Ms A Giscombe v The Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea: 2217098/2023

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Case No 2217098/2023

Between

Ms A GiscombeClaimant

The Royal Borough of Kensington and ChelseaRespondent

Before

Employment Judge Nicolle

Date 5 September 2024

JUDGMENT

[1]The Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to hear the claims of direct race discrimination pursuant to section 13 of the Equality Act 2010 (the EQA), harassment related to race pursuant to section 26 of the EQA (save for the meeting on 5 July 2023), direct age discrimination pursuant to section 13 of the EQA (save for the medical redeployment review meeting on 5 July 2023), direct sex discrimination pursuant to S 13 of the EQA (save for the medical redeployment meeting on 5 July 2023), indirect sex discrimination pursuant to section 19 of the EQA as the claims were not submitted within the time period provided for by section 123 (1) (a), and nor would it be appropriate for the Tribunal to exercise its discretion on the grounds that it would be just and equitable to do so, pursuant to S123 (1) (b) of the EQA.

[2]In relation to the various claims of disability discrimination whether direct pursuant to section 13 of the EQA, discrimination arising from disability pursuant to section 15 of the EQA, indirect pursuant to section 19 of the EQA, failure to make reasonable adjustments for a disability pursuant to sections 20 and 21 of the EQA or disability related harassment pursuant to section 26 of the EQA, all acts or omissions which took place prior to 1 July 2023 are out of time save for those acts, omissions or events which related to the sickness management absence process, and related - 1 - employee redeployment process, which took place on or after 6 December 2021.

[3]Whilst the Respondent contended, in the alternative, that those claims which were out of time also had no reasonable prospect of success pursuant to Rule 37 (1) (a) of the Employment Tribunals (Constitution & Rules of Procedure) Regulations 2013 (the Rules) it is unnecessary to strike out those claims which were out of time and in respect of which the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction.

[4]The Claimant is not entitled to pursue claims, subject to an application to amend, for alleged disabilities other than PTSD and related mental health conditions. Whilst she may have referred to other conditions in the chronology of events they do not form part of the pleaded case. However, as they have not been pleaded it is not strictly necessary for allegations in respect of such disabilities to be struck out. Nevertheless, for completeness all acts or omissions relied on by the Claimant which relate to health conditions other than PTSD are struck out as having no reasonable prospect of success.

[5]The specific allegations which are struck out as having no reasonable prospect of success, excluding those elements of the claim which are out of time, or not previously pleaded are as follows: Harassment related to race

[6]The unwanted verbal meeting statement at a meeting with Bernadette Fry (Ms Fry) on 5 July 2023. This contention has no reasonable prospect of success as it is not been particularised how such a statement related to race or why it constituted harassment. Direct age discrimination

[7]The medical redeployment to review meeting with Ms Fry, Karine Currie and Lisa Parkin on 5 July 2023. The Claimant seeks to rely on dual protected characteristics pertaining to “older women” and reliance on dual characteristics is not permitted pursuant to the EQA. Direct sex discrimination

[8]The medical redeployment of meeting with the Ms Fry on 5 July 2023. Discrimination arising from disability

[9]Those claims pursuant to section 17 of the Claimant’s schedule of information have not previously been pleaded and for completeness are struck out as having no reasonable prospect of success. Indirect disability discrimination - 2 -

[10]For completeness those claims which relate to health conditions other than PTSD, to include those at section 20.10 to 20.12 which relate to other health conditions are struck out as having no reasonable prospect of success.

[11]For the avoidance of doubt the claim of unfair dismissal, and those elements of the disability discrimination claims relating to the course of conduct pertaining to the sickness absence procedure commencing on 6 December 2021, proceed to a full hearing.

REASONS

[12]Oral reasons were given to the parties. The Claimant requested written reasons and these are set out below. Approach taken

[13]The case had been listed for an open preliminary hearing in accordance with the case management order of Employment Judge Burns on 11 July 2024. The issues to be considered were set out in a notice of hearing from the Tribunal sent to the parties on 12 July 2024 which should be regarded as read into this ruling. I discussed with the parties at the commencement of the hearing the order in which I proposed to deal with those matters. It was agreed that I would I first consider the Respondent’s application that certain elements of the claim should be either struck out as having no reasonable prospect of success pursuant to Rule 37(1) (a) of the Rules and/or in the alternative that those claims, or significant parts of those claims, are out of time and the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction pursuant to S.123 of the EQA and nor would it be appropriate for the Tribunal to exercise its discretion to extend time. I indicated that matters regarding amendments would be dealt with separately and any application made in relation to any outstanding claims for deposit orders. Relevant background

[14]The Claimant undertook ACAS early conciliation between 13 September 2023 and 11 November 2023 and a claim form was issued on 10 December 2023. Ms Bain asserts that therefore any act or omission relied on which took place before 1 July 2023 is out of time and she says that there was no continuing course of conduct which would potentially render the matters to be within time.

[15]There was an issue as to whether the claim form submitted by the Claimant pursuant to an email on 23 January 2024 was in time. Ms Bain, quite properly in my view, accepted that the earlier omission of that document from the claim as served on 10 December 2023 was not a matter which caused the Respondent any real prejudice and was willing to discontinue any application that this should be disallowed as being out of - 3 - time. This did not however extend to the document submitted on the same date entitled s.2 chronology of events which sets out in chronological sequence a whole series of individual matters and is not a document which I considered in any significant detail. The law Time limits

[16]The relevant section is 123 of the EQA with the basic period being three months starting with date of the act which the complaint relates or under s.123 (b) such other period as the tribunal thinks just and equitable.

[17]It is clear from the case law that an employment tribunal’s discretion to extend time in discrimination cases is wider than the discretion available in unfair dismissal cases. Therefore, whereas incorrect advice by a solicitor is unlikely to save a late tribunal claim in an unfair dismissal case, the same is not necessarily true when the claim is one of discrimination — Hawkins v Ball and anor

1996 IRLR 258

, EAT and British Coal Corporation v Keeble and ors

1997 IRLR 336

, EAT.

[18]The checklist of factors in s.33 of the Limitation Act 1980 is a useful guide of factors likely to be relevant, but a tribunal will not make an error of law by failing to consider the matters listed in s.33 provided that no materially relevant consideration is left out of account: Neary v Governing Body of St Albans Girls’ School

[2010] ICR 473

. Section 33 requires the court to take into account all the circumstances of the case, and in particular the factors set out at s.33(3). Those factors which are potentially relevant are:a. the length of, and reasons for, the delay by the Claimant;

b. the extent to which the cogency of the evidence is likely to be affected by the delay;

c. the promptness with which the Claimant acted once she knew of the facts giving rise to the cause of action; and

d. the steps taken by the Claimant to obtain appropriate professional advice once he knew of the possibility of taking action. Strike-out of claims for discrimination as having a reasonable prospect of success

[19]The Court of Appeal in Southwark London Borough Council v Afolabi

2003 ICR 800

, CA, confirmed that, while the checklist in S.33 of the Limitation Act 1980 provides a useful guide for tribunals, it need not be adhered to slavishly.

[20]Mechkarov v Citibank NA

[2016] ICR 1121

is authority for it should only being in the clearest case that a discrimination case should be struck - 4 - out and that a tribunal should not conduct an impromptu mini trial of oral evidence to resolve core disputed facts.

[21]I took account of the extremely well known passage in Anyanwu v South Bank Students’ Union [2001) IRLR305, HL per Lord Steyn at para 24 to the effect that it should be only in the most obvious and plainest cases that discrimination claim should be struck out and that such cases are generally fact sensitive. Discussion and conclusions

[22]The sensible starting point in terms of the claim is to look at the documents which the Claimant has produced to include the schedule of information dated 12 August 2024. The paragraph numbers referred to below are to those used by the Claimant in this document. It is to be read in conjunction with the original claim and the accompanying claim form. To avoid this ruling becoming unnecessarily long I have not set out in full the 15 pages of the allegations set out in this document which form the basis of this ruling. I have, however, endeavoured to make it clear in delivering this ruling which of the individual/collective allegations are being referred to.

