Mr M Chakir v The Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis: 2215333/2023

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Case No 2215333/2023

Between

Mr M ChakirClaimant

The Commissioner of Police of the MetropolisRespondent

Before

Employment Judge Hodgson

In person for claimant

Mr Gareth Deane (instructed by counsel) for respondent

Date 1 May 2025

REASONS

1.1 On 7 October 2023, the claimant lodged his first claim, 2215333/2023, it contained allegations of direct race discrimination. It is unclear what, if any, other claims it contained. At that time, the claimant had not been dismissed. - 1 -

1.2 The claimant presented a further claim, 2219624/2024 on 11 May 2024. That claim was dismissed on withdrawal on or about 18 November 2024. It is unclear what claims it contained.

1.3 On 7 May 2024, EJ Goodman considered a number of applications to amend, and allowed some amendments, including an allegation that the claimant was dismissed contrary to section 15 Equality Act 2010, being a claim that post-dated the original claim and predated the second claim. The Issues

2.1 The issues were agreed on day two and are set out below. Failure to a reasonable adjustments

2.2 The claimant relies on three PCPs as follows:2.2.1 PCP one: the requirement that the claimant be fit for frontline duties including interaction with the public;

2.2.2 PCP two: the requirement the claimant attend for work; and

2.2.3 PCP three: the application of regulation 13 of the 2003 Police Conduct Regulations which may lead to termination of probation.

2.3 The alleged substantial disadvantage in relation to PCP one is the claimant was not able to perform his duties.

2.4 The alleged substantial disadvantage in relation to PCP two is the claimant was unable to attend for work.

2.5 The alleged substantial disadvantage in relation PCP three is the inability to perform his duties and attend for work exposed the claimant to termination of his probation period.

2.6 The claimant identifies the following proposed reasonable adjustments:2.6.1 adjustment one: by placing the claimant in the regulation 12 process (to extend probation) rather than the regulation 13 process (leading to termination);

2.6.2 adjustment two: by giving the claimant duties which did not require face-to-face contact with the public and which did not require the claimant to leave the police station; and

2.6.3 adjustment three: by excluding him from driving duties from 2023. Discrimination arising from disability

2.7 The matter arising in consequence of disability is said to be disability absence.

2.8 The claimant alleges the following unfavourable treatment:2.8.1 allegation one: by Sgt Abbie Ranns triggering the regulation 13 process in November 2022; and - 2 -

2.8.2 allegation two: by dismissing the claimant.1

2.9 The respondent alleged that the treatment was a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. The respondent was ordered to provide details. Harassment related to disability

2.10 The claimant alleges the following amounted to harassment:2.10.1 allegation three: by Inspector Michael Branford making comments on 4 December 2023 described by the claimant as follows: Mr Branford when asked by the superintendent to comment on my back injury, he said “He’s been in the job for just over three years now. His sickness was initially limited, but he was not deployable for the best part of a year. and obviously since September he’s had a relapse, quiet clearly we have someone in their probation.. we need operational cops, there comes a point where we have to say well he is not ﬁt to be an operational constable, that’s what we need we have got enough people with back injuries with no end”

2.10.2 Allegation four: by Inspector Branford making an application for fast-track termination of the claimant’s probation utilising regulation 13 on or around 31 October 2023.

2.10.3 Allegation five: On 4 December 2023, by managers being Sergeant Abbie Ranns and Inspector Michael Branford attending the regulation 13 meeting. Age discrimination – harassment related to age

2.11 The following is the allegation of harassment related to age: 2.11.1 allegation six: by Inspector Michael Branford, in the meeting on 4 December 2023, commenting that PC Sophie Persaud is 22 years old and would have no reason to lie, it being the claimant’s case it is implied he was lying. Age discrimination – direct

2.12 The following is the allegation of direct age discrimination: 2.12.1 allegation seven: by Inspector Branford and other unspecified individuals believing PCP Persaud rather than the claimant. Victimisation

2.13 The claimant relies on two alleged protected acts first the written grievance of 2 August 2023. The second is his oral comments made on

The Issues

[1]The application of regulation 13 of the 2003 Police Conduct Regulations may lead to termination of service of a police officer who is on probation. In this context it is that termination of service which will be referred to as either “dismissal” or “termination.” - 3 - 16 August 2023 consistent with the written grievance. The respondent accepts that they were protected acts. 2.14 The alleged allegations of detrimental treatment are as follows:2.14.1 allegation eight: by Inspector Michael Branford fast tracking the regulation 13 process at the meeting on or about 16 August 2023;

2.14.2 allegation nine: by Inspector Michael Branford on or around 1 November 2023 recommending the claimant’s services be dispensed with; and

2.14.3 allegation 10: by Inspector Michael Branford on 4 December 2023 accusing the claimant of trying to end Sgt Kate Reilly’s career by making untrue allegations. Time 2.15 the tribunal to determine whether any of the claims to try and do so with a time should be extended. Evidence

3.1 The claimant gave evidence and relied on a written statement concerning liability and his disability impact statement.

3.2 For the respondent the following gave evidence: Sgt Abbie Ranns; Inspector Mike Branford; Assistant Commissioner Louise Rolffe; Sgt Kate Riley; and Sgt Charli Catchpole

3.3 I received a bundle of documents.

3.4 The respondent submitted a chronology and a cast list.

3.5 Both parties gave written submissions supplemented by oral submissions. Concessions/Applications

4.1 On day one of the hearing, there remained dispute about what claims had been pleaded, what claims had been allowed by way of amendment, and what claims should be included in the issues. Those difficulties were discussed and the claims identified. The tribunal confirmed the issues would be set out by the tribunal and sent to the parties. The parties were directed to identify any claims which had been incorporated in the original claim or by way of amendment, which were not included in the issues. The claimant was directed to make an application for amendment, if he wished to include any additional claims.

4.2 The tribunal’s list of issues were sent.

4.3 Day two was a reading day. - 4 -

4.4 On day three the final list was agreed by both parties. The claimant confirmed all of the claims had been identified. He confirmed he was not applying for any amendments.

4.5 On day one, the tribunal noted that the second claim had been dismissed on withdrawal.

4.6 The claimant confirmed that all claims of race discrimination and harassment related to race, as contained in the first claim or allowed by amendment, where withdrawn. Those claims were dismissed.

4.7 On day one the respondent was ordered to set out the alleged legitimate aim relied on for the purpose of section 15 Equality Act 2010 together any supporting explanation. The respondent was to identify the claimant’s disability impact statement. It being noted the respondent conceded disability it was to provide the following details: the accepted impairment; when and how it became long-term; the effect on day-to-day activity; and the effect, if any, on the claimant’s ability to perform his duties.

4.8 The respondent provided the information in relation to its position on reasonable adjustments and the alleged legitimate aim. To the extent it was relevant I will consider it in due course.

4.9 On day one, the claimant indicated he had sent documentation including applications on the morning of the hearