L Abuhaloob v Imperial College of Science, Technology and Medicine: 2221318/2024

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Case No 2221318/2024

Between

L AbuhaloobClaimant

Imperial College of Science, Technology and MedicineRespondent

Before

Tribunal Judge Peer

In person for claimant

Date 28 April 2025

JUDGMENT

(1) The complaint of less favourable treatment due fixed-term employee status is struck out under rule 38(1)(a) of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024 because it has no reasonable prospect of success.

(2) The complaint of direct race discrimination is struck out under rule 38(1)(a) of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024 because it has no reasonable prospect of success.

(3) The complaint of direct age discrimination is struck out under rule 38(1)(a) of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024 because it has no reasonable prospect of success.

(4) The complaint of detriment due the making of protected disclosures is struck out under rule 38(1)(a) of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024 because it has no reasonable prospect of success.

(5) Accordingly, the claimant’s claim is struck out in its entirety under rule 38(1)(a).

(6) The claimant is refused permission to amend her claim.

REASONS

[1]The claimant is Dr. Lamis Abuhaloob. The respondent is a university based in London which conducts teaching and research in the disciplines of science, engineering, medicine and business. The claimant held a post as a research associate on a fixed term contract basis from 19 June 2023 until her contract was terminated on 18 March 2024.

[2]Early conciliation took place between 21 March 2024 and 2 May 2024. By way of her claim form presented on 9 June 2024 and accompanying claim document, the claimant brings complaints of direct race discrimination, direct age discrimination, less favourable treatment due fixed-term employee status and a whistleblowing claim.

[3]A response form and accompanying grounds of resistance was presented by the respondent on 16 August 2024. The respondent applied for an extension of time for the presentation of their response and permission was granted by the Tribunal for the reasons requested namely that the claim form had only been received on 6 August 2024. The grounds of resistance contained a general denial and requested further and better particulars of the claims. In particular, the respondent submitted that it was unclear if the claimant’s whistleblowing claim was one of detriment due the making of protected disclosures under section 47B of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (the 1996 Act) or automatic unfair dismissal due the making of protected disclosures under section 103A of the 1996 Act and that the claimant had not identified what was relied on as a protected disclosure or a detriment/s.

[4]The grounds of resistance also requested particulars of the act/s and/or omission/s relied upon as less favourable treatment on grounds of race and/or age or status as a fixed term employee together with details of the comparator/s relied upon.

[5]A case management preliminary hearing took place on 4 October 2024 before Employment Judge Forde. The record of the preliminary hearing was preliminary hearing to consider whether some or all of the claims should be struck out on the basis that they do not have reasonable prospects of success or deposit orders made in the alternative.

[6]It is relevant to note that paragraph 1 of EJ Forde’s record of the case management preliminary hearing sets out that ‘It was explained to the claimant in the hearing what strike out means and what the effect of a deposit order will be if ordered in her case.’ Paragraph 43 records that the claimant was told to address the issue of time limits. Paragraph 40 records that ‘A considerable amount of time was in the hearing spent trying to understand the issues in the claim. During those discussions, it appeared to me that the claimant’s claims, in some if not most respects, lacked the crucial connection between the facts and the legal claims that she pursues. Further, in respect of all of the claims that she pursues, a vital element was missing as far as the legal claim is concerned.’ At paragraph 44, EJ Forde sets out that, ‘I explained to the claimant the orders that I was making and why I was making them. I explained that I was not making a final determination in respect of her claims. I explained to the claimant that I was concerned as to her understanding of the legal elements of the claims and in light of her estimation that her claim was worth in excess of £1.3m. I repeat here my strong recommendation that she obtains legal advice.’

[7]EJ Forde expressly set out details of the particulars that were required at paragraphs 9 to 11 of the record and ordered the claimant to provide further particulars of her claims by 29 November 2024. The claimant was reminded that if she wished to add to or amend her claim, she needed to present an application to do so.

[8]On 29 November 2024, the claimant provided a further and better particulars document (HB 31-43) in the form of a table. A schedule of loss claiming losses of over £1million was also provided. On 10 January 2025, the respondent provided amended grounds of resistance.

[9]By way of a document dated 21 January 2025, the claimant set out that ‘in addition to the amended claim I submitted on 29th November 2024, I am adding the following reply to the Respondent’s letters on 10 and 15 January 2025’.

[10]The case management orders sent to the parties on 14 October 2024 recorded the listing of a public preliminary hearing on 22 January 2025 to consider the issue of strike out and/or deposit orders. That hearing was postponed due lack of judicial resource. By way of notice of hearing sent to the parties on 27 January 2025, the parties were informed that the preliminary hearing would take place on 21 March 2025 for the purpose of considering whether to strike out some or all of the claims as having no reasonable prospects of success or alternatively make deposit orders. THE PRELIMINARY HEARING

[11]The hearing was a remote hearing. The form of remote hearing was fully remote by Cloud Video Platform. A face-to-face hearing was not held because it was not practicable and all issues could be determined in a remote hearing. The parties agreed in advance to the hearing being held as a remote hearing.

[12]In the ordinary way, it was confirmed at the outset of the hearing that all participants could see and hear each other clearly. The hearing proceeded effectively as a remote hearing although there were occasional connection difficulties and no party raised any objection.

[13]The respondent was represented by counsel, Mr. L. Harris. The claimant appeared as a litigant in person and I was therefore mindful throughout the hearing to explain points of law and procedure. At various points, I encouraged the claimant to take time so she could reflect on what she wished to say and offered her the opportunity to take short adjournments to gather her thoughts before making submissions if she wished. Interpreter

[14]The claimant was assisted by an interpreter. The language was Arabic. The claimant told the tribunal that she preferred to speak English and that she would only use the interpreter if necessary and if she didn’t understand something. I explained to the claimant that it was important that I was assured that she understood what was being said in order that she could fully participate in the proceedings and I could be satisfied there was a fair hearing.

