recommended referral to an OH psychiatrist.

[25]Due to the Claimant’s prolonged absence from work, Ms. Slevin conducted a home visit on 2nd November 2021 to check on the Claimant’s welfare. Ms. Brown was also in attendance as Ms. Slevin wanted to ensure that the Claimant had a person present to support her. Mr. Mnyama was also at the Claimant’s home at the time of the visit so the Claimant was doubly supported.

[26]Ms. Slevin explained to the Claimant that when she eventually returned to work adjustments had been made to ensure she had adequate support to enable the Claimant to carry out her role. Ms. Slevin confirmed that an officer had been allocated to support the Claimant when Ms. Slevin was away from the office, a desk would be allocated to the Claimant in the main office and it would be ‘marked up’ so that others did not use it when the Claimant worked her shifts, a ‘quiet area’ had been identified for the Claimant to go to when she felt stressed, and that on her first day back the Claimant would be met and shown around the office. Ms. Slevin was being proactive in anticipation of the Claimant’s return to work and wanted to ensure that the transition was a smooth one for the Claimant.

[27]At the home meeting, Ms. Slevin commented that she was concerned that the Claimant did not really want to be at work and that there were other options such as redeployment or retirement and that maybe the Claimant should discuss them with her husband. Ms. Slevin was not exerting any pressure upon the Claimant to retire but rather, was conveying to the Claimant that she had options to consider. We found that Ms. Slevin’s remarks were innocuous and not threatening or malevolent.

[28]On 4th November 2021 Ms. Slevin emailed the Claimant re-capping the meeting of 2nd November 2021. In the email Ms. Slevin confirmed the adjustments that had been made for the Claimant and went on to say, ‘I was concerned you were not really wanting to be at work and there may be another driving force behind you continuing when you could retire. I said this is something you and Ben (Mr. Mnyama) need to have an honest conversation about. You stated you did enjoy being at work and you like to come and see people. I was very honest when I stated I failed to see any evidence of that and when suggesting you and Ben need to discuss this Ben stated he understood and you would do this.’

[29]On 12th November 2021 the Claimant raised a grievance [544] against Ms. Slevin and Mr. Daws. The nub of the Claimant’s grievance was that she had been placed on an unofficial poor performance plan and that Ms. Slevin had stated, at the 2nd November 2021 meeting, that she did not feel the Claimant was happy at work and therefore, she may want to consider retirement or another job as an option.

[30]On 20th January 2022 the Claimant attended a grievance meeting chaired by Toby Noar (Chief Inspector) and was represented by Ms. Brown. Amanda Phillips was also in attendance in the capacity of note-taker. The Claimant was emotional and she cried throughout the meeting [274]. During the meeting the Claimant alleged that Ms. Selvin had asked her to retire and Mr. Noar pointed out that that was incorrect and all that Ms. Selvin had done is mention that retirement was an option. Mr. Noar assured the Claimant that ‘you decide when you want to retire’ and that Ms. Slevin had sympathy for her plight. The meeting lasted two-and-a-half hours and the Claimant was sent notes of the meeting.

[31]Following the grievance meeting the Claimant sent at an email to Stuart Ryan (Detective Superintendent) at 3.14pm on 20th January 2022. The Claimant complained that the grievance meeting was not very helpful as she did not get a chance to discuss her side of the story and that Ms. Slevin’s virtues were repeatedly extolled. The Claimant concluded her email by stating that she was utterly dismayed by what she felt was a ‘one sided’ process. In her email the Claimant made no mention of Mr. Noar’s alleged comment that she could retire and look after her grandchildren. If Mr. Noar had made the comment the Claimant would have mentioned it.

[32]On 20th February 2022, the Claimant sent the Respondent the meeting notes with added text in red to denote what had not been, according to the Claimant, included in the note recorded by Ms. Phillips. The Claimant alleged that after the following exchange, ‘MK Jane asked me to retire TN No she didn’t…..she said that was an option available to you’ the conversation continued thus, ‘TN – you can retire and look after your grandchildren. MK – My Grandchildren are all teenagers and are at Secondary School and do not need to be looked after by me. TN – It is an option.’

