Mr L J Decker v Quinn Emanuel Urquhart and Sullivan UK LLP and Mr P M Baker: 2219507/2024

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Case No 2219507/2024

Between

Mr L J DeckerClaimant

Quinn Emanuel Urquhart and Sullivan UK LLP and Mr P M BakerRespondent

Before

Employment Judge David Hughes

Christopher Milsom (instructed by counsel) for claimant

Michael Lee (instructed by counsel) for respondent

Date 23 November 2025

JUDGMENT

[1]The Claimant’s application for a costs order is allowed;

[2]The Respondents are ordered to pay the Claimant the sum of £8,371, inclusive of VAT, in respect of costs incurred at the hearing on 20 and 21 November 2025.

REASONS

[1]This case comes before me pursuant to the order of EJ Woodhead, made on 06.12.2024. In it, the EJ set out the following tasks to be accomplished:14.1 Whether a Rule 50 order should be made in respect of documents and witness evidence that is subject to privilege and confidentiality (as relating to clients of R1);

14.2 Practical matters as regards the Full Merits Hearing associated with any Rule 50 order that is made;

14.3 Whether the Full Merits Hearing should hear evidence and submissions on Polkey/Chagger v Abbey National & anor questions;

14.4 Whether the parties should be required to attend an Dispute Resolution Appointment and the listing of that hearing;

14.5 Whether and when the Claimant must update their schedule of loss and evidence of mitigation and send it to the Respondent.

14.6 Whether the judge hearing this Private PH can and should reserve the Final Hearing to him or herself

[2]My decisions on the above are contained in the Order.

[3]At the same hearing on 06.12.2024, EJ Woodhead ordered that disclosure take place, by list and copy, by 14.03.2025.

[4]It is not in dispute that both parties are in breach of that order.

[5]The Respondents’ position is that some of the disclosure they will need to give is of privileged material. They ask for conditions to be attached to the disclosure order, insofar as it relates to privileged material.

[6]In the course of the hearing, I was advised that the parties wanted me to provide written reasons for my decision on the Respondents’ application for conditions to be attached to the disclosure order.

[7]I also heard an application by the Claimant for costs. I was not able to give a decision on that application during the hearing. I therefore reserved that decision. History

[8]I have already referred to EJ Woodhead’s Order of 06.12.2024. which I will refer to as the CMO.

[9]On 07.02.2025, the solicitors acting for the Respondents wrote to the Tribunal, asking that the CMO be varied in a number of respects. It was said that the Claimant had applied for a time extension the previous day, but I have not seen that application. They also said that the Claimant had breached the CMO. What is perhaps most noteworthy for present purposes is that, in their request, the Respondents did not ask that conditions be added to the disclosure order.

[10]On 09.04.2024, the Respondents’ solicitors wrote to the Tribunal. In their letter, they complained of a lack of engagement from the Claimant’s then-solicitors between 25.02.2025 and 21.03.2025.

[11]On 10.04.2025, the Claimant’s then-solicitors wrote to the Tribunal, explaining that the Claimant had had a “…particularly difficult few weeks…” regarding an acute mental health crisis.

[12]On 16.05.2025, the Respondents’ Solicitors wrote to the Tribunal. Their email includes the following: In the course of conducting the disclosure exercise on behalf of the First Respondent, we have identified a number of potentially disclosable documents which belong to and/or contain confidential and legally privileged information about the First Respondent's clients, in respect of which the First Respondent has regulatory obligations. Such obligations require careful consideration as to the extent to which anonymisation and/or redaction of any disclosable documents may be appropriate, and what further steps may be necessary to safeguard any confidential and/or legally privileged information once disclosed. Although the Respondents have invested, and are continuing to invest, significant resources into the disclosure exercise, it became clear that it would not be possible to complete this by 16 May 2025. On 7 May 2025, we therefore wrote to the Claimant's solicitors in this respect and requested their agreement to a short extension to the deadline for the parties to exchange disclosure to 13 June 2025 (a copy of this letter is enclosed). The Claimant's solicitors replied on 15 May 2025 to confirm that the Claimant would not agree to the extension sought by the Respondent. Instead, the Claimant said he would agree only to a much shorter 1.5-week extension, and on the condition that the Respondents agreed to:(a) an extension to the provision of his disability impact statement (which the Respondents note was due to be provided by the Claimant on 14 March 2025 and in respect of which no explanation whatsoever has been volunteered by the Claimant for why he has not provided it months after the Tribunal's direction, and no explanation now has been provided for why the Claimant cannot provide it until 28 May 2025); and

(b) an extension to the agreement of contents of the bundle until 9 July 2025 and provision by the Respondent to the Claimant of a soft copy of the bundle by 16 July 2025. A copy of the letter from the Claimant's solicitors is enclosed. In accordance with the Overriding Objective, the Respondents are willing to agree to the additional variations proposed by the Claimant (including in respect of the disability impact statement). However, the Respondent anticipates that the Claimant's agreement to an extension until 28 May 2025 for disclosure will not be sufficient to enable the Respondents to complete their disclosure exercise. The Respondents therefore seek an Order from the Tribunal, extending the date for disclosure until 13 June 2025, for the reasons set out in this letter and in our letter to the Claimant's solicitors dated 7 May 2025….

[13]The above letter did not mention the addition of any conditions to the disclosure provisions in the CMO.

[14]On 07.10.2025, the Respondents applied that the Claimant’s claim be struck out, on the grounds that he had failed to comply with orders, and/or that he had not actively pursued his claim. In the event, this application was not pursued. However, the application raised the question of disclosure, complaining of a lack of engagement from the Claimant’s then-solicitors.

[15]The Respondents referred to attempts to engage with the Claimant on the subject of the privileged material. It went on to say: On 11 July 2025, we (again) explained why the Claimant's position was not appropriate. We set out two possible ways in which disclosure could be progressed. Those were, in summary:(i) to arrange a call between the parties' representatives to discuss appropriate safeguards for the Privileged Documents and seek to agree a way forward; or

(ii) for the parties to exchange disclosure save for the Privileged Documents, the First Respondent to make an application to the Tribunal for an appropriate order as to the safeguarding of the Privileged Documents, and in the meantime make copies of the Privileged Documents available for inspection by Ashfords at our offices.

[16]No reply had been received to those suggestions, as of the date of the Respondents’ strike-out application.

[17]On 13.11.2025, the Tribunal was notified that the Claimant’s current solicitors had been instructed, in place of his earlier solicitors.

[18]The Claimant’s solicitors referred to a list of safeguards that had been suggested by those acting for the Respondents on 12.06.2025, the day before the extended deadline for disclosure.

[19]On 17.11.2025, the Respondents’ solicitors wrote to the Claimant’s solicitors, the letter including the observation that: … You will be well aware that the First Respondent is a regulated law firm and that much of the work the Claimant was doing on its behalf involved or concerned the provision of legal advice and/or the conduct of litigation. It cannot be a surprise to you, or the Claimant, or the Claimant's former solicitors, that the First Respondent's disclosure was therefore likely to contain a number of disclosable documents which contain the First Respondent's clients' confidential and/or legally privileged information…

[20]The letter went on to suggest a telephone call between the parties.

[21]The Claimant’s solicitors responded the same day, contending that the Respondents were seeking to put an unnecessary gloss on the CMO.

[22]On 19.11.2025, the Claimant’s solicitors set out in a letter to the Tribunal their position on the proposed conditions to disclosure.

[23]In a separate order, I declined to attach conditions to the disclosure order in place already. Costs application

[24]This preliminary hearing was originally listed with a specific set of tasks to be accomplished, identified and included in the CMO by EJ Woodhead. I have set these out above.

[25]The first of the tasks identified was, to consider whether an order should be made under Rule 50 (now Rule 49) in respect of documents and witness evidence. It has not been possible to accomplish that task. The Respondents’ position was this task cannot be considered properly in the abstract, and I did not understand this to be disputed by the Claimant.

[26]It was not possible to accomplish this task because the Respondents did not give the disclosure that they had been ordered to give, by the date they were ordered to give it, and indeed have still not given it. Law

[27]The Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2025/1155 (“the Rules”), Rules 73 to 76, read as follows: 73.— Costs orders and preparation time orders(1) A costs order is an order that the paying party make a payment to— (a) the receiving party in respect of the costs that the receiving party has incurred while represented by a legal representative or a lay representative, or (b) another party or witness in respect of expenses incurred, or to be incurred, for the purpose of, or in connection with, an individual’s attendance as a witness at a hearing.

(2) A preparation time order is an order that the paying party make a payment to the receiving party in respect of the receiving party’s preparation time while not represented by a legal representative.

