Mr A Kiddle and Mr R Seabright v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis: 2218585/2024 and others
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Case No 2218585/2024
Between
Mr A Kiddle and Mr R SeabrightClaimantCommissioner of Police of the MetropolisRespondent
Before
Employment Judge A M SnelsonDate 3 August 2025
JUDGMENT
17 July 2025 (in chambers) BEFORE: Employment Judge A M Snelson On hearing Mr J Feeny, counsel, on behalf of the Claimants and Mr C Adjei, counsel, on behalf of the Respondent; The Tribunal determines that:(1) The First Claimant’s complaints of detrimental treatment under the Employment Rights Act 1996 (‘the 1996 Act’), ss 47B and 48(1A) are not well-founded.(2) The First Claimant’s complaint of ‘automatically’ unfair dismissal under the 1996 Act, ss103A and 111(1) is not well-founded.(3) The Second Claimant’s complaints of detrimental treatment under the 1996 Act’, ss 47B and 48(1A) are not well-founded.(4) The Second Claimant’s complaint of ‘automatically’ unfair dismissal under the 1996 Act, ss103A and 111(1) is not well-founded.(5) To the extent that the First and Second Claimant’s complaints of detrimental treatment under the 1996 Act, ss47B and 48(1A) were presented outside the period of three months (as extended by the Early Conciliation provisions) beginning with the date of the act or failure to act to which, in each case, the complaint relates, such complaints fail on the further ground that they were presented out of time and the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to consider them.(6) Accordingly, the proceedings as a whole are dismissed.
REASONS
[1]The Claimants, to whom I will refer by name1, are former Constables in the Metropolitan (‘Met’) Police Force. The Respondent (‘the Commissioner’) is the Chief Constable.[2]By his claim forms presented on 17 April 2024 and 5 March 2025 (case no’s 2218585/2024 and 6007628/2025), Mr Kiddle brings complaints of detrimental treatment on ‘whistle-blowing’ grounds and ‘automatically’ unfair dismissal on ‘whistle-blowing’ grounds.[3]In his claim form presented on 17 April 2024 (case no. 2218586/2024) Mr Seabright brings parallel claims under the same two causes of action.[4]All claims are resisted on their merits. The Commissioner also pleads timebased jurisdictional defences to some.[5]At a preliminary hearing for case management on 1 August 2024 at which all parties were represented by counsel Employment Judge Lewis gave directions for the delivery of further information by the Claimants and amended grounds of resistance by the Commissioner and set a timetable for the preparation of evidence for trial.[6]The matter came before me for final hearing on 1 July this year, with 17 sitting days allocated. The Claimants, who have been legally represented throughout, appeared by Mr Feeny, counsel and the Commissioner by Mr Adjei, counsel. I am very grateful to both for their considerable assistance.[7]Having read into the case until lunchtime on day two, I heard evidence on liability over the following eight days before adjourning to allow counsel time to prepare closing submissions. These were delivered on the afternoon of 15 July. At that point I decided to release the parties on the understanding that they would be notified of the outcome once I had completed my deliberations and, should a remedies hearing be required, I would aim to use the remainder of the allocation for that purpose.[8]On 17 July the parties were notified that the claims had failed and that accordingly there would be no resumption of the hearing.
The Legal Framework
[9]By the Employment Rights Act 1996 (‘the 1996 Act’), s43B, it is stipulated (so far as relevant) that: 1 When a serving officer, Mr Kiddle routinely signed correspondence under the title of Lord of a (named) Manor in Cumbria, but was content for the purposes of the proceedings with the title of Mr. (1) In this Part a ‘qualifying disclosure’ means any disclosure of information which, in the reasonable belief of the worker making the disclosure, is in the public interest and tends to show one or more of the following – (a) that a criminal offence has been committed, is being committed or is likely to be committed; (b) that a person has failed, is failing or is likely to fail to comply with any legal obligation to which he is subject; … (d) that the health or safety of any individual has been, is being or is likely to be endangered; … (f) that information tending to show any matter falling within any one of the preceding paragraphs has been, is being or is likely to be deliberately concealed.[10]Qualifying disclosures are protected if made in accordance with ss43C to 43H (see s43A). By s43C, it is provided that: (1) A qualifying disclosure is made in accordance with this section if the worker makes the disclosure – (a) to his employer …[11]The requirement for a disclosure of ‘information’ was considered by Slade J sitting in the EAT in Cavendish Munro Professional Risk Management Ltd v Geduld [2010] ICR 325. She equated ‘information’ with ‘facts’, observing that mere ‘allegations’ did not fall within the statutory protection. This analysis was qualified in Kilraine v London Borough of Wandsworth [2018] ICR 1850 CA, in which it was pointed out that the legislation posited no rigid dichotomy between facts and allegations and that ‘information’ may comprise both: a disclosure which makes an allegation will be protected provided that it has sufficient factual content and specificity.[12]By the 1996 Act, s47B(1) and (1A) a worker has the right not to suffer a detriment done by his/her employer or another worker of the employer in the course of employment or by an agent of the employer with the employer’s authority, ‘on the ground that’ he/she has made a protected disclosure (‘PD’).[13]A ‘detriment’ arises in the employment law context where, by reason of the act(s) complained of, a reasonable worker would or might take the view that he/she has been disadvantaged in the workplace. An unjustified sense of grievance cannot amount to a detriment (see Shamoon v Chief Constable of the RUC [2003] IRLR 285 HL).[14]By the 1996 Act, s48(1A) the Tribunal has jurisdiction to consider a complaint under s47B.[15]The 1996 Act, s48(2) provides, materially, that on a complaint under subsection (1A) it is for the employer to show the ground on which any act, or failure to act, was done.[16]In Osipov v International Petroleum Ltd UKEAT/0058/17/DA Simler P, sitting in the EAT, stated (judgment, para 115): Counsel submits and I agree that the proper approach to inference drawing and the burden of proof in a s47B ERA case can be summarised as follows:(a) the burden of proof lies on a claimant to show that a ground or reason (that is more than trivial) for detrimental treatment to which he or she is subjected is a protected disclosure he or she made.(b) By virtue of s48(2) ERA 1996, the employer (or other respondent) must be prepared to show why the detrimental treatment was done. If they do not do so inferences may be drawn against them …(c) However, as with inferences drawn in any discrimination case, inferences drawn by tribunals in protected disclosure cases must be justified by the facts as found.[17]By the 1996 Act, s103A, an employee is treated as ‘automatically’ unfairly dismissed where the reason, or principal reason, for the dismissal is that he/she has made a PD.[18]It is elementary that police officers are neither employees nor ‘workers’, but ‘whistle-blowing’ protection is extended to them by the 1996 Act, s43KA, which deems them, for this purpose, to be employed by the applicable Chief Constable.[19]The time limit for presentation of complaints of detrimental treatment on ‘whistle-blowing’ is that which applies to almost all rights under the 1996 Act. The claim form must be presented within the period of three months2 beginning with the date of the act or failure to act to which the complaint relates unless the complainant shows that it was ‘not reasonably practicable’ to present within that period. In that event, the Tribunal may substitute ‘such further period as [it] considers reasonable’ (see s48(3)). Where there is a series of similar acts or failures to act, the three-month period runs from the last of them (s48(3)(a)). And where an act extends over a period, time runs from the last day of the period (s48(4)(a)).[20]The ‘not reasonably practicable’ formulation sets a high standard. The wording has been equated to ‘not reasonably feasible’ (see Palmer v Southend-onSea BC [1984] ICR 372 CA).
