Miss A Pereira v British Petrol Oil UK Ltd and Others: 2218537/2024
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Case No 2218537/2024
Between
Miss A PereiraClaimant1. British Petrol Oil UK Limited (R1) 2. Sanderson Recruitment Plc (R2) 3. Xcede Global Holdings Limited (R3)Respondent
Before
Employment Judge WisbyDate 4 October 2025
REASONS
[1]In his CMO dated 19 September 2024, EJ Green set out a lengthy summary of the factual and procedural history of the case, which I adopt and should be referred to. Further procedural background is set out by EJ Bunting in the Record of the Preliminary Hearing on 3 December 2024, that should also be referred to.[2]I repeat for ease the brief factual overview of the Claimant’s claim set out by EJ Bunting in the Record of the Preliminary Hearing on 3 December 2024:2.1 The Claimant claims she was employed by the first Respondent, as a Senior Product Designer, from 20 October 2022 until 2 December 2022. Early conciliation with the first Respondent started on 12 February 2024 and ended on 16 February 2024.2.2 Early conciliation with the second Respondent started on 1 April 2024 and ended on 5 April 2024. Early conciliation with the third Respondent started on 19 November 2023 and ended on 21 November 2023.2.3 The claim form was presented on 15 April 2024.2.4 The Claimant believes the First Respondent’s actions amount to whistleblowing detriment, harassment, and disability and racial discrimination, citing their interference in her employment prospects as racially motivated. She further claims the Second and Third Respondents refused to offer her employment, contributing to the alleged discrimination and detriment.[3]The Claimant issued separate proceedings against the third Respondent (2216650/2023). That claim was dismissed upon withdrawal by Employment Judge Burns. The Claimant applied for a reconsideration of that judgment. Her application was refused. The Claimant unsuccessfully appealed that decision to the Employment Appeal Tribunal.[4]The Claimant overall alleges that a significant number of recruitment companies including Xcede Group, Oliver Bernard Ltd, Salt Recruitment, and La Fosse Associates amongst others are engaged in discriminatory practices against her, particularly blacklisting her and refusing to offer employment services.[5]The Claimant stated to EJ Bunting at the December hearing that she wished to pursue her application to add two further respondents: Chaucer and TRG to the proceedings:5.1 EJ Bunting made Orders to be complied with in respect of that application, including that a written application should be made to the Tribunal by 20 December 2024, which should include minimum prescribed information (please refer to the Order made) and that application should be also sent to Chaucer and TRG.5.2 The Claimant appealed EJ Bunting’s decision to make the Orders explained above. That appeal was not successful. Casper Glynn KC set out in his decision dated 24 January 2025 that the Tribunal made proper Orders, with no error of law, and the Claimant must comply with them or may face adverse consequences in her applications.[6]The Claimant confirmed at the hearing before me that she had received the EAT decision of 24 January 2025.[7]Today’s hearing has been listed to consider the following matters:7.1 The Claimant’s application to add Chaucer and TRG to the proceedings as Respondents.7.2 The matters set out by EJ Green being:7.2.1 Are the discrimination and detriment claims out of time?7.2.2 If so, would it be just and equitable to extend the time limit for presenting the discrimination claims?7.2.3 If so, was it reasonably practicable to present the detriment claim within the time limit? If not, was it presented within a reasonable period?7.2.4 In respect of the claim against the third Respondent, should the claim be struck out on the basis of issue estoppel?7.2.5 Should the claim or any part of it be struck out because it has no reasonable prospect of success?7.2.6 Further case management, as appropriate[8]I note that on 26 September 2024 in correspondence to the Claimant, responding to various concerns that she had raised, EJ Green further set out: Opportunity to Present Your Arguments The upcoming preliminary hearing is an opportunity for you to present your arguments regarding:• Whether the discrimination and detriment claims were submitted within the required time limits or whether an extension should be granted.• Whether your claims against the third Respondent are barred by "issue estoppel" (i.e., previously dismissed claims cannot be relitigated).• Whether your claims have a reasonable prospect of success.• Further case management. You are encouraged to prepare your witness statement addressing the time limit issues and any arguments regarding the strike-out applications. If the Respondents wish to file their own witness statements, they will do so before the hearing.[9]Before me at the hearing I had the following materials to which I was referred:9.1 A 626-page bundle that was prepared for the preliminary hearing in December 2024, this bundle contains the witness statement the Claimant stated she wanted to rely upon, and did rely upon, at today’s hearing).9.2 A 475-page Supplementary Bundle prepared for the hearing before me on 4 February 2025.9.3 R1’s written Skeleton Argument.9.4 Various emails from the Claimant to the Tribunal and others, including emails dated 6, 28 and 31 January 2025, 2, 3 and 4 February 2025 with their attachments, including the 40 page document prepared by the Claimant, titled “4 Feb 2025 Hearing & Judicial review, C’s GROUNDS AGAINST BP & OTHERS, & Challenge EJ Green’s & EJ Bunting’s CMOs: ‘out of date claim’, ‘First & Third Respondent’s names’ issues; ‘Third Respondent application to strike out “C’s” claim’, “Respondent’s application to “C” to produce more documents stating the same grounds” (“31 January 2025 Document”).[10]At the hearing on 4 February 2025 I heard from each of the parties in full regarding the matters the hearing had been listed to consider, there was time for me to read relevant documentation and to hear oral evidence from the Claimant about the relevant matters (who was cross examined and answered questions posed by the Respodents’ representatives and me). Submissions were taken from all parties including the Claimant, who gave her submission last and was given time to put forward the points that she wanted me to take into consideration. I checked after her submissions had ended that there was nothing further that the Claimant or any of the Respondents wanted to add before I brought the day’s hearing to an end. Due to time constraints consideration of the relevant matters and decision making was reserved until the day in Chambers.[11]The Claimant stated that the witness statement she wished to rely upon was the 60 page document, signed and dated by the Claimant as a witness statement on 7 October 2024, however I also considered the matters set out in 31 January 2025 Document and the other documents that the Claimant had prepared that were included in both bundles. To be clear in this case management summary I have not attempted to summarise all of the material that I have reviewed and was before me, where a particular matter is not expressly summarised that does not mean I have ignored that information.[12]The Claimant at the hearing was very clear that she had provided all of the information she needed to and that regardless of previous orders she would not be providing additional evidence and explanations of matters to the Respondents or the Tribunal. High Level Summary of Legal Principles Overriding objective[13]In considering the matters before me and in reaching the conclusion that I have I have borne in mind throughout the importance of Rule 3.— Overriding objective(1) The overriding objective of these Rules is to enable the Tribunal to deal with cases fairly and justly.(2) Dealing with a case fairly and justly includes, so far as practicable— (a) ensuring that the parties are on an equal footing, (b) dealing with cases in ways which are proportionate to the complexity and importance of the issues, (c) avoiding unnecessary formality and seeking flexibility in the proceedings, (d) avoiding delay, so far as compatible with proper consideration of the issues, and (e) saving expense.(3) The Tribunal must seek to give effect to the overriding objective when it— (a) exercises any power under these Rules, or (b) interprets any rule or practice direction.(4) The parties and their representatives must— (a) assist the Tribunal to further the overriding objective, and (b) co-operate generally with each other and with the Tribunal. Application to amend to include additional Respondents.[14]The Tribunal has a wide discretion to add a new party or substitute a party to proceedings if it appears that "there are issues between that person and any of the existing parties falling within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal which it is in the interests of justice to have determined in the proceedings"[15]The Presidential guidance states that if the application is to add a new party to the claim, it should be made promptly and set out clearly the name and address of the party the applicant wishes to add and state why the applicant believes the new party is liable for something claimed. The application should further explain when the applicant became aware of the need to add the new party and what action they have taken since that date.[16]A respondent can be joined to proceedings even if the time limit within which a claim could have been brought against it has expired. A claim can be amended to bring new claims arising after an ET1 is presented.[17]I have born in mind the principles set out in Okugade v Shaw Trust UKEAT/0172/05 and SakyiOpare v Albert Kennedy Trust UKEAT/0086/20.[18]I have in mind that events sought to be added by way of amendment could be potentially relevant to the issue of whether a claim is in time, for example if more recent alleged events demonstrated a continuous and ongoing sequence of discrimination.[19]I have considered the factors set out in Selkent (Selkent Bus Company Ltd (trading as Stagecoach Selkent) v Moore [1996] IRLR 661) and the need to take account of all the circumstances, to balance the injustice and hardship of allowing an amendment against the injustice and hardship of refusing it. I have borne in mind that the facts set out in Selkent are not exhaustive nor to be approached in a tick-box fashion. I have in mind the guidance set out in Vaughan v Modality Partnership UKEAT/0147/20/BA (V). Time limits and continuous acts Employment Rights Act 1996 (ERA 1996)[20]Claims under the ERA 1996 usually have to be presented to a Tribunal before the end of the three month period starting with the date of the last act that the claim relates to, as extended by participation in Acas early conciliation if conciliation commences within that period.[21]A claim for detriment under section 47B of the ERA 1996 must be presented "before the end of the period of three months beginning with the date of the act or failure to act to which the complaint relates or, where that act or failure is part of a series of similar acts or failures, the last of them" (section 48(3)(a), ERA 1996), as extended by participation in Acas early conciliation. Where an act extends over a period, the date of the act means the last day of that period (section 43(4)(a), ERA 1996). For alleged acts of detriment to form part of "a series of similar acts", there must be "some relevant connection between the acts". Each of the acts forming part of the alleged series is, in itself, must be unlawful.[22]A Tribunal may only extend time for presenting a claim where it is satisfied of the following:22.1 It was "not reasonably practicable" for the complaint to be presented in time.22.2 The claim was nevertheless presented "within such further period as the Tribunal considers reasonable".[23]The burden of proof for establishing that it was not reasonably practicable to present the claim in time is on the Claimant. Equality Act 2010 (EqA 2010)[24]The primary time limit (as it is colloquially known, although the EAT have pointed out that it is not strictly a ‘primary’ time limit) for a discrimination claim to be presented to a Tribunal is normally before the end of "the period of three months starting with the date of the act to which the complaint relates" (section 123(1), EqA 2010), as extended by participation in Acas early conciliation if conciliation commences within that period. However, acts occurring more than three months before the claim is brought may still form the basis of the claim if they are part of "conduct extended over a period", and the claim is brought within three months of the end of that period (section 123(3)).[25]Where a discrimination claim has been presented outside the primary time limit, the Tribunal has the discretion to accept it if it is presented within such other period as the Tribunal considers just and equitable (section 123(1)(b), EqA 2010).[26]The Tribunal has a wide discretion when considering the application of time limits under the EqA 2010. There is no presumption in favour of extending time. Time should not be extended unless the Tribunal is persuaded that it is just and equitable to do so. When exercising discretion under section 123(1)(b) EqA 2010, Tribunals should assess all relevant factors in a case, including the length of, and the reasons for, the delay of the presentation of the claim. In deciding whether to exercise the discretion to extend a time limit the Tribunal must not go through a simply a tick box, checklist process of set factors.[27]Where there is more than one respondent, the Tribunal should consider the balance of prejudice test in respect of each Respondent separately. Continuing acts[28]Tribunals should consider the allegations "in the round", and ask whether, on the facts, a respondent was responsible for an ongoing state of affairs where the Claimant was treated less favourably. At a preliminary stage the Tribunal has to ask itself whether the complaints are capable of being part of an act extending over a period - the Claimant must have a reasonably arguable basis for the contention that the various complaints are so linked as to be continuing acts or to constitute an ongoing state of affairs.[29]The Court of Appeal Tyagi v BBC World Service [2001] I.R.L.R. 465 held that unlawful discrimination had to relate to specific employment rather than employment generally and in that case the refusal of a post to a job applicant was a single incident and the time limit flowed from its date. Estoppel– general principles[30]It is in the public interest for there to be finality of litigation. This is important both for finality for the parties involved and the proper management of the court’s resources.[31]Defendants should not be required to defend twice the same set of circumstances. A party may not bring subsequent proceedings regarding an issue that has already been determined.[32]A party is precluded from raising in subsequent proceedings matters that could with reasonable diligence and should in all the circumstances have been raised in the earlier proceedings. Employment Tribunal proceedings referred to at the hearing before me[33]On 20 June 2023 the Claimant submitted an ET1 against Reply Limited and Salt Recruitment Limited – claim number 2210420/2023.