(3) A costs order under paragraph (1)(a) and a preparation time order may not both be made in favour of the same party in the same proceedings.

(4) The Tribunal may decide in the course of the proceedings that a party is entitled to either a costs order or a preparation time order but may defer its decision on the kind of order to make until a later stage in the proceedings. 74.— When a costs order or a preparation time order may or must be made (1) The Tribunal may make a costs order or a preparation time order (as appropriate) on its own initiative or on the application of a party or, in respect of a costs order under rule 73(1)(b), a witness who has attended or has been ordered to attend to give oral evidence at a hearing. (2) The Tribunal must consider making a costs order or a preparation time order where it considers that— (a) a party (or that party’s representative) has acted vexatiously, abusively, disruptively or otherwise unreasonably in either the bringing of the proceedings, or part of it, or the way that the proceedings, or part of it, have been conducted, (b) any claim, response or reply had no reasonable prospect of success, or (c) a hearing has been postponed or adjourned on the application of a party made less than 7 days before the date on which that hearing begins. (3) The Tribunal may also make a costs order or a preparation time order (as appropriate) on the application of a party where a party has been in breach of any order, rule or practice direction or where a hearing has been postponed or adjourned. (4) Where in proceedings for unfair dismissal a final hearing is postponed or adjourned, the Tribunal must order the respondent to pay the costs incurred as a result of the postponement or adjournment if— (a) the claimant has expressed a wish to be reinstated or re-engaged which has been communicated to the respondent not less than 7 days before the hearing, and (b) the postponement or adjournment of that hearing has been caused by the respondent’s failure, without a special reason, to adduce reasonable evidence as to the availability of the job from which the claimant was dismissed or of comparable or suitable employment. 75.— Procedure (1) A party may apply for a costs order or a preparation time order at any stage up to 28 days after the date on which the judgment finally determining the proceedings in respect of that party was sent to the parties. (2) The Tribunal must not make a costs order or a preparation time order against a party unless that party has had a reasonable opportunity to make representations (in writing or at a hearing, as the Tribunal may order). 76.— The amount of a costs order (1) A costs order may order the paying party to pay— (a) the receiving party a specified amount, not exceeding £20,000, in respect of the costs of the receiving party; (b) the receiving party the whole or a specified part of the costs of the receiving party, with the amount to be paid being determined— (i) in England and Wales, by way of detailed assessment carried out either by a county court in accordance with the Civil Procedure Rules 19981, or by the Tribunal applying the same principles; (ii) in Scotland, by way of taxation carried out either by the auditor of court in accordance with the Act of Sederunt (Taxation of Judicial Expenses Rules) 20192, or by the Tribunal applying the same principles; (c) another party or a witness, as appropriate, a specified amount in respect of necessary and reasonably incurred expenses for the purpose of, or in connection with, an individual’s attendance as a witness at a hearing; (d) an amount agreed between the paying party and the receiving party in respect of the receiving party’s costs. (2) Where the costs order includes an amount in respect of fees charged by a lay representative, for the purposes of the calculation of the order, the hourly rate applicable for the fees of the lay representative must not exceed the rate under rule 77(2) (the amount of a preparation time order). (3) A costs order under sub-paragraphs (b) to (d) of paragraph (1) may exceed £20,000.

[28]Save where rule 74(4) applies, the question of whether or not a costs order is to be made is one of discretion. A finding by the Tribunal that the conditions provided for by rule 74(2)(a) and/or (b) apply, would mean that the Tribunal then has to exercise a discretion as to whether to make the order. Rules 74(2)(a) and (b) provide gateways that allow the making of an order. Indeed, they require the Tribunal to consider whether or not to make an order. However, it does not follow that, because the gateway is passed through, an order must be made. It is then a matter of the Tribunal’s discretion – Edenbeck Ltd -v- Stevenson1.

[29]The making of a costs order is the exception, rather than the rule - see Barnsley Metropolitan Borough Council -v- Yerrakalva2. The exercise of the discretion is not dependent upon any precise causal nexus between the conduct relied upon and the costs incurred – see McPherson -v- BNP Paribas (London Branch)3, and the Court of Appeal has cautioned against an over-analytical approach to the exercise of a broad discretion4. Mummary LJ said:41. The vital point in exercising the discretion to order costs is to look at the whole picture of what happened in the case and to ask whether there has been unreasonable conduct by the claimant in bringing and conducting the case and, in doing so, to identify the conduct, what was unreasonable about it and what effects it had. The main thrust of the passages cited above from my judgment in McPherson’s case was to reject as erroneous the submission to the court that, in deciding whether to make a costs order, the employment tribunal had to determine whether or not there was a precise causal link between the unreasonable conduct in question and the specific costs being claimed….

42. On matters of discretion an earlier case only stands as authority for what are, or what are not, the principles governing the discretion and serving only as a broad steer on the factors covered by the paramount principle of relevance. A costs decision in one case will not in most cases pre-determine the outcome of a costs application in another case: the facts of the cases will be different, as will be the interaction of the relevant factors with one another and the varying weight to be attached to them.

[30]It is for a party seeking a costs order to establish that the jurisdiction to grant one is engaged, in which case it is then for the Tribunal to satisfy itself that it is right and proper to exercise the discretion to make such order – see Haydar - v- Pennine Acute NHS Trust5. 1

[2023] EAT 128

@ paras 83-84. 2

[2011] EWCA Civ 1255

[2012] ICR 78

per Mummary LJ @ para 7. 3

[2004] EWCA Civ 569

[2004] I.C.R. 1398 4 Yerraklava per Mummary LJ @ para 39 – 42. 5

UKEAT/0141/17/BA

@ para 37

[31]“Vexatious” was defined in Attorney-General -v- Barker6 as follows: …"Vexatious" is a familiar term in legal parlance. The hallmark of a vexatious proceeding is in my judgment that it has little or no basis in law (or at least no discernible basis); that whatever the intention of the proceeding may be, its effect is to subject the defendant to inconvenience, harassment and expense out of all proportion to any gain likely to accrue to the claimant; and that it involves an abuse of the process of the court, meaning by that a use of the court process for a purpose or in a way which is significantly different from the ordinary and proper use of the court process….7

[32]The above has been applied in the context of this Tribunal in Scott -v- Russell8.

[33]Regarding the meaning of “Abusively or disruptively”, these terms do not appear to have been authoritatively defined. IDS Employment Law Handbook9 refers to Garnes -v- London Borough of Lambeth & anor10 as an example of behaviour that was unreasonable, vexatious and disruptive, rather than a case defining such terms. I take “abusively or disruptively” to carry their ordinary meaning in the English language.

[34]“Unreasonably” carries its ordinary English meaning, and is not to be interpreted as meaning something similar to vexatious – see Dyer -v- Secretary of State11.

[35]Costs awarded under Rule 76(1)(a) are sometimes referred to as “unassessed costs”. That does not mean that an arbitrary sum can be awarded. In Sumukan (UK) Ltd & anor -v- Raghaven12, it was held that the Tribunal must state on what basis, and in accordance with what established principles, it is awarding any sum of costs, on what basis it arrives at the sum it awards and why costs are awarded against one or more respondents13.

[36]Rule 30 provides as follows: 6 [2000] 1 F.L.R. 759 7 Per Lord Bingham of Cornhill LCJ @ para 19. 8

[2013] EWCA Civ 1432

[2014] Costs LR 95, per Beatson LJ @ para 30. 9 Vol 10, Chpt 18, para 18.57. 10 EAT 1237/97 11 EAT 183/83 12

UKEAT/0087/09/RN

13 @ para 55. 30.— Case management orders(1) Subject to rule 32(2) and (3) (postponements), the Tribunal may, on its own initiative or on the application of a party, make a case management order.

(2) The particular powers identified in these Rules do not restrict that general power.

(3) A case management order may vary, suspend or set aside an earlier case management order where that is necessary in the interests of justice, and in particular where a party affected by the earlier order did not have a reasonable opportunity to make representations before it was made.

[37]I was referred to Goldman Sachs -v- Montali14, Serco Ltd v Wells15 and TW White and Sons Ltd v White16

[38]The Respondent referred me to Cavallari & Ors v Mercedes-Benz Group AG & Ors17, to Nailard v Unite the Union18 and to Al Sadeq v Dechert LLP19.

