Mr Z Campbell v Tik Tok Information Technologies UK Ltd: 2220654/2024

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Case No 2220654/2024

Between

Mr Z CampbellClaimant

Tik Tok Information Technologies UK LtdRespondent

Before

Employment Judge Boyle

In person for claimant

Mr T Brown (instructed by Counsel) for respondent

Date 22 January 2025

JUDGMENT

[1]The claims for protected disclosure detriment/ automatic unfair dismissal, and unlawful deductions from wages (in relation to shares) were not presented within the applicable time limit. It was reasonably practicable to do so. These claims are therefore dismissed.

[2]The claim for notice pay was not presented within the applicable time limit. It was reasonably practicable to do so. The claim for notice pay is therefore dismissed.

[3]The discrimination claims of age, disability, race, sex and sexual orientation discrimination were not presented within the applicable time limit. It is not just and equitable to extend the time limit. The claims are therefore dismissed. 10.2 Judgment - rule 61 February Case No 2220654/2024 JUDGMENT having been sent to the parties on 28 January 2025 and written reasons having been requested by the claimant on 11 February 2025 in accordance with Rule 60 of the Employment Tribunals Procedure Rules 2024 the following reasons are provided:

REASONS

The REASONS for the judgment are as follows Claims and Issues

[1]The claimant presented a claim with London Central Employment Tribunal on 23 May 2024 alleging unfair dismissal (based on protected disclosures), notice pay, unauthorised deductions from wages and allegations of age, sex, sexual orientation, race and disability

[2]The respondent lodged an ET3 denying all claims. The respondent in its ET3 raised a potential jurisdictional point regarding the claimant’s claims – namely that they were all presented outside of the primary time limit (subject to ACAS Early Conciliation) that applies for each claim.

[3]A case management hearing took place before EJ Glennie on 21 October 2024. The Judge ordered that a public preliminary hearing take place to consider various matters, and that is what came before me on 22 January 2025. Procedure Documents and Evidence

[4]The case before me was well prepared with a joint bundle of 86 pages containing all the key documents and a witness statement prepared by the claimant. This case was heard by CVP and all parties had a strong internet connection. I have been able to assess the claimant’s evidence adequately and formed a view of his evidence. The claimant was crossexamined by the respondent’s counsel, Mr Brown.

[5]The preliminary hearing was to determine:a. Whether an extension of time should be granted in respect of all or any of the complaints.

b. The respondent’s application to strike out the claim or for deposit orders.

c. To the extent that the claimant provides further particulars of the claim as set out below, any issues as to whether those particulars fall within the claim as already pleaded and, if not, whether the claimant should have permission to amend the claim accordingly.

d. Further case management as necessary.

[6]I decided that it would be sensible to consider the jurisdictional point and, then, if the claimant was successful, to move on to consider the other parts of the hearing. Therefore, the jurisdiction point was considered first.

[7]At the conclusion of the evidence each party made oral submissions.

[8]The claimant submitted as follows:a. He asked me to consider his witness statement where he had explained everything about his claim.

b. He said that it remains within the court’s remit and overriding objective, to apply an extension where the claimant requires reasonable adjustments to be made on account of disability and exceptional personal circumstances. Moreover, given the public interest element of this claim (pertaining to industrial espionage) it would be just and equitable to allow it to continue.

c. As noted in the medical evidence provided, he was declared unfit to work for several weeks at a time during the submission period (e.g. 8th Jan - 22nd Jan, 29th Feb - 14th March) and therefore he had significantly less than the standard three months minus one day, so it was not reasonably practical that he could have submitted in time.

d. As a disabled person and as a , discretion by way of reasonable adjustments are required to ensure his access to justice remains unfettered. The court promotes accessibility to justice for all; not applying an extension where a claimant has been rendered incapacitated for a significant period and has faced considerable adversity would be unreasonable.

e. Cognitive impairment is a known side effect of the mental health issues his doctors determined had affected him so much that he wasn’t fit to work.

f. Moreover, cognitive impairment is a well known side effect of the epilepsy medication (Keppra) he must still take today. Even if this wasn’t the case, the fact that for several weeks Ihe was deemed medically unfit to work demonstrates the clear need for an allowance to be made on this occasion. Unlike other able bodied claimants, it wasn’t reasonably practical to submit the application in time. He did not have the opportunity to fully utilise the three month minus one day window, limiting his access to justice.

g. The respondent is a well-insured, state affiliated, multi-billion pound company.