[15]I informed the claimant that I could not advise her but that many representatives would say that use of the interpreter gave a person with familiarity with the English language additional time in the unfamiliar context of a hearing. I also indicated that it was preferable that she use the interpreter consistently rather than make ad hoc elections during the hearing. Although this message was repeated at various points including a strong suggestion that the claimant use the interpreter, the claimant continued to switch intermittently between speaking English and use of the interpreter. On occasion to ensure that I was confident that the claimant did understand what was being said to her, I asked for interpretation.

[16]I note that the claimant is highly educated, has a doctorate and was working in the UK in English in a professional academic capacity. Overall, I was satisfied that the claimant sufficiently understood in order to engage with the proceedings and she clearly had reasonable fluency in the English language. Purpose of the hearing and papers

[17]At the start of the hearing, the purpose of the hearing was discussed. It was agreed with the parties that the purpose of the hearing was to consider the claimant’s application to amend her claim and the respondent’s application for strike out and/or deposit orders with case management to follow as necessary.

[18]There was a hearing bundle of 163 pages (HB). The bundle contained copies of the claim form and particulars of claim, further and better particulars, response form and grounds of resistance, amended grounds of resistance, record of preliminary hearing on 4 October 2024 and other documents. I also had before me a respondent’s note for the preliminary hearing dated 14 March 2025.

[19]The claimant referred to an additional document that she had sent to the tribunal. I therefore took time to obtain access to this document with the assistance of the tribunal clerk as it had not been available on the tribunal’s electronic file accessible to me. The document had been emailed to the tribunal on 15 March 2025. Claimant’s application for postponement

[20]I noted that paragraph 1 of the document referred to receiving the strike out application and respondent’s note on 14 March 2025 and stated ‘I am unable to seek legal advice to respond to the respondent’s correspondence before the Preliminary Hearing on 21 March 2025. Therefore, I am requesting an additional three months to seek legal advice and prepare a response. I am requesting equal access to legal advice.’ I therefore identified to the parties that this presented as an application from the claimant for postponement of the hearing for a period of three months and asked the claimant to confirm if she was making this request. I told the parties that I would first need to address this application. I explained that there were procedure rules which governed applications for postponements made less than 7 days before the hearing. I gave the claimant an opportunity to explain her position. The claimant raised points about evidence provided by the respondent and I explained that when considering strike out I was required to take her case at its highest. The respondent objected to postponement.

[21]The claimant requests a postponement of three months on the basis that she has been unable to seek legal advice to respond to the Respondent’s Note dated 14 March 2025. I gave a reasoned oral decision refusing postponement.

[22]I acknowledged that this document had been sent on 14 March 2025 but explained that the document was not atypical for such proceedings and akin to written submissions or a skeleton argument sent close to a hearing. I noted that such a document was not required but arguably helpful for a litigant in person as it clearly set out the legal framework and arguments that would be put by the respondent in written form so that they could be considered in advance of the hearing.

[23]The respondent’s note was not the claimant’s first notice of the strike out application. The parties have been on notice of the hearing to consider strike out since EJ Forde’s orders of 4 October 2024 sent to the parties on 14 October 2024 listing such a hearing for 22 January 2025 albeit that hearing was postponed and re-listed for today, 21 March 2025. EJ Forde’s record sets out both that strike out was explained to the claimant and also his ‘strong recommendation’ that the claimant obtain legal advice.

[24]The notice of hearing set out the purpose of the hearing. The notice sent on 27 January 2025 also includes a link to tribunal guidance which includes information about sources of legal advice. The claimant had not given any details or information about any steps taken to obtain legal advice since October 2024 and told the tribunal she had not had any legal advice. The claimant had also not indicated any timeframe for obtaining legal advice and I was concerned that postponement would not result in the claimant obtaining legal advice in light of the lack of any information as to any attempts or steps made in the preceding months. (Although after I had reached my decision on the postponement application it came out during the course of the hearing that the claimant had in fact met with a legal advisor and had advice in relation to preparation of the document dated 21 January 2025.)

[25]I considered rule 32 of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024 which regulates late applications for postponement. As the respondent objected to the postponement (and also properly noted the potential risk of costs for the claimant), my discretion to postpone was only exercisable in exceptional circumstances and no such circumstances had been identified for me. I further considered that it was incumbent on me to explain points of law and procedure to facilitate a fair hearing and for the claimant to fully participate. I took account of the overriding objective. I refused to postpone the hearing.

[26]The tribunal ensured that members of the public could attend and observe the hearing. This was done via a notice published on Courtserve.net. Request for bundle by members of the public

[27]I note that the hearing was attended by members of the public who via the chat bar requested a link to have access to the hearing bundle part way through the hearing and shortly before the lunch break. I provided a link to the Presidential Practice Direction on remote hearings and open justice (“the Practice Direction”) and suggested they consider paragraph 11.2 in particular, obtained the views of the parties and took time to consider the request.

[28]I gave a reasoned decision refusing to send the members of the public a full copy of the hearing bundle. I was mindful of the fundamental principle of open justice. I took full account of the Practice Direction. The request did not explain why access to the complete hearing bundle was sought nor how granting such access will advance the principle of open justice. It was clear that not all the documents contained in the hearing bundle would be referred to in open court and members of the public are entitled to see evidence as it arises. It was not necessary to have sight of the entire hearing bundle in order to follow the one day preliminary hearing. In addition, there was no link to the hearing bundle that could be provided as the hearing bundle was in pdf format only.

[29]I balanced all the circumstances and decided it was disproportionate, inappropriate and did not advance open justice to provide a copy of the complete hearing bundle.

[30]I heard submissions from each party in respect of all the applications before me and reserved my decision.