[34]On 21 November 2023 the Claimant submitted an ET1 against Oliver Bernard Ltd and La Fosse Associates - claim number 2216640/2023.[35]On 21 November 2023 the Claimant submitted a claim against Xcede Group - claim number 2216650/2023.[36]On 15 April 2024 the Claimant submitted the ET1 in respect of this claim. CLAIMANT’S AMENDMENT APPLICATION TO ADD: (i) CHAUCER GROUP LIMITED (“CHAUCER”); and, (2) TRG UK (TOTAL RECRUITMENT SPECIALISTS LIMITED) (“TRG”) AS RESPONDENTS TO THE CLAIM[37]I did not make a decision on this application at the hearing on 4 February 2025 due to the lack of notice those entities had received of the hearing. The Claimant had not emailed Chaucer and TRG about her claim and the application to add those entities until 31 January 2025 at 6:27 pm, when, following her receipt of the EAT decision dated 24 January 2025, she sent the following email: Dear Employment Tribunal and parties, I’m acting as a Claimant under the claim against BP & Others (2218537/2024), and I’m sharing a reminder of the claim grounds within a new structure that I will be sending to Judicial Review. The content of those grounds are the same that I already shared on 17 Jun 2024 t 03:32AM, on 10 Jul 2024 at 14:27PM, on 18 Sep 2024 at 01:04AM, on 24 Sep 2024 at 16:42PM, on 26 Sep 2024 at 12:43PM, on 7 Oct 2024 at 20:35PM and on 2 Dec 2024 to which contradicts the EJ Bunting CMOs dated on 3 Dec 2024 that I haven't made an application or added grounds to add Chaucer Group and Trg UK under the claim against BP. It has not been obvious because both the Victory House Tribunal and Respondents refused to read or allow me to read the grounds during the hearings to which are evidences of bias towards the Respondents. Therefore, I’m sharing the grounds for all the Respondents including Chaucer Group and Trg UK by sections, as well the legal grounds to which also have been there since the first grounds I shared with the Tribunal. [….] Apologies, but it wasn't possible to send it again before, because I was only notified by the Tribunal about the sharing the grounds again on 28 Jan 2025, at 09:39AM after the EAT notice on Sunday 19 Jan 2025. Here is the bundle of evidences to download (link expires in 6 days): To Analah.Fawcett@chaucer.com; bhillman@trg-uk.com; and claims@chaucergroup.com, along with others, attaching:• the 40 page document titled: “4Feb 2025 Hearing & Judicial review C’s GROUNDS AGAINST BP & OTHERS & Challenge EJ Green’s & EJ Bunting’s CMOs: ‘out of date claim’, ‘First & Third Respondent’s names’ issues; ‘Third Respondent application to strike out “C’s” claim’, “Respondent’s application to “C” to produce more documents stating the same grounds” (“31 January Document”)• ANNEX 1: Chronological timeline against Respondents (shared on 10 Jul 2024 at 14:27PM and updated on 7 Oct 2024 at 20:35PM)• ANNEX 2: EJ Green’s letter instructions shared with “C” on 10 Oct 2024 at 10:32AM, as result of “C” challenge the EJ Green’s CMOs• ANNEX 3_EAT’s letter dated on 8 Oct 2024 at 14:57PM with questions for the Victory House Tribunal (ET) to consider on following hearings• ANNEX 4_EAT’s letter dated on 9 Oct 2024 at 14:57PM with questions for the Victory House Tribunal (ET) to consider on following hearings but only shared with “C” on 20 Nov 2024 at 10:38AM• And a link to a bundle.[38]Due to the volume and breath of material sent by the Claimant to Chaucer and TRG and the lack of precision by the Claimant in following the Orders made by EJ Bunting, it would not, in my opinion, have been immediately obvious to Chaucer and TRG that this was an application to add them as Respondents to the proceedings that they should respond to but with careful reading of the full materials, the fact that the Claimant was applying to add those entities to the proceedings could be discerned.[39]The later Chambers day, listed on 14 February 2025 provided a further period within which Chaucer and TRG could write to the parties and Tribunal to make enquiries about the case and/or make representations about the application to add them to the proceedings. No correspondence from Chaucer or TRG had been received by the Tribunal prior to the Chambers day. I decided therefore, in light of the overriding objective, to review the Claimant’s application in detail during the Chambers day and reach a decision on that application. The Claimant had been adamant that she had provided all of the information that she needed to in writing in respect of her application for it to be heard and that she would not be providing any further explanation. I also considered that an application for reconsideration would be open to Chaucer and TRG should they object to the decision reached.[40]The stance taken by the Claimant regarding further clarity of her claims was consistent with the approach recorded by EJ Bunting in his Case Management Summary, that after making an Order for the Claimant to provide further and better particulars, she informed him that she would not comply with that Order. The Claimant has indeed not complied with the specific Orders made by EJ Bunting (set out at 7, 8 and 9 of the Order dated 3 December 2025). She reiterated to me on 4 February 2025 that she would not be taking any additional steps to comply with that Order.[41]The Claimant explained to me that the 31 January Document sent to TRG and Chaucer does contain the relevant chronology of interactions with those entities for the purposes of her amendment application. I considered the contents of that document and in particular, in respect of the application to amend, the sections subtitled: “Detriment post-employment and lawbreaking of “C’s” rights and freedoms (freedom of expression, freedom of thought) Sanderson Managed Services Limited (R2) & Chaucer Group timeline” and “C’s grounds against Trg UK Limited timeline”.[42]The Claimant states that “The entire recruitment and onboarding process confirms that Chaucer Group Limited (3rd party) and Trg UK (3rd party) and Sanderson Managed Services Limited (Second Respondent / 3rd party) are tubbing companies of BP” and are ‘join controllers’ under the Data Protection Act 2018 and that “BP is causing detriment through their tubbing companies (Second Respondent, Sanderson PLC, together with Chaucer Group Limited). And, also causing detriment among their Employment agencies’ connections such as the Third Respondents (Xcede Group), Trg UK and the others listed Employment agencies on the following grounds” – the Claimant then sets out a chronology of the actions around her recruitment in 2022 to carry out work for BP.[43]The Claimant states: The second (Sanderson Managed Services Limited) and third (Xcede Group Limited) Respondents were added under the present claim as 3rd parties in accordance with the Tribunal Rule 38 for carrying BP’s detriment and for unlawful discrimination for continuously refusing their employment services up to now the same way as Chaucer Group Limited and Trg UK; and Since “C” was unfairly dismissed by BP (Luc Charmasson) from her duties after making a complaint against his team and after “C” exposed BP over her Linkedn, “C” started being blacklisted among BP's recruitment agencies’s connections and 3rd parties (Sanderson, Chaucer, Trg UK), who started refusing their employment services and/or called out about her Linkedn’s posts on grounds of the Equality Act 2010 Section 6 Disability; Section 9 Race; Section 13 Direct discrimination; Section 26 Harassment; Section 27 Victimisation; Section 39 Employees and applicants; Section 40 Employees and applicants: harassment; Section 55 Employment service-providers.[44]The Claimant states that between the 18 Nov 2022 to 29 Mar 2023, the Lead of Design Ops at BP (Hitesh Parmar) kept pretending to arrange a new contract with another department to avoid her making a Tribunal claim within the 3 month period post termination of her contract and that this was why she did not bring a claim at that time.[45]The Claimant has set out a chronology of the involvement she says TRG and Chaucer had in the contractual arrangements and interactions regarding the provision of the Claimant’s work/services to BP in 2022 and the termination of that contract in 2022.[46]The Claimant’s chronology in respect of interactions with Chaucer after 2022 sets out that: On 9 Jun 2023 at 17:20PM, “C” received an automatic job email confirmation from Sanderson & Chaucer (Olivia Roberts) to which is another evidences that Sanderson Managed Services Limited is a tubbing company of Chaucer Group Ltd. The Claimant raises issues under the Data Protection Act 2018 in respect of that email.[47]The Claimant goes on to say: “On 13 Jun 2023 at 12:56PM, Sanderson Managed Services Limited (Olivia Roberts) emailed “C” apologising for the vetting email from the Sanderson Recruitment by excluding “C” from the recruitment process of a position that “C’s profile was automatic selected because she had the right skillset for. Otherwise, “C” would have not received an automatic invite to apply for the new position advertised by Sanderson PLC. Wether the email was, automatically or not, Sanderson PLC rejected “C” from the recruitment process without a comprehensive justification, specially when they are directly connected to Chaucer and BP whom unfairly dismissed “C” for making a complaint and by that time they were also aware of “C’s” health long term condition.”[48]In respect of TRG the Claimant sets out:[49]“The link between Trg UK with Chaucer Group and British Petrol was confirmed during the recruitment process between 7 Sep 2022 at 16:49PM to 23 Sep 2022 at 16:28PM, where “C” was placed by Trg UK’s Portuguese employee (Diogo Cruz) to work at BP through Chaucer Group, but pretending that job would be to work directly to BP, as way of selling the job position without transparency and in accordance with The Conduct of Employment Agencies and Employment Businesses Regulations 2003 Regulation 21 ‘Provision of information to work- seekers and hirers’”[50]The Claimant set out a chronology of the interactions she says there were with TRG in respect of the 2022 recruitment.[51]The Claimant then explains that on 4 Aug 2023 at 12:11PM, “C” approached Trg UK (Diogo Cruz) by WhatsApp asking if he was working with any contract that he could introduce “C’s” profile to the hires. The Claimant states that on 4 Aug 2023 at 12:33PM, Trg UK (Diogo Cruz) replied to “C’s’ WhatsApp message with an excuse as refusal of employment services by stating: “Hey Ana, at this moment I’m more focus in Business Development considering the market is quite for UX at Trg, but if I will know about something I’ll give you a shout.”[52]On 28 Mar 2024 at 12:34PM, the Claimant states she made a subject access request to TRG for her data within their systems.[53]The Claimant states that on 2 Apr 2024 at 10:42AM, Trg UK (Beth Hillman) replied to her subject access request “confirming their link with Chaucer Group and BP” by stating: “From my records, due to dates not aligning with the contract for bp the background references were not needed and the screening was cancelled (screenshot attached). So we did not ask for the reference checks. Chaucer may well have done separate checks prior to your introduction to trg. You would need to contact them as we don’t have access to that data.”[54]The Claimant states that in accordance with the Equality Act 2010 Section 55: ‘Employment service- providers’ and Trg UK is discriminating “C” on grounds of health, rights and freedoms (freedom of expression, freedom of thought, freedom of public speaking, etc). Trg UK is therefore “blacklisting” / “excluding” “C” and refusing their employment services, consequently of BP's detriment for being publicly exposed by “C” over her Linkedin as well consequently of their client and/or business partner: Chaucer Group to which is also against The Conduct of Employment Agencies and Employment Businesses Regulations 2003 Regulation 6 Restriction on detrimental action relating to work-seekers working elsewhere’;[55]For the avoidance of doubt I have considered the application to amend for Chaucer and TRG separately, not as a question of adding both as Respondents or neither.[56]I have concluded that it is not in the interests of justice nor in line with Rule 3 to add either TRG or Chaucer as parties to the proceedings.[57]Based on the written and oral information provided no new facts have come to the Claimant’s attention prompting the application at the point it was made in June 2024. In respect of matters raised regarding her contractual arrangements with either of those entitles in 2022, any claims in the Employment Tribunal against either of those entities have been raised substantially beyond the period of 3 months after the termination of those 2022 contractual arrangements. Inevitably the significant passage of time negatively impacts evidence available and recollection of events. The Claimant states that the reason she did not raise claims in the period immediately after her contract to work for BP was terminated was due to the hope of a new role with BP, she has advanced no additional basis for the delay in raising claims about the events in 2022 after she was no longer holding out for a new role with BP as per her chronology.[58]The Claimant states that after she exposed BP via a Linkedin post in April 2023, she started to be blacklisted by BP's recruitment agencies’ connections and other 3rd parties.[59]The Claimant has, as set out above, brought other claims in the employment Tribunal in the period between the end of 2022 and the date this claim was raised on 15 April 2024 (in June and November 2023). I have not been persuaded that it was not practicable for the Claimant to raise claims within the relevant 3-month period for claims under the ERA 1996. Even if it were the case that it was not reasonably practicable for the Claimant to bring claims within that initial 3- month period, I do not find that the application to amend this claim to include complaints against TRG and Chaucer was brought within a further reasonable period. I do not consider the Claimant acted promptly. I have also concluded that there is no basis before me on which it should be concluded that it would be just and equitable to extend the time limit for submission of a claim under the EqA 2010.[60]As the Claimant is aware the Tribunal does not have justification to consider complaints regarding data access requests or data processing.[61]I also considered if time should be extended due to any suggested continuing course of conduct running on from 2022. The Claimant has not suggested she was in a continuing employment or worker relationship with Chaucer or TRG. She alleges that she had an interaction (set out above) with TRG in August 2023. The last incident set out by the Claimant specifically mentioning Chaucer was on 9 June 2023 at 17:20PM. This Claim was raised on 15 April 2024.