The Issues
[21]The issues to which the claims give rise have been agreed in the three documents appended to these reasons.3 Oral Evidence and Documents[22]I heard oral evidence from the two Claimants and their five supporting witnesses, Sgt Michael Howlett, a volunteer instructor with Havering Volunteer Police Cadet (‘VPC’) Units since 2014, Sgt Philip Brewster, a Police Federation representative who supported Mr Kiddle through the two disciplinary investigations in which he was involved, PC Malcolm Faulkes, a VPC volunteer at Havering from 2 Extended, where applicable by any period of Early Conciliation. 3 I have shortened the lists to remove references to remedy issues, which do not now arise. March 2023 until February 2024, Ms Irem Haider, formerly a Constable based at Dagenham and Ms Natalie Clark, the mother of a former cadet in the Havering VPC Unit.[23]The 11 witnesses called on behalf of the Commissioner were Insp Adam Richmond, PC Joanne McCarthy, Sgt James Benge, A/Insp Matthew Feather, Sgt Lisa Ryan, DC Elizabeth Coombs, Sgt (formerly DC) Amy Cross, Insp Tom Wilson, Det Ch Supt Andy Day, Sgt Matthew Chatters and A/PS Atif Shaikh. The parts which they played in the material events will emerge from my narrative below.[24]In addition to the evidence of witnesses I read the documents to which I was referred in the main bundle of over 3,100 pages and the supplemental bundle of over 250 pages.[25]I also had the benefit of an agreed chronology, an agreed cast list, an agreed list of abbreviations and the written closing submissions of both counsel. The Primary Facts The work setting[26]Mr Kiddle, who joined the police force in 2000, was Cadet Coordinator for the Havering VPC Unit from October 2018 until his resignation in November 2024.[27]Mr Seabright, a police officer since 1994, was Cadet Coordinator for the VPC Unit for Barking & Dagenham from October 2018 until his retirement in December 2023.[28]These locations are in the Met Police East Area, which also covers Redbridge, where a third VPC Unit is to be found.[29]Management of the East Area VPCs is ultimately the responsibility of the Schools Inspector. From 2021, Insp Adam Richmond held that position. In May 2023, he was replaced by Insp Tom Wilson. Both were witnesses before me.[30]Direct line management of VPC Coordinators fell to a Sergeant in the Youth Engagement Team. One such was Sgt Jo Chandler, who managed Mr Kiddle and Mr Seabright in 2022. Another was Sgt James Benge, a witness before me, who came into post in January 2023. When he left in April 2023 to take up another role, the managerial function was divided between three sergeants, each being a member of the Safer Schools team for the Borough in which the relevant VPC Unit was located. By this means, Sgt Lisa Ryan, also a witness before me, came to manage Mr Kiddle. With effect from November 2023, A/S Atif Shaikh, also a witness before me, took up the position of Youth Engagement Sergeant for the East Area and, in that capacity, became responsible for the direct line management of all three VPC Coordinators.[31]As I have mentioned, Mr Kiddle and Mr Seabright were the designated Coordinators for, respectively, Havering and Barking & Dagenham. PC Amanda Miller was the Coordinator for Redbridge. Following the instigation of a disciplinary investigation in the summer of 2023, Mr Kiddle and Mr Seabright were removed from their VPC duties and were replaced temporarily by PC Jo McCarthy and PC Sean Pickering respectively. Mr Kiddle resumed his role in April 2024 but Mr Seabright elected to retire in December 2023 and so never returned. Following his departure, Mr Pickering was confirmed in the Barking & Dagenham role on a longterm basis.[32]The VPC programme is run by the Metropolitan Police Service. It aims to bring together groups of young people and police officers to share information and understanding about policing and community issues and to take part in various activities. Cadets are divided into Junior Cadets (10-13) and Senior Cadets (13- 18). They wear uniform. Regular sessions are held. There are drills and parades. Outings are arranged, including camping trips during holiday periods.[33]There is very little funding for the VPC programme. The Coordinators draw full-time salaries but the scheme also requires the support of a body of volunteers, made up of police officers, Police Community Support Officers (‘PSCOs’) and civilians. To maintain it, a happy and positive relationship between the Coordinators and the volunteers is of obvious importance. 4[34]As the job title suggests, the role of the Coordinator is wide-ranging. It involves everything from arranging events and activities to marketing the organisation and seeking fresh recruits, to applying for external funding, to reporting to senior officers on the work of the Unit, to supporting and engaging with cadets’ families, to managing risk. Safeguarding[35]For obvious reasons, a central responsibility of all involved in the VPC programme, and in particular the Coordinator, is to ensure that proper and adequate measures and processes for the safeguarding of cadets are entrenched and observed. The Coordinator must hold an enhanced DBS check certificate. There is a programme of mandatory training. A Safeguarding Policy and Code of Practice are published.[36]There is also a system of Designated Safeguarding Leads (‘DSLs’), to whom reference is to be made on safeguarding issues. I was told without challenge, and accept, that in 2022 the DSL was Sgt Chandler and that Mr Kiddle was authorised to deputise for her when she was away and it seems that the same arrangement applied in relation to her successors. Misconduct procedures[37]As I will explain in due course, misconduct allegations were brought against both Claimants in August 2023 and an entirely separate allegation was raised against Mr Kiddle in July 2024. Police misconduct procedures are complex but for present purposes the following summary will suffice. An allegation will first be 4 On occasions the Claimants appeared to extend the term ‘Coordinator’ to volunteers attached to VPC Units. This may or may not be technically correct, but it is liable to confuse. I use it to refer only to the three salaried leaders of the three VPC Units. considered in the Information Bureau, where a triage exercise is performed. The choice at that stage is whether to leave the matter on file or to pass it to the Complaints Resolution Unit (‘CRU’) for determination. A CRU determination (this time, no doubt, following a closer examination) is again between leaving the matter on file or passing it forward to be progressed further. If the latter option is taken, it goes to the Special Investigations Unit (‘SIU’) for full investigation by an Investigating Officer (‘IO’). This stage will result in a decision whether there is sufficient material on which a misconduct panel could make a finding of misconduct or gross misconduct.[38]When a matter gets as far as the SIU, the IO’s first task is to prepare a severity assessment report and a restrictions report. The former offers a view on whether the alleged behaviour, if established, would rank as misconduct or gross misconduct. The latter addresses the need (or not) for restrictions to be placed on the officer’s activities pending completion of the investigation. It appears that decisions on whether to impose restrictions and, if so, in what form, are to be taken at Inspector level.[39]In her evidence, DS Amy Cross, who, in the rank of DC had been the IO in Mr Kiddle’s case, told me that usually restrictions remain in place for the duration of any investigation and that the exception would be where new information arising in the course of the investigation made it necessary for the restrictions to be reviewed. I accept that evidence.[40]I make findings about the disciplinary processes in which Mr Kiddle and Mr Seabright were involved when dealing with the alleged detriments below. But one general finding is appropriate here. I asked questions about the time taken to complete the investigation of the August 2023 allegations (which struck me as anything but complex) and was told by at least one witness on behalf of the Respondent that the duration of the exercise was certainly not in any way unusual. That evidence was not challenged and, with a heavy heart, I accept it as true. Performance of the VPC Units, working relationships and associated problems[41]I was told by Mr Redmond that the Havering VPC Unit (under Mr Kiddle) consistently underperformed. The cadet numbers were low, as were the numbers of volunteers. The Units in the other two Boroughs ran their programmes for Junior Cadets alongside the Senior Cadets programme. At Havering, that did not happen; its Junior Cadets were run by the Schools Team. According to Mr Redmond, this was because the Schools Team was not willing to work side-by-side with Mr Kiddle. The general tenor of Mr Redmond’s evidence was that this was just one of many illustrations of the problems in Havering which stemmed from the poor working relationships between Mr Kiddle and many of those with whom he came into contact. Having known him since 2006, Mr Redmond felt able to say that he had seen him over years ‘constantly falling out with his supervisors and getting into arguments with his colleagues’ (witness statement, para 4) and that he had been made aware of such issues in the VPC context on taking over his role in 2021 (para 8). He also judged Mr Seabright unsatisfactory, although less so than Mr Kiddle. By contrast, Mr Redmond and other senior officers had a very high regard for Ms Miller, whose leadership of the Redbridge VPC Unit won her the Cadet Coordinator of the Year award for 2023. Mr Kiddle and Mr Seabright seem to have resented the fact that she was regarded so highly and, according to Mr Redmond, this sentiment manifested itself on occasions in ‘vile’ behaviour towards her. Mr Benge and Ms Ryan gave evidence which strongly corroborated that of Mr Redmond.[42]Mr Kiddle and Mr Seabright entirely rejected these criticisms, maintaining that, in so far as colleagues spoke ill of them, it was purely because of their faithful upholding of high standards, particularly in matters relating to safeguarding.