[31]I reserved my decision because there was insufficient time at the public preliminary hearing on 21 March 2025 to deliberate and deliver decision in relation to each of the applications before me. There was also insufficient time and it would have been impractical in any event to make case management orders to prepare and list the case for final hearing. A date was agreed with the parties for a further preliminary hearing for case management arising consequent on my decision.

[32]Notwithstanding the order in which matters are addressed below, I gave consideration to all matters before reaching my decisions on the applications before me.

[33]The parties will note that not all the matters that they told me about are recorded below. That is because I have limited them to points that are relevant to the issues for determination. I take account that in deciding whether or not to strike out claims, the claimant’s position is to be taken at its highest rather than settling disputes of fact if any. LEGAL FRAMEWORK Qualifying disclosures

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

[34]Section 43B (Disclosures qualifying for protection) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 provides: 43BDisclosures qualifying for protection. (1)In this Part a “ qualifying disclosure ” means any disclosure of information which, in the reasonable belief of the worker making the disclosure, is made in the public interest and tends to show one or more of the following— (a)that a criminal offence has been committed, is being committed or is likely to be committed, (b)that a person has failed, is failing or is likely to fail to comply with any legal obligation to which he is subject, (c)that a miscarriage of justice has occurred, is occurring or is likely to occur, (d)that the health or safety of any individual has been, is being or is likely to be endangered, (e)that the environment has been, is being or is likely to be damaged, or (f)that information tending to show any matter falling within any one of the preceding paragraphs has been, is being or is likely to be deliberately concealed. Less favourable treatment due fixed-term employee status

[35]Regulation 2 (Comparable employees) of the Fixed-Term Employees (Prevention of Less Favourable Treatment) Regulations 2002 (FTE Regulations) provides: Comparable employees 2.—(1) For the purposes of these Regulations, an employee is a comparable permanent employee in relation to a fixed-term employee if, at the time when the treatment that is alleged to be less favourable to the fixed-term employee takes place, (a)both employees are— (i)employed by the same employer, and (ii)engaged in the same or broadly similar work having regard, where relevant, to whether they have a similar level of qualification and skills; and (b)the permanent employee works or is based at the same establishment as the fixed-term employee or, where there is no comparable permanent employee working or based at that establishment who satisfies the requirements of sub-paragraph (a), works or is based at a different establishment and satisfies those requirements. (2) For the purposes of paragraph (1), an employee is not a comparable permanent employee if his employment has ceased.

[36]Regulation 3 (Less favourable treatment of fixed-term employees) of the FTE Regulations provides: Less favourable treatment of fixed-term employees 3.—(1) A fixed-term employee has the right not to be treated by his employer less favourably than the employer treats a comparable permanent employee— (a)as regards the terms of his contract; or (b)by being subjected to any other detriment by any act, or deliberate failure to act, of his employer. (2) Subject to paragraphs (3) and (4), the right conferred by paragraph (1) includes in particular the right of the fixed-term employee in question not to be treated less favourably than the employer treats a comparable permanent employee in relation to— (a)any period of service qualification relating to any particular condition of service, (b)the opportunity to receive training, or (c)the opportunity to secure any permanent position in the establishment. (3) The right conferred by paragraph (1) applies only if— (a)the treatment is on the ground that the employee is a fixed-term employee, and (b)the treatment is not justified on objective grounds. (4) Paragraph (3)(b) is subject to regulation 4. (5) In determining whether a fixed-term employee has been treated less favourably than a comparable permanent employee, the pro rata principle shall be applied unless it is inappropriate. (6) In order to ensure that an employee is able to exercise the right conferred by paragraph (1) as described in paragraph (2)(c) the employee has the right to be informed by his employer of available vacancies in the establishment. (7) For the purposes of paragraph (6) an employee is “informed by his employer” only if the vacancy is contained in an advertisement which the employee has a reasonable opportunity of reading in the course of his employment or the employee is given reasonable notification of the vacancy in some other way.

[37]Regulation 4 of the FTE Regulations provides: Objective justification 4.—(1) Where a fixed-term employee is treated by his employer less favourably than the employer treats a comparable permanent employee as regards any term of his contract, the treatment in question shall be regarded for the purposes of regulation 3(3)(b) as justified on objective grounds if the terms of the fixed-term employee’s contract of employment, taken as a whole, are at least as favourable as the terms of the comparable permanent employee’s contract of employment. (2) Paragraph (1) is without prejudice to the generality of regulation 3(3)(b).

[38]Regulation 6 (Unfair dismissal and the right not to be subjected to detriment) of the FTE Regulations provides: Unfair dismissal and the right not to be subjected to detriment 6.—(1) An employee who is dismissed shall be regarded as unfairly dismissed for the purposes of Part 10 of the 1996 Act if the reason (or, if more than one, the principal reason) for the dismissal is a reason specified in paragraph (3). (2) An employee has the right not to be subjected to any detriment by any act, or any deliberate failure to act, of his employer done on a ground specified in paragraph (3). (3) The reasons or, as the case may be, grounds are— (a)that the employee— (i)brought proceedings against the employer under these Regulations; (ii)requested from his employer a written statement under regulation 5 or regulation 9; (iii)gave evidence or information in connection with such proceedings brought by any employee; (iv)otherwise did anything under these Regulations in relation to the employer or any other person; (v)alleged that the employer had infringed these Regulations; (vi)refused (or proposed to refuse) to forgo a right conferred on him by these Regulations; (vii)declined to sign a workforce agreement for the purposes of these Regulations, or (viii)being— (aa)a representative of members of the workforce for the purposes of Schedule 1, or (bb)a candidate in an election in which any person elected will, on being elected, become such a representative, performed (or proposed to perform) any functions or activities as such a representative or candidate, or (b)that the employer believes or suspects that the employee has done or intends to do any of the things mentioned in sub-paragraph (a). (4) Where the reason or principal reason for dismissal or, as the case may be, ground for subjection to any act or deliberate failure to act, is that mentioned in paragraph (3)(a)(v), or (b) so far as it relates thereto, neither paragraph (1) nor paragraph (2) applies if the allegation made by the employee is false and not made in good faith. (5) Paragraph (2) does not apply where the detriment in question amounts to dismissal within the meaning of Part 10 of the 1996 Act. Discrimination and Equality Act 2010

[39]Section 5 (Age) of the Equality Act 2010 provides that in relation to the protected characteristic of age ‘a reference to a person who has a particular protected characteristic is a reference to a person of a particular age group’. Section 9 (Race) of the Equality Act 2020 provides that for the purposes of the Equality Act 2010 the concept of race includes colour; nationality; ethnic or national origins.