[62]The Claimant states she wrote to the Tribunal on 26 Jun 2023 at 21:52PM as follows: “C” emailed the ET again, copied to the parties, highlighting they none of the parties have complied with the response (Rule 16) within the 28 days, neither made an application for extension (Rule 20) and making an application to add Chaucer BIP Group and Trg UK as 3rd parties under the claim against BP & others, as direct business connections of BP and for also discriminating against in accordance with Rule 34 (‘Addition, substitution and removal of parties’) by stating: “Dear Tribunal, […] as previously mentioned, I will be providing further grounds on next few days, against BP, Sanderson PLC, together with Chaucer BIP Group and TRG Uk to which I take a chance to make an application to be added as 3rd parties under the present claim, as direct business connections of BP which are also discriminating against myself, in accordance with the Tribunal rule 34 (addition of third parties). Besides of what I already provided against Xcede Group on 17 June 2024 at 03:42AM (email attached). I believe that you don’t need to copy any further emails to the Respondents because they failed to comply the Tribunal rules, which are there for everyone to follow. Thanks for your attention and reply. Many thanks, Ana C. Pereira”[63]The application to amend was also raised on 9 September 2024 when the Claimant stated in correspondence to the Tribunal “APPLICATION TO ADD 3rd PARTIES With the application to add Chaucer Consultancy and TRG as 3rd parties under the same claim in accordance with the Tribunal rule 38”.[64]Even if it were to be argued that there is a continuity course of conduct from 2022 and the incidents cited in 2023 were connected by that continuing conduct (which I do not accept to be the case), any claim in respect of those later dates has still been brought, based on the facts before me, out of time.[65]As already set out above, no reason has been put before me that means that I consider it is just and equitable to extend the time limits under the EqA 2010 regardless of the legal basis of the discrimination complaints the Claimant is suggesting the Tribunal should consider her factual allegations under, and I do not accept that the Claim was brought within the required time limits as set out in the ERA 1996.[66]I have additionally considered I need to take account of all the circumstances, to balance the injustice and hardship of allowing an amendment against the injustice and hardship of refusing it. I have concluded based the matters before me that the balance of injustice and hardship in this case would fall on Chaucer and TRG if I were to add them as Respondents to these proceedings – the Claimant’s application to add Chaucer and TRG as Respondents is therefore refused.[67]I have considered what impact adding Chaucer and TRG as Respondents to the proceedings would have on the arguments being put forward by the Claimant regarding a continuous course of conduct under the EqA, or a series of acts/failures for the purposes of a detriment claim under the ERA 1996 in respect of the allegations made against the other Respondents. I have concluded that even if I had decided to add them as Respondents to the proceedings that would not have changed the decisions I have reached below in respect of each of those Respodents. Sanderson Managed Services Limited (“R2”) Are the discrimination and detriment claims against R2 out of time? If so, would it be just and equitable to extend the time limit for presenting the discrimination claims? If so, was it reasonably practicable to present the detriment claim within the time limit? If not, was it presented within a reasonable period?[68]The ET1 against all three Respondents states generally that the Claimant is raising claims of unfair dismissal (which has been dismissed on withdrawal), age, race and disability discrimination, and, detriment and intimidation post-employment as a result of making a public disclosure, consequently for refusal of employment services. In box 8.2 the reference to R2 is simply “Consequently against SANDERSON PLC (Sanderson Recruitment) and XCEDE for refusal of employment services”.[69]In the further documentation provide by the Claimant to the Tribunal R2 is accused by the Claimant of “detriment post-employment and lawbreaking of “C’s” rights and freedoms (freedom of expression, freedom of thought)”, the Claimant says BP is causing her a detriment through many other companies including R2. She states that “Sanderson Managed Services Limited and Xcede Group are only on this claim as 3rd parties of BP, consequently of BP’s detriment”.[70]The Claimant states that: ““C” unfair dismissal occurred, at the time the employer (Sanderson / Chaucer and “BP”) become aware of “C’s complaint sent by email to the Design Ops and Principal at “BP” (Hitesh Parmar), to Programme Manager and Principal at BP (Luc Charmasson) and to the Head of Engineering and Design (Gerald Miller), on 15 Nov 2022 at 6PM, whom together decided to unfairly dismiss “C” without making arrangements to follow a disciplinary procedures or given access to the HR without grounds for dismissal, by terminating “C’s contract agreement early on 16 Nov at 09:21AM rather than on 28 April 2023. That also gives “C” the legal right to make a Tribunal Complaint against BP/Chaucer and Sanderson for making a replacement of “C’s” duties as Business Senior Product Designer within the Executive Department of BP in accordance with the Employment Rights Act 1996 Exclusion of right Section 110 ‘Dismissal procedures agreements’ and Other dismissal Section 98B ‘Jury service’”[71]As set out above the Claimant has stated: “Since “C” was unfairly dismissed by BP (Luc Charmasson) from her duties after making a complaint against his team and after “C” exposed BP over her Linkedn, [April 2023] “C” started being blacklisted among BP's recruitment agencies’s connections and 3rd parties (Sanderson, Chaucer, Trg UK), who started refusing their employment services and/or called out about her Linkedn’s posts on grounds of the Equality Act 2010 Section 6 Disability; Section 9 Race; Section 13 Direct discrimination; Section 26 Harassment; Section 27 Victimisation; Section 39 Employees and applicants; Section 40 Employees and applicants: harassment; Section 55 Employment service-providers”[72]As set out above in the section relating to Chaucer, on 9 June 2023 the Claimant raised an issue that she perceived about an automatic email she alleges she received from R2.[73]The Claimant then states that: Between the 5 Jul 2023 at 17:07PM and the 29 Aug 2023 at 20:45PM, “C” applied for design job opportunities advertised by Sanderson Recruitment through the recruitment channels (“TotalJobs”) to which “C” kept being automatically excluded after submitting her details.[74]If C is correct that R2 was involved in the 2022 work carried out for BP by her and the termination of that contract, those matters were within the Claimant’s knowledge in 2022. As set out above the reason the Claimant put forward as to why she said she did not bring a claim within 3 months of the end of her contact in 2022 was she was hoping during that time for another role with BP. Orally in cross examination, when asked about her knowledge of time limits, the Claimant said she was misdirected at first by her trade union but then did her own research, however she was hoping BP would keep a promise in respect of providing a new job at that time. Over a year has passed since the termination of her contract to work for BP. As set out above the Claimant raised other claims at the Employment Tribunal in June and November 2023, during the intervening period between the terminate of her contract and the date of the ET1 in this claim.[75]I am satisfied that it was reasonably practicable for the Claimant to contact ACAS within the initial relevant 3 months period following the termination of her contact in 2022 and raise a claim to the Employment Tribunal within the extension period that would have been provided by early conciliation). Even if I were to have concluded that the matters leading up to and the Claimant’s dismissal in 2022, the receipt of an automatic email in 2023 and alleged recruitment issues in 2023 amounted to a series of similar acts or failures (which I have not – at a high level there was no continuous employment/worker relationship, the claimant states recruitment blacklisting happened after her Linkedin post in April 2023), early conciliation did not commence within 3 months of the date of the last act cited by the Claimant (29 August 2023), conciliation should have commenced on or before 28 November 2023 but did not commence until 1 April 2024. Further, even if that were not the case I am satisfied that the Claimant did not lodge her claim within a further reasonable period. I am satisfied therefore that the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to consider detriment claims under the Employment Rights Act against R2.[76]In relation to claims under the Equality Act 2010, once again even if I were to have concluded that the matters leading up to and the Claimant’s dismissal in 2022, the receipt of an automatic email in 2023 and alleged recruitment issues in 2023 amounted to a continuing course of conduct (which I have not (see above)), early conciliation did not commence within 3 months of the date of the last act cited by the Claimant (29 August 2023), conciliation should have commenced on or before 28 November 2023 but did not commence until 1 April 2024. The Claimant’s explanation of the timeline of why she raised her claim in April 2024 did not present any grounds upon which I considered it would be just and equitable to accept the Claim against R2 as having been raised within the relevant time limit.[77]For the reasons set out above the Claim against R2 is dismissed on the basis that the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to consider it, as her claims have not been brought within the relevant time limits and the balance of prejudice of permitting the legal complaints under this Claim to continue against R2 would, I have concluded, fall to a greater extent on R2 were her claims not to be dismissed.[78]Xcede – estoppel[79]The Claimant undertook early consultation with XCEDE GROUP (Xcede International Group Holdings Limited) from 19 November 2023 to 21 November 2023, she used the same ACAS certificate number for both claim number 2216650/2023 and this claim.[80]On 21 November 2023 the Claimant raised claim number 2216650/2023 against “Xcede Group”. The Claimant in the ET1 stated she was bringing claims of discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief, “trade union membership discrimination, lawbreaking the GDPR legislation and rights and freedoms”. In box 8.2 the Claimant set out that: “XCEDE is business connections of REPLY UK, SALT RECRUITMENT GROUP, LA FOSSE ASSOCIATES LTD, OLIVER BERNARD (Who I'm disputing a claim for trade union membership discrimination and unfair dismissal. They are breaking multiple legislations that falls under the Data protection Act 2018 (GDPR), Equality Act 210 (race discrimination and discrimination of rights and freedoms, as well as Liability of employers; Employees and applicants; Employment service-providers) as well as Human Rights (freedom of thought and expression). They started excluding me from recruitment processes, asking in advance for references without an offer; and they blocked me from their recruitment channels as consequence of REPLY UK and SALT RECRUITMENT bad mouthing about being part of a trade union. XCEDE is a new company under my previous claim, but because the current Tribunal have ignored many times my request of adding third parties, I'm not making different claims for the different parties, because I have strong beliefs with subtle evidences that the Tribunal is dealing with my claim is corrupt.[81]The ET3 for claim number 2216650/2023 was entered in the name of Xcede Limited, on the basis that ‘Xcede International Group Holdings Limited’ does not exist. The Respondent’s name was then formally amended to ‘Xcede Limited’ by consent.[82]Claim number 2216650/2023 against Xcede Limited was dismissed upon withdrawal. An application dated 23 February 2024 for reconsideration of the dismissal was refused by EJ Burns on 12 March 2024. The Claimant appealed against that decision to the EAT, that appeal was not upheld (decision of John Bowers KC dated 1 June 2024).[83]The ET1 in this claim was issued against: XCEDE GROUP (Xcede International Group Holdings Limited). Before EJ Green R3’s name was amended to Xcede Global Holdings Limited.[84]R3’s representative states Xcede Global Holdings Limited is a holding company and does not directly trade, instead the recruitment business is run by Xcede Limited.[85]In the current claim against three Respondents, raised on 15 April 2024, as set out above, the ET1 states the Claimant is raising claims of unfair dismissal (now withdrawn), age race and disability discrimination, detriment and intimidation post employment as a result of making a public disclosure, consequently for refusal of employment services. In box 8.2 the reference to R2 is simply “Consequently against SANDERSON PLC (Sanderson Recruitment) and XCEDE for refusal of employment services”.[86]In further documentation the Claimant has stated : Therefore still there the doubt to whether Xcede Group is discriminating against “C” only consequently of BP’s (Hitesh Parmar) references to which made Xcede’s completely stopped providing their services or if Xcede is also discriminating “C” on grounds of race and trade union membership, consequently of Reply UK & Salt Recruitment badmouthing.[87]The Claimant also highlights a number of complaints that she has against Xcede in respect of subject data access, over which the Tribunal has no jurisdiction.[88]In both ET1’s the Claimant raised complaints against “Exede Group”, however regardless of the precise legal entity in the Xcede Group that is legally responsible for the recruitment business, having considered: the chronology of events and explanation of the matters the Claimant is relying upon; the ET1 for this claim; and, the ET1 raised under claim number 2216650/2023, it is clear to me that the Claimant is seeking to litigate matters arising from the same set of facts. To the extent that those matters arose prior to the Claimant submitting her ET1 under 2216650/2023 on 21 November 2023 I am satisfied that those matters should be struck out on the basis of Estoppel. To not take this action following the refusal of the reconsideration of the dismissal of her previous claim and unsuccessful appeal against that dismissal would provide the Claimant with an impermissible second bite at the cherry. As set out above, it is in the public interest for there to be finality of litigation. To the extent that the Claimant may argue that she is now seeking to pursue different legal claims in respect of that set of facts, for example relying on a different protected characteristic under the Equality Act 2010 (and I note the general scattergun approach to the legal complaints said to be relied upon that the Claimant has adopted in her documentation without further clarification), there was no fraud inducing the Claimant to withdraw claim number 2216650/2023 which led to that claim’s dismissal and a party is precluded from raising in subsequent proceedings matters that could with reasonable diligence and should in all the circumstances have been raised in the earlier proceedings. I therefore do not consider her complaints regarding those factual events should be allowed to continue under these proceedings, not just as a result of the important of finality for the parties involved but also due to the need for there to be the proper management of the Tribunal’s resources.[89]Post the ET1 being lodged in claim 2216650/2023 on 21 November 2023, in respect of matters not concerning complaints about her subject access request and matters with the ICO (over which the Tribunal has no jurisdiction), the Claimant has set out that:89.1 “On 18 Jan 2024 at 14:59PM, XCEDE (Daniel Baldock) emailed “C” confirming that he received “C’s” application, by stating: “Just wanted to drop you an email to let you know I’ve received your application for the UX role with one of our agency clients. To keep you in the loop, we already have a few profiles forward for this that have begun interviewing, but I will keep you considered should these not be the right match for the role. Thanks, Dan” “89.2 The Claimant states she replied the same day asking why Daniel Baldock was wasting his time if he wasn't serious about representing “C’s” profile to any role, stating: “Hi Daniel, Thanks for your email and for being polite. However, I’m unsure why do still wasting your time and mine pretending that you will keep my details for future opportunities when we both know that I have the right skills for most of the roles your company is searching. Although, and unfortunately because your company do not follow the legislation and you paid a favour to someone to represent me. who decided to tell all his connections: “don’t hire Ana anymore because she is a trouble”. Well I’m not a trouble, I pursue my legal rights if people are not correct and try to take advantage. Now you sent me an email, to make reassure me that ‘everything is going to be ok’. so I stop doing what I’m doing. So, please only contact me if you are serious about representing me for new roles. Otherwise you can say to whoever is behind this (which I have an idea) to stop manipulating my life, because there is nothing he can do to stop me, and I better find an UX role as soon as possible, otherwise he pay much more. I have attached my latest CV for your consideration when and if you decide to be serious about represent me.”89.3 The Claimant states that she received the following reply on 26 Jan 2024 at 10:57PM,: “Dear Ana, Daniel forwarded to me the emails below. Pending the Employment Tribunal hearing on Tuesday 13 February please direct any correspondence with Xcede to me alone. It is inappropriate for us to be dealing with you on a commercial level at the same time as defending employment litigation with you. I expect the Employment Tribunal judge to give further guidance on this and other points at the hearing. Yours sincerely, Sarkis Zeronian”[90]The Claimant explained at the hearing before me that she considered that in respect of the matters set out in the sub paragraphs of paragraph 89 above, that this may amount to race discrimination (refusal to provide employment service because of race would be unlawful under section 55 Equality Act 2010).[91]I do not consider that it can be concluded that the Claimant is prevented by reason of issue estoppel from pursuing claims regarding the matters set out in paragraph 89 above, as they had not arisen at the time she submitted claim number 2216650/2023.[92]The matters set out in the sub paragraphs of paragraph 89 above were not however expressly set out in narrative of the ET1 in these proceedings. At the next preliminary hearing (since this was not discussed at the hearing before me) it will need to be decided whether or not an amendment to the claim is required for those allegations to be heard by a Tribunal at a final hearing and, if so, should that amendment be granted. British Petrol Oil UK Limited Are the discrimination and detriment claims out of time? If so, would it be just and equitable to extend the time limit for presenting the discrimination claims? If so, was it reasonably practicable to present the detriment claim within the time limit? If not, was it presented within a reasonable period? Should the claim or any part of it be struck out because it has no reasonable prospect of success?[93]The Claimant claims she was employed by the R1, as a Senior Product Designer, from 20 October 2022 until 2 December 2022.[94]Early conciliation in respect of R1 ran from 12 – 16 February 2024. The ET1 was lodged on 15 April 2024. Claims in respect of events prior to 12 November 2023 are therefore potentially out of time.[95]The Claimant states that:95.1 On 15 Nov 2022, while working as Senior Product Designer position at BP, “C” was pushed to only do visual design, where the Business Analyst for Rick & Insurance (Mr.Chuck) refused to provide user insights or allow “C" to conduct user research to access such information. Consequently, “C" made a complaint, by email, against the entire Business Analyst’s team of the BP Corporate Functions to the Programme Manager (Luc Charmasson), the Head of Ops and Design (Hitesh Parmar) and to Principal Advisor in the Digital Design team (Gerald Miller).95.2 On 16 Nov 2022, “C’s” was then unfair dismissal by Chaucer Group on behalf of BP (Luc Charmasson) , after her complaint against the BP’s Executive department’s team.95.3 On 16 Nov 2022 at 09:21AM, Chaucer (Robyn Dobson) emailed “C” to inform that BP (Luc Charmasson) decided to terminate her contract by stating: "Hi Ana, Following a conversation with Luc, we have decided to terminate your contract. It is clear that you working in this portfolio is not working for any party as you don't seem to want to work in our flexible environment. Your contract states a 2 week notice period so you will get paid that, but given where we are with the projects, there is no need for you to work that notice period. Luc has already let Hitesh know and will tell the rest of the team. Thanks Robyn”95.4 My unfair dismissal occurred, at the time the employer (“SDS”/ Chaucer and “BP”) become aware of “C’s complaint sent by email to the Design Ops and Principal at “BP” (Hitesh Parmar), to Programme Manager and Principal at BP (Luc Charmasson) and to the Head of Engineering and Design (Gerald Miller), on 15 Nov 2022 at 6PM, whom together decided to unfairly dismiss me without making arrangements to follow a disciplinary procedures or given access to the HR without grounds for dismissal, by terminating my contract agreement early on 16 Nov at 09:21AM rather than on 28 April 2023. That also gives me the legal right to make a Tribunal Complaint against BP/Chaucer and Sanderson for making a replacement of “C’s” duties as Business Senior Product Designer within the Executive Department of BP in accordance with the Employment Rights Act 1996 Exclusion of right Section 110 ‘Dismissal procedures agreements’ and Other dismissal Section 98B ‘Jury service’95.5 “C” understood BP (Luc Charmasson) wants to force “C” to accept the corporative market, to avoid that she does her job as designer and apply the design thinking and he also wants to force her to be submissive to whatever the manager wants, consequently of her unfairly dismissal. When “C” was a junior designer in Portugal, she would argue with her boss and founder of the company if she disagree with him, and no one would force her to follow a certain design process when giving her a task to do. Forcing “C” to apply a certain process is micromanagement which is considered by law detriment’.[96]The 15 November 2022 email was included in the bundle and is set out below (minus the lists of duties for the various roles mentioned): “From: Pereira, Ana (CHAUCER GROUP) <ana.pereira@bp.com> Sent: Tuesday, November 15, 2022 5:46 AM To: Miller, Gerald <gerald.miller@bp.com>; Charmasson, Luc (E&P CONSULTING) <Luc.Charmasson1@bp.com> Subject: BUSINESS CASE / Goal proposition of restructure the team set up ?Hi all, I hope you are well. Apologies for my direct approach, although I took the initiative to analyse and identify some of the problems are happening at the Business function, and across different departments where is a designer. At my department, I understand that we are currently in a deadline, and we have a massive time constrains and we don't have budget to hire more designers at this point. That is exactly the reason I have decided to build this business case in order to propose a change , a restructure (at least within my function). I also understand by doing this I can either be successful or be fired right way. I'm being bold and having the courage that many people don't have in saying what they want and propose change, instead people prefer to leave their jobs. In opposite I prefer to always try to make changes, instead of giving up straightway, and then if things won't work leave. Please find below a draft of a business case, that I have been observing since I started.” Business case: On this Business case I have analyse the current team set up, skills set and identified the following problems, which makes any decent designer with broad knowledge frustrated and not wanting to work at BP. Main identified Problems:• Not having budget to hire more product designers (main issue)• Zero user experience processes applied: o BAs doesn’t have UX knowledge and do not understand the importance of design o The current process set up is pretty much: you need a designer only to translate the business requirements into high-fidelity wireframes (using the design system), meaning UI designers who don’t have any UX knowledge. As all the team needs at the moment, is person who knows how to use the design tools, because if the BAs knew/know how to use the design tools, then you don’t need any designer, they can do everything. o Restrict access to users and who uses the platforms and how they currently doing things on early stages projects;• Collaboration doesn’t happen besides of meetings with stakeholders and agile ceremonies o During the stakeholders' meetings: ▪ BAs are not asking the right questions, in order to move forward the project ▪ BAs are not thinking on big picture of the projects, only at small scale, so they are not able to provide value with their work, only they do is a planning route, which I'm not really sure what is based on. ▪ During the stakeholders' meetings, only a conversation happens, and it is about what the best experience should be instead of what the requirements are. ▪ Information is not transferable:• BAs are not recording information across the board and are not able to handover project backgrounds probably;• No one knows what are they doing, if they are not working in sprints• When handover a project, no-one knows: how they get where they are; what information was received from Stakeholders; what the technical issues are/were found out, the projects rational (why has the project took the path it took) is not anywhere, etc. Conclusion is everything in their minds. o Collaboration across all departments is restricted and limited to Business Analyst - like engineers. The communication across different departments is not visible, and the BA owns the relationships with different departments.• Time constrains: The time at each project is limited across projects, that means BA’s are working at many projects at the same time and not doing anything well.• Is there a resistance in adopting the design thinking process: (ignorance about design processes and not wanting to change because is there many work to do, so the quick thing is easier than doing the correct thing). Considering all those problems, specially there is not budget to hire more designers, the main issue is the budget, then the aim of this business case is to propose a change on team structured and working processes across projects in order to make BP a driven by design business. That said, it means, the main goal is to propose the replacement of all the BA's by Senior/Lead Ux/Product designers (with agency background) who would be working in collaboration with different teams (stakeholders, engineers, product managers, scrum master, QA's, Marketing, Design business and users to define the best experience possible and do the right thing and who knows how to perform the BA’s duties, and distribute the left duties (see below) across the project managers at each projects, which can be called ‘Product Managers’ instead of ‘Project Managers’. Previously, I had experience of working at PA Consultancy without a Business Analyst. The Business Analysts were/are only at the client facing projects, acting as stakeholders. However, if a good designer is based on client side, like BP, we have direct access to stakeholders and the BA position is pointless. In addition to my experience, there are many other good agencies/companies who does applies the same work process, like Thomson Wunderman, Foolproof, McKinsey & Company, AQKA, Spotify in order to be a driven-by design business and to do the right thing instead of the easy thing to do. BA’s vs Product Designer Duties During a session with all the Business Analysts (across my function), and Andrei Procopie (Lead designer at the agency), Hitesh Parmar (who is aware of this) and myself we all concluded that BA’s duties overlap with UX/Product Designer duties, as we all agreed on following diagram the at the Mural board (https://app.mural.co/invitation/mural/peopleculture2655/1667815507332?sender=u5d2a3e842d167150e00d3832 &key=362e272e-a41d-42bb-ba74-db4f3535d444) Overall Business Analytics duties:• [….] What most of the UX/UI designers do:• […] What a designer like myself does:• [….] What a Product Manager does or can do:• [….] In addition to the Mural board and the list of duties of each role, I have done some research about how the different roles - Business Analysts, UX/Product Designer and Project managers duties and how they overlap, which I’m sharing the following links, if you would like to have a look. As well what means to be a driven-design culture. https://qubstudio.com/blog/business-analysis-and-ux-ui-design-collaboration/ https://www.atlassian.com/agile/product-management/product-manager https://www.mckinsey.com/capabilities/growth-marketing-and-sales/our-insights/building-a-design-driven-culture I would be thankful if you could please kindly think on my proposition and let me know what’s your thoughts about it when you can. In case you are not willing to re-thinking the path you want to take in a near future or if you prefer to continue working the same way by not adopting change, or at least make some adjustments, then I’m either happy to handover my notice to leave BP, remain at the end of the year, or alternatively not renew the contract after April (this last one is my preference) but as you prefer. I'm being upfront and honest, because if we carry on like this, I’m going to end up being fired anyway. If you decide that I can remain at BP for the full length of the contract, then until I leave BP, I will be performing my duties, and will be translating the requirements in wireframes by using the design tools, because that is all is required from me now. To be honest, I rather be at a job that I like and I'm doing the right thing as designer rather than being at a job because it pays well to only use a design system and a software. Thank for your time and attention. Best regards, Ana Pereira”[97]The Claimant states that between the 18 Nov 2022 to 29 Mar 2023, the Lead of design Ops at BP (Hitesh Parmar) kept pretending to arrange a new contract with another department to avoid her making a Tribunal claim within the 3 month period post termination of employment for unfair dismissal and that this was why she did not bring a claim at that time.[98]The Claimant states that (bold emphasis added): “On 16 Mar 2023 at 12:51PM, “C” sent a Linkedin’s private message to the Head of Ops at BP (Hitesh Parmar) by stating: “Hi Hitesh, I hope you are well. Sorry to bother you, FYI I applied for a contract position at BP as a service designer. I’m unsure if you can still consider me after all, but I did no accept the position previously without receiving the paid notice because I was afraid it was a trap. My communication might not have been the best, and I’m not sure if my health condition makes it bigger than it was but I have schizophrenia and sometimes I feel paranoid and have a conspiracy in mind if I feel threatened in somehow. I’m not telling you that for you to feel sorry or to get the job, as I only want to be hired for my skillset. And by applying now at least I know if there still is a future for me at BP or if that is out. I have good references from my last project too, which is service design and it was only a short contract over Christmas. It wasn’t because of my performance. Many thanks, Ana”[99]The Claimant states that: On 31 Mar 2023 at 18:08PM, “C” sent a Linkedin’s message to Mr.Parmar’s by stating: “Hi Hitesh, I'm sorry to bother you and I don't want to sound rude, but would you mind to send a message to Luc, and ask him to stop using his influence to force me to do Ul positions, because I made a complaint against him and his team. If I won't stop do it, I'm going use that to sue him for discrimination and for abuse of power. You can also tell him, please that I have done that before and I won. I know it's him.”[100]The Claimant states that: On 3 Apr 2023 at 14:28PM, “C” sent another Linkedin’s message to Mr.Parmar’s by stating: “Also, if I won't resolve this legally. The next name is going to appear on my linkedin posts is going to be BP with what happened I'm tired of dealing with incompetents assholes and no one can force me to do what I don't want to. This is not a treat or blackmail, this is what I'm going to do, and I'm defending myself. Thanks, Ana”[101]The Claimant states that in April 2023, “C” announced publicly that she was unfairly dismissed by BP (Luc Charmasson) after making a complaint, while she kept sending Linkedin’s private messages to the Lead Design Ops at BP (Hitesh Parmar). – the Claimant says this LinkedIn message was a public disclosure.[102]The Claimant states that:102.1 On 9 Jan 2024 at 10:33AM, “C” sent a Linkedin’s private message to the Head of Ops at BP (Hitesh Parmar) saying that she acknowledge who recommended to work at BP and that she would better find a designer role soon, as UX designer/User researcher by stating: “Happy new year 3 I just to want to let you know that I acknowledge who recommended to work at BP. it will have consequences for them. My last post is for them, so I better find a design job soon as UX designer/user researcher, please. When we make deals with the devil we think things will be ok, but then we realise that we are trapped forever. Cheers, Ana”;102.2 On 26 Jan 2024 at 15:04PM, On 26 Jan 2024 at 15:04PM, “C” sent a LinkedIn’s private message to BP’s Lead of Ops (Hitesh Parmar) saying that she acknowledge that Luc Charmasson were using his connections to recommend “C” to jobs so she would drop the Tribunal claim, by stating: “Hello Hitesh, Happy Friday! I hope you are doing well. I already noticed that you passed on my previous message, which is great. And, that Luc recommended me to work at Lloyd's and at a few other roles (which is recorded FYI), as everything else after all the asshole I went through at BP (I learn with mistakes). Although, I think my message was wrongly interpreted and my strategy of trying to find a new design role, has nothing be with me dropping the Tribunal claim against other business that are not BP. Just you know my strategy goes beyond that and I'm definitely not dropping any of the Tribunal claim, I’m going until the end no matter what. Now it's up you, what you want to do with this information because I'm not going to subject myself to tyranny and I'm going to get a UX roles no matter what.”; and102.3 then on 30 Jan 2024 at 09:57AM:, “C” received an email from BP Digital (Magdalena Mazurikiewicz) for a job interview as Senior UX Researcher at BP.[103]The Claimant states that: On 2 Feb 2024 at 14:00PM, “C” had the 1st and last interview with Digital Design Lead at BP (Gautama Payment) by Microsoft Team video call, and on 7 Feb 2024 at 09:50AM, “C” received an automatic email rejection from BP Digital excluding her from the recruitment process for the Senior UX researcher position without a justification, even after “C” was told during the interview that she would move to the next stage.[104]On 8 Feb 2024 at 17:28PM, that Claimant states that: “C” emailed Luc Charmasson, sharing the record of the 1st Interview with Lloyds Bank, to which “C” was recommended by him, by stating: “On this interview the interviewer obviously conducted my answers. I’m also aware that you know a a person at the HR, who pick my profile, on your behalf so I would be called for interview. I’m not sure what hell do you think you are, to manipulate my life. For me you are nothing, I do not own you a thing, and I do what I want with my life. If you don’t want to have consequences, stop interfering with my life. Otherwise I’m going to build a case against yourself personally and BP for harassment, abuse of power, manipulation, stalk, tyranny because that is what you are, a tyrannous. And I hate you and regret that I ever met you, because people like you shouldn’t even exist. Everything else the message was already sent across. Thanks, and go the fucking hell piece of shit.”[105]The Claimant says she stated publicly in April 2023 that she has been unfairly dismissed by BP. She raised other Employment Tribunal proceedings in June and November 2023. I am satisfied that it was reasonably practicable for the Claimant to contact ACAS within the initial relevant 3 months period following the termination of her contact working for BP in 2022 and raise a claim to the Employment Tribunal regarding the events in 2022 within the extension period that would have been provided by early conciliation. I do not consider that the hope of another position with BP prohibited this. Even if that were not the case however, I am satisfied that the Claimant did not lodge her claim regarding the events in 2022 within a further reasonable period. I am satisfied therefore that the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to consider detriment claims under the ERA 1996 in respect of the events of 2022 (the unfair dismissal complaint having been withdrawn already).[106]I am also satisfied that the events described by the Claimant prior to 12 November 2023 cannot reasonably be considered to be part of a series of similar acts or failures, the last of them having been brought within the relevant time limits. The Claimant has not been in a continuous employment or worker relationship with R1 since 2022. The allegations she makes are not about the same employment. She describes LinkedIn messages that she says she sent in the interim period to R1 but those alone would be insufficient to create such a series of acts by R1. She accuses Luc Charmasson of recommending her for positions at other companies, which she appears to have viewed as manipulative. If it is indeed true that Mr Charmasson did recommend her for roles with other companies, it is hard to see how making such a recommendation by itself could be considered unlawful conduct. The merits of an allegation that Mr Charmasson was at the same time recommending the Claimant for roles (perhaps as an attempt to get her to drop employment litigation) and at the same time was the trying to scupper her recruitment by other entities in some way, appears to me to be low. The Claimant states she was rejected as a job applicant to a role with R1 in 2024 which has been raised in time, however, considering matters in the round I do not consider that the Claimant has a reasonably arguable basis for the contention that the various complaints are so linked as to be a series of acts or failures or to constitute an ongoing state of affairs for the purposes of a detriment claim.[107]In relation to claims under the Equality Act 2010, the Claimant’s explanation of the timeline of why she raised her claim in April 2024 did not present any grounds upon which I considered it would be just and equitable to accept the historic complaints against R1 as having been raised within the relevant time limit.[108]Considering matters in the round, for the same reasons as I have concluded that the Claimant does not have a reasonably arguable basis that there is a series of acts/failures for a detriment claim, such that that the complaints regarding events prior to 13 November 2023 have been raised within the relevant time period, I do not consider that the Claimant has a reasonably arguable basis for the contention that the various complaints are so linked as to be a continuous course of conduct for the purposes of the discrimination claims she has alleged under the Equality Act 2010.[109]I have therefore concluded that the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to consider the complaints raised regarding matters that are alleged to have taken place prior to 12 November 2023, as part of this I consider the balance of prejudice of allowing those complaints to continue would fall on R1.[110]R1 correctly accepted however that the allegation relating to R1’s refusal to recruit the Claimant in February 2024 has been raised in time. R1 says this should be struck out as having no reasonable prospects of success. I have concluded that it is not appropriate to strike that complaint out at this stage as have no reasonable prospects of success. The Claimant explained her case is that R1 knew by March 2023 as a result of her LinkedIn message to Hitesh Parmar that she was disabled (as a result of informing him that she has a schizophrenia diagnosis); she states that she was told she would progress to the next stage of recruitment process in February 2024 but then suddenly that did not happen. The Claimant set out that she considers at a high level this was because the information about her diagnosis reached the relevant recruiters or that they were warned off in some way because of that information. It cannot be said at this stage, without evidence being tested, that that legal complaint has no reasonable prospects of success and accordingly I have decided not to strike that complaint out. At the next preliminary hearing an appropriate list of issues will need to be established regarding the allegation that the rejection of the Claimant as a job application from the role she had applied for at BP was unlawful and further case management orders will need to be made in relation to that complaint.[1]I conducted a preliminary hearing on 30 June 2025. In my Case Management Orders (CMOs), authorised on 30 June 2025 for issuing to the parties, I set out my record of matters discussed and the orders and directions necessary to prepare the case for a further preliminary hearing and a final hearing. The Tribunal sent the CMOs to the parties on 03 July 2025.[2]The Claimant is a litigant in person. On 01 July 2025, before the parties had been sent the CMOs but after the preliminary hearing, the Claimant emailed the Tribunal (copying the Respondents) to seek a reconsideration of the CMOs. Her request was sent to Employment Judge Russell on 26 August 2025. I have treated her request for reconsideration as a request to either vary or revoke the CMOs.[3]The Claimant provides four main reasons for her request:(i) That the listing of the final hearing in November 2026 is in breach of the overriding objective and the hearing should be listed sooner:(ii) That the final hearing should be listed in person at the London Central Tribunal;(iii) That Employment Judge Russell refused to ‘unpack’ decisions made at previous preliminary hearings by other Employment Judges; and(iv) That there are concerns regarding a lack of procedural fairness to the benefit of the Respondents.[4]Rule 68 of The Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024 (“the Rules”) provides that a Tribunal may reconsider any judgment where it is necessary in the interests of justice to do so. On reconsideration, the original judgment may be confirmed, varied, or revoked.[5]Rule 69 provides that applications for reconsideration shall be made either in the hearing itself or, in writing, within 14 days of the date on which the judgment is sent to the parties. The Claimant’s application for reconsideration was made in time.[6]Rule 70 sets out the process that must be followed when an application for reconsideration is made. The first stage is for the Employment Judge to consider the application and decide whether there are reasonable prospects of the judgment being varied or revoked. If the Employment Judge considers that there are no reasonable prospects of the judgment being varied or revoked, the application must be refused.[7]A judgment can only be reconsidered if it is in the interests of justice to do so. The Employment Judge should, when dealing with an application for reconsideration, take into account the following principles:(a) The underlying public policy interest in all judicial proceedings that there should be finality of litigation. This is a central aspect of the interests of justice. The power to reconsider should be used with caution (Ebury Partners UK Ltd v Acton Davis [2023] EAT 40).(b) The reconsideration process is not designed to give a litigant a ‘second bite of the cherry’ (Ebury Partners UK Ltd v Acton Davis [2023] EAT 40). It is “not intended to provide parties with the opportunity of a rehearing at which the same evidence can be rehearsed with different emphasis, or further evidence adduced which was available before” (per Lord McDonald in Stevenson v Golden Wonder Ltd 1977 IRLR 474).(c) The Tribunal must seek to give effect to the overriding objective of dealing with cases fairly and justly, which includes dealing with cases in ways which are proportionate to the complexity and importance of the issues, avoiding delay so far as compatible with proper consideration of the issues, and saving expense.(d) The interests of both parties should be taken into account when deciding whether it is in the interests of justice to reconsider the judgment (Outasight VB Limited v Brown 2015 ICR D11, EAT).(e) Reconsideration of a judgment may be in the interests of justice where new evidence becomes available that was not available at the time of the original judgment. To rely on this new evidence, it must be shown that: (i) the evidence could not have been obtained with reasonable diligence for use at the original hearing; (ii) the evidence is relevant and is likely to have had an important influence on the case; and (iii) the evidence is apparently credible (Ladd v Marshall [1954] 3 All ER 745, Court of Appeal). None of these conditions apply in this case.[8]There is no reasonable prospect of the original decision in the CMOs being varied or revoked.[9]The Tribunal appreciates that lengthy waiting times for final hearings can be frustrating for the parties. It is mindful of the overriding objective and also of the requirement for the parties to assist the Tribunal to further the overriding objective. The issue of when a hearing can be listed is an administrative matter. Administrative colleagues will provide an Employment Judge with available dates during which the Employment Judge can list a hearing. Tribunals are typically able to list shorter hearings (0.5-1 days) sooner than lengthier hearings (3+ days). This is due to a number of factors including the availability of judges and court space.