[43]These differences are not for me to resolve here. For present purposes it is enough to make two points. First, the work of the VPC Units in the East Region was constantly bedevilled by the exceedingly poor working relationships between, on the one hand, Mr Kiddle and Mr Seabright and a small faction which supported them and, on the other, the larger group which feared or mistrusted them. Second, I was told without challenge by Mr Wilson, and see no reason to doubt, that since the departures of Mr Seabright and Mr Kiddle, the three Eastern Area VPC Units have cooperated effectively and harmonious relationships have been restored. Outline chronology[44]Mr Kiddle relies on communications between January 2022 and November 2023 as protected disclosures.[45]Mr Seabright relies on alleged protected disclosures between September 2020 and August 2023.[46]Both pray in aid numerous detriments said to have been done to them because of the protected disclosures, culminating in their resignations on, respectively, 1 November 2024 and 4 December 2023.[47]My findings on disclosures and detriments are given under separate headings below.[48]As a consequence of an anonymous report, which included allegations of financial impropriety, Mr Kiddle and Mr Seabright were removed from their VPC responsibilities in August 2023. An investigation followed, which resulted in a formal determination, released on 23 February 2024, of ‘no case to answer’.[49]While away from his VPC duties (a significant part of his time away was marked as sick leave owing to severe anxiety), Mr Kiddle made a number of allegations against, among others, Ms McCarthy, who had been drafted in as his temporary replacement. These included alleged safeguarding breaches[50]Mr Kiddle returned to his VPC Coordinator role at Havering on 2 April 2024.[51]At that point Ms McCarthy declined any further involvement in the Havering VPC and expressed grave concerns about the implications for the Unit of Mr Kiddle’s return. She made a number of specific complaints about his behaviour towards her.[52]It is not in question that, by the time of Mr Kiddle’s return to his duties, his working relationship with Ms McCarthy had entirely broken down. It was necessary for Mr Wilson to institute measures to keep any contact between them to an absolute minimum.[53]As already mentioned, Mr Seabright did not return, having chosen to retire with effect from 4 December 2023. He told me without challenge, and I have no reason to doubt, that his original planned retirement date had been 24 June 2024.[54]On 19 July 2024, Mr Wilson informed Mr Kiddle of a new allegation of financial impropriety, relating to a collection of money for the benefit of a particular cadet.[55]On the following day, Mr Kiddle again signed himself off sick (as he had done when made aware of the August 2023 allegation). He did not return to work.[56]On 21 September 2024 Mr Kiddle gave notice of resignation, to take effect on 1 November 2024.[57]It seems that the (second) investigation was never completed. Perhaps it is still underway today. Mr Kiddle – the alleged disclosures[58]At this stage, I will record only primary findings concerning the alleged disclosures of information. Evaluative findings will follow in due course.[59]Mr Kiddle relied on eight alleged protected disclosures. I will refer to them as PD1, PD2 and so on.[60]PD1 This disclosure took the form of an email of 19 January 2022 to Mr Richmond and PC Paula Cooper, MPS Cadet Manager and Safeguarding Lead, alleging a failure to conduct risk assessments in relation to a camping trip in October 2021. This disclosure is established in fact.[61]PD2 This disclosure, made in writing to Mr Richmond on 20 January 2022, alleged that a named PCSO had travelled alone with a cadet in a vehicle during a camping trip in October 2021 and repeated PD1 in relation to the absence of risk assessments. This disclosure is established in fact.[62]PD3 This was a disclosure made by email on 23 April 2022 by which Mr Kiddle informed Ms Chandler and the Directorate of Professional Standards (‘DPS’) that a named PCSO had been paying cadets to work at his private business without holding a licence to employ children and without the business being registered as a business interest. This disclosure is established in fact.[63]PD4 Mr Kiddle’s case here is that, on 10 August 2022, he informed Ms Chandler and Ms Ryan that cadets had not been recorded correctly on the Junior VPC programme. I find that he fails to establish any disclosure of anything to Ms Chandler on 10 August 2022. I further find, accepting the evidence of Ms Ryan, that, on 10 August 2022, Mr Kiddle made an oral allegation to Ms Ryan about an inadequate staff/cadet ratio at a Junior Cadet evening run by the Safer Schools Team. This communication resulted in Ms Ryan having to leave a training course she was attending in order to check Mr Kiddle’s point. After she satisfied herself that it was groundless (the staff/cadet ratio was correct), there was a further conversation in which she spoke sharply to him. This in turn provoked one of his detriment claims. The pleaded disclosure (about the correct recording of cadets on the Junior VPC programme) is not established in fact. I reject Mr Kiddle’s attempt in his evidence to equate the cadet recording and staff/cadet ratio issues.[64]PD5 This was a disclosure made by Mr Kiddle in writing on 6 September 2022 to the local Professional Standards Unit (‘PSU’), and passed on the same day to Mr Richmond, alleging ‘potential fraud’ by Safer Schools Officers in failing to account for proceeds generated by a cadet event. This disclosure is established in fact.[65]PD6 This was a disclosure made by Mr Kiddle in an email to Ms Ryan on 22 March 2023, alleging that a Safer Schools Officer had shown an indecent image to a cadet. (Ms Ryan was already aware of the incident because the officer had reported it to her and she (Ms Ryan) had satisfied herself that the officer had acted properly (by sanitising the image so that what was shown to the cadet was not indecent).) This disclosure is established in fact.[66]PD7 The pleaded disclosure here was said to have consisted of reporting to A/I Matthew Feather (a witness before me), on 8 August 2023, that PC Pickering had failed to carry out a risk assessment in respect of a proposed walk with cadets on Mersea Island. Mr Kiddle gave evidence consistent with his pleaded case. Mr Feather accepted that he had had a conversation with Mr Kiddle on or around 8 August 2023 at which he had raised some concerns to do with the VPC Units, and said that he had reported his concerns to the Independent Officer for Police Conduct (‘IOPC’). Mr Feather’s evidence was that he had no recollection of any concern about the Mersea Island trip and a clear recollection that Mr Kiddle had told him that all his concerns were in his report to the IOPC. There appears to be no documentary evidence of any complaint or allegation concerning the Mersea Island walk. It found no mention in the information which he sent to the IOPC and (not surprisingly) was not considered by the IOPC. I much prefer the evidence of Mr Feather to that of Mr Kiddle. This disclosure is not established in fact.[67]PD8 Here, the pleaded case alleges that Mr Kiddle informed Ms Ryan on 2 November 2023 of concerns about a camping trip (in October of that year) attended by two vulnerable cadets without ‘tailored’ risk assessments having been carried out by Mr Pickering or Ms McCarthy. The communication on which Mr Kiddle purports to rely is an email of 2 November 2023 to Ms Lisa Hayden, who was then his Police Federation representative, with a copy to Ms Helen Nellany, National Police Chiefs’ Safeguarding Manager. It contained no request or authority for either to forward it to anyone else. In the event, Ms Nellany forwarded it to Ms Cooper. The pleaded disclosure to Ms Ryan is not established in fact. It is not even relied upon by Mr Kiddle. Mr Kiddle – the alleged detriments[68]Again I confine myself here to primary findings concerning the allegedly detrimental treatment. Evaluation of the events which I find established will be for later on.[69]Mr Kiddle relies on 18 detriments altogether, 10 in his first claim and eight in his second. The protected disclosures relied on for each claim are the same.[70]Detriment 1 is expressed as being ‘sworn at’ by Ms Ryan during the episode on 10 August 2022 already mentioned under PD4 above. When the complaint was tested, it went no further than saying that Ms Ryan had told him that she was ‘pissed off’ or perhaps that he had ‘pissed her off’. I find that she did use that language, being annoyed that he had pressed a groundless (alleged) concern about staff/cadet numbers, which had necessitated her missing part of a training course.[71]Detriment 2 is framed as the service of the ‘Reg 17 Notice’ on 26 August 2023, arising out of the anonymous allegation of misconduct against Mr Kiddle and Mr Seabright. In my view the fair approach is to regard the detriment relied upon as being the disciplinary investigation as a whole. On this footing, It is necessary to consider Detriment 2 jointly with Detriment 3 and Detriment 4 (imposition of restrictions and continuation thereof for longer than was necessary). I make the following findings of fact.[72]An anonymous allegation of wrongdoing was made against Mr Kiddle and Mr Seabright in November 2022. In summary they were accused of:(a) improper use of cadet funds for personal purposes, namely a trip to the New Forest in March 2022 which both had attended together with four volunteers, including one Constable and one PCSO;(b) manipulation of records to cover up (a);(c) registering cadets across multiple sites to maximise VPC revenues; and(d) improper and inaccurate record-keeping relating to VPC funds, receipts and ecashbooks.[73]The matter was referred in November 2022 to DC Elizabeth Coombs, a member of the Financial Investigation Unit within the Intelligence Bureau (and a witness before me). She carried out an investigation and produced a report submitted to CRU on 27 July 2023, recommending that there was a potential misconduct matter for investigation.[74]Ms Coombs’s report was reviewed by A/I Rebecca Hawkey of CRU, who, the following day, took the decision to pass the matter to SIU for full investigation.[75]On 8 August 2023 Ms Cross (already mentioned) of SIU was given the task of carrying out the investigation by her line manager, DS Jonny Norman. She prepared a severity assessment report, in which she judged that, if proven, the allegations would constitute gross misconduct and a restrictions report, considering proposed restrictions pending the outcome of the investigation. These were passed to Mr Norman on 18 August 2023. He referred them to his line manager, D/I Katie Rumph who, on 23 August 2023 requested various restrictions including confining the Claimants to working in police buildings and under supervision, preventing them from having face-to-face contact with the public, excluding them from management of finances and deploying them in roles not involving working with cadets. Restrictions in line with Ms Rumph’s recommendations were imposed pursuant to the approval of Mr Day (a witness before me).[76]Ms Cross formed the opinion at an early stage that allegation (c) could not be sustained and gave notice of that finding to the local PSU in October 2023.[77]On 23 November 2023 Ms Cross notified Ms Hayden, then Mr Kiddle’s Police Federation representative, that allegation (c) was not substantiated. She also summarised the matters outstanding.[78]On 6 December 2023 Ms Cross wrote to Ms Hayden disclosing the material which she had collected to date and asking for answers to 18 questions. Ms Hayden replied promptly, stating that she had forwarded the request to Mr Kiddle.[79]Having been chased by Ms Cross on 3 January 2024, Ms Hayden wrote to her on 12 January 2024 attaching some documents disclosed by Mr Kiddle and promising to follow up with answers to the 18 questions ‘in the next few weeks’.[80]In the absence of assistance from Mr Kiddle, Ms Cross approached Ms Coombs for assistance on one matter which was concerning her, namely the interaction between receipts and the cadet cashbook records. It seems that Ms Coombs was not able to provide the clarification, or all the clarification, which she was looking for.[81]By late January 2024, Ms Cross had reached a conclusion on allegation (a), namely that the trip to the New Forest had taken place and had had a legitimate purpose (to serve as a ‘recce’ for a planned future cadets camping trip).[82]On 29 January 2024 Ms Cross spoke with Mr Brewster, who by then had replaced Ms Hayden as Mr Kiddle’s Police Federation representative (also a witness before me). It seems that there was no apparent prospect of Ms Cross’s questions receiving answers from Mr Kiddle and it was agreed that she would do her best to reach a conclusion on the two remaining allegations without further input from him.[83]Ms Cross completed her report on 21 February 2024, concluding that none of the allegations was made out and that there was no case for either of the Claimants to answer.[84]The result was communicated on 23 February 2024 to both Claimants (as already noted, Mr Seabright had by then retired in any event) and the restrictions applying to Mr Kiddle were immediately lifted.[85]Detriment 5 complains of removal of ‘support networks’ between 27 August 2023 and 23 November 2023. The vague formulation was ultimately clarified as being about Mr Kiddle’s name being removed from a work WhatsApp group and a work Facebook page. It was not in dispute that Mr Kiddle removed his own name from the WhatsApp group. Mr Shaikh directed his removal from the Facebook page because of the restrictions excluding him from involvement in work connected with the VPC programme. The pleaded further complaint about colleagues being discouraged from speaking to Mr Kiddle appeared not to be pursued. In any event, I am not persuaded on the material before me that it is made out in fact.[86]Mr Kiddle withdrew most of his case on Detriment 6 before closing submissions. All that remains is the complaint that, on returning to work on 2 April 2024, he found that items which had been in his office had been ‘boxed up and unceremoniously dumped’. In cross-examination, he claimed that it was Ms McCarthy who had ‘boxed up’ his possessions but provided no evidential basis for that assertion. Ms McCarthy told me that members of the school staff (the office was on a school site) had done the ‘boxing up’ and that the boxes had been placed in a room used by the school for storage. I accept her evidence, having no reason to disbelieve it. I find that Mr Kiddle’s property was moved because it was necessary to make space in what had been his office to accommodate both Ms McCarthy and the new Safer Schools Officer. By the time of Mr Kiddle’s return to work in April 2024 a decision had been taken (about which he now makes no complaint) that the holder of the VPC Coordinator position should no longer be based at the school (or any school).[87]Detriment 7 On 2 April 2024 Ms McCarthy sent a message to a private WhatsApp group which seems to have consisted wholly or mainly of volunteers who had supported her during her time standing in for Mr Kiddle. Her message read (with typographical corrections): I’m sorry to say this but PC Kiddle is returning to the role of Cadet Coordinator (Seniors) once his safeguarding is up-to-date. I would like to thank you all for your support for me and the cadets, they really have developed into a great unit with all of your hard work … I will not be working alongside him and decided to step away. I’m gutted and worry for the cadets and you all … No words … but thank you xx Mr Kiddle was not one of the named recipients and did not receive the message at the time when it was sent.[88]Detriment 8 is based on the fact that, on 8 April 2024, Ms McCarthy sent an email to Mr Kiddle asking him to pay outstanding cadet fees owed in respect of his son. The following matters were not in dispute:(a) collection of outstanding fees was part of the VPC Coordinator role which Ms McCarthy had been discharging;(b) the email was polite and unobjectionable in its language and tone;(c) Mr Kiddle was in arrears in respect of fees for regular activities between March and August 2023 and two camping trips;(d) Ms McCarthy’s treatment of Mr Kiddle was consistent with the action she had taken between November 2023 and January 2024 in relation to another parent who had fallen into arrears.[89]Detriment 9 rests on an instruction given by Mr Wilson to Mr Kiddle on 8 April 2024 to limit his contact with Ms McCarthy to urgent situations only and to report to Mr Shaikh on his planned place of work and working pattern, in order to minimise the risk of ‘unplanned confrontations’. It is not in dispute that he gave an identical instruction to Ms McCarthy.[90]Detriment 10 complains about a notification to Mr Kiddle on 8 April 2024 of a determination that he should undergo ‘reflective practice’ in respect of an incident which had occurred in June 2023 and (on his case) had been dealt with at the time. The following matters were, ultimately, not in dispute:(a) the incident had happened during a Havering VPC Unit trips to Scotland when a school minibus driven by a police officer (not Mr Kiddle or Mr Seabright) was driven very close to a cyclist, resulting in a complaint;(b) contrary to established procedures, Mr Kiddle, the Coordinator and, as such, the responsible officer, failed to report the incident, or the complaint, to his supervisor or register it with the PSU or the DPS. 91 ‘Reflective practice’ is a non-disciplinary measure intended to improve the conduct and performance of police officers.[92]The decision that Mr Kiddle should undergo reflective practice was, in the usual way, taken by DPS.[93]Detriment 11 was withdrawn.[94]Detriment 12 is based on an email sent by Ms McCarthy to Mr Shaikh on 19 January 2024 detailing numerous concerns and complaints about Mr Kiddle’s performance and behaviour. Mr Kiddle’s case is that Ms McCarthy had printed a copy of the email and left it lying around in the office in order for him to find it on his return to work. Her case was that it was left in a drawer in a locked office. I decline to make a finding as to precisely how Mr Kiddle came by the email. I am not persuaded that Ms McCarthy left it lying around with a view to him finding it.[95]Detriment 13 rests on an email from Ms Ryan to Mr Shaikh dated 22 January 2024. She wrote it having been copied into Mr Shaikh’s reply to Ms McCarthy’s email of 19 January 2024. It seems that this email was also printed and came to Mr Kiddle’s attention at the same time as that email. Ms Ryan told Mr Shaikh that she had had concerns for a long time about ‘deep-rooted issues’ arising out of Mr Kiddle’s running of the Havering Unit and that she had advised Ms McCarthy to document her own concerns. She also noted what she perceived as material improvements since Miss McCarthy had taken over.[96]Detriment 14 adds nothing to Detriment 10.[97]Detriment 15 alleges that on 29 May 2024 Insp Connolly asked Mr Kiddle to leave Hornchurch police station while he was using the toilet facilities. By the end of his evidence it seemed that Mr Kiddle was not asserting that the request to leave was made at the very time when he was using the facilities. I find in any event that if that was his case, it was not true. It is common ground that the request to leave the station was made. It was also common ground that Mr Kiddle had been asked by Mr Wilson to stay away from Hornchurch police station. The reason was that Ms McCarthy was based there. It seems to have taken Mr Connolly at least an hour to persuade him to leave.[98]Detriment 16 is framed as a complaint about service of the Reg 17 Notice of 5 August 2024. As with the earlier disciplinary investigation, I treat the relevant detriment as being made subject to the disciplinary investigation process as a whole. Accordingly, I treat it as fully covering Detriment 17, the complaint that the Notice was not withdrawn.[99]The allegation to which the Notice related arose out of a collection organised by Mr Kiddle in 2021 for the benefit of a cadet who had suffered serious injuries in a road traffic accident. The complaint had come from the cadet’s family, the gist of the allegation being that Mr Kiddle had not accounted for the money collected (which seems to have exceeded £3000), or all of it. Some unremarkable restrictions were imposed on Mr Kiddle. It seems that the investigation had made very little headway before he gave notice of his resignation.[100]For the first time, Mr Kiddle asserted in his evidence before me that the subject-matter of the Reg 17 Notice had been examined and dealt with by Ms Chandler in 2021. There is no sign of that claim in his witness statement and I have been shown no document tending to support it. I reject Mr Kiddle’s evidence on this point.