[23]The Respondent says that it includes a number of matters which are new and should not be permitted. I will endeavour to deal with this in the most logical fashion but to avoid this ruling being overly long and convoluted I will deal with related matters conjunctively. General observation

[24]Where something is out of time it fails primarily on that ground because the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction and therefore no reasonable prospect of success becomes an alternative ground. If something is out of time strictly I do not need to consider whether it has a reasonable prospect of success but in many cases I do so for completeness. Direct race discrimination and the Claimant’s one-to-one meeting with Mr Kenyon on 25 October 2021

[25]The Claimant refers to a one to one meeting with David Kenyon (Mr Kenyon) on 25 October 2021 in which she contends that his reference to her being angry involved a pejorative stereotype used in reference to black women. She then refers to that matter being considered at subsequent meetings on 7 June and 7 July 2022 and ultimately no follow up action being taken. The Respondent says that this is out of time and in any event has no reasonable prospect of success. Further they say that the end of year review meeting was undertaken by Louise Alex-Oni who is another black woman and therefore rendering it inherently unlikely that that she would have treated the Claimant less favourably on account of her race. - 5 -

[26]I find that this element of the claim is substantially out of time. Given that the cut of date was 1 July 2023 and it is over a year earlier. There is no suggestion that there was a continuing course of conduct. For completeness I also consider, but it is not necessary for me to do so, that there would have been a significant argument that the claim would have no reasonable prospect of success as being described as being angry does not as the Claimant asserts necessarily have any ethnic or racial connotation. However, I do not need to make a ruling specifically on that point as it is sufficient that the claim is out of time and therefore the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to consider it. 2.2

[27]Ms Bain says 2.2 is wholly new and relates to matters in 2020 which are substantially out of time. She says there is no basis for suggesting that they represent a continuing course of conduct.

[28]They were not previously pleaded and as such they are out of time. It would be inappropriate to exercise my discretion to extend time particularly given the prejudice the Respondent would suffer. Mr Kenyon left its employment in 2022. 2.329. 2.3 refers to reporting health and well being concerns with no pro active response to the Respondent’s duty of care. Again it is out of time, it is wholly new, it is unparticularised as to why it would constitute an act of direct race discrimination and therefore it be inappropriate to extend time but also it has no reasonable prospects of success. Therefore it is not an element of the claim which the Claimant is entitled to continue. 2.4

30. 2.4 involves a contention of the Claimant experiencing discrimination by perception because she says she is a black woman reporting physical and mental health issues. Again it has not been explained why it relates to race and it is not clear when this alleged treatment took place. Anything prior to 1 July 2023 would be out of time but ultimately this allegation has no reasonable prospect of success. Further it involves a combination of protected characteristics being a black woman reporting possible health/ disability issues involves a combination of arguably associated protected characteristics and that is not protection the law provides.

[31]Therefore the Claimant is not entitled to continue the claims for direct race discrimination. It is not necessary for me to comment on the comparators she has named. Harassment related to race - 6 -

[32]Again Ms Bains says these contentions save for the final meeting on 5 July 2023 are out of time. She says some of them are new and that there is no continuing course of conduct.4.1 33. 4.1 was corrected to be June 2021 and related to the Claimant saying that she had to attend to her elderly father who resided in the Caribbean. Ms Bain says this has nothing to do with race it was to do with geographical location. I accept her position in that respect, it would have been exactly the same situation as an Australian who had to travel to Australia to attend to an elderly parent. This was not because of the Claimant’s race. Further this is substantially out of time and cannot possibly be said to be a continuing course of conduct.

4.2 34. 4.2 involves a contention that Bernadette Fry (Ms Fry) questioned if the Respondent was the right place for the Claimant which she contends was repeated at a meeting on 5 July 2023. First, the 28 March 2023 is clearly substantially out of time. Whilst less so than earlier matters it is nevertheless several months out of time and whilst there may he an argument that there was a continuing course of conduct, as it was allegedly repeated on 5 July 2023, I do not accept that the Claimant has a reasonable prospect of demonstrating that the treatment was related to race. Simply asking someone, and this is Ms Fry another black employee asking a colleague whether the Respondent was the right place for them, does not in my view have a reasonable prospect of success. To succeed this contention would require the Claimant to demonstrate grounds to infer a causative link between race and the s.26 harassment alleged to have been suffered. So again a claim which can not be pursued.

4.3 35. 4.3 involves the reference to looking up at the ceiling whilst she was expressing herself. This is both out of time and no reasonable prospect of success. I do not consider that any suggestion has been put forward from which it can be inferred to be related to the Claimant’s race. Further, it is difficult to see it could constitute an act of harassment other than the most extreme and disdainful way that someone might register their disinterest in someone’s reported position. 5 April 2023

[36]Not clear as to what is being contended as it just refers to unwanted behaviour creating a hostile environment. It is out of time and has no reasonable prospect of success.