[9]The respondent made the following oral submissions:a. They went through the different legal tests involved in jurisdiction matters.

b. The claimant was dismissed on 12 December 2023 and it was no coincidence that the contacted ACAS on the very last day of his primary time limit – namely 11 March 2024. He therefore must have appreciated the relevant dates for bringing a claim.

c. The claimant is a law graduate and appeared to understand that time limits apply to the bringing of any claim.

d. The claim should have been presented on or before 22 May 2024 and accepted by both parties that the ET1 was presented one day late. However there was a sufficient period from the date of the last Fit note for the claimant to have presented the claims in time. Further unfitness for work is not unfitness to start a claim. The claimant managed to get a claim presented and didn’t answer every box on the ET1. There was no effective impendent to his getting his claim in.

e. Details of complaints were really very brief – with only proper particulars in relation to the discrimination claims being given two dates before this hearing.

f. The burden is on the claimant to show why he could not bring these claims in time.

g. It was submitted that the effects of the claimant’s impairments were being overstated by the claimant in his evidence at the hearing.

i. The claims under the Employment Rights Act 1996 could and should have been presented in time.

j. In respect of the Equality Act claims the test is a different test. He pointed to a complete lack of particularity in the claimant’s claim form and that this should weigh against him.

k. It is difficult to see what the claimant complains about. The main witness, Clare Welch has already left the respondent’s employment.

l. He urged me to consider the claimant’s claims as particularised in the ET1 and that the claimant should not be the beneficiary of months of delay in providing any particulars.

m. It is not just and equitable to allow the claimant to benefit from his own significant delay and non-particularisation of complaints. Fact Findings

[10]After a careful consideration of all the evidence before the Tribunal during the hearing I make the following findings of fact.

[11]There were limited issues in dispute in relation to this preliminary issue.

[12]The claimant has a law degree.

[13]The claimant commenced employment with the respondent (a global technology company and part of the ByteDance Group) on 12 June 2023 as a Compliance Manager within the Risk Definition Investigation (RDI) team.

[14]The claimant was dismissed on 12 December 2023. Whilst the claimant believed there was an inference that his employment might be reinstated due a post-dismissal appeal/grievance, this was not the case and the claimant produced no documentary evidence to support this.

[15]Following his dismissal the claimant lodged a grievance/appeal with the respondent.

[16]The primary time limit for bringing any employment law claims that the claimant was pursuing was 11 March 2024.

[17]The claimant contacted ACAS on 11 March 2024 and an Early Conciliation certificate was issued on 22 April 2024.

[18]The claimant presented his ET1 with the Tribunal on 23 May 2024 claiminga. Disability discrimination

b. Age discrimination

c. Race discrimination

d. Sex discrimination

e. Sexual orientation discrimination

f. Detriment and dismissal due to a protected disclosure

g. Notice pay and other payments

[19]It was agreed by the parties that this was one day outside of the extended time limit for bringing all claims.

[20]The claimant was signed off work for some periods during this time (from the documents/Fit notes produced at the hearing), He did not have a job at this time but obtained these Fit notes for the purposes of claiming benefits. The periods of the fit notes were:.a. 8 January 2024 to 22 January 2024 - the reason given was “work-related stress”;

b. 29 February 2024 to 14 March 2024 (The claimant commenced engagement with ACAS during the period of this Fit note on 11 March 2024) - the reason given was “stress”;

c. 24 April 2024 to 14 May 2024 – the reason given was “mental health”.

[21]The claimant supplied a referral letter from Dr Tabish Saifee dated 11 December 2023 which asked for the claimant to be investigated with an “EEG Post-operative parasagittal meningioma. Likely focal onset with occasional secondary generalisation.”

[22]The claimant also supplied a screen print which related to a hospital visit he made on 17 February 2024 which states that : “on Wednesday night, was injected with ?Heroin in left thigh, unsure as semi -conscious, whilst at a party. Not taken PEP since. Concern regarding the needlestick injury.”

[23]The claimant agreed that he started the ACAS Early Conciliation process whilst on a period covered by a Fit note. 24. . Whilst I don’t need to make any finding here, at the least the claimant was subject to a traumatic incident involving a needle around this time.

[25]He said he could not speak to his thought process at the time given how unwell he was but believed he miscalculated the time limits There was no information around his medical condition during this time barring reference to being to the Fit notes. The majority of his witness statement was in fact submissions as to why his claims should be accepted.

[26]There was limited medical evidence before me. The claimant refers to being disabled but provided no evidence from which it can be determined that he is a disabled person.

[27]Aside from the Fit notes and the hospital print out, the claimant did not give evidence to support a finding that he was incapacitated during the relevant time. In fact, as found, he did engage with ACAS during a period covered by a fit note. Therefore, I find that the claimant was fit in the periods outside of these Fit notes.

[28]Following the case management hearing on 21 October 2024, the claimant supplied further particulars of his whistleblowing claim only. This appeared to be his primary focus and the reason he says he was dismissed.

[29]The respondent requested further particulars from the claimant in a letter to him dated 6 December 2024. This was a detailed request and thoughtfully set out in a way that a litigant in person could understand that the respondent was still trying to obtain details about the claimant’s claims.

[30]The claimant responded on 20 January 2025 (two days before this public preliminary hearing) finally giving some details of his allegations of race, age sexual orientation, and sex discrimination. He reiterated his claims regarding “whistleblowing” and stated that he was owed notice pay and “shares (were) outstanding”. No particulars were given for disability I have applied the following LAW to these facts Time Limit – unfair dismissal

[31]The time limit for unfair dismissal claims is three months. Section 111 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (‘ERA’) provides that: ‘(1) A complaint may be presented to an employment tribunal against an employer by any person that he was unfairly dismissed by the employer. (2) Subject to the following provisions of this section, an employment tribunal shall not consider a complaint under this section unless it is presented to the tribunal—(a) before the end of the period of three months beginning with the effective date of termination, or

(b) within such further period as the tribunal considers reasonable in a case where it is satisfied that it was not reasonably practicable for the complaint to be presented before the end of that period of three months. (2A) Section 207B (extension of time limits to facilitate conciliation before institution of proceedings) applies for the purposes of subsection (2)(a).’ Time limit – unlawful deductions from wages

[32]The time limit for unlawful deductions from wages claims is three months. Section 23 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (‘ERA’) provides that: ‘(1) A worker may present a complaint to an employment tribunal— (a)that his employer has made a deduction from his wages … (2)Subject to subsection (4), an employment tribunal shall not consider a complaint under this section unless it is presented before the end of the period of three months beginning with— (a)in the case of a complaint relating to a deduction by the employer, the date of payment of the wages from which the deduction was made, or (b)in the case of a complaint relating to a payment received by the employer, the date when the payment was received. (3)… (4) Where the employment tribunal is satisfied that it was not reasonably practicable for a complaint under this section to be presented before the end of the relevant period of three months, the tribunal may consider the complaint if it is presented within such further period as the tribunal considers reasonable. Time limit – Wrongful dismissal/Breach of contract

[33]The time limit for wrongful dismissal/breach of contract claims is also three months. Article 7 of the Employment Tribunals Extension of Jurisdiction (England and Wales) Order 1994 SI 1994/1623 (‘the 1994 Order’) provides that: ‘An employment tribunal shall not entertain a complaint in respect of an employee’s contract claim unless it is presented—(a) within the period of three months beginning with the effective date of termination of the contract giving rise to the claim, or

(b) where there is no effective date of termination, within the period of three months beginning with the last day upon which the employee worked in the employment which has terminated, or (ba) where the period within which a complaint must be presented in accordance with paragraph (a) or (b) is extended by regulation 15 of the Employment Act 2002 (Dispute Resolution) Regulations 2004, the period within which the complaint must be presented shall be the extended period rather than the period in paragraph (a) or (b).’

(c) where the tribunal is satisfied that it was not reasonably practicable for the complaint to be presented within whichever of those periods is applicable, within such further period as the tribunal considers reasonable.’ Extension of time limit for early conciliation

[34]The clock stops when ACAS receives the early conciliation request and starts to run again the day after the prospective claimant receives the certificate: ‘(2) In this section—(a) Day A is the day on which the complainant or applicant concerned complies with the requirement in subsection (1) of section 18A of the Employment Tribunals Act 1996 (requirement to contact ACAS before instituting proceedings) in relation to the matter in respect of which the proceedings are brought, and

(b) Day B is the day on which the complainant or applicant concerned receives or, if earlier, is treated as receiving (by virtue of regulations made under subsection (11) of that section) the certificate issued under subsection (4) of that section. (3) In working out when a time limit set by a relevant provision expires the period beginning with the day after Day A and ending with Day B is not to be counted.’ [Section 207B, ERA] The “reasonably practicable” test

[35]The onus of proving that presentation in time was not reasonably practicable rests on the claimant: ‘That imposes a duty upon him to show precisely why it was that he did not present his complaint.’ [Porter v Bandridge Ltd

[1978] ICR 943

, CA at p.948E]

[36]Accordingly, if the claimant fails to argue that it was not reasonably practicable to present the claim in time, the Tribunal may find it was. This was explained in Sterling v United Learning Trust EAT 0439/14 per Mr Justice Langstaff (President) at §23: ‘Where an argument is not pursued before a Tribunal, a Judge is entitled to conclude that, since the burden is on the Claimant to show that it was not reasonably practicable, she has failed to discharge that burden.’

[37]There is no authoritative definition of ‘reasonably practicable,’ but Lord Justice Underhill summarised the essential points from the case law in Lowri Beck Services Ltd v Brophy

[2019] EWCA Civ 2490

, CA at §12: ‘(1) The test should be given “a liberal interpretation in favour of the employee (Marks and Spencer plc v Williams-Ryan

[2005] EWCA Civ 470

[2005] ICR 1293

, which reaffirms the older case law going back to Dedman v British Building & Engineering Appliances Ltd

[1974] ICR 53

). (2) The statutory language is not to be taken as referring only to physical impracticability and for that reason might be paraphrased as whether it was ‘reasonably feasible’ for the claimant to present his or her claim in time: see Palmer and Saunders v Southend-on-Sea Borough Council

[1984] IRLR 119

… (3) If an employee misses the time limit because he or she is ignorant about the existence of a time limit, or mistaken about when it expires in their case, the question is whether that ignorance or mistake is reasonable. If it is, then it will have been reasonably practicable for them to bring the claim in time (see Wall’s Meat Co Ltd v Khan

[1979] ICR 52

); but it is important to note that in assessing whether ignorance or mistake is reasonable it is necessary to take into account any enquiries which the claimant or their adviser should have made. (4) If the employee retains a skilled adviser, any unreasonable ignorance or mistake on the part of the adviser is attributed to the employee (Dedman). (5) The test of reasonable practicability is one of fact and not of law (Palmer).’

[38]When assessing the reasonableness of a claimant’s ignorance, the question for the Tribunal is: ‘ought the plaintiff to have known and, if he did not know, has the applicant given a satisfactory explanation of why he did not know?’ [Porter v Bandridge Ltd

1978 ICR 943

, CA at p.949D]

[39]Where the claimant is generally aware of his rights, he will generally be taken to have been put on inquiry as to the time limit. Per Lord Scarman in Dedman v British Building and Engineering Appliances Ltd

[1974] 1 All ER 520

, CA at p.528E: ‘…does total ignorance of his rights inevitably mean that it is impracticable for him to present his complaint in time? In my opinion, no. It would be necessary to pay regard to his circumstances and the course of events. What were his opportunities for finding out that he had rights? Did he take them? If not, why not? Was he misled or deceived? Should there prove to be an acceptable explanation for his continuing ignorance of the existence of his rights, it would not be appropriate to disregard it, relying on the maxim “ignorance of the law is no excuse.” The word “practicable” is there to moderate the severity of the maxim and to require an examination of the circumstances of his ignorance. But what, if, as here, a complainant knows he has rights, but does not know that there is a time limit? Ordinarily, I would not expect him to be able to rely on such ignorance as making it impracticable to present his complaint in time. Unless he can show a specific and acceptable explanation for not acting within four weeks, he will be out of court.’ (emphasis added)