[40]Section 13 (Direct discrimination) of the Equality Act 2010 provides as relevant: 13Direct discrimination (1)A person(a) (A) discriminates against another

(b) (B) if, because of a protected characteristic, A treats B less favourably than A treats or would treat others. (2)If the protected characteristic is age, A does not discriminate against B if A can show A's treatment of B to be a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. … (5)If the protected characteristic is race, less favourable treatment includes segregating B from others….

[41]Section 39 (Employees and applicants) of the Equality Act 2010 provides: 39Employees and applicants (1)An employer (A) must not discriminate against a person (B)— (a)in the arrangements A makes for deciding to whom to offer employment; (b)as to the terms on which A offers B employment; (c)by not offering B employment. (2)An employer (A) must not discriminate against an employee of A's (B)— (a)as to B's terms of employment; (b)in the way A affords B access, or by not affording B access, to opportunities for promotion, transfer or training or for receiving any other benefit, facility or service; (c)by dismissing B; (d)by subjecting B to any other detriment. (3)An employer (A) must not victimise a person (B)— (a)in the arrangements A makes for deciding to whom to offer employment; (b)as to the terms on which A offers B employment; (c)by not offering B employment. (4)An employer (A) must not victimise an employee of A's (B)— (a)as to B's terms of employment; (b)in the way A affords B access, or by not affording B access, to opportunities for promotion, transfer or training or for any other benefit, facility or service; (c)by dismissing B; (d)by subjecting B to any other detriment. (5)A duty to make reasonable adjustments applies to an employer. (6)Subsection (1)(b), so far as relating to sex or pregnancy and maternity, does not apply to a term that relates to pay— (a)unless, were B to accept the offer, an equality clause or rule would have effect in relation to the term, or (b)if paragraph (a) does not apply, except in so far as making an offer on terms including that term amounts to a contravention of subsection (1)(b) by virtue of section 13, 14 or 18. (7)In subsections (2)(c) and (4)(c), the reference to dismissing B includes a reference to the termination of B's employment— (a)by the expiry of a period (including a period expiring by reference to an event or circumstance); (b)by an act of B's (including giving notice) in circumstances such that B is entitled, because of A's conduct, to terminate the employment without notice. (8)Subsection (7)(a) does not apply if, immediately after the termination, the employment is renewed on the same terms. Procedure rules and strike out

[42]Rule 38 of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024 gives the tribunal the power to strike out a claim or a response in whole or part at any stage of the proceedings on any of the grounds set out at rule 38 but the power must be exercised in accordance with reason, relevance, principle and justice, Williams v Real Care Agency Ltd 2012 ICR D27, EAT. Reasons for any strike out must be given.

[43]The summary of the EAT’s judgment in Cox v Adecco

[2021] ICR 1307

,EAT explains that: “You can’t decide whether a claim has reasonable prospects of success if you don’t know what it is. Before considering strike out, or making a deposit order, reasonable steps should be taken to identify the claims, and the issues in the claims. With a litigant in person, this involves more than just requiring the claimant at a preliminary hearing to say what the claims and issues are; but requires reading the pleadings and any core documents that set out the claimant’s case. The issues were not sufficiently identified in this case, which was the backdrop to the errors of law the tribunal made in determining that the claim of protected disclosure detriment or dismissal had no reasonable prospects of success because the tribunal:(1) failed to sufficiently analyse the information the claimant contended he had disclosed;

(2) failed to consider the context in which the disclosure was made;

(3) misdirected itself as to the test for whether protected disclosure were in the reasonable belief of the claimant made in the public interest; and

(4) failed to properly analyse to whom the disclosure was made, and whether it was arguable that any qualifying disclosure was protected.”

[44]In appropriate cases, strike outs can minimise the anxiety, expense and time inherent in taking claims to trial, Abertawe Bro Morgannwg University Health Board v Ferguson

2013 ICR 1108

, EAT.

[45]In relation to strike out on the ground at rule 38(1)(a) that a claim or response has no reasonable prospect of success, the test is not whether the claim or response is likely to fail and the tribunal must be able to properly conclude that the claim or response has no reasonable prospect of success on consideration of the available material. The facts relied on by the claimant (or indeed a respondent) must be taken at their highest and where there are conflicts of fact, a tribunal must be cautious to strike out at the preliminary stage.

[46]In Anyanwu and anor v South Bank Student Union and anor

2001 ICR 391

, HL the House of Lords emphasised that discrimination claims should not be struck out save in the most obvious cases as they are generally factsensitive and require full examination to make a proper determination.

[47]In Ezsias v North Glamorgan NHS Trust

2007 ICR 1126

, CA, the Court of Appeal referred to protected disclosure cases as requiring a similar approach to discrimination cases and that when the central facts are in dispute, it will be an exceptional case where strike out is appropriate. An example of where strike out may be appropriate is where contemporaneous documents are undisputed and inconsistent with the facts pleaded by a claimant, Shestak v Royal College of Nursing and ors

EAT/0270/08

. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

[48]The originating claim form and accompanying particulars presented on 9 June 2024 raise complaints of discrimination on grounds of age and race, less favourable treatment due fixed-term employee status and whistleblowing.