[33]Mr. Noar’s grievance report was completed on 30th March 2022 and the Claimant’s grievance was not upheld although, Mr. Noar did make a number of recommendations in his report. The Claimant appealed the grievance outcome (on an unconfirmed date) and a grievance appeal report was produced on 23rd September 2022. A finding contained within the grievance appeal document was that, ‘it would appear that retirement was mentioned (by Ms. Slevin) in good faith and with good intention. DS Slevin outlines her concerns for Margaret’s wellbeing and the negative impact her work environment was causing her which appear to be the leading factors to retirement being mentioned as a potential option for Margaret. I do not consider there to have been sufficient evidence supplied by the aggrieved to support her allegation that retirement was mentioned on more than one occasion and therefore I am unable to substantiate this allegation on that basis.’

[34]The Claimant retired from employment on 30th April 2024. Relevant Law Time limits for EqA claims

[35]S.123 EqA states: (1) Subject to proceedings on a complaint within section 120 may not be brought after the end of— (a) the period of 3 months starting with the date of the act to which the complaint relates, or (b) such other period as the employment tribunal thinks just and equitable. … (3) For the purposes of this section— (a) conduct extending over a period is to be treated as done at the end of the period; (b) failure to do something is to be treated as occurring when the person in question decided on it. (4) In the absence of evidence to the contrary, a person (P) is to be taken to decide on failure to do something— (a) when P does an act inconsistent with doing it, or (b) if P does no inconsistent act, on the expiry of the period in which P might reasonably have been expected to do it.

[36]In terms of case law: i. For the “conduct extending over a period” to be relevant, something that is found to have been the relevant discrimination must be in time for it to render the out of time claims justiciable by virtue of “conduct extending over a period” (South Western Ambulance Service NHS Foundation Trust v King UEAT/0056/19 at [33]); ii. with respect to the just and equitable extension arguments, it is for the Claimant to show discretion to extend time should be exercised and that there is no presumption to exercise the discretion – extension is the exception not the rule: Robertson v Bexley Community Centre3

[2003] EWCA Civ 576

[2003] IRLR 434

at [25] 1. it is always necessary for tribunals, when exercising their discretion, to identify the cause of the complaint’s failure to bring the claim in time: Accurist Watches Ltd v Wadher4 (

EAT/102/09

) at [15] 2. moreover, as the purpose of time bars is to ensure finality and certainty, it is difficult to see how a claimant can discharge such a burden of showing that it is just and equitable to extend time if either(a) he/she does not explain the delay or

(b) the explanation is disbelieved: Edomobi v La Retraite RC Girls School

UKEAT/0180/16

at [31].5 3 Indeed prior to this case the EAT already made clear that just because a fair trial is still possible it does not automatically to lead time being extended: Newnham v Transco plc

EAT/125/00

EAT/126/00

EAT/844/00

at [29] 4 Langstaff J, without making any citation or reference to this case, equally reaches the same conclusion in Abertawe Bro Morgannwg University Local Health Board v Morgan UKEAT//0305/13 at [52] also stated that “'The first question in deciding whether to extend time is why it is that the primary time limit has not been met…” 5 Indeed, the Court of Appeal in Abertawe Bro Morgannwg University Local Health Board v Morgan

[2018] EWCA Civ 640

;

[2018] ICR 1194

accepted that whilst the test is broad with no specific list of factors to be considered, with lack of a good reason for delay not operating as an absolute bar, two factors that are always relevant: the reason for the delay and any prejudice caused to the other parties (at [18]-[20], and [24]-[26]). Harassment

[37]Section 26(1) of the Equality Act 2010 provides (so far as material): ‘A person(a) (A) harasses another

(b) (B) if (a) A engages in unwanted conduct related to a relevant protected characteristic, and (b) the conduct has the purpose or effect of— (i) violating B's dignity, or (ii) creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for B.’

[38]A similar causation test applies to claims under section 26 as described above to claims under section 13. The unwanted conduct must be shown ‘to be related’ to the relevant protected characteristic.

[39]The shifting burden of proof rules set out in section 136 EqA can be helpful in considering this question. The burden is on the Claimant to establish, on the balance of probabilities, facts that in the absence of an adequate explanation from the Respondent, show she has been subjected to unwanted conduct related to the relevant characteristic. If she succeeds, the burden transfers to the Respondent to prove otherwise.

[40]Harassment does not have to be deliberate to be unlawful. If A's unwanted conduct (related to the relevant protected characteristic) was deliberate and is shown to have had the purpose of violating B's dignity or of creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for B, the definition of harassment is made out. There is no need to consider the effect of the unwanted conduct.