[40]As Judge LJ observed in London Underground Ltd v Noel [2000] I.C.R. 109 at p.117G: ‘The power to disapply the statutory period is therefore very restricted. In particular it is not available to be exercised, for example, “in all the circumstances,” nor when it is “just and reasonable,” nor even where the Tribunal “considers that there is a good reason” for doing so. As Browne Wilkinson J (as he then was) observed: “The statutory test remains one of practicability … the statutory test is not satisfied just because it was reasonable not to do what could be done” (Bodha v Hampshire Area Health Authority

[1982] ICR 200

at p 204).’

[41]Even if a claimant satisfies a Tribunal that presentation in time was not reasonably practicable, it does not automatically decide the issue in his favour. The Tribunal must go on to whether the claim was presented within such further period as the Tribunal considers reasonable. In Cullinane v Balfour Beattie Engineering Services Ltd

UKEAT/0537/10

, Underhill P (as he then was) held at §16:1 ‘The question at “stage 2” is what period – that is, between the expiry of the primary time limit and the eventual presentation of the claim - is reasonable. That is not the same as asking whether the claimant acted reasonably; still less is it equivalent to the question whether it would be just and equitable to extend time. It requires an objective consideration of the factors causing the delay and what period should reasonably be allowed in those circumstances for proceedings to be instituted - having regard, certainly, to the strong public interest in claims in this field being brought promptly, and against a background where the primary time limit is three months.’ Jurisdiction

[42]If a claim is presented out of time, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to hear it. The Court of Appeal endorsed first instance principles in Dedman v British Building and Engineering Appliances

[1974] ICR 53

, CA per Lord Denning MR at p.59H: ‘According to the decisions of the Industrial Court, the time limit is so strict that it goes to the jurisdiction of the tribunal to hear the complaint. By that I mean that, if the complaint is presented to the tribunal just one day late, the tribunal has no jurisdiction to consider it. Even if the employer is ready to waive it and says to the tribunal: “I do not want to take advantage of this man. I will not take any point that he is a day late:” nevertheless the tribunal cannot hear the case. It has no power to extend the time: see … Rogers v Bodfari (Transport) Ltd

[1973] ICR 325

, NIRC.’

[43]The burden of proof for establishing that it was not reasonably practicable to present the claim in time is on the claimant. The issue is whether it was reasonably practicable for the claimant to have presented his claim (or contacted ACAS) within the three-month time frame. Reasonably practicable does not mean reasonable, nor does it mean simply physically possible, but means something like “reasonably feasible”.

[44]Individuals who have acted “reasonably” may fall foul of the time limit provisions. As Lady Smith in Asda Stores v Kauser EAT 0165/07 explained: “The relevant test is not simply a matter of looking at what was possible but to ask whether, on the facts of the case, it is reasonable to expect that it was possible to have been done.”

[45]No cases were referred to me by either party during their submissions, but I found the cases referred to above helpful to be in determining these issues. Time Limits – Discrimination claims

[46]The time limit for discrimination claims is three months. Section 123 (1) Equality Act 2010 states: “proceedings on a complaint within s.120 may not be brought after the end of (a) the period of three months starting at the date of the act to which the complaint relates or (b) such other period as the Employment Tribunal thinks just and equitable.”

[47]The just and equitable test gives the Tribunal a much broader discretion to extend time than the test of “not reasonably practicable” which I have referred to above. In considering whether it would be “just and equitable” to extend the relevant time limits, all the circumstances are relevant including the balance of hardship, prejudice and the possibility of a fair trial. In this context, the extent and reasons for the delay will nearly always be relevant factors.

[48]Again, I was not referred to any case law by either parties here but I found the following helpful in determining this issue.