[49]The record of preliminary hearing contained a list of issues and recorded the complaints the claimant was making as follows: “44.1 Direct race discrimination about her dismissal. She alleges she was denied an extension to her fixed term contract. She relies on a hypothetical comparator who is Lebanese. The claimant identifies as Palestinian; 44.2 Direct age discrimination on the basis that she was not permitted to author a paper while in her role by Prof Rawaf on or around 21 February 2024, by not extending her fixed term contract, the refusal to extend her role and work. 44.3 Whistleblowing; the claimant says that she exposed misconduct and unprofessional practices which she is required to particularise as ordered. 44.4 Detriment by being a fixed term worker; the claimant says that she was denied the opportunity to be employed beyond her term of 9 months because of the respondent’s rules and regulations which adversely affected her because she did not have 12 months’ employment.”

[50]The claimant was initially engaged on a contract commencing on 19 June 2023 by Professor Rawaf. The appointment was to a post which was not advertised and the claimant was not required to go through a competitive recruitment process for the post. The contract was extended by Professor Rawaf. The claimant’s employment with the respondent ended on 18 March 2024. The claimant appealed against the termination of employment and further to an appeal meeting on 25 April 2024, the respondent dismissed her appeal.

[51]The reasons given by the respondent in a letter dated 13 May 2024 (HB 134-137) for dismissing the claimant’s appeal were that there was no right to be redeployed where engaged on a short term contract due not having been employed on a competitive basis and that ‘the final extension beyond six months may have confused matters but it was issued in response to exceptional (and humanitarian) circumstances. At the end of the six month contract, Imperial would normally have gone out to a competitive process and you would have had to apply for the role, had it been required at the time. However, the panel had no doubt that you were aware of the end date and that there was no possibility of a further extension because there were no available funds.’ The exceptional circumstances referred to relate to the context of the Israel/Gaza conflict and the events of 7 October 2023.

[52]The claimant does not dispute that she in fact had access to the redeployment register from 7 February 2024 which was withdrawn on 11 March 2024. The originating claim sets out that she applied for a teaching fellow position on 23 February 2024 and a research assistant role on 6 March 2024 but was refused those roles. The claimant does dispute the reasons given in the outcome letter and in particular disputes that there were no funds available.

[53]As set out above, in considering whether to strike out any or all of the claimant’s allegations as having no reasonable prospects of success, I must take the claimant’s case at its highest. Less favourable treatment due fixed-term employee status

[54]Although the claimant has not ticked the relevant box at section 8.1 to indicate any unfair dismissal claim, at section 9.1 she has ticked the boxes which state ‘If claiming unfair dismissal…’ to indicate she wants reinstatement or re-engagement by way of remedy if her claim is successful.

[55]The claimant complains about the non-renewal of her fixed-term contract. The non-renewal of a fixed-term contract is a ‘dismissal’ as defined at section 95 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 and, if the reason, or if more than one, the principal reason, for the dismissal is a reason set out at regulation 6(3) of the FTE Regulations, any dismissal is automatically unfair and is an exception to the requirement of two years qualifying service for the bringing of an unfair dismissal claim, section 108(3)(j) of the 1996 Act.

[56]The document accompanying the originating claim form alleges four different reasons for the non-renewal. None of these reasons are allegations or particulars that the non-renewal was on the ground that the claimant was a fixed-term employee or linked to the FTE Regulations.

[57]At paragraph 3, the claimant sets out that, ‘In January 2024, I requested to renew my contract, but my line manager, Professor Salman Rawaf refused due to insufficient funds.’ At paragraph 8 the claimant alleges that she was told by Rachel Barker that a team had ‘reviewed my fund proposal’ and that ‘She indicated that the application has a lot of mistakes and therefore it is unsuccessful, leading to the denial of an extension for my post…caused the refusal of my post-extension. At paragraph 10, the claimant alleges that she lost Professor Rawaf’s support from January 2024 ‘after I applied complaints against the WHOCC team’s bullying and unprofessional practices.’ At paragraph 13, the claimant alleges that ‘in 25th April 2024, Professor Rawaf mentioned that he is not recommending my post-extension because I should return to my country and that the contract extension (from January 2024 to March 2024) was merely due to the fact that I am living in a war area’ and that this ‘also highlights the fact that, due to my nationality, I was denied an extension on my contract’.

[58]The numbering on the document accompanying the claim form re-starts on page 5 (HB 17) and the second paragraph 3 sets out that requests were made on 17 May 2024 and ‘I also requested a review of the appeal decision because I believe I have been subjected to less favourable treatment, and the decision is based on imprecise information from Prof. Salman Rawaf and personal views from panel members, not supported by university policies and employment regulations….Additionally, I requested protection under the [FTE Regulations].’

[59]At paragraph 13, the claimant states ‘it’s worth noting that other staff members with permanent contracts who are younger did not face the same circumstances I experienced’ without specifying what those ‘circumstances’ are. At paragraph 15, the claimant alleges that Professor Rawaf ‘allowed another staff member, Celine Tabche, who holds a permanent contract, to use the personal emails of authors to continue publication.’

[60]I have carefully reviewed the document accompanying the originating claim form and otherwise it does not set out any allegation of other less favourable treatment linked in any way to fixed-term employee status.

[61]As set out above, in order to succeed in a complaint of less favourable treatment under the FTE Regulations, the complaint must be one that alleges the stated less favourable treatment was ‘on the ground that the employee is a fixed-term employee’, regulation 3(3)(a). There is no clear allegation that sets out particulars of less favourable treatment that either regard a contractual term or is identified as a detriment that relates to the matters set out at regulation 3(2) and is stated to be on the ground that the claimant is a fixed-term employee.