[101]As to the argument that, in so far as it was proper to institute the investigation at all, Mr Kiddle was subjected to a detriment in that the Notice ought to have been withdrawn after his email to the IO of 15 August 2024, I find as follows. In that email, Mr Kiddle provided some documentary evidence said to substantiate a £500 donation from a local charity and a payment of £579 to the cadet for a new phone and stated that the remaining funds were held in the Havering VPC bank account, £1,500 having been transferred to it in August 2023 and the balance ‘paid into’ a ‘cash tin’ in June 2024, before being paid into the VPC bank account the following month. No account of the total was provided. He explained the interval from August 2023 to June 2024 as being attributable to the fact that he had been ‘gated’ (a reference to the earlier disciplinary investigation) and, even on returning to work, was denied access to his ‘office or banking material’ until the beginning of June 2024.[102]Detriment 18 is based on an alleged ‘threat’ on 16 August by the IO to arrest Mr Kiddle if he failed to attend an interview into the matters on which the Reg 17 Notice related. Mr Kiddle says that he learned of the alleged threat from Mr Brewster, but the latter makes no mention of it in his witness statement. I have not been taken to any contemporary complaint. There were certainly communications between the IO and Mr Brewster. On 3 September 2024 she advised Mr Wilson that Mr Kiddle had turned down ‘another two’ proposed interview dates. There may have been some conversation about possible consequences if Mr Kiddle was not willing to cooperate with the investigation. But I am not persuaded that anything that can properly be called a ‘threat’ was made. Mr Seabright – the alleged disclosures[103]Mr Seabright relied on 10 alleged protected disclosures. As before, I will call them PD1, PD2 and so on.[104]Here again, my findings of fact that this stage are concerned only with whether the alleged disclosures of information were made.[105]Mr Seabright’s pleaded case is that PD1 consisted of concerns which he had raised with Insp Michael O’Donoghue on 3 September 2020 concerning the behaviour of A/S Jhala towards female members of staff. In his evidence he relied on an email message of 9 September 2020. On examination, that communication says nothing about the officer’s treatment of female staff and is all about Mr Seabright’s complaint about the way in which he (Mr Jhala) was managing him. I do not accept Mr Seabright’s attempt in his witness statement to plug the gap by asserting, nearly five years after the event, that he made an oral disclosure at around the same time about misogynistic behaviour by Mr Jhala – a claim for which I was shown no corroborative contemporary documentary evidence. The pleaded disclosure is not established in fact.[106]PD2 is said to consist of an email sent on 19 November 2021 disclosing that a particular PCSO had not followed proper procedures in gaining cadet funding. On examination, the communication concerned turns out to be a message to the PCSO which asks a series of questions. It does not convey information. The fact that it was copied to Ms Chandler does not assist Mr Seabright since the copying of it did not convey any information to her either. The disclosure relied on is not established in fact.[107]PD3 consists of an email sent by Mr Seabright to Mr Kiddle on 19 January 2022 alleging that members of the VPC team had failed to carry out risk assessments in relation to cadet activities between April 2021 and November 2021. The disclosure here relied upon is not disputed and I find that it was made.[108]PD4 was said to consist of a disclosure by Mr Seabright to Mr Kiddle on 20 January 2022 about a cadet leader travelling with an unaccompanied cadet in a vehicle during a camping trip and about the absence of adequate risk assessments. In his evidence Mr Seabright acknowledged that the only relevant message sent on 20 January 2022 had been from a Safer Schools Officer to Mr Kiddle. That message was about the cadet leader and the unaccompanied cadet being together in the vehicle. It said nothing about risk assessments.[109]In his witness statement (para 36) Mr Seabright referred to an email of 19 January sent by Mr Kiddle to Mr Richmond. Self-evidently, this could not be put forward as a disclosure on the part of Mr Seabright.[110]In his oral evidence, Mr Seabright sought to rely on an email sent by him to several recipients including Ms Cooper, Mr Richmond and Mr Kiddle on 20 January 2022, which referred to the unaccompanied cadet episode but said nothing about risk assessments. Mr Feeny in his closing submissions relied on this evidence as ‘clarifying’ Mr Seabright’s case on PD4.[111]The pleaded disclosure under PD4 is not established in fact.[112]PD5 was said to consist of a disclosure on 23 April 2022 by Mr Seabright to Ms Chandler and DPS concerning a named PCSO paying cadets to work at his private business without a licence to employ children and without the business being registered as a business interest. This mirrors Mr Kiddle’s PD3. Mr Seabright’s difficulty here is that the relevant email was not his but Mr Kiddle’s. In his witness statement (para 36), Mr Seabright attempts to associate himself with Mr Kiddle and even characterises the email as being that of ‘the officers’ (meaning, presumably, his and Mr Kiddle’s jointly). But the document speaks for itself: it comes from Mr Kiddle, who speaks in the first person singular throughout.[113]Conscious, perhaps, of the weakness of his position, Mr Seabright claimed in his oral evidence that, also on 23 April 2023, he personally had had a telephone conversation with Ms Chandler in which (seemingly) the information covered by the email of the same day was communicated. This alleged conversation is nowhere documented in the evidence. It does not feature anywhere in the pleaded case. There is no hint of it in Mr Seabright’s own witness statement. I regret to say that I simply disbelieve this evidence.[114]The disarray in Mr Seabright’s case on PD5 is well illustrated by the fact that Mr Feeny interpreted his instructions as being to the effect that the disclosure was oral and made to Mr Kiddle.[115]I am clear that the pleaded disclosure under PD5 is not established in fact.[116]PD6 was said to consist of Mr Seabright informing Ms Chandler and Mr Richmond on 19 July 2022 that cadets had not been correctly recorded on the Junior VPC programme. This disclosure is rightly accepted on behalf of the Respondent and I find it established in fact, save that the information imparted related not to ‘cadets’ but to one individual cadet.[117]PD7 was abandoned.[118]PD8 was said to consist of a message from Mr Seabright to Mr Richmond of 25 January 2023 alleging that Ms Miller had not been following specific orders. I find that Mr Seabright did write to Mr Richmond on that date complaining that Ms Miller was not cooperating in preparing for a passing-out parade in which cadets from all three East Region Boroughs were to participate. A disclosure of information (as understood in Kilraine) is established in fact.[119]PD9 was said to consist of oral disclosures made by Mr Seabright to Mr Richmond and Mr Benge on or around 29 April 2023 that:(a) Ms Miller had, on more than one occasion, driven a minibus with cadets on board without having another cadet leader present; and(b) Ms Miller had had two cadets in her unit who had passed their eighteenth birthdays, did not hold DBS cheques and had not completed the prescribed safeguarding course. These disclosures are established in fact.[120]PD10 was said be based on an alleged disclosure of 8 August 2023 by Mr Seabright and Mr Kiddle to Mr Feather about an alleged failure to carry out a risk assessment in relation to a planned cadet trip to Mersea Island. In crossexamination, Mr Seabright abandoned the pleaded case. Instead, he sought to rely on an alleged disclosure of the same information to Mr Kiddle on an unspecified date between 24 and 30 July 2023. The pleaded disclosure is not established in fact. Mr Seabright – the alleged detriments[121]Mr Seabright relied on six detriments.[122]Detriment 1 is put as ‘unfair treatment’ by Mr O’Donoghue after 3 September 2020, following Mr Seabright raising ‘issues of poor practice’ on the part of Mr Jhala. This unfair treatment was said to include Mr O’Donoghue threatening to ‘do his legs in’ if he continued to be difficult.[123]It is apparent from the contemporary emails that Mr O’Donoghue was exasperated to find himself being approached by a Constable who was apparently affronted at being invited by his line manager (Mr Jhala) to attend a meeting with a view to agreeing ways to improve the performance of the VPC Unit. Mr O’Donoghue pointed out that there was nothing unusual about a line manager wishing to hold one-to-one meetings with his ‘reports’ and suggested that he should attend and put forward his position at the meeting. I cannot accept that there was any threat of violence, if that was really what Mr Seabright wanted to suggest.[124]Under Detriment 2 Mr Seabright alleged ‘unfair and unlawful use of misconduct procedures’ and complained that his concerns about Mr Jhala had been ignored or that that officer’s behaviour had been supported.[125]Although the evidence is very unsatisfactory, it seems that, at some point in 2020 or 2021, Mr Jhala applied to Mr Seabright some form of performance management measure or procedure which culminated in ‘reflective practice’. All of this caused Mr Seabright to experience pressure and a strong sense of resentment.[126]As to Detriment 3, Detriment 4 and Detriment 5, these arise out of the disciplinary investigation between August 2023 and February 2024 and correspond exactly with Mr Kiddle’s Detriment 2, Detriment 3 and Detriment 4. So far as material, the findings already made apply equally in the context of Mr Seabright’s case, and I will not repeat them here.[127]Mr Seabright accepted that the restrictions imposed on him had effect only after 16 September 2023 (he said that they were not served on him and that accordingly he had not become aware of them on that date) and that his period of service came to an end less than three months after that.[128]As already mentioned, the disciplinary investigation culminated in a formal finding issued on 23 February 2024 of ‘no case to answer’ in respect of both Claimants.[129]Detriment 6 is said to consist of ‘hostile’ treatment by Mr Richmond on 25 January 2023 after Mr Seabright raised a concern alleging that Ms Miller had not been following orders.5[130]The evidence is of poor quality and lacks detail. My findings are necessarily general. As already mentioned, I find that Mr Richmond shared the view of other senior managers that Ms Miller provided an admirable service at Redbridge and that her unit overwhelmingly outshone the other two Boroughs. He also regarded Mr Kiddle and Mr Seabright as negative, confrontational, divisive figures and held 55 Counsel renumbered this as Detriment 3 in the interests of chronological coherence. Rightly or wrongly, I prefer to leave the numbering unchanged. them largely responsible for the fractured working relationships not only within their Boroughs but also between Boroughs. Mr Richmond was not impressed with the long complaint about Ms Miller in Mr Seabright’s email of 25 January 2023 in which he alleged that she was not cooperating in preparations for a passing-out parade and that her lack of cooperation amounted to a failure to follow orders. He heard her side, which he found persuasive. In brief, she maintained that she was not in a position, at quite short notice, to sign up for the number of practice sessions which Mr Kiddle and Mr Seabright were contending for. I reject Mr Seabright’s vague allegations of ‘hostility’ on the part of Mr Richmond. Quite simply, Mr Richmond was not persuaded that Ms Miller was in breach of any order which she had received. More generally, I have no doubt, he did his best to stress the importance of the three Boroughs, and in particular the three Coordinators, working together. Regrettably, his words seem to have fallen on deaf ears. Emails followed from Mr Kittle and Mr Seabright to Ms Miller which read more like instructions than proposals for a way forward, copied to senior officers. Eventually, on 10 February 2023, Mr Richmond wrote to Mr Kiddle, Mr Seabright, Mr Pickering, Ms Miller and Mr Benge as follows: The lack of professionalism from all involved is clear across the board. Sort this out. In person or phone would be better. I will cancel this event if needed. Stop bickering. This drew an immediate, angry response from Mr Seabright, disputing any lack of professionalism on his part and attaching all the blame to Ms Miller. Action taken in response to the disclosures[131]A constant theme of the witness statements of both Claimants was that they raised numerous concerns on important matters (particularly relating to safeguarding) but no action was taken. This was surprising because it bore no relation to the facts. Time and again, Mr Adjei took them to documents demonstrating that points of concern were examined and, where appropriate, wrongdoing was identified and sanctions or lesser measures applied. The evidence simply does not establish a culture of turning a blind eye, as the Claimants were so disposed to insinuate. Knowledge of the decision-makers about the (alleged) protected disclosures[132]An appreciable number of the Respondents’ witnesses gave evidence to the effect that, at relevant times, they had been unaware of the disclosures on which the Claimants rely as instances of ‘whistle-blowing’. It would not be proportionate for me to make findings in all cases since (as will be explained) large parts of the case of each Claimant fails in any event because certain alleged disclosures are found not to have happened or not to have been protected and certain alleged detriments are found not to have amounted to detriments. I return to this subject below. Analysis and Conclusions Rationale for primary findings[133]It is not my function to explain, item by item, my reasons for arriving at particular factual findings. I have referred above to a number of factors which struck me as significant in relation to particular disputes in the evidence. My main touchstones have been plausibility, internal consistency and, most important of all, consistency with contemporary documents. Generally, I found the evidence given on behalf of the Commissioner of higher quality than that given by the Claimants and their supporting witnesses. In particular, I found the two Claimants unprepossessing witnesses who seemed to tailor their evidence to what they perceived as their personal advantage rather than having due regard to their duty to present truthful and accurate accounts of events.
Preliminary
[134]Before embarking on my analysis, I must address an important controversy between counsel on their closing submissions. Mr Adjei submitted that I should address the case as presented through the pleadings and, more specifically, through the agreed lists of issues. I should not stray beyond those boundaries. Mr Feeny argued for a looser approach, treating the Claimants’ evidence as ‘clarifying’ in some instances the claims formulated in the pleadings and lists of issues. I reject Mr Feeny’s submission. The Claimants and the Respondent have been represented throughout. The Claimants have had the good fortune to have the support of the Police Federation for much longer. The case has been carefully managed by the Tribunal. Particulars have been served. The matter came before me on the basis that all issues were agreed. In my judgment it is not appropriate or just to treat the pleadings and the agreed lists of issues as a starting-point. On the contrary, in a case like this where both sides have expert representation, the proper course is to regard them as firmly setting the boundaries of the dispute. Mr Feeny did not ask me for permission to amend the case of either Claimant. No doubt that was a well-considered approach. I would have taken a great deal of persuading that it was just all in keeping with the overriding objective to permit any material amendment at trial, let alone at the end of the trial, after all the evidence has been given. Mr Kiddle - protected disclosures[135]On my primary findings, relevant disclosures of information are established under PD1, PD2, PD3, PD5 and PD6. PD4 and PD7 fall away at once.[136]So does PD8. As I have found, the pleaded disclosure to Ms Ryan is not established in fact. It may be superfluous to add that Mr Kiddle does not rely on Ms Nellany as the ‘employer’ or as a specially designated person for the purposes of communicating qualifying disclosures. His case (submissions para 66) is that his disclosure became a protected disclosure when it reached Paula Cooper. But, as already explained, the disclosure to Paula Cooper was not Mr Kiddle’s disclosure.[137]Were the five that survive disclosures of information to the ‘employer’? Clearly, they were.[138]Were they disclosures of information which in Mr Kiddle’s reasonable belief tended to show any of the matters referred to in the 1996 Act, s43B(1)? I find that the disclosures under PD1, PD2, PD3 and PD4 were. The first three were credible allegations of breaches of safeguarding rules which could properly be seen as legal obligations and, in any event, matters bearing upon the health and safety of young people. The fourth appears to raise a legitimate concern about financial probity. I find that Mr Kiddle had the requisite belief and that it was, in each case, reasonable,[139]I am more doubtful about PD6. Mr Kiddle did not know the circumstances in which the image was shown to the cadet. That being so, it strikes me as remarkable that he felt able to make the categorical allegation that the officer had committed a criminal offence. That said, I bear in mind the deliberate flexibility of the statutory language, which requires a belief that a particular state of affairs exists ‘or is likely to’ exist. The purpose of the legislation is surely to embrace the case of someone revealing not only an established fact but also information less certain than that, but which may well tend to point to the existence of such a state of affairs. Having regard to that flexibility, I find (not without hesitation) that Mr Kiddle passes the test also in relation to PD6.[140]Did Mr Kiddle believe that the disclosures were made in the public interest and, if so, was that a reasonable belief? Again, it seems to me that the legislation requires the Tribunal to allow the putative ‘whistle-blower’ a fair degree of latitude. To qualify for protection, he or she does not have to have the question of public interest in the forefront of his or her mind. I accept that Mr Kiddle starts from the premise that it is generally in the public interest that information about safeguarding of young people should be aired. I proceed on the footing that when making the five relevant disclosures, he had it in his consciousness that, in some way, they spoke to the public interest generally. Mr Kiddle – detriments[141]Do the established facts make out detrimental treatment?[142]Detriment 1 Given the low bar for establishing a detriment, I am just persuaded that one is made out here. Although the complaint that Mr Kiddle was ‘sworn at’ by Ms Ryan borders on the absurd, she did speak crossly to him and her manner was not what is expected of a police officer (hence the fact that reflective practice was applied to her).[143]Detriment 2 Despite what is said above about a rigorous adherence to the pleaded dispute, I acknowledge that it would not be right to stretch rigour into pedantry. In my view, a fair reading of Detriment 2 treats it as embracing the entire disciplinary investigation.[144]I find Detriment 2 made out on the simple basis that both Claimants were ultimately acquitted of the allegations against them and (on the assumption, which I make, that the outcome was correct) it was obviously detrimental for them to be faced with a disciplinary investigation at all. I do not find any additional detriment in the regrettable delay in seeing through a notably uncomplicated investigation. Detriment must be measured in its proper context and if, as I find, the delay here was anything but unusual, I cannot see in it any separate ground for legal complaint.[145]Under Detriment 3 the Claimants establish a detriment which goes hand in hand with Detriment 2, namely being subjected to restrictions and excluded from their normal working activities.[146]As to Detriment 4, I am not persuaded. I have accepted evidence on behalf of the Respondent that it is not usual for the question of restrictions to be re-visited mid-investigation. No doubt such a practice of reviewing restrictions in the course of investigations would serve only to slow further the glacial pace with which the Respondent’s investigations are conducted. There was no special reason for such intervention here. In context, Mr Kiddle identifies no legitimate ground of grievance.[147]Mr Kiddle removed himself from the WhatsApp group and Mr Shaikh removing him from the Facebook page was, self-evidently, a proper and reasonable course to take. Accordingly, I find no actionable detriment under Detriment 5. Mr Kiddle shows nothing here on which a justifiable sense of grievance could be based.[148]There is nothing in Detriment 6. Mr Kiddle was not disadvantaged by having his items ‘boxed up’. Arguably, he benefited from having a chore performed for him. I regret that this complaint was ever put forward as the basis for a legal claim.[149]Detriment 7 fails. It consists of a private message not addressed to Mr Kiddle, which he had no business to read. In any event, his case here was in the end put exclusively on an erroneous premise, namely that Ms McCarthy’s words implied that Mr Kiddle was inclined, or likely, to subject the cadets to some kind of abuse when he returned to the Coordinator role. The argument is baseless.[150]Detriment 8 is equally untenable. Mr Kiddle failed to pay his dues. Why he should feel aggrieved at being politely asked to do so is puzzling. If that really is how he feels, his sense of indignation is entirely unwarranted.[151]There is nothing in Detriment 9. Mr Wilson gave a legitimate and reasonable instruction to Mr Kiddle and Ms McCarthy because of the parlous state of the working relationship between them. Neither had any tenable ground for feeling aggrieved about Mr Wilson’s intervention.[152]I also reject Detriment 10. Although Mr Kiddle clearly seems to have regarded it as slighting his dignity, the application of the remedial, non-disciplinary measure of reflective practice was unobjectionable. He had been in charge on the Scotland trip and had failed to take the steps which should have been taken following the near-miss with the cyclist. It would have been open to DPS to take a harsher line. If he feels aggrieved, he is not justified in that sentiment.[153]Detriment 12 and Detriment 13 are both obviously unsustainable. The messages on which they rest were not addressed to Mr Kiddle and (irrespective of the means by which they fell into his possession) he had no business to read them. Moreover and in any event, they contain legitimate comment and the fact that he disagrees with them cannot turn the experience of reading them into an actionable detriment.[154]There is nothing in Detriment 15. Mr Kiddle was at Hornchurch police station. He should not have been there. Mr Connolly gave effect to the perfectly legitimate instruction of Mr Wilson. There is no suggestion that he did so in an aggressive or offensive way. It is a matter of regret that he appears to have had to devote an hour of his valuable time to hearing vacuous argument about the legality of the instruction before Mr Kiddle did the right thing and left.[155]I reject the claims based on Detriment 16 and Detriment 17. As I have found, the complaint concerning the collection for the cadet had not been considered in 2021. Even if it had, Mr Kiddle’s handling of the matter between then and the summer of 2024 would have called for separate investigation. His ‘explanation’ in his email of 15 August 2024 posed as many obvious (and worrying) questions as it purported to answer. To have dismissed the allegation without a full investigation would have been the height of folly and would have exposed the Commissioner to serious jeopardy. I find that it was no detriment to him to be faced with a disciplinary investigation of a matter which seemed to ask serious issues about his conduct and integrity over a sustained period of time. Mr Kiddle – the ‘reason-why’ question[156]It may be helpful to recapitulate again at this point. I have found that Mr Kiddle made five PDs (PD1, PD2, PD3, PD5 and PD6) and experienced detrimental treatment under Detriment 1, Detriment 2 and Detriment 3.[157]Was any of those detriments done to him ‘on the ground that’ he had made a PD? In my view, the only sensible answer to the question is no. I start with Detriment 1. Ms Ryan did not speak crossly to Mr Kiddle because he had made a PD. She did so because she was irked at having to leave a training course in order to check a technical point which he had raised with her and which, on further enquiry, she had found to be entirely groundless. I see no possible reason to think that if his concern had been about something not touching upon safeguarding rules, her reaction would have been any different. Common sense argues that it would have been precisely the same.[158]Moving from the immediate circumstances of the detriment to the wider evidence, I find nothing to support Mr Feeny’s submissions about a ‘culture’ disposed to squash or disparage or trivialise or ignore concerns about safeguarding matters. Mr Kiddle (and Mr Seabright) repeatedly claimed that reports about safeguarding issues were ignored and ‘nothing was done’ about them. But the facts were otherwise, as I have found.[159]Mr Kiddle complained that he was repeatedly subjected to detriments because of his ‘whistle-blowing’ but, as my findings above demonstrate, the bulk of the alleged detriments turn out on examination to be nothing of the kind. Rather, most have proved to be baseless points about which no sensible complaint could be made.[160]Moreover, I have reminded myself that the statutory question is whether the reason for the behaviour complained of is that the complainant has made a protected disclosure. Time and again, the suggestion was made that Mr Kiddle was penalised for being a valiant upholder of safeguarding protections, willing to make a nuisance of himself for that higher purpose. But the statutory protection does not attach to campaigners, but to makers of PDs. My focus must be on whether, in so far as Mr Kiddle did ‘blow the whistle’, he was penalised for that specific act or, if applicable, those specific acts. In this context, it is instructive to consider the possible motivation behind many of the acts complained about which have already fallen away as failing to disclose actionable detriments. So, for example, it is not challenged that the requirement to undergo reflective practice (Detriment 10) came from DPS and there is no possible evidential basis for a theory that the decision-maker was aware of any PD by Mr Kiddle. Likewise, there is no reason to infer that Mr Connolly was aware of any PD when he asked Mr Kiddle to leave Hornchurch police station (Detriment 15).[161]All in all, I find nothing in the evidence before me pointing to Mr Kiddle’s PDs prior to 10 August 2022 (PD1, PD2 or PD3) having influenced in any way Ms Ryan’s treatment of him on 10 August 2022. Indeed, I find no evidence that Ms Ryan was even aware of those disclosures (all of which were made at a time when she was not managing him).[162]Turning to Detriment 2 and Detriment 3, Mr Feeny complained that the allegations were obviously false and malicious and that it must have been obvious to those who handled them that they had no substance. I cannot accept that. The fact that, at the end of an investigation, a clear result was given does not warrant the view that it was plain all along that there was nothing which merited investigation.[163]I also reject the complaint that the treatment of the Claimants was, viewed on its own terms, unreasonably harsh. The charge, made anonymously, accused two officers in positions of responsibility with involvement in financial irregularities in relation to the VPC Units for which they were responsible. That was, on any view, a serious allegation and, not being self-evidently groundless, clearly needed to be investigated under the misconduct procedures.[164]I am also unpersuaded by Mr Feeny’s attempt to compare the Claimants’ treatment with that applied to the other four members who attended the New Forest trip. They were not in positions of authority or responsibility. There was no suggestion that they handled money or were involved in accounting for any expense on that trip. Had Ms Cross found that the trip had never happened, or had simply been a ‘jolly’ for those involved, that might have been the moment to consider whether the other four should also face disciplinary action since, in those circumstances, they would arguably have been implicated in a deception. But no such finding was made.[165]In addition, Mr Feeny sought to draw comparisons with those who were found to have departed in various ways from good practice, including in matters relating to safeguarding. The measures taken in such cases (words of advice, reflective practice and so on) were obviously sensible and proportionate. But none involved allegations of serious financial misconduct of the sort which Mr Kiddle and Mr Seabright faced.[166]Stepping back, I find nothing odd or disproportionate about the institution and conduct of the disciplinary investigation. I have commented on delay but, sad to say, the delay here was unremarkable in the context of Met Police disciplinary processes. And I have noted that the fact that the restrictions were not reviewed after parts of the disciplinary case had fallen away, was again consistent with standard practice.[167]And here again, there is simply nothing to suggest that the key decisionmakers in relation to the disciplinary investigation knew anything about the relevant PDs (PDs 1, 2, 3 and 5). Ms Coombs gave evidence that she did not. Ms Cross gave similar evidence save that she acknowledged that she was made aware in general terms in around January 2024 that Mr Kiddle and Mr Seabright had raised concerns to do with VPC cadets (by which time her investigation was at a very advanced stage). Nor is there any evidence to suggest that Ms Hawkey, Mr Norman or Ms Rumph were aware when they took their decisions of any material disclosure by either Claimant. Likewise, there is no evidence that Mr Day was aware of any disclosure by either Claimant when he decided on 16 September 2023 to approve the restrictions proposed in relation to both pending the outcome of the investigation. I am offered no reason to doubt his clear and entirely plausible evidence that he knew nothing about the alleged disclosures until June 2024.