[49]On its face this is a wide discretion but case law has suggested the following approach to applying this discretion. British Coal and Keble

[1997] IRLR 336

a. the length of and reasons for the delay

b. the extent to which the cogency of the evidence is likely to be affected by the delay

c. the extent to which the respondent cooperated with any requests for information

d. the promptness with which the claimant acted once they knew of the facts giving rise to the claim

e. the steps taken by the claimant to obtain appropriate professional advice once they knew of the possibility of taking action.

f. This is not an exhaustive list and can include: i. Delay caused by wating for an internal grievance to be resolved ii. The actual merits of the case.

[50]The list is this case is a guide only and not a legal requirement. In Robertson v Bexley Community Centre

2003 IRLR 434

the Court of Appeal reviewed the law and principles which should guide Tribunals in deciding whether to exercise their discretion to extend time. The Tribunal has a wide discretion. On the other hand, time limits are jurisdictional, and it is for a claimant to persuade a Tribunal to accept a late Claim.

[51]I have also considered the following cases to assist me in the application of s.123(1)(b) of the Equality Act, in particular, the cases of Robertson v Bexley Community Centre

[2003] IRLR 434

CA, Chief Constable of Lincolnshire Police v Caston

[2010] IRLR 327

CA, Abertawe University v Morgan

[2018] IRLR 1050

CA, Adedeji v University Hospitals Birmingham NHS Foundation

2021 EWCA Civ 23

all of which consider the proper approach to the application of s.123 (1) (b).

[52]From those cases, I draw the following principles:a. the discretion conferred by s.123(1)(b) of the Equality Act 2010 is a broad discretion;

b. it is for a claimant who is seeking the exercise of that discretion to persuade the Tribunal that the extension of the time limit is just and equitable in all the circumstances;

c. and in exercising the discretion the Tribunal may have reference to any relevant factors;

d. it will almost always be relevant to consider the length of, and reasons for, delay and whether the delay has caused prejudice to the respondent

e. whether there is a “good reason” for delay will be a relevant consideration but is not a necessary prerequisite for the discretion

Conclusions

[53]I considered the Employment Rights Act 1996 and the breach of contract claims first as they both had the same “reasonably practicable” test applying to them.

[54]I considered the following factors:a. It is accepted that the case was submitted only one day late.

b. The claimant is a highly educated person who was used to using his computer or phone to look up matters. He has a law degree and has studied various areas of law including tort, labour law and

c. He clearly was aware of the time limits but believes he miscalculated due to his ill health.

d. The evidence is that he was signed off with stress/mental health but the last day of being signed off was 14 May 2024 giving him 8 days to present a claim at the Tribunal.

e. The claimant did not adduce any medical evidence as to how any illness affected his ability to undertake other tasks save that he was unfit to do work.

f. He completed a minimal ET1 and did not say he was waiting for further information in order to complete his claim – ie he believed he knew he had employment law rights and the only thing he says he wasn’t sure was of some dates of events.

g. Time limits are considered important – it is in the interest of the parties and justice for time limits to be followed in the main, but there are some exceptions to this. Time limits for bringing claims in the Employment Tribunal are short.

[55]I find that the claimant was aware of his rights and I don’t find that an illness or disability effectively impeded his ability to lodge an Employment Tribunal claim through the entire period from the period from his dismissal on 12 December 2023 to 23 May 2024.

[56]The claimant did engage with the process during this time and in his own evidence talked about repeated attempts to get the respondent to reverse the termination of his employment, be part of a formal investigation and engage with ACAS . He was clearly not incapable of engaging with a potential litigation process.

[57]I find that the claimant was fully aware of the relevant time periods as he chose to engage with ACAS on the very last time he would have been in time to do so. I do not believe this was a coincidence.

[58]The claimant knew of all the factual issues which he now says amounted to unlawful treatment at the time. He was aggrieved and brought a grievance/appeal immediately following his dismissal.

[59]He could have done research. The existence of the Employment Tribunal is well-known. Rights and the possibility of action are easily accessible via search engines.

[60]Disability may be a factor in the exercise of my discretion if it goes some way to explaining the delay. Although the claimant says that he was disabled at the time there is no medical evidence to indicate that he was disabled or that he would not have been able to enquire as to his rights to bring a claim at the time (i.e. in the three months after he left the Respondent’s employment).

[61]I find that he would have been capable of doing the relevant research at the time.