[37]So, no claim on account of harassment related to race proceeds. - 7 - Direct age discrimination

[38]The matters relied on are comments allegedly made by Ms Fry in 2020. These are self evidently substantially out of time and no adequate explanation has been provided as to why a claim was not pursued earlier. The Claimant referred to mental health issues and wanting to resolve things internally but ultimately a substantial period of time has elapsed and there would be significant prejudice to the Respondent if these were permitted to continue. 20 May 2021

[39]I adopt the same approach in relation to 20 May 2021. The pay and grade review was an act having continuing consequences rather than a continuing course of conduct and was therefore substantially out of time. 5 July 2023 40. 5 July 2023 (7) (iv) in which the Claimant refers to the Respondent not considering these as a mitigating medical issues reported and associated to older women. This I consider has no reasonable prospect of success as, in part, it again involves a combination of protected characteristics older women (the Claimant actually in submissions referred to older black women) but just for the present purposes I am taking that as older women. It is difficult to see this as being a direct age discrimination complaint because it does not relate specifically and solely to age but rather to older women. I think the Claimant, for example, maybe referencing older women and the menopause and menopause related symptoms. I consider it has no reasonable prospect of success.

[41]Therefore none of the age discrimination claims can proceed. Direct sex discrimination

[42]The Claimant makes reference at 9.1 to having caring responsibilities for elderly disabled parents who reside abroad. That was dated 29 June 2021 and is substantially out of time with no grounds put forward for time being extended and therefore it would not be appropriate to exercise my discretion to extend time. Further no real basis was put forward as to why it would constitute direct sex discrimination. Arguably there might have been a case for indirect sex discrimination if women can be said to have predominant caring responsibilities for parents but even that would have been problematic. The contention of direct sex discrimination has no reasonable prospect of success. 5 July 2023 medical redeployment meeting 43. 5 July 2023 the medical redeployment meeting is potentially in time. It involves a contention that Ms Fry disregarded and failed to consider the Claimant’s medical investigation at the Newham Hospital Breast Clinic. - 8 - However, this is being brought as a direct sex discrimination claim in other words Ms Fry treated the Claimant less favourably on account of her sex. This cannot possibly be direct sex discrimination case. Again there may have been an argument that it was indirect sex discrimination but that would have been problematic. On the basis of a claim for direct sex discrimination it cannot proceed. Indirect sex discrimination

[44]It is important to consider the PCPs relied on by the Claimant. She makes reference to the generic application of the sickness absence policy to medical conditions that disproportionately affect women. Looking at these individual matters at 13(1) the Claimant says that she was disadvantaged in relation to use of annual leave to attend a tutor lead workshop and then she sets out various dates where she contends this occurred. These are all in 2021 and they are therefore substantially out of time they are not matters which give rise to a continuing course of conduct and therefore the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to consider them, nor would it be appropriate to exercise discretion to extend time. Also in terms of reasonable prospect of success they do not necessarily relate to the application of the specified PCP, being the generic application of the sickness absence policy, so there would be an issue as to whether the claim would have a reasonable prospect of success but given my finding that they are out of time I need not address that further. 14.2

[45]The Claimant says that she is in an age group of women likely to be experiencing the menopause and therefore is disadvantaged in being required to attend a panel interview and numerous other meetings. First the panel interview on 5 April 2023 and virtually all of the other numerous meetings are out of time and I am not satisfied that there would be a continuing course of conduct. Therefore the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to consider them. Also it is not clear to me that this claim would have a reasonable prospect of success. The reference to general application of the sickness absence policy as being the PCP and medical conditions particularly affecting women would be highly problematic without more Disability Disabilities pleaded and approach taken

[46]I will adopt a more holistic approach in relation to disability given that there are certain elements which will proceed. The Claimant on the claim form makes it clear that the disability relied on is PTSD. I explained to the parties that I adopt a broad approach to PTSD and it includes related mental health conditions to include depression. However, the Respondent says that the numerous other conditions relied on by the Claimant are not ones which she has listed as part of her claim and therefore would require - 9 - amendments so dyslexia, menopausal symptoms, hearing impairment and chronic tinnitus, chronic joint arthritis, cataract, fatigue and chronic pain daily. I do, however, take the view that where conditions are at least arguably attributable to PTSD a broad interpretation should be applied, so for example if fatigue is a condition linked to PTSD/mental health that is something which would fall within the scope of the disability claim. The Claimant says that her existing tinnitus was exacerbated by the stress she suffered following the Grenfell fire and her PTSD so there may, subject to appropriate medical evidence, an argument that it falls within the general umbrella.