[168]For the above reasons, I have reached the clear conclusion that, to the extent that he makes out any PD and/or detriment, Mr Kiddle fails to establish any arguable ground for an inference that any detriment was materially influenced by any PD. Mr Kiddle – outcome of detriment claims[169]Accordingly, Mr Kiddle’s detriment claims fail. Mr Kiddle – unfair dismissal[170]The first requirement for an unfair dismissal is a dismissal. Since he relies on a constructive dismissal, Mr Kiddle must establish a breach going to the root of the (deemed) contract of employment and an election on his part, without an intervening affirmation, to accept the breach by resignation.[171]The proposed unfair dismissal claim does not get off the ground. There manifestly was no dismissal. The fact that Mr Kiddle has established some detrimental treatment does not justify the view that there was any breach on the part of the Commissioner. It was no breach for Ms Ryan to speak sharply to him on 10 August 2022. Nor was it a breach for the Respondent to put into effect a disciplinary investigation as a result of the first misconduct complaint. Nor does it avail Mr Kiddle to aggregate those two matters together. There was no breach, much less repudiation, of the contract.[172]Even if he had established a repudiation of the contract, Mr Kiddle would have failed in his complaint of unfair, constructive dismissal. This is because, on any view, his action in remaining in his role after the last matter complained of (the conclusion of the first disciplinary investigation) could only stand as an affirmation of the contract as breached. The effect of the affirmation was to rob Mr Kiddle, long before he gave notice, of any possibility of being entitled to resign and treat himself as constructively dismissed.[173]Further and in any event, even if there had been a repudiation and a legallyeffective resignation in response, with the consequence that a constructive dismissal was established, I would have held that the reason (or principal reason) for the dismissal (whatever it was) was not the fact that Mr Kiddle had made PD’s. For the reasons given above, there is simply no rational basis for finding any such motivation.[174]It follows that the complaint by Mr Kiddle of ‘automatically’ unfair dismissal also fails. Mr Kiddle – jurisdiction[175]Since all claims have failed, the question of jurisdiction becomes moot. For completeness, however, I hold that all claims brought outside the primary threemonth period (as extended by the Early Conciliation provisions) fail also on jurisdictional grounds, being out of time. And for these purposes there can be no question of any ‘series of similar acts or failures’ for the purposes of the 1996 Act, s48(3) or any ‘act extending over a period’ for the purposes of s48(4)(a). This is because where the legislation speaks of ‘similar acts or failures’ or of ‘act extending over a period’ it necessarily refers to unlawful conduct. Here, on my findings, no unlawful act is shown.[176]Perhaps not surprisingly, I was presented with no good reason for taking a different view on jurisdiction. The Claimants had the support of the Police Federation throughout. They have had access to expert legal advice since leaving the Met and, it may be, before that. At all events, they were on enquiry as to their rights throughout. No arguable reason is shown for the view that it was ‘not reasonably practicable’ to present each detriment claim within three months (as extended) from the date of accrual of the cause of action. Mr Seabright – protected disclosures[177]On my primary findings, all alleged disclosures other than PD3, PD6, PD8 and PD9 have fallen away.[178]Before considering those, I should come back quickly to PD1. As I understood Mr Feeny, he did not ultimately rely on the content of the 9 September 2020 email as a protected disclosure. But in case I misunderstand him, I find as a fact in any event that Mr Seabright did not believe that what he said about Mr Jhala’s management of him tended to show any breach of any legal obligation or that his disclosure to Mr O’Donoghue was in the public interest. Moreover, if he had believed either of those matters, such belief would, in my view, have been quite unreasonable.[179]As to PD3, I am satisfied that a protected disclosure is made out. The reasoning applicable to Mr Kiddle’s first three PDs is equally applicable here.[180]The same goes for PD6, which repeats Mr Kiddle’s PD4.[181]PD8 is certainly not a protected disclosure. I am quite satisfied that it was not a disclosure of information which Mr Seabright believed tended to show any breach of a legal obligation. It was the product of Mr Seabright’s determination to try and secure some advantage in his unseemly campaign against Ms Miller, by attempting to persuade Mr Redmond to intervene against her. The information was also not imparted with any belief on Mr Seabright’s part that its disclosure was in the public interest. He knew very well that it was anything but. And if I am wrong about whether he believed either that the disclosure tended to show any breach of a legal obligation or that it was made in the public interest, I am very clear that neither such belief was at all reasonable.[182]Although I am quite satisfied that the primary motivation behind it were resentment and spite, I find that PD9 does, nonetheless, come within the statutory protection. It was a disclosure of information arguably tending to show a breach of safeguarding rules and Mr Seabright was entitled to think that in the circumstances it was made in the public interest. Mr Seabright – detriments[183]I am not persuaded that Mr Seabright makes out an actionable detriment under Detriment 1. The complaint of ‘unfair treatment’ lacks any specificity. The documents do not help. The supposed threat to ‘do his legs in’ cannot, I think, stand as serious evidence of a genuine threat of violence. I think it much more likely that it was in the nature of a throwaway comment intended to convey Mr O’Donoghue’s heartfelt sentiment that Mr Seabright needed stop bothering him and instead engage with his line manager in an adult and constructive way.[184]The complaint under Detriment 2 fails for similar reasons. Mr Seabright falls well short of establishing any treatment about which sensible complaint can be made. His line manager applied ‘reflective practice’, a strictly non-disciplinary measure technique designed to improve performance. The fact that Mr Seabright appears to have thought that he was not in need of any improvement cannot turn that into an actionable detriment.[185]The complaints under Detriment 1 and Detriment 2 were in any event hopeless for separate reasons shortly given under the next heading below.[186]Detriment 3 and Detriment 4, I find, are established, for the same reasons as apply to Mr Kiddle’s Detriments 2 and Detriment 3.[187]Detriment 5 fails for the same reasons as Mr Kiddle’s Detriment 4.[188]Detriment 6 fails. In my judgment Mr Seabright has simply no ground for complaining about the way in which Mr Redmond treated him. Arguably, he received a more patient and indulgent response than he deserved. If he feels genuinely aggrieved, I am satisfied that he has no sensible reason for doing so. Mr Seabright – the ‘reason-why’ question[189]To recapitulate, I have found that Mr Seabright made three PDs, PD3, PD6 and PD9 and experienced detrimental treatment under Detriment 3 and Detriment 4 only.[190]Had I seen the issue of detriment differently under Detriment 1 or Detriment 2 or both, Mr Seabright could not have profited from such a finding. As to the former, the claim based on Mr O’Donoghue’s alleged hostility was doomed because I have found that no PD prior to the relevant was made out. As to Detriment 2, the same reasoning applies. Moreover, Mr Seabright himself accepted in evidence that, even on his own case, there was no link between that alleged detriment and his alleged disclosure under PD1.[191]Were the only detriments standing, namely Detriment 3 and Detriment 4, materially influenced by the fact that Mr Seabright had made PD3, PD6 and PD9, or any of them? The answer is obviously no. The reasoning in relation to the corresponding detriments in Mr Kiddle’s case is equally applicable here. The institution of the investigation was a natural consequence of what was, on its face, a plausible allegation of wrongdoing. The restrictions were a rational and routine feature of the investigation. It was noteworthy that Mr Seabright accepted in cross examination that the investigation by Ms Cross had been fair and that there was nothing to link the restrictions to his disclosures. The snail-like progress of the investigation (at both stages) was, I fear, unremarkable. The outcome favoured Mr Seabright. I see no possible reason for detecting in these events any unlawful underlying motivation.[192]It follows that the ‘reason-why’ question must be answered in favour of the Commissioner. Mr Seabright – outcome of detriment claims[193]Mr Seabright’s detriment claims fail. Mr Seabright – unfair dismissal[194]The inevitable result of the foregoing analysis is that Mr Seabright’s complaint of unfair dismissal is unsustainable. The reasoning applicable to Mr Kiddle’s unfair dismissal claim applies and will not be repeated. Mr Seabright – jurisdiction[195]For the reasons given in relation to Mr Kiddle, the claims brought outside the primary three-month limitation period (as extended by the Early Conciliation provisions) fall outside the Tribunal’s jurisdiction in any event. Disposal and Postscript[196]For all the reasons stated, the claims are dismissed.[197]Fortunately for Mr Kiddle and Mr Seabright, it is not necessary for me to make detailed findings about the causes of their deeply problematic working relationships with those around them and the damaging consequences for all concerned. Suffice it to say, I have no doubt that the difficulties were, in large part, a result of their dogmatic, confrontational and intransigent approach to their duties, the abandon with which they felt able to accuse others of wrongdoing and their inability to acknowledge error or accept new ideas. I do not question that they took up their duties with good intentions. But they do not have a monopoly on virtue and I see no reason to think that their colleagues did otherwise.[198]I also found it depressing to hear the complacent evidence from witnesses on behalf of the Commissioner, most notably Mr Wilson. This is a story of organisational failure – in particular managerial failure. Organisations which do not recognise their own failures and the need to learn from them will seldom thrive.