[10]During the preliminary hearing, administrative listings colleagues were consulted with regards to available hearing dates. At the time of the preliminary hearing, 3-4 day hearings were being listed from 31 October 2026 and 5 day hearings were being listed from December 2026. Based on the available sitting days at the time of the preliminary hearing, the final hearing has been listed on the earliest possible dates for an in-person hearing of 4 days duration.[11]The final hearing will take place in person at London Central Tribunal. This is clear from paragraph 22 of the CMOs made on 30 June 2025.[12]Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the CMOs set out part of the complex procedural history in this case. As I explained to the parties at the outset of the preliminary hearing, it would not be appropriate for me to consider matters that have already been decided by another Employment Judge and that are currently the subject of an appeal to the EAT. As I set out at paragraph 4 of the CMOs, the issues in this case may need to be revisited depending on what the EAT decides. For the purposes of the preliminary hearing, the issues that I had to determine had been set out in the notice of hearing dated 05 March 2025 and I set these out again at paragraph 5 of the CMOs. I confirmed these with the parties at the outset of the hearing and determined these matters.[13]The complaint about a lack of procedural fairness to the benefit of the Respondents is without foundation. A further preliminary hearing is necessary to determine a further application to amend the claim (a previous amendment application was determined at the preliminary hearing on 30 June 2025 in favour of the Claimant), whether a deposit order should be made, and any further case management including finalising the list of issues to be decided at the final hearing. It was not possible in the time available on 30 June 2025 to deal with these additional matters. As I explained above, when a hearing can be listed is an administrative matter. In this case, the Tribunal was able to list a further three-hour preliminary hearing by video on either 01 or 14 October 2025. Having discussed the available dates with the parties, I determined that the preliminary hearing should be listed on the earlier of these two dates.[14]For the above reasons, there is no reasonable prospect of the CMOs being varied or revoked. The Claimant’s application for reconsideration is refused. Date: 28 August 2025 Approved by[1]This Preliminary Hearing (PH) was listed by Employment Judge Russell at a public PH that she conducted on 30 June 2025. EJ Russell’s summary from 30 June 2025[2]EJ Russell sets out in her summary a number of points that are also relevant to the hearing before me:a. There has been a lengthy procedural history to the case. EJ Russell’s hearing followed a hearing conducted by EJ Wisby on 4 February 2025, in which EJ Wisby struck out the claim against Sanderson Recruitment PLC, then the Second Respondent. Thus, the then Third Respondent, Xcede Global Holdings Limited, became the Second Respondent, and that is how I refer to that party in these Reasons.b. EJ Wisby had also decided that a number of allegations against the First Respondent were out of time; and that by reason of estoppel, the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to consider certain claims against the Second Respondent. At the date of the hearing before EJ Russell, those decisions of EJ Wisby were the subject of an appeal to the EAT, which I understand was unsuccessful.c. In any event, as EJ Russell noted, an Employment Judge does not have the legal power to reconsider another judge’s decisions. She decided that the PH would proceed with the decisions as they were at the time of the hearing, despite any live appeal(s). I took the same approach in the PH before me.d. Another point decided by EJ Wisby at the hearing in February 2025 had been that a PH should be held to determine whether the Claimant needed to make an application to amend her claim in respect of allegations against the Second Respondent arising after 21 November 2023, and if so, whether that application should be allowed. That was dealt with at the PH before EJ Russell, who decided to allow the Claimant’s application in this regard. The claim therefore includes allegations against the Second Respondent of direct race discrimination.e. EJ Russell noted that the Claimant wished to add a further complaint of direct disability discrimination against the First Respondent. She listed consideration of that application for a further PH on 1 October 2025.f. In addition, EJ Russell directed that consideration would be given at the PH to whether the claims stand little reasonable prospect of success and, if not, whether the Claimant should be required to pay a deposit as a condition of proceeding; then, whether the Respondents’ grounds of response stand little reasonable prospect of success and, if not, whether they should be required to pay deposits as a condition of continuing to defend the claim; and finally to carry out any further case management.g. EJ Russell also listed a final Hearing on the merits in this matter, which will take place between 3 and 6 November 2026 inclusive (four days) in person. The parties are reminded that the hearing centre address may have changed by the date of the Hearing. They will be notified by the Tribunal if that happens.h. Finally, EJ Russell noted that the Claimant is a litigant in person who has an “enduring and complex mental health condition”. Like EJ Russell, I had this in mind throughout the PH on 1 October 2025. Material before this PH[3]On 24 September 2025, the First Respondent’s representative circulated to the other parties and to the Tribunal a small bundle of documents said to be relevant to the issues that EJ Russell had said were to be considered at the PH. This included EJ Russell’s Orders and the outcome of the Claimant’s associated reconsideration application (which was unsuccessful), the application made by the First Respondent in writing for a Deposit Order - or more than one - and the Claimant’s written response to that application.[4]At 22.38 on 30 September 2025, the Claimant sent an email with six attachments to the other parties and to the Tribunal. She did not consider it in accordance with the overriding objective to proceed with new case management while there were EAT matters outstanding. She asserted that the allegations against both Respondents should be seen as part of continuing acts rather than discrete or time-barred issues. She contended that she should be allowed to amend her claim against the First Respondent regarding “post-claim retaliation/detriment e.g. LinkedIn/blocking” and against the Second Respondent regarding race discrimination. She said that the Respondents’ applications for deposit orders were premature, but that hers should be allowed. The Claimant also asked for the Tribunal to consider “joinder/re-joinder” under Rule 35 and objected to reliance on orders previously made that she disputed. She wanted the Tribunal to adopt her issues list rather than that of the Respondents. Conduct of the PH[5]I explained to the Claimant at the start of the PH that I had only received this email with its attachments at 09.12, for a hearing start time of 10.00, although the Claimant told me she had sent it in previously as well. However, I also explained that in any event, I was going to stick to the issues that EJ Russell in her summary from the 30 June hearing, had said we would be considering, because that is what the other parties had come prepared to address and the hearing had only been listed for three hours. There would not be time, nor would it be appropriate, to go outside what EJ Russell had decided the PH would consider.[6]The Claimant was most unhappy with this and that unhappiness set the tone for her approach throughout the PH. When the Claimant disagreed with something that was being said (or that she anticipated might be said), she persisted in arguing and speaking over both Ms Munro and me, including making allegations of bias and corruption against me and the other judges who have been involved in the case, shouting and swearing. Eventually, I explained if she swore at the Tribunal or continued to shout, I would have to mute her. I had to do so from time to time so that I could give decisions on the points considered. I unmuted the Claimant so that she could then address me on other points, but had to mute her again when the shouting resumed. While she was muted, the Claimant continued to post detailed messages in the chat. I record that the Claimant demanded that I copy and paste her messages into this decision, which I declined to do, though I set out in this document the brief gist of them, as I do with the other parties’ submissions.[7]I also record that shortly after 11.00, I invited the Claimant to take a break to compose herself and to consider whether she pursued her amendment application. She declined, but I decided everyone present would benefit from a break of ten minutes. Both Respondents’ representatives returned at 11.10. The Claimant did not return until just after 11.30 and said she thought that was the time I had given. This longer delay meant that it was difficult to deal with all the matters listed by EJ Russell, but for reasons I set out below, the question of the Claimant’s application for the Respondents to pay deposit orders could be dealt with in short order.[8]At the end of the PH, the Claimant asked me to reconsider all my decisions and followed that application up in writing with a cover letter and a 612-page bundle of supporting evidence the following day. I deal with that reconsideration application in a separate document. Name of the First Respondent[9]EJ Russell had noted additionally in her summary that there is an outstanding preliminary issue regarding the name of the First Respondent. The Respondent itself says the correct name is BP International Limited. The Claimant is insistent it is British Petrol Oil UK Limited, although that is not the name of a company registered at Companies House. I have explained that the Claimant may struggle to enforce any remedy that she is awarded against a company that does not exist. The Claimant was unpersuaded by this and repeated more than once that this is the name of the First Respondent against whom she is bringing the claim. I can see that this is a point to which successive judges have referred, but the Claimant has been adamant that she does not wish to change the name. In the circumstances, I have left it as it is. Amendment application[10]The first issue to consider at this PH was whether to allow the Claimant to amend her claim to include an additional claim of direct disability discrimination against the First Respondent, specifically that Mr Charmasson, of the First Respondent’s Executive Department, blocked the Claimant on LinkedIn after she sent him a private LinkedIn message at 17.11 on 12 July 2024.[11]The Claimant did not accept that this was the amendment application she was making, although I shared my screen with the section of EJ Russell’s summary highlighted. The Claimant was insistent that this should be a claim of victimisation. I explained that if she wishes to make any further amendment applications, she may do so, but this is what EJ Russell recorded. I invited the Claimant to say whether, in the circumstances, she did pursue this allegation as one of direct disability discrimination. After the break, she confirmed she did. Respondent’s position[12]In summary, the First Respondent’s objection to this amendment being allowed was for three reasons:a. It says that Mr Charmasson (whom the Claimant describes as a Programme Manager) is not an employee of the First Respondent and therefore the First Respondent cannot be liable for his conduct. The First Respondent relies on the Court of Appeal’s authority of Kemeh v MOD [2014] EWCA Civ 91 in this regard.b. The claim was brought on 15 April 2024 and the conduct complained of happened on 12 July 2024. There have been numerous preliminary hearings since then, but the Claimant did not intimate that this was an additional claim until it was considerably out of time.c. The balance of injustice and hardship was in favour of refusing the amendment. The reason why Mr Charmasson blocked the Claimant was because of the language she was using and the threats she was making towards him. Ms Munro took the Tribunal to some of the correspondence on which she relied in this connection. The complaint, she said, would stand no reasonable prospect of success. Claimant’s position[13]The Claimant’s response was that if Mr Charmasson was a contractor with the First Respondent, he has accountability and responsibility for his actions just as he would as an internal direct employee. He was providing the First Respondent with a service and was her line manager while she worked at the First Respondent. The Claimant relies on section 109 EqA which says that the First Respondent will be liable for anything done by an agent for a principal, and that includes contractors who are acting with their manager’s authority. Mr Charmasson already knew her from work she had carried out previously, and he knew she has a disability.[14]The Claimant went on to contend that she said nothing special, other than defending herself; it is not for the First Respondent’s employees to dictate what she says online. Blocking her on LinkedIn is a sign to the industry that she has been excluded and blacklisted. She had interacted with Mr Parmar, the First Respondent’s Head of Design Operations. He blocked her, and then she brought a claim, then she noticed she had been blocked by Mr Parmar. She emailed him and Mr Charmasson, but they continued to use recruiters to call her out and try to stop her proceeding with her claim, so she sent an email to Mr Charmasson to tell him to stop interfering in her life. Besides being blacklisted, this amounted to victimisation under section 27 EqA and arises from the fact that the Claimant has brought Tribunal proceedings.[15]I asked the Claimant why she said Mr Charmasson blocking her amounted to direct disability discrimination. She replied that he already knew she had schizophrenia. Mr Parmar had promised her a job with another department but had “played around” with her for the three months in which she could have brought a claim for unfair dismissal and victimisation to the Employment Tribunal. Then after three months, Mr Parmar stopped engaging with her. She started exposing the First Respondent publicly on LinkedIn, and after that would sometimes interact with Mr Charmasson and always there would be a reaction. The Claimant started being excluded from opportunities.[16]I asked the Claimant several more times before the break why she believed Mr Charmasson blocking her was an act of direct disability discrimination. In her replies, she did not disclose any grounds for so believing, instead saying repeatedly that it was an act of victimisation/blacklisting. Timing of the application[17]After the break, I asked the Claimant when she had applied to add this allegation. She gave me a number of answers. First, she said it was in November 2022 but it happened in July 2024 so that was not possible. I tried to assist the Claimant by asking whether she had made it in writing or at a hearing. She said in writing, and that the allegation had been in the claim from the outset. Again, it could not have been, as it happened three months after the claim was lodged. Next, the Claimant said it was on 1 March 2025, when she challenged EJ Wisby’s decision, and again at the PH before EJ Russell on 30 June.