[39]I was not addressed by the parties on the scope of the protection against the collateral use of documents by those who receive disclosure ordered by this Tribunal. I approach the issue on the basis that the scope of the protection is the same as before the civil courts. I was not referred to IG Index Ltd v Cloete20, in which it was held that it was implicit in the rules that then applied, that disclosed documents would be subject to the same restrictions as applied by virtue of CPR 31.22 in the civil courts. This rule provides as follows: 31.22— Subsequent use of disclosed documents[ and completed Electronic Documents Questionnaires]1(1) A party to whom a document has been disclosed may use the document only for the purpose of the proceedings in which it is disclosed, except where– (a) the document has been read to or by the court, or referred to, at a hearing which has been held in public; (b) the court gives permission; or 14

[2002] ICR 1251

[2016] ICR 768

UKEAT/0022/21/VP

UKEAT/0023/21/VP

[2015] I.C.R. 254 (c) the party who disclosed the document and the person to whom the document belongs agree.

(2) The court may make an order restricting or prohibiting the use of a document which has been disclosed, even where the document has been read to or by the court, or referred to, at a hearing which has been held in public.

(3) An application for such an order may be made– (a) by a party; or (b) by any person to whom the document belongs.

(4) For the purpose of this rule, an Electronic Documents Questionnaire which has been completed and served by another party pursuant to Practice Direction 31B is to be treated as if it is a document which has been disclosed

Discussion

[40]In this case, the Claimant contends that the Respondents have behaved unreasonably. It relies on the following21: i. Wholesale non-disclosure and the absence of any application to the ET to determine the legitimacy of the self-imposed barriers to compliance with the orders of the ET; ii. The pursuit of a groundless strike-out application; and iii. A needlessly repetitive approach to correspondence on matters which either do not advance the overriding objective or actively undermine its achievement.

[41]The Respondents respond by saying that, just because I have rejected their application to add conditions to the disclosure provisions of the CMO, it does not mean that their stance was unreasonable. They point out that they had offered to discuss possible safeguards regarding privilege as far back as July 2025. That offer was not taken up but, had it been, sensible dialogue could have ensued. They say that the strike-out followed a lengthy period of nonengagement by the Claimant.

[42]They also point to the Claimant’s own conduct. Not only did he fail to respond to attempts to engage, he didn’t mention that he had a disability impact statement and medical evidence ready to disclose until 13.11.2025. They point 21 The wording used in the Claimant’s written submissions. to the observation in the Claimant’s skeleton argument that the CMO had ordered simultaneous disclosure, and say that it is wrong to contend that the Claimant would have been severely impacted by providing standard disclosure on the date ordered. They point out that the Claimant has redacted the identities of potential employers he has approached, manifestly less sensitive information than privileged information.

[43]The Respondents say that the Claimant’s own behaviour is something that I should consider, if I decide that my discretion to make a costs award is engaged.

[44]The first question is, has the Respondent acted unreasonably?

[45]Taking the points relied upon by the Claimant in reverse order, I think that it was unreasonable of the Respondents to make a strike-out application. It is right that the Claimant had not engaged with it. But strike-out would have been an excessive response to the lack of engagement, as really ought to have been known to the Respondents and their solicitors. And to make the application knowing that the Respondents themselves were in breach of the CMO re disclosure really is unreasonable.

[46]Insofar as the second point is concerned, it is true that the correspondence has been lengthy, but I am not satisfied that it reaches the standard of being unreasonable.

[47]Then there is the question of the approach to disclosure. I am satisfied that the Respondents’ approach has been unreasonable. I accept that, just because I have not accepted the application to add conditions to the disclosure order, it does not follow that the Respondents were unreasonable to ask.

[48]That does not, however, seem to me to address the issue. If the Respondents had indicated before EJ Woodhead that they had concerns about privileged material and wished to make representations about conditions – even if they had not been in a position to make representations there and then – would be one thing. But to wait for a significant period of time before raising the issue seems to me to be clearly unreasonable.

[49]That privileged material would need to be disclosed is something that should have been evident early on. There is no reason this should not have been identified at the hearing before EJ Woodhead, so that provision for its resolution could not have been made if it were not possible to resolve it at that hearing.

[50]Thereafter, to sit on something that should have been evident, for a period of months, was also unreasonable.

[51]Having determined that the Respondents have behaved unreasonably, I am required to consider whether to make a costs order. I remind myself of the law discussed above.

[52]I am not persuaded that I should exercise my discretion to make a costs order because of the unreasonable application to strike out. It might be said that the Respondents were rather bold to make their application, but the application was not pursued.