[62]There are also the available grounds at regulation 6(3) of the FTE Regulations but none of these are set out as relied upon by the claimant. To the extent the claimant sets out that she alleged infringement of the FTE Regulations as per regulation 6(3)(a)(v) when she allegedly requested protection under the FTE Regulations, this post-dates the non-renewal. In addition, the FTE Regulations provide that where the allegation of detriment on grounds at regulation 6(3) is dismissal, regulation 6(2) does not apply. If the claimant is alleging that the reason or if more than one the principal reason for the dismissal is one of the grounds set out at regulation 6(3) and as such automatically unfair, she does not set this out or bring any unfair dismissal claim and I refer to the reasons she gives for the dismissal with her originating claim as cited above.

[63]The claimant complains about not being redeployed. Regulation 3(2)(c) refers to the opportunity to secure any permanent position. This is different from an entitlement to be redeployed. The claimant made two applications but failed to secure a permanent post. Whilst it is for the respondent to make out any objective justification; the respondent’s objective justification is that their redeployment process is only accessible to those who had been employed further to a competitive process. The claimant does not dispute that her appointment was not as a result of any competitive process.

[64]The document provided by the claimant on 29 November 2024 (HB32 – 42) sets out three allegations in a section of the table under the heading less favourable treatment on the basis of being a fixed-term worker. The claimant alleges that Emma Rockenbatch, Professor Majeed Azeem and Professor Salman Rawaf terminated her contract on 18 March 2024, did not give her a consultation period or a 4-week trial in a suitable alternative post and that the reason was ‘because I have not worked for 12 months and no funds is available to extend my contract’. The claimant also provides extensive narrative detail in the column headed ‘When the act or acts of less favourable treatment occurred’ across two pages which makes it very difficult to identify with any precision the date of the impugned act said to amount to less favourable treatment.

[65]The second allegation names Professor Rawaf but under the ‘when’ column further significant narrative detail is given from which it is very difficult to elicit the date or date/s of acts relied upon not least as the information repeats the 18 March 2024 date on which the contract ended, the date of the appeal and appeal outcome letter but starts with the date 25 January 2024 and Rachel Barker asking the claimant to handover her work and responsibilities.

[66]The third allegation is that Rachel Barker instructed the claimant not to attend meetings by email on 8 February 2024 referring to this as bullying and/or harassment.

[67]The claimant does not state that the reasons for any of this alleged treatment is on the ground of fixed-term employee status.

[68]The detriments are stated as loss of a permanent post and loss of work. The comparators given are persons referred to as ‘staff who worked for less than 12 months in research at Imperial College London and were subsequently offered permanent re-employment within the university’.

[69]The document dated 21 January 2025 (HB 126) refers to the acts relied upon as less favourable treatment as being ‘act 1’ ‘providing permanent contracts after a 6-month fixed-term contract to comparators’ which refutes the claim that staff with contracts less than 12 months are not redeployed and ‘act 2’ not being allowed to continue the development and publication of work or secure funding for its continuation with the dates being 11 March 2024 as per email from Emma Rockenbach and 25 January 2024 hand over requirement.

[70]Having given careful consideration to the claimant’s case as set out across various documents and in particular as she does not raise any allegations of less favourable treatment on the grounds of her fixed-term employee status, I concluded that her complaints under the FTE Regulations had no reasonable prospects of success and that it was appropriate to exercise discretion to strike them out. Race and age discrimination

[71]I turn to consider the claimant’s discrimination complaints.

[72]The claimant refers to herself as Palestinian and compares herself to persons who are not Palestinian and in particular lists as comparators in the 29 November 2024 document: Celine Tabche (Lebanese and younger); Zeena Atwan (Iraqi and younger); Samuel Rogers (non-Palestinian and younger); and Oana-Andrea Lang (non-Palestinian and less experienced). The claimant has given no particulars of the particular age group she relies on and does not even provide her date of birth on her claim form; the material available to me refers to feedback from ‘younger’ colleagues although their ages or any particular age group for them are not provided either.

[73]In the originating claim form, the claimant refers under a heading of discrimination to ‘Professor Rawaf mentioned that he is not recommending my post-extension because I should return to my country and that the contract extension…was merely due to the fact that I am living in a war area…contradicts the annual review plan... the extension was intended for fulfilling these responsibilities and applying for funds. This also highlights the fact that, due to my nationality, I was denied an extension on my contract, despite being legally allowed to stay and work in the UK under my visa.’

[74]The claimant also alleges that Professor Rawaf refused to allow her to access her university email after her contract had terminated or to finalize publication of reviews. These allegations relate to a period of time after employment had terminated and when the claimant was not an employee of the respondent. The claimant also alleges humiliating circumstances while working on a particular paper in that she was allegedly falsely accused of poor performance.

[75]There is no mention of age in this section headed discrimination. The claimant does refer to younger colleagues of other nationalities at paragraph 6 and younger colleagues at paragraph 13 of the document accompanying the originating claim form.

[76]The table presented on 29 November 2024 presents the four allegations that can be discerned on the document accompanying the claim form referring to them on this document as both ‘age and race discrimination’ and gives as comparators for the non-renewal staff members who are younger and have different nationalities. However, the document dated 21 January 2025 refers only to an allegation of race discrimination due the non-renewal and an allegation of age discrimination that the non-renewal of her contract resulted from allegations made to Professor Rawaf that she found it difficult to comply with feedback from younger members of staff.

[77]In the document dated 21 January 2025, the claimant also widens the alleged perpetrators of discrimination setting out at paragraph 16 that, ‘I cannot specify who is the primarily responsible for discrimination whether Professor Rawaf or the WHOCC team members’ and alleges that ‘Professor Rawaf later refused to extend my contract following numerous false allegations from the team, claiming I was refusing to consider feedback from younger staff due to my age. In the meantime, they prioritised working with younger staff and transferred my work responsibilities to them.’