[18]I asked why there had been such a long delay in raising this allegation. The Claimant then said that in fact she had raised on 9 September 2024 the fact that Mr Charmasson had blocked her on LinkedIn. I asked whether she had worded it as a direct disability discrimination complaint then. The Claimant did not reply but gave me a long list of dates when she had sought to update her grounds of complaint.[19]Since the PH before me, I have read the case management summary of EJ Green, who dealt with this matter on 19 September 2024, i.e. ten days after the Claimant now says she first raised this as a direct disability complaint. He does not mention any complaint involving Mr Charmasson. He refers to the Claimant having emailed the Tribunal on 9 September 2024 seeking to add two additional parties (Chaucer Consultancy and TRG) to the claim. At the hearing on 19 September, the Claimant said that the last act of discrimination or detriment had been 7 February 2024. It does not appear that this particular complaint of direct disability discrimination against the First Respondent was raised then.[20]On 24 September 2024, the Claimant sent a detailed 12-page email that sought to take issue with a number of matters in EJ Green’s case management summary. She says that on 12 July 2024 at 17.11 she sent a private message to the Executive Department of the First Respondent (i.e. to Mr Charmasson) and he blocked her. She did not contend that this was an act of direct disability discrimination. On 26 September 2024, the Claimant sent a further email to the Tribunal in which she said, “I was last discriminated by BP Oil UK Limited [sic] on 12 February 2024, after being blocked by the head of Ops and design (Hitesh Parmar)…”.[21]On 2 December 2024, the Claimant sent in a detailed Skeleton Argument for a hearing listed to take place the following day. She quotes (and does not correct) what EJ Green has recorded is her claim, “You assert that your claim is within time because the last act of discrimination allegedly occurred on 12 February 2024, when BP’s Hitesh Parmar allegedly blocked you on LinkedIn following your automatic disqualification from a UX researcher recruitment process”. In that 28-page document she again mentions Mr Charmasson blocking her on 12 July after she sent him a message, but does not allege that this was an act of direct disability discrimination. So far as can be discerned, this is something listed as relevant to the Claimant’s argument regarding issue estoppel against the Third (now Second) Respondent, although many of the paragraphs under that heading bear the same number.[22]There was another PH before EJ Bunting on 3 December 2024; he listed the matter for the hearing before EJ Wisby on 4 February 2025 to which I have referred above. It does not appear that the Claimant raised the new allegation about Mr Charmasson blocking her on LinkedIn on either occasion, i.e. before EJ Bunting on 3 December 2024 or before EJ Wisby on 4 February 2025.[23]On 1 March 2025, the Claimant sent in a 42-page document in which she sought a judicial review and/or a review of EJs Bunting, Green and Wisby’s decisions. On page 25, the Claimant makes a reference to Mr Charmasson blocking her: “On 12 Jul 2024 at 17:11PM, “C” sent a Linkedin’s private message to Executive Department of BP (Luc Charmasson) and he blocked “C”.” As before, she asserts no link to Mr Charmasson’s conduct in blocking her on LinkedIn and her disability.[24]Having thoroughly reviewed the history of this matter, the first mention of this allegation that I could find in the documents before me is that of EJ Russell on 30 June 2025. I note that EJ Russell says as follows: “Considerable time was spent today clarifying the claim. We identified what was background material and what were allegations against the Respondents. The relevant legal claims were identified by the Claimant. One claim raised by the Claimant relates to an event that occurred after the claim was submitted. It was agreed that I would treat this as an application to amend that would be decided at a further preliminary hearing on 01 October 2025” (emphasis added). EJ Russell then wrote in the issues to be considered at the 1 October PH: “Should the Claimant be allowed to amend the claim to include the following allegation of direct disability discrimination against R1: Luc Charmasson, of R1’s Executive Department, blocked the Claimant on LinkedIn after she sent him a private LinkedIn message at 17:11 on 12 July 2024?” I infer from these paragraphs that this was the first time the Claimant had raised the specific allegation that Mr Charmasson’s conduct was because of disability, i.e. it was direct disability discrimination. Merits of the amendment[25]So far as the merits were concerned, the Claimant contended (while mistakenly asserting that the blocking occurred in July 2025 rather than July 2024) that this was a fresh detriment arising from the same factual matrix on which she intended to rely: victimisation for litigation and stigma linked to disability. She contended that what she wrote to Mr Charmasson was an exercise in free speech. Conclusion on the amendment application[26]EJ Russell has set out at paragraphs 11 and 12 of her summary from 30 June 2025 the legal test and relevant authorities in considering an amendment application. I adopt those paragraphs and do not repeat them here.[27]Unlike the First Respondent’s application for a deposit order, there was no written submission by the First Respondent in relation to this amendment application. Further, the First Respondent had produced no evidence to show that Mr Charmasson is not employed by the First Respondent but by someone else, and it was therefore most unexpected that this was said to be the primary reason for the First Respondent to resist the Claimant’s application.[28]Certainly, the Claimant had understood that Mr Charmasson was an employee in the First Respondent’s Executive Department. That is unsurprising: it is his employer on LinkedIn (“Product Manager at bp”… “Programme Manager bp June 2020 - Present 3 yrs 8 mos London, England UK Managed 6 services within Corporate Functions – Company Secretary, G…”) and he has a BP email address. I have not however gone through all the material before me, which runs to thousands of pages, as I considered that if the First Respondent wanted to advance this argument, it was incumbent on it to produce supporting evidence of Mr Charmasson’s status.[29]I also did not consider that the case of Kemeh was necessarily relevant here. In Kemeh, the facts were that the claimant was racially abused by the employee of a subcontractor. The Court of Appeal upheld the EAT’s decision to overturn a finding of liability on the part of the respondent for that subcontractor’s employee’s discrimination. The EAT had held that there was no evidence that the respondent had consented, expressly or impliedly, to the subcontractor or its employees acting as its agent. The Court of Appeal (Elias LJ) held that “the fact that someone is employed by A would not automatically prevent him from being an agent of B, and I would not discount the possibility that the two relationships can co-exist even in relation to the same transaction. But in my judgment there would, particularly in the latter case, need to be very cogent evidence to show that the duties which an employee was obliged to do as the employee of A were also being performed as an agent of B.”[30]Given the length of time for which Mr Charmasson has been working for the First Respondent, the self-described breadth of his duties and the manner in which he appears to hold himself out to the world at large as being, if not an employee of the First Respondent, at the very least, authorised to manage services on its behalf, it seemed to me that this point should not be fatal to the Claimant’s application to amend the claim. Had I otherwise found in the Claimant’s favour on this application, the question of the First Respondent’s liability could have been the subject of proper argument at the full Hearing.[31]However, I did not find in the Claimant’s favour on the other two points: the time point and the merits. As I have found, the Claimant says Mr Charmasson blocked her on 12 July 2024, but she did not raise that conduct as a complaint of direct disability discrimination until 30 June 2025, some eight and a half months out of time. There has been no explanation for that delay.[32]I considered that the Claimant has provided no grounds to conclude that the “reason why” Mr Charmasson blocked her was because of disability. On the contrary, the First Respondent had produced the messages that the Claimant had sent to Mr Charmasson. I have set these out in the Deposit Order and repeat the relevant ones here – the typos are in the original: a) On 3 April 2023, the Claimant messaged the First Respondent (I understand this to be a message to Mr Charmasson) saying: “…I’m tired of dealing with incompetents assholes and no one can force me to do what I don’t want to. This is not a treat or blackmail, this is what I’m going to do, and I’m defending myself”. b) Later the same day, she messaged: “I honestly thought that you were a honest person, but after all I was made stupid and I should have done a complaint as soon as I got unfairly fired, so now you can assist in first place to my public announcement. I’m just building more audience. Thanks for destroying my career”. c) On 9 January 2024, the Claimant messaged via LinkedIn: “Happy new year. I just to want to let you know that I acknowledge who recommended to work at BP. it will have consequences for them. My last post is for them, so I better find a design job soon as UX designer/user researcher, please. When we make deals with the devil we think things will be ok, but than we realise that we are trapped forever”. d) On 8 February 2024, the Claimant emailed Mr Charmasson in a message whose subject line was “Interview with Lloyds bank”. The contents of the email were: “On this interview the interviewer obviously conducted my answers. I’m also aware that you know a a person at the HR, who pick my profile, on your behalf so I would be called for interview. I’m not sure what hell do you think you are, to manipulate my life. For me you are nothing, I do not own you a thing, and I do what I want with my life. If you don’t want to have consequences, stop interfering with my life. Otherwise I’m going to build a case against yourself personally and BP for harassment, abuse of power, manipulation, stalk, tyranny because that is what you are, a tyrannous. And I hate you and regret that I ever met you, because people like you shouldn’t even exist. Everything else the message was already sent across. Thanks, and go the fucking hell piece of shit.” e) There is also an undated message to Mr Charmasson (though I infer that this may have been the one which on 25 July 2024 alerted the Claimant to the block), which reads:[33]In the circumstances, whether the last message was sent before or after 12 July 2024, I considered it entirely unsurprising that Mr Charmasson would have chosen to block the Claimant.[34]I considered that the balance of injustice and hardship were firmly in favour of rejecting the amendment: a) First and most importantly, there was no prospect of the Claimant showing that the “reason why” Mr Charmasson blocked her was because of disability. I could see no justification for allowing the Claimant to pursue a complaint many months out of time, without any explanation for the delay, that was bound to fail. Indeed, the Claimant herself did not, as I have noted above, give me any reason to believe that she really thinks the blocking was because of her disability. Despite having attended three hearings prior to the PH conducted by EJ Russell, and having produced quantities of written material setting out her complaints, the Claimant has not alleged this at any point, nor did she before me. Rather, the Claimant repeatedly referred to the blocking as “victimisation” or “blacklisting” (the latter related, as I understand it, to her previous allegations of trade union detriment). I did not consider the Claimant would be prejudiced by a refusal to permit her to pursue an allegation for which she has still advanced no legal or factual basis, more than 17 months after she lodged her claim. It is also unclear how the blocking could be said to be less favourable treatment than would have been given to a hypothetical comparator who did not share the Claimant’s disability but who otherwise was in not materially different circumstances from her, i.e. who had sent the same messages to Mr Charmasson, or why the Claimant says that Mr Charmasson blocking her on LinkedIn would (or could) send a message to other recruiters and/or the public at large that she was blacklisted. I indicated to the Claimant that if she wishes to pursue a complaint of victimisation against the First Respondent, she would have to make a further amendment application. As I had already said, that was not the application that EJ Russell had listed for me to consider. However, the Claimant may wish to reflect on what I have said above about the reason why it appears Mr Charmasson blocked her and whether such an application would succeed. b) The Claimant has other complaints of disability discrimination against the First Respondent which, subject to the payment of a deposit, she will be able to pursue. c) A Hearing has already been listed in the case for four days. If the amendment was allowed, Mr Charmasson would likely have to be called to deal with this allegation. It was not clear to me that the First Respondent would call Mr Charmasson otherwise, and there are already four Respondent witnesses (including those for the Second Respondent) and the Claimant proposes to give evidence herself; therefore, there would be a serious danger that the Hearing would not be concluded in the time for which it has been listed if there was an additional witness.[35]Accordingly, the amendment application is refused. Deposit orders[36]I have noted that I have made deposit orders of £10 per complaint for each of the five complaints that proceed (three against the First Respondent and two against the Second Respondent). Those orders and written reasons for making them are contained in another document.[37]I made those orders because I considered that the Claimant’s claims stand little reasonable prospect of success. In the circumstances, although there remained under ten minutes of the PH by the time I had considered the Claimant’s amendment application and the Respondent’s application for deposit orders, I did not consider it appropriate to list the matter for another hearing to determine the Claimant’s application for deposit orders against the Respondents, or either of them. By definition, having found that the Claimant’s claims are so weak as to require a deposit to be paid as a condition of pursuing them, it follows that the Respondents’ defences are likely to succeed. I consider it disproportionate to hold a sixth preliminary hearing to deal with the Claimant’s application.