[53]More serious, I think, is the Respondents’ position re disclosure. This was unreasonable, and I think seriously so. Moreover, I think the Claimant is right to say that this position has meant that one of the primary objectives of this hearing, namely a consideration of whether Rule 49 orders should be made, could not be achieved.

[54]As to the Claimant’s own behaviour, it seems to me that this is something I should consider when deciding whether or not to exercise my discretion to make a costs order. Not to do so would mean exercising my discretion on the basis of only half the picture.

[55]What, then, of the Claimant’s behaviour?

[56]It is true that he had not engaged with the Respondents for significant periods of time. But I am mindful that he is said to have been suffering, for at least a period of time, from a significant mental health crisis.

[57]I note the comments in the written submissions prepared on his behalf, that the CMO provided for simultaneous disclosure. The clear inference – and the one draw – is that the Claimant did not provide disclosure as a response to the Respondents’ failure to do so. His mental health crisis may explain a failure to engage with the Respondents properly, but the decision not to provide disclosure was a response to the Respondents’ position.

[58]That is not a good reason for the Claimant to have failed to provide disclosure. It was, I think, unreasonable of him to take that approach. The Respondents have not made an application for costs, and in the circumstances I would not be minded to take a costs order against the Claimant even if, on a strict reading of Rule 74(2)(a), I have to consider whether to do so. However, I certainly should consider that when considering to exercise my discretion in the Claimant’s favour on his application.

[59]The Claimant’s case for a costs order would have been stronger, had he not behaved unreasonably himself. As it is, is it strong enough to persuade me to exercise my discretion to make an order that is an exception, rather than the rule, in this Tribunal?

[60]I think it is.

[61]In the hearing, considerable time was spent discussing the attachment of conditions to the order for disclosure. This is time that could have been spent considering Rule 49. I have had to list the case for a further preliminary hearing, to consider Rule 49, a listing of a whole day. Although I note that there does not have to be any causal nexus between the unreasonable behaviour and the costs awarded, it seems to me that, where unreasonable behaviour causes costs to be incurred, that is a relevant factor to consider in the exercise of the discretion.

[62]I turn then to the amount of the order.

[63]There was no schedule of costs before me, but Mr Milsom advised me orally of some sums. He told me that:(a) His own fees were £11,922 including VAT, of which £10,800 including VAT represented the fees for the hearing before me;

(b) A sum of £5,942 including VAT was said to be incurred for his instructing solicitors attending the hearing before me;

[64]Mr Milson did not seek a detailed assessment, but instead limited the amount sought to £20,000.

[65]Although there does not need to be a causal nexus between the costs awarded and the unreasonable behaviour that forms the basis for the award, that is not a reason for thinking that it is necessarily inappropriate to award the costs that have been incurred because of the behaviour.

[66]In one sense, no costs have yet been incurred because of the Respondents’ unreasonable behaviour. This hearing would still have taken place, and to discuss Rule 49 issues would, I think, probably have required at least as long a hearing as, in fact took place.

[67]However, the preliminary hearing that I have had to order before the final hearing, might have been avoided.

[68]Insofar as the correspondence is concerned, I do not think it would be appropriate to award costs representing that, and would not exercise my discretion to do so. The correspondence has been lengthy, and – without unduly extending these reasons by lengthy citation of it – not all of it productive. But the Claimant was not always engaging, and I do not think the correspondence justifies a departure from the ‘no costs’ norm in this Tribunal.

[69]Insofar as the hearing before me is concerned, even though I think it would have had to take place anyway, I think it would have been more useful and the next preliminary hearing might have been avoided.

[70]In the circumstances, I think the just approach would be to award the Claimant a sum representing 50% of the costs that I was told directly represent fees for this hearing. That is to acknowledge that this hearing would have had to take place, but to recognise that the next preliminary hearing might have been avoided.

[71]I summarily assess the costs as follows:(a) Counsel’s fees in the sum of £5,400, including VAT, and;

(b) Solicitors’ costs in the sum of £2,971 including VAT.

[72]I have no reason to doubt the figures given to me by Mr Milsom. The sums claimed do not strike me as unreasonable, and Mr Lee did not address me on quantum, although Mr Milsom had done so.

[73]I make the costs order against the Respondents jointly and severally. Although at times in the correspondence the position of the 1st Respondent is addressed solely, at the hearing no distinction was drawn between their respective positions.

[74]Finally, I wish to record my thanks to counsel for their assistance before me.