[41]In Richmond Pharmacology v. Dhaliwal

[2009] IRLR 336

, the EAT specified that harassment is defined by way of three elements:a. unwanted conduct;

b. having the purpose or effect of either: i. violating the claimant's dignity; or ii. creating an adverse environment for him; and

c. on the prohibited grounds.

[42]The EAT held that it would normally be a 'healthy discipline' for Tribunals to address each factor separately and ensure that factual findings are made on each of them.

[43]In so far as the second of those matters is concerned, guidance was given by the EAT in Betsi Cadwaladr University Health Board v. Hughes [2014] 2 WLUK 991; per Langstaff P: ‘10. Next, it was pointed out by Elias LJ in the case of Grant v. HM Land Registry

[2011] EWCA Civ 769

that the words ‘violating dignity’, ‘intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating, offensive’ are significant words. As he said: ‘Tribunals must not cheapen the significance of these words. They are an important control to prevent trivial acts causing minor upsets being caught by the concept of harassment.’ 11. Exactly the same point was made by Underhill P in Richmond at paragraph 22: ‘..not every racially slanted adverse comment or conduct may constitute the violation of a person's dignity. Dignity is not necessarily violated by things said or done which are trivial or transitory, particularly if it should have been clear that any offence was unintended. While it is very important that employers, and tribunals, are sensitive to the hurt that can be caused by racially offensive comments or conduct (or indeed comments or conduct on other grounds covered by the cognate legislation to which we have referred), it is also important not to encourage a culture of hypersensitivity or the imposition of legal liability in respect of every unfortunate phrase.’’

[44]Consideration should also be given at this stage to the reasonableness of the effect. The test in this regard has both subjective and objective elements. The Tribunal is to look at the effect of the conduct from the claimant's point of view, but must also ask whether it was reasonable of the claimant to consider that conduct had that requisite effect Dhaliwal. The context of the conduct in question is relevant to all stages of the test.

[45]In Nazir and Aslam v. Asim and Nottinghamshire Black Partnership

[2010] ICR 1225

, the EAT gave particular emphasis to the last element commenting that: ‘We wish to emphasise this last question. The provisions to which we have referred find their place in legislation concerned with equality. It is not the purpose of such legislation to address all forms of bullying or antisocial behaviour in the workplace. The legislation therefore does not prohibit all harassment, still less every argument or dispute in the workplace; it is concerned only with harassment which is related to a characteristic protected by equality law—such as a person’s race and gender.’

[46]If the conduct was not deliberate, it may still constitute unlawful harassment. In deciding whether conduct has the effect of creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for B, we must consider the factors set out in section 26(4), namely:(a) the perception of B;

(b) the other circumstances of the case;

(c) whether it is reasonable for the conduct to have that affect. The shifting burden of proof rules can be also be helpful in considering the question as to whether unwanted conduct was deliberate. Conclusions and Analysis Credibility of Evidence

[47]We find that the Claimant’s evidence was honest but that her recollection of events was tainted by her belief that Ms. Slevin was committed to forcing the Claimant into retirement and her perception of being discriminated against because of her disability and age.

[48]We found Ms. Slevin’s evidence to be consistent, credible, and corroborated by the documentary evidence. We accept the unchallenged witness statement evidence of Mr. Daws and Ms. Brown. Where there was a dispute of fact, we preferred the evidence of the Respondent witnesses. Harassment Related to Disability LoI 3.1.1 In an occupational health referral of 20 August 2021, Ms Slevin stated that the Claimant “finds it hard to cope with any form of management or change and the behaviour that follows and form of supervision is untenable”

[49]It is agreed that Ms. Levin wrote the words alleged in the OH referral and it is evident to us that they are not an instance of harassment but evidence of what a responsible manager should do. Whilst what Ms. Slevin wrote was unwanted by the Claimant it did not have the purpose or effect of violating the Claimant’s dignity or creating an adverse environment for the Claimant.

[50]Ms. Slevin completed the OH referral with a real intention to assist the Claimant and in doing so was robust and straightforward regarding her understanding of the situation. Ms. Slevin did not write the impugned words because of the Claimant’s disability. LoI 3.1.2 At the meeting on 2 November 2021, Ms Slevin said that she “saw no evidence that the Claimant was happy at work”.