List of issues
[38]In the remaining minutes of the PH, we briefly discussed the list of issues that EJ Russell had set out in her summary: a) It is agreed that the Respondents take no time point and accordingly the first issue “Time limits” can be removed. b) It is further agreed that the Claimant has a disability (schizophrenia/psychosis). Issue 2 “Disability” can also be removed. c) The remaining issues are as listed. In light of my decision not to allow the amendment application, there remain three complaints of direct disability discrimination against the First Respondent and two of direct race discrimination against the Second Respondent, the pursuit of which is subject to the Claimant paying the deposits that I have ordered.[39]By agreement the First Respondent is to produce a revised list taking the above into account, and to share that with the Claimant and with the Second Respondent by no later than 8 October 2025. That will be the final list of issues to be considered by the Tribunal at the Hearing in November 2026, unless an Employment Judge decides otherwise.[1]The Preliminary Hearing (PH) on 1 October 2025 had been listed by EJ Russell, to take place by CVP.[2]There had already been a lengthy procedural history to the case, as EJ Russell and I have noted. EJ Russell had explained to the Claimant that she could not interfere with the decisions of the previous judge, EJ Wisby, whose decisions the Claimant had appealed to the EAT, and expressly said, “The proper way forward would be to proceed with case managing the case ‘as is’ pending any decision by the EAT”.[3]By the time the case reached the PH on 1 October 2025, the EAT had completed the “sift” in relation to the appeal against EJ Wisby’s decision and refused it on the basis that the notice of appeal discloses no reasonable grounds of appeal; and EJ Russell had refused the Claimant’s request for reconsideration of her own orders on the basis that there was no reasonable prospect of them being varied or revoked.[4]At the outset of the PH, I reminded the Claimant of what EJ Russell had said in relation to a judge not being empowered to interfere with a previous judge’s decisions and indicated that I proposed to adopt the same approach, i.e. I was not going to reconsider any matter decided by one of the other Employment Judges at London Central Employment Tribunal that had not been overturned by the EAT. The Claimant told me that I was wrong in law but did not put forward any basis for so saying.[5]In any event, the PH had only been listed for three hours. During that time, the Tribunal was to consider:a. The Claimant’s application to amend her claim;b. Whether the claim stood any reasonable prospect of success;c. Whether the responses stood any reasonable prospect of success; andd. Any further case management including finalising the list of issues. Those were the issues that the parties had, or should have, come prepared to address, and indeed that is what the Respondents had done.[6]I bore in mind that the Claimant is not legally represented (though nor was the Second Respondent). A minor addition to or deviation from the case management orders made by EJ Russell might have been permissible if it would not have caused the PH to overrun, as I had another hearing starting at 14.00, but the Claimant’s list went far beyond a minor addition or deviation as follows.a. Referring to an additional four respondents (“Chaucer, Salt, La Fosse, Oliver Bernard”) who are not parties to the claim, and suggested that the Tribunal consider whether they and the two named Respondents had complied with Rules 4, 29-31 and 37, the inference being that the Claimant considers they have not, though without specifying how it is said they have failed;b. Alleging that the Respondents had failed to comply with EJ Russell’s Case Management Orders (CMOs), again without specificity;c. Seeking an extension of time for bringing the Claimant’s race discrimination claims against the Second Respondent; andd. Proposing that the Tribunal determine “third party joinder applications” against three other proposed respondents, again, none of whom was present or represented at the PH.[7]It clearly would not have been in the interests of justice for the Tribunal to consider adding or determining an application in respect of anyone who is not a party to the proceedings, and/or who was not on notice of the application and/or without allowing them to make representations.[8]The Claimant had not set out how the two Respondents have allegedly failed to comply with EJ Russell’s orders. We could potentially have discussed this as part of overall case management at the end of the PH if there had been time, but there was not. In any event, save for the Respondents being required to give an indication as to whether disability is conceded, which they have done, no date for compliance with EJ Russell’s CMOs had yet arrived; the first was for document exchange by 13 October 2025. There could not have been any basis for making an Unless Order against either or both Respondents in the circumstances.[9]In relation to the race discrimination claim against the Second Respondent, there are specific complaints itemised in EJ Russell’s list of issues and the remainder of the matter may be dealt with as background (see below); but so far as events prior to 21 November 2023 are concerned, EJ Wisby dealt with those in her judgment of 24 February 2025 and noted that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to deal with them as a result of estoppel. Similarly, the Claimant was seeking to add Sanderson Recruitment PLC as a Respondent, despite EJ Wisby having struck out the claim against that party (formerly the Second Respondent) in February 2025. These were therefore not matters to which I could have given any consideration, even if there had been time.[10]EJ Russell had explained at the hearing in June that she could not deal with matters that had not been set out in the notice of hearing. On that basis she declined to deal, on that occasion, with the First Respondent’s application for a deposit order because she could not be sure that the Claimant had had sufficient notice of that application, and, as I have noted, listed the matter for a further PH. The points that the Claimant wanted me to consider had not been included in the notice of hearing. It was therefore not an error or, as the Claimant alleged, bias in favour of the Respondents, to confine the matters for consideration at the PH to those identified by EJ Russell at the PHCM on 30 June 2025 as confirmed by her summary. Refusal to consider the Claimant’s
List of issues
[11]EJ Russell stated in the summary that she had spent considerable time at the previous hearing clarifying the claim, identifying what was background material and what were allegations against the Respondents. She noted that the Claimant was raising one matter that had arisen after the claim had been submitted and that was the first thing to be considered at the PH before me (see above). It had been agreed that she would set out the claims and issues that had been discussed in the CMOs and that the parties would review the list. They were to write to the Tribunal and the other side(s) by 30 July 2025 if they considered her list was wrong.[12]The Claimant however had produced a list of issues dated 24 September 2025 that was markedly different from the list compiled by EJ Russell in her summary:a. There were allegations of both direct and indirect race discrimination by the Second Respondent. EJ Russell had only set out direct race discrimination, and in relation to two specific events in 2024. The Claimant was seeking in her list of issues to reintroduce vague and unspecified allegations against the Second Respondent (e.g. “Repeated unsolicited but unsuitable approaches (2017– 2019)” which, as I have noted above, to the extent they have been pleaded, have already been struck out because of estoppel.b. There was a further vague allegation that the First Respondent “and other Respondents acted in concert in refusing services or excluding C from opportunities (blacklisting/victimisation)” and that “Respondents” (unspecified) “subjected C to detriment (refusal of services, blocking, adverse references) because she raised complaints or Tribunal claims”. I explained to the Claimant more than once that these complaints were not on EJ Russell’s list and that if she wished to make a further application to amend the claim, she could do so in writing, but it could/would not be considered by me at that PH. I was mindful that in light of the history of not only this claim but the previous claim or claims brought by the Claimant, I would be in danger of re-opening matters that have already been litigated. This is not something that could possibly have been dealt with in the absence of both a proper, focused application in writing and the opportunity for the Respondents, or either of them, to consider in advance.c. There was reference to data protection breaches and breach(es) of the Conduct of Employment Agencies Regulations 2003. The Claimant has not explained how the Employment Tribunal might have jurisdiction to deal with these issues.d. The Claimant appeared to seek to introduce a further new allegation, of “detriment after protected act” in the handling by the First Respondent of her grievance and “subsequent exclusion from opportunities”. These were all vague and undated, and again, there will have to be a proper application to amend the claim (including the dates on which the alleged conduct took place, who was involved and the basis on which the Tribunal has jurisdiction to deal with them) if the Claimant wishes to advance these complaints.[13]In her reconsideration application, the Claimant seeks the determination of her “pending joinder applications”. Given that there were no such applications before the Tribunal, this point cannot be taken any further.[14]In the circumstances, it was not an error for the Tribunal to refuse to include the above complaints, or any of them, in the list of issues that the Tribunal will have to determine at the final Hearing, or to say that as there was no application before the Tribunal at the PH to make any further amendment to the claim, the list of issues would remain as set out by EJ Russell. Acceptance of the Respondents’ deposit order applications/Refusal of the Claimant’s amendment application[15]The First Respondent’s deposit order application had been set out in writing and Ms Munro spoke to it. Mr Smith then briefly addressed the Tribunal on the allegations against the Second Respondent before I heard the Claimant’s response.[16]The Claimant persisted in referring to allegations of a continuing act of discrimination, discrimination because of something arising in consequence of disability under section 15 Equality Act 2010, protected disclosure detriments and a victimisation claim, none of which are before the Tribunal, also raising during her argument her right to freedom of expression. The Claimant alternated between saying that the Tribunal was refusing to look at the Respondent’s conduct and saying that she would not pay a deposit to enable the claim to be heard, even if she had the means to do so. She addressed only very briefly the specific grounds on which the Respondents’ applications were made. I then gave my decision.[17]As I noted in the original decision, when the Claimant was interrupting, shouting and/or swearing at the Tribunal while I was giving a decision on her amendment application, I had to mute her, having first warned her of my intention to do so. She then started to type lengthy submissions in the “chat” and failed to listen to what I was saying, seeking to challenge me even when what I was saying was in her favour (e.g. the point argued by the First Respondent about a lack of liability for Mr Charmasson’s actions under the rule in Kemeh v MOD [2014] EWCA Civ 91).[18]I said I would make a note of those submissions, but I was not prepared to deal with them at the time because I was in the process of giving my decision and the Claimant could advance any arguments in a reconsideration application or appeal if, having heard the decision I was trying to give, she considered I had been in error. The fact that the Claimant was not listening to what I was saying is demonstrated by her submission at paragraph 29 of the reconsideration application, in which she objects to the First Respondent’s categorisation of Mr Charmasson as a “contractor for another entity”. I have dealt with this at paragraph 31 of my judgment, and repeat here that this would not have been fatal to the Claimant’s amendment application had the balance of prejudice and hardship otherwise been in her favour.[19]The Claimant also seeks in her detailed 17-page reconsideration application (and accompanying 621-page bundle) to cover the previous decisions of different Employment Judges and the EAT, and to include matters that I understand are still the subject of a live appeal. Other than advancing the same arguments in relation to what she said to both Mr Charmasson and Mr Parmar (i.e. that she was exercising her right to freedom of expression), the Claimant has said nothing to suggest that the reason why Mr Charmasson blocked her on LinkedIn was because of disability (this was the complaint that was the subject of the amendment application) or anything that might show her complaints against the First and Second Respondents stand more than little reasonable prospects of success.[20]In the circumstances, there is no reasonable prospect of the decision to make deposit orders and/or the decision to refuse the Claimant’s amendment application being varied or revoked. The Claimant’s application for deposit orders against the Respondents[21]Similarly, the Claimant has not advanced any argument that might suggest the Respondents’ defences, or either of them, stood little reasonable prospect of success.[22]The Claimant argued in the chat at the PH that the Second Respondent had breached the 13 January 2024 deadline for submission of its ET3 and that it had “admitted breaches of the Conduct Regulations 2003”. Whether or not that is right (and I make no finding either way) is nothing to the point of whether the Second Respondent’s defence to the Claimant’s allegations of race discrimination is likely to succeed. She also wrote that both Respondents have committed “repeated statutory breaches and procedural defaults” but did not provide any specifics that I might have been able to address (and which have not already been the subject of consideration/determination by other Employment Judges).[23]Given that I have found the Claimant’s complaints against both Respondents are so weak as to require her to pay deposits as a condition of proceeding with each of them, I did not consider it was likely that her own application for a deposit order or orders would succeed and nor was it proportionate to list the case for a seventh preliminary hearing to deal with the application. It is also particularly pertinent that if the Claimant persists in her stated refusal to pay the deposit orders that I have made, her claims against both Respondents will be struck out in any event.[24]I dealt with this point at paragraph 37 of the judgment. There is nothing before me to suggest that this stands any prospect of being varied or revoked. Application for written reasons I deal with this point briefly[26]Written reasons for a decision do not include a “cut and paste” of any party’s submissions and for that reason, I did not include in my original judgment every point the Claimant had written in the chat, although I did engage in the written reasons with any valid points that she had made. Not all her points were valid however: for example, the Claimant retorted when I said that she had not shown any reason to conclude that the First Respondent’s actions were because of disability, “It was disability and because they have no scruples”. She also contended, “I can say whatever I want in public space”. In any event there is no requirement for a Judge to go through and answer a party’s submissions line-by-line. I have dealt with any points that were of merit.[27]However, the main issue here is that the Claimant requested reasons, and they have been provided as noted above. There is therefore nothing to reconsider.