[78]At paragraph 17 the claimant alleges that rather than Professor Rawaf, ‘regarding race, Ms. Ela Augustyniak made clear that the refusal to extend my contract was due to my being Palestinian and unable to return to my country because of the war.’ At paragraph 21 and 22 the claimant sets out that the acts/omissions complained of are ‘the refusal to extend my contract, offer redeployment, or provide an extension of an honorary contract’ and that the individual involved is Ela Augustyniak.

[79]The claimant sets out on the 21 January 2025 document that the alleged act of discrimination because of age is that it was alleged that she found it difficult to comply with feedback or comments from younger staff because of her age and this resulted in the refusal to extend her contract and the individuals involved are Celine Tabche and Rachel Barker.

[80]When considering how the claimant is putting her allegations, I have been mindful that she is a litigant in person and have accordingly tried to approach flexibly what she has written down as her allegations. For example, without putting too much emphasis on the fact that the claimant simply does not set out anywhere facts related to her age or particular age group and the particular age group or comparators compared with whom she has been treated less favourably and merely references ‘younger’ persons usually joined with reference to those persons also being of a different nationality.

[81]There is a difficulty with the direct age discrimination claim presented by the claimant because the claimant states that the refusal to extend her contract was not directly because of her age but because she found it difficult to comply with feedback or comments from younger staff which moreover she refers to as something alleged by the respondent. Although the claimant does also refer to declining review or being unable to comply with requests for changes from the same named staff, Celine Tabche and Rachel Barker thus it would seem on the claimant’s case there were difficulties in her acquiescing to review and/or requests from these persons. A direct discrimination complaint is a complaint that something was done because of the relevant protected characteristic i.e. age not because of something allegedly arising from age.

[82]The case law sets out that in order to consider that facts are such that the tribunal could find, in the absence of an explanation from a respondent, that discrimination had taken place, there needs to be something – which may not itself be significant – beyond a difference in protected characteristic and a difference in treatment, Madarassy v Nomura [2007] IRLR.

[83]The respondent submits that the allegation that the claimant was denied extension to her contract because of her race/age are entirely misconceived as Professor Rawaf engaged her and extended her contract; that the reason given for being unable to extend as lack of funding was entirely straightforward and credible and that the allegations were mere assertions without any basis on which the tribunal could conclude there was a prima facie case of discrimination. The respondent further submits that the comparators chosen are inappropriate as they are persons with permanent contracts and as such not in the same material circumstances as the claimant with regard to the non-renewal of a fixed-term contract.

[84]I have considered all the information provided by the claimant in both the claim form and accompanying particulars and the later documents. This is even though there are allegations in the claimant’s later documents which amount to amendments requiring permission and/or even appear to contradict earlier allegations. I acknowledge but do not seek to resolve the factual dispute between the parties as to whether or not there was funding for the relevant project.

[85]I record that I made reasonable enquiries of the claimant as to her means at the hearing. The claimant told me that she had no income from employment and no other sources of income and that she received universal credit. The claimant said that she had no savings. When discussing the reasons for making these enquiries, the claimant told me that she would need to be given time to save if she was ordered to pay a deposit in an amount such as £50 per allegation.

[86]Having considered the information provided and facts relied on by the claimant including across both her originating claim form and accompanying particulars and documents filed later, I am not satisfied that the claimant has set out any basis on which the non-renewal and/or other conduct complained of relates to race or age in any way beyond the assertions that the non-renewal was because she was Palestinian and/or because of age. The claimant does not set out any basis on which the initial burden of proof is discharged.

[87]I reflected on the purpose of strike out and that strike out can in appropriate cases minimise the time and anxiety inherent in taking claims to trial. I reflected very carefully on the draconian nature of strike out and particularly in the context of discrimination claims.

[88]In all the circumstances taking the facts pleaded by the claimant at their highest, I have concluded that there are no reasonable prospects of the claimant’s allegations of direct age discrimination succeeding and further, no reasonable prospects of the claimant’s allegations of direct race discrimination succeeding. I further considered that it was appropriate, proportionate and in line with the overriding objective to exercise discretion to strike out the discrimination complaints rather than impose any lesser form of sanction. Whistleblowing complaint

[89]The claimant’s originating claim form makes no reference to any whistleblowing complaint. The document accompanying the originating claim form contains a heading of ‘Less favourable treatment and unfair treatment after complaining of unprofessional practices (whistleblowing)’ and this is the sole use of the word ‘whistleblowing’. Paragraph 3 immediately under that heading starts with ‘In January 2024, I requested to renew my contract, but my line manager, Professor Salman Rawaf, refused due to insufficient funds’ and does not go on to outline any details of any qualifying disclosure or other aspect of a ‘whistleblowing’ complaint.

[90]EJ Forde noted at paragraph 37 of the record of the case management hearing that the claimant does not identify any qualifying disclosure on her originating claim form. It is not sufficient simply to use the word ‘whistleblowing’ without providing any particulars or details of what any such complaint is. As set out above, if a complaint of detriment due ‘whistleblowing’ is made, this is a complaint of detriment due the making of a protected disclosure. The complaint needs to identify the ‘qualifying disclosure’ as defined at section 43B of the Employment Rights Act 1996, which is set out above, which was allegedly made. As it is not possible to discern any qualifying disclosure on the claimant’s originating claim form, there is clearly no reasonable prospect of the claimant succeeding with any complaint of whistleblowing taking her case at its highest as set out on the originating claim form.