[62]For all these reasons, I therefore find it was reasonably practicable for the claimant to have lodged his claim on or before 22 May 2024. On this basis I do not need to go ahead and consider the second part of the tests. Therefore all the claims under the ERA are dismissed.

[63]The test is the same for notice pay and I come to the same conclusion here. It was reasonably practicable for the claimant to have lodged his claim for notice pay on or before 22 May 2024. Therefore, this claim is also dismissed.

[64]Turning to the discrimination claims under the Equality Act. This is a different test. The claim was presented out of time and therefore I must consider if it would be just and equitable to extend the time limit here. I have a wider discretion to extend time for claims of discrimination. The test is whether it would be just and equitable to allow the claim to proceed. I concluded that it would not be.

[65]In doing so I have considered all the points above and the relevant case law.

[66]The claims were only one day “late”. I have not found that any medical factor impeded the claimant to such an extent that he could not engage with the process. The claimant was aware of the deadlines.

[67]The main witness for the respondent has already left employment, which will undoubtedly affect their ability to properly prepare and defend this case and caused them significant prejudice.

[68]The delay for submitting the claim was in no part caused by the respondent. They were not withholding information that the claimant needed to submit his claim on time.

[69]The claimant knew about the possibility of a claim from the moment his employment was terminated. He complained about discrimination in his appeal/grievance. He was aware that there might be legal options for him.

[70]The claimant was not awaiting the outcome of any process. He fully believed the respondent’s had discriminated against him by the time his employment was terminated.

[71]I have also looked at the merits of the case also as a relevant factor. The claims of discrimination are only minimally pleaded in the ET and do not even on their face demonstrate any arguable case. There is no reference at all to either age or sexual orientation discrimination apart from a box tick in 8.1.

[72]The claimant has been on notice since July 2024 that the respondent believed that the claimant’s claims were thoroughly unparticularised. With respect to any discrimination allegations the claims were wholly unclear and lacking in any detail such that they could not be properly understood. The claimant had not provided any information at all about the alleged acts or omissions that he considered constituted discrimination and instead the details of his claim were limited to setting out the protected characteristic he was relying on.

[73]Despite being given a chance to do so, there is very little to go on from the further and better particulars which were supplied by the claimant on 4 November 2024. The main thrust of the claimant’s case in the particulars appears to be the whistleblowing element and alleged performance issues.

[74]Even with now some further particulars finally provided to the respondent on 20 January 2025 (some 2 days before this hearing) and several months after the case management hearing, the claimant has given minimal information regarding his potential claims.

[75]I do not believe I have to give the claimant the benefit of this time delay and looking at his ET1 – there is very little there that suggests there are arguable discrimination claims. I have taken this into account when determining whether it is just and equitable to extend time and where the balance of prejudice lies.

[76]I appreciate the claims were submitted only one day late and that the effect of this is stark for the claimant. But it is not the case that even with only a short delay I must exercise my discretion to allow these claims to proceed. I have instead weighed up all the relevant factors in concluding that it would not be just and equitable to extend time here. Therefore the discrimination claims are also dismissed.

[77]The claims for protected disclosure detriment/ automatic unfair dismissal, and unlawful deductions from wages (in relation to shares) were not presented within the applicable time limit. It was reasonably practicable to do so. These claims are therefore dismissed.

[78]The claim for notice pay was not presented within the applicable time limit. It was reasonably practicable to do so. The claim for notice pay is therefore dismissed.

[79]The discrimination claims of age, disability, race, sex and sexual orientation discrimination were not presented within the applicable time limit. It is not just and equitable to extend the time limit. The claims are therefore dismissed.

Conclusions

[1]The claimant attended the Public Preliminary Hearing on 22 January 2025 and was given the opportunity to present his case.

[2]The Tribunal considered all documents referred to it during the hearing by the claimant including medical information during the hearing.

[3]The claimant has provided no substantive basis in his application dated 7 March 2025 to suggest this decision is unsound.

[4]It is not in the interests of justice for this matter to be re-opened following the hearing on 9 October 2024 and the Judgment made. 11.6R Judgment – Reconsideration refused – respondent - rule 72 Case No: 2220654/2024