[51]Again, Ms. Slevin does not dispute that she said the Claimant did not appear happy at work as that was her experience. The Claimant would frequently leave the workplace – without permission – having taken umbrage at innocuous events. An example is the Claimant’s extreme reaction to Mr. Balderston simply stating that he did not expect to see the Claimant at work that day.

[52]Ms. Slevin’s observation did not have the purpose or effect of violating the Claimant’s dignity or creating an adverse environment for her and was not made because of the Claimant’s disability. Harassment Related to Age LoI 4.1.1 At the meeting on 2 November 2021, Ms Slevin told the Claimant that she should seriously consider retirement which was repeated in the meeting minutes dated 4th November 2021;

[53]The Claimant was partially retired by 4th November 2021 and it was perfectly reasonable for Ms. Slevin to record in writing what she had said at the meeting on 2nd November 2021 i.e. that the Claimant could consider retirement as an option. Talk of retirement is not unusual at the Respondent’s workplace and Ms. Slevin did not violate the Claimant’s dignity or create an adverse environment for her because of age or any other characteristic.

[54]Ms. Slevin’s comment did not have the purpose or effect of violating the Claimant’s dignity or creating an adverse environment for her and was not made because of the Claimant’s disability. LoI 4.1.2 On 20 January 2022, Mr Noar told the Claimant that she should consider retirement as this would allow her more time to spend with her grandchildren.

[55]Mr. Noar did not make this comment and therefore, did not harass the Claimant because of her age. The comment does not appear in the notes of the grievance meeting produced by Ms. Phillips and we accept Ms. Brown’s evidence that she did not recall Mr. Noar making such a comment and if he had, she would have challenged him. As an experienced trade union representative we accept that Ms. Brown would have intervened if the alleged comment was made. The alleged commit was inserted into the grievance hearing notes ‘corrected’ by the Claimant five days prior to presentation of her ET1 claim form and it is not beyond the realms of possibility that the comment was added to bolster her complaint. If Mr. Noar had made the comment the Claimant would have raised it in her lengthy email sent to the Respondent approximately twohours after the grievance meeting in which she makes several other complaints.

[56]However, if we are wrong about this the alleged comment, whilst unwanted, would not violate the Claimant’s dignity or create an adverse environment for her because of age or any other characteristic.

[57]For these reasons our unanimous decision was that the Claimant’s complaints were unfounded and dismissed.

[58]Due to our findings (supra) we did not need to consider the issue of time limits or jurisdiction. Approved by:

[1]The Respondent applied, under Rule 69 of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024, for reconsideration of the Tribunal’s decision.

[2]The Claimant, on 12th October 2025, has applied for a reconsideration of my judgment as she says, 1 of 5 ‘• The Tribunal did not follow the correct procedures, and this affected the decision/ judgement.• The Tribunal was unfairly biased towards the Respondent throughout the hearing. The Oral judgement was similar in content to the ET3 provided by the Respondent.

• The Tribunal did not apply the law correctly in terms of natural justice, fairness and impartiality.’

[3]The Claimant’s reconsideration application identifies three bullet-pointed grounds upon which reconsideration is sought. Some of these are broken into discrete numbered sub-grounds. Ground 1: ‘The Tribunal did not follow the correct procedures, and this affected the decision/ judgement’ (sic).

[4]The Respondent had provided electronic and hard copies of the bundle and witness statements. The Claimant’s representative (and husband (‘Mr. Mnyama’)) was using a hard copy and claimed not to have all of the bindles 895 pages. Employment Judge Sudra (‘the Judge’) gave Mr. Mnyama his unused hard copy bundle to use as the Judge was working from an electronic copy. This benefited rather than disadvantaged the Claimant and did not amount to the ‘respondent varying the contents of a trial bundle.’

[5]Whilst the Claimant had provided written opening submissions, there was no need to address the ‘issues of concern’ contained within it as they were matters of evidence to be heard and then determined. It is not understood what is meant by the Claimant’s statement that ‘The Tribunal relied on the respondent’s schedule.’ There was no schedule from the Res[pendent. If the Claimant is referring to the cast list and chronology provided by the Respondent, then yes, 2 of 5 these documents were relied upon as they were accurate, useful, neutral documents of reference and were unchallenged by the Claimant.