[47]To the extent to which conditions are separate and distinct to PTSD/ mental health they are not matters which are before the Tribunal and their inclusion would require an amendment application. The fact that medical conditions were referred to within the chronology is not sufficient for them to be considered as pleaded within the claim. That would give rise to substantial uncertainty in terms of how a Respondent perceived and responded to a claim. I am not considering amendment applications today. Direct disability discrimination16.1 and

16.2

[48]Looking at those confined to the Claimant’s PTSD. First, looking at the matters from16.1 and

16.2 these are out of time, and no continuing course of conduct. The deployment to the covid hub team is out of time with no continuing course of conduct and therefore it would be inappropriate to extend time. The application of the Respondent’s sickness absence policy (16.3, 16.4 and 16.5)

[49]The Respondent helpfully conceded that the sickness absence management process started from 6 December 2021, and that at least arguably all matters pertaining to that process, and the related redeployment process, were part of a continuing course of conduct. I accept that position. I am permitting those claims which are connected to that process, and which are connected to PTSD and associated mental health issues, as being a continuing course of conduct which are brought within time. So the matters at 16.3, 16.4 and 16.5 are part of that process and are matters which the Claimant is entitled to pursue. 16.6

[50]It is listed as 16.5 but should be 16.6 and relates to the clavicle injury which the Claimant sustained on 11 March 2022. That is a separate condition which has not been pleaded. It is out of time and it is not one in respect of which I am willing to extend time. 16.9 and 16.10 - 10 - 51. 16.9 and 16.10 are matters which I am willing to include on the basis that they form part of that continuing course of conduct. Discrimination arising from disability 17.1, 17.2, 17.3 and 17.4 52. 17.1, 17.2 and 17.3 all relate to the adverse effect of background noise on the Claimant. Attending meetings does not obviously relate to PTSD and no time period is given. The reference to being unable to use public transport at 17.4 related to the physical clavicle injury. These matters are either out of time, have no reasonable prospect of success or involve new matters being added absent an amendment application so they are not matters which the Claimant is entitled to pursue.18.1 53. 18.1 is something which the Claimant is entitled to pursue as it is arguably linked into the continuing course of conduct pertaining to the sickness absence process. I am taking a relatively broad brush approach here because to give a definitive decision on each individual element would be outside reasonable the scope of a strike out application.

18.2 54. 18.2 and associated sub-sections relates to the clavicle injury and as per 17 above the Claimant is not entitled to pursue it.

18.3 55. 18.3 (1) taking annual leave does not give rise to a course of action. Reporting sick arguably that forms part of the chronology but it is difficult to see how that would be an individual claim but I am not specifically going to strike it out.

18.4

[56]The Respondent says these are out of time and it is difficult to see how some of these matters, for example, scheduling a grievance meeting form an individual head of claim but in so far as they form part of the general chronology of events regarding the sickness absence policy, and ultimately the Claimant’s dismissal, I am allowing them to continue. I think the Claimant needs to give consideration as to each individual sub point rather than some of these simply being a chronology of events. However, to descend into rulings on each of those individual points would be excessive in my opinion. 57. 18.4(1) the Claimant’s father passing is out of time and is not part of the general course of conduct and the Claimant is not entitled to pursue it. - 11 - 58. 18.4

(2) it is not clear why that would be part of that continuing course of conduct as it appears more related to physical rather than mental health issue and again is not something the Claimant is entitled to pursue.

[59]The Claimant reporting health issues related to the menopause to Ms Fry on 5 July 2023 and their not being considered as a mitigating circumstance is not part of the continuing course of conduct and relates to a health condition which is not part of the pleaded disabilities.

[60]On 5 April 2023 attending a panel interview in person without support. I will allow that to continue as at least arguably forms part of that continuing course of conduct. Indirect disability discrimination

[61]Deployment to the covid help team matters at 19.1 is out of time with no continuing course of conduct and inappropriate to extend time.