[91]As ACAS was initially approached on 21 March 2024, it follows that any allegation of treatment that occurred prior to 22 December 2023 is potentially out of time due the ordinary three month time limit. In relation to any allegations of detriment due making protected disclosures brought after the ordinary three month time limit, the claimant must demonstrate that it was not reasonably practicable to bring those within the three months and that the allegation has in any event been brought within such further period as the tribunal considers reasonable. In so far as allegations are raised in the claimant’s later documents of 29 November 2024, 21 January 2025 and 15 March 2025 they are potentially raised out of time in light of employment having ended on 18 March 2024.

[92]At the preliminary hearing before EJ Forde, the claimant was told she had to address the issue of time. The claimant does not address the issue of time in either the 29 November 2024 document, 21 January 2025 document or in the 15 March 2025 document other than to state that ‘my request to amend the claim is not out of time because it relates to my recent claim, which was submitted on time’.

[93]Having carefully considered the claimant’s documents, it is still difficult to discern any qualifying disclosures. The claimant’s 29 November 2024 table contains two rows of information under the heading ‘whistleblowing’. I have carefully reviewed this information and been mindful of the summary to the EAT’s decision in Cox. The first row relates to circumstances around the claimant’s probation review. Under the heading ‘what was said’ the claimant sets out, ‘I declined to have my probation review conducted by a staff member, Celine Tabche, who has less experience in academic research and my field of work.’

[94]Although each column entry in the row contains extensive narrative it primarily consists of details which do not address what is required. For example, under a column headed ‘To whom was it said’, the claimant writes ‘Ela Augustyniak (WHOCC Project Manager) told me that she and Celine Tabche (Teaching Fellow) wanted to conduct the performance review evaluation to proceed with my probation review process’. Under a heading to provide details of what the qualifying disclosure is considered to be, the claimant refers to it being inaccurate that Professor Rawaf, who had delegated to Celine Tabche whilst he was recovering from open heart surgery, had called her to discuss her refusal to meet with Celine Tabche.

[95]It is difficult to isolate from either of the rows any alleged information provided by the claimant either by reference to specific wording in written form communicated by her in a written document such as an email or by reference to an allegation that the claimant communicated information orally on a particular date in order to analyse any information contended to have been disclosed as to whether it amounts to a qualifying disclosure.

[96]The information disclosed must tend to show one or more of the matters set out at section 43B(1)(a) to (f) of the Employment Rights Act 1996. I have not approached what is written on the basis that the claimant must identify the legislative provisions precisely bearing in mind she is a litigant in person but there is no wording in the table that might be construed as pertaining to any of the matters set out at section 43B(1).

[97]When considering whether there is a qualifying disclosure, the tribunal also has to consider as explained by Underhill LJ in Chesterton Global Ltd v Nurmohamed

[2018] ICR 731

“(a) whether the worker believed, at the time he was making it, that the disclosure was in the public interest and (b) whether, if so, that belief was reasonable.’ These matters are not addressed at all in the table in that the claimant does not explain what her belief was at the time of any disclosure of information and/or why the disclosure of information was made in the public interest.

[98]The second row relates to the claimant being unable to comply with requests to make changes or revisions to a manuscript from Celine Tabche, Rachel Barker and/or Professor Rawaf. Under the heading, ‘what was said’, the claimant refers ‘I was unable to comply with the request’. The second row does not clearly present the components of a qualifying disclosure.

[99]The claimant’s 21 January 2025 document does not refer at all to the contents of the first row of the table i.e. the allegation that relates to probation review but does expand on the second row allegation i.e. the inability to comply with requests for changes. Whilst it remains unclear what information the claimant contends that she disclosed, when she disclosed that information, who she disclosed the information to and why it was her belief that the disclosure was in the public interest and that her belief was reasonable; the circumstances described in the 21 January 2025 do enable an understanding of the context.

[100]The claimant alleges that Professor Rawaf requested ‘that Rachel Barker be added as proofreader for two papers I published.’ The claimant did not include Rachel Barker’s name ‘to avoid the risk of plagiarism or fraud’ as ‘Rachel Barker refused to confirm, via written email, whether she had personally proofread the papers or if a specialist or Artificial Intelligence (AI) program was used.’ The claimant further contends that Celine Tabche directly contacted the journal and requested Rachel Barker be added and the claimant subsequently wrote requesting publication of a correction. The claimant contends that the situation would ‘constitute research misconduct and abuse of position if Rachel Barker and Celine Tabche attributed the review and proofreading of the publications to themselves, failed to acknowledge the use of AI’. The claimant still does not set out what the information was that she disclosed about these circumstances as compared with what she refused to do, when she made any such disclosure of information or who she made the disclosure to such that any alleged detriment might be alleged to be attributable to having made that disclosure.

[101]In addition, I have no explanation before me as to why it was not reasonably practicable to set out this information about matters that must have occurred before the contract terminated in March 2024, at any point in time prior to three months thereafter (allowing for extension for early conciliation) and in particular in the originating claim form and accompanying particulars. I cannot speculate as to any reason as to why it was not reasonably practicable to provide this information earlier as a basis on which to then consider whether any allegations have been brought within such further period thereafter as I consider reasonable. I note that to the extent the 21 January 2025 document can be read as setting out details of a qualifying disclosure, that document is approximately 6 months after any ordinary 3 month time limit.

[102]In all the circumstances, I have concluded that the claimant’s whistleblowing complaints have no reasonable prospects of success and strike them out on that basis.

[103]Accordingly, the claimant’s complaints are struck out in their entirety.

[104]I refer to my reasons above regarding in particular the timing of the claimant’s whistleblowing allegations. I considered the principles in Selkent Bus Co Ltd v Moore

1996 ICR 836

, EAT. I have considered all the circumstances of the case including the nature of the amendments sought, the timing and manner of the amendments and time limits and the balance of injustice and hardship. Having considered all the circumstances, I decided not to exercise discretion to permit amendments. Whilst strictly speaking this is an order rather than a judgment, I consider it appropriate to include it above. Tribunal Judge Peer acting as an