[6]The Claimant alleges that ‘There was no opportunity to give her evidence in chief. To explain her case.’ That is wholly incorrect. The Claimant’s sworn written witness statement stood as her evidence-in-chief as is the practice in the Employment Tribunal. Ground 2: ‘The Tribunal was unfairly biased towards the Respondent throughout the hearing. The Oral judgement (sic) was similar in content to the ET3 provided by the Respondent.’

[7]When Jane Slevin (Respondent witness) referred to a document in the bundle and proceeded to read it out (during Tribunal questions not cross-examination), the Judge told her that the Tribunal had read it (more than once) so a recital was not necessary. This was in keeping with conducting the Hearing in an efficient manner and did not disadvantage or prejudice any party. The Judge did not nod in agreement with Ms. Slevin’s answer or the answer of any witnesses.

[8]The Judge did say that the Respondent’s Counsel was an experienced advocate but that was in the context of her being aware to her duties when dealing with a litigant-in-person or a lay representative. Ground 3: ‘The Tribunal did not apply the law correctly in terms of natural justice, fairness and impartiality.’

[9]On day two Mr. Mnyama made a conscious and deliberate decision not to crossexamine all of the Respondent’s witnesses and said he wished to proceed directly to closing submissions. Mr. Mnyama was asked by the Judge, at least three times, if he was sure that is how he wished to proceed as that would mean the remaining Respondent witness evidence would be unchallenged. Mr. Mnyama stated at 11.20am ‘I am certain 100% I want to proceed to submissions.’

[10]The Judge explained the closing submissions process to Mr. Mnyama and clarified that a party could make written, oral, a mixture of written and oral closing submissions. Mr. Mnyama stated that he would not be making any closing 3 of 5 submissions and asked if he had to listen to the Respondent’s closing submissions. The Judge told Mr. Mnyama that there was no requirement for a party to make closing submissions but he may wish to listen to the Respondent’s closing submissions before making a decision.

[11]The five-day listing was concluded within three-days as Mr. Mnyama abandoned his cross-examination of the Respondent’s witnesses and made oral closing submissions which were one-minute in length.

Relevant Law

[12]There is an underlying public policy principle in all judicial proceedings that there should be finality in litigation, and reconsideration applications are a limited exception to that rule. The importance of finality was confirmed by the Court of Appeal in Ministry of Justice v. Burton and anor

[2016] EWCA Civ 714

in July 2016 where Elias LJ said that: ‘the discretion to act in the interests of justice is not open-ended; it should be exercised in a principled way, and the earlier case law cannot be ignored. In particular, the courts have emphasised the importance of finality (Flint v. Eastern Electricity Board

[1975] ICR 395

) which militates against the discretion being exercised too readily; and in Lindsay v. Ironsides Ray and Vials

[1994] ICR 384

Mummery J held that the failure of a party's representative to draw attention to a particular argument will not generally justify granting a review.’

[13]Similarly, in Liddington v. 2Gether NHS Foundation Trust

EAT/0002/16

the EAT chaired by Simler P (as she then was) said in paragraph 34 that: ‘a request for reconsideration is not an opportunity for a party to seek to re-litigate matters that have already been litigated, or to reargue matters in a different way or by adopting points previously omitted. There is an underlying public policy principle in all judicial proceedings that there should be finality in litigation, and reconsideration applications are a limited exception to that rule. They are not a 4 of 5 means by which to have a second bite at the cherry, nor are they intended to provide parties with the opportunity of a rehearing at which the same evidence and the same arguments can be rehearsed but with different emphasis or additional evidence that was previously available being tendered.’

[14]In common with all powers under the 2024 Rules, reconsideration under rule 70 must be conducted in accordance with the Overriding Objective which appears in rule 3, namely, to deal with cases fairly and justly. Achieving finality in litigation is part of a fair and just adjudication.

[15]Reconsideration is not a means by which to have a second bite at the cherry, or is it intended to provide parties with the opportunity of a rehearing at which the same evidence and the same arguments can be rehearsed but with different emphasis or additional evidence that was previously available being tendered.

[16]Tribunals have a wide discretion whether or not to order reconsideration. Where a matter has been fully ventilated and properly argued, and in the absence of any identifiable administrative error or event occurring after the hearing that requires a reconsideration in the interests of justice, any asserted error of law is to be corrected on appeal and not through the back door by way of a reconsideration application.

[17]For all of the above reasons, the Claimant’s application is refused in its entirety. Approved By