[62]Matters forming part of the sickness absence meetings from February 2022 onwards through to 19.5 I will allow to continue on the basis they form part of that continuing process culminating in the Claimant’s dismissal.20.1 and

20.2 63. 20.1, 20.2 I am not allowing to continue. It is not clear that using annual leave instead of sick leave would relate to any pleaded PCP. It is also likely to be out of time.

[64]The April 2020 generic redeployment to the Covid hub team is again out of time. 20.3, 20.4 and 20.5 65. 20.3, 20.4, 20.5 and onwards through to matters relating to the capability process, to the extent to which, and this is a generic point rather than going through each individually that they are after 8 December 2021 and relate to PTSD or related conditions, they can proceed. Anything before that date is out of time and cannot proceed and whilst it may potentially be background evidence it is not part of the pleaded claim. Ultimately many of the individual stages will not form separate allegations but part of a chronology culminating in the Claimant’s dismissal. 20.6

[66]At 20.6 matters relating to physical limitations, for example, the Claimant’s clavicle injury are out of time or are matters which have not been pleaded. - 12 - 67. 15 July 2022 is substantially out of time and are not matters which can continue. Overarching clarification

[68]To be absolutely clear it is those matters relating to the process pertaining to the Claimant’s PTSD and associated mental health issues on or after 6 December 2021 and culminating in dismissal which form part of that continuing course of conduct. 20.10, 20.11, 20.12 and 20.1369. 20.10 and 20.11 are out of time, relate to physical conditions and are new allegations. Similarly with 20.12 a new work place monitor is new matter not pleaded, appears to relate to physical conditions. 20.12 subject access request is a new matter not pleaded previously and no basis for it having reasonable prospects of success as being an indirect disability discrimination claim so must fail. Matters at 20.13 are out of time. Failure to make reasonable adjustments

70. 22.1 – 22.6 are all out of time, not part of a continuing course of conduct and inappropriate to extend time.

[71]Matters at 23.1 through to 23.7 I am going to allow to proceed as part of the continuing course of conduct relating to PTSD/mental health issues on the basis that they are all connected or at least arguably connected with the sickness absence process.

[72]These matters are out of time and it would be inappropriate to extend time. Communications with Mr Kenyon and Ms Holdsworth arguably fall within the general course of conduct pertaining to the sickness absence process so are not expressly excluded as being out of time.73. 25 relating to the clavicle injury is not something which has been pleaded. 25.1, 25.2, 25.3 adequacy of work station and effects on audibility is a specific matter which is out of time. Whilst the Claimant says hearing, audibility and tinnitus issues relate to PTSD that is a much more specific point, it has not been specifically pleaded and, in any event, it is out of time and it is inappropriate to allow it to continue.

74. 25.4 does not give rise to a specific claim and it is not appropriate for it to be permitted to continue. Disability related harassment - 13 -

[75]Some of these matters relate to the Claimant’s clavicle injury.26.1 and others are new such as

26.2 26.3. The matters at 26.1, 26.2 are not matters which I am going to permit to proceed. Either they are out of time or alternatively they do not create a reasonably arguable case for harassment on account of disability. They form part of the overall chronology of events given rise to the Claimant’s ultimate dismissal but I am not satisfied that they would have a reasonable prospect of success. So, for example, Ms Maresch completing the OH referral without discussing it with the Claimant does not get any where near the threshold for an act of harassment. It may be something which caused the Claimant dissatisfaction but tribunals are reminded pursuant to Richmond Pharmacology v Dhaliwal

[2009] IRLR 336

and other cases that one off, minor or trivial matters should not be regarded as constituting harassment. So, none of the claims related to disability related harassment proceed.

[76]It is accepted that the unfair dismissal claim proceeds. Note to the parties

[77]Whilst I have endeavoured to ensure that these written reasons cover all issues the parties will appreciate that with an application involving multiple individual claims, arguments and determinations there is a risk of confusion, but I would invite the parties to read this judgment purposively in conjunction with the relevant documents provided as part of the hearing bundle. General observation on the pleaded disability discrimination complaint

[78]As a general observation, and I made this point to the parties in discussion, is that these points do not inherently fall within direct disability discrimination. I do not want to take an overly rigid approach to a litigant in person but to consider that the claim should sensibly be confined to discrimination arising from disability and/or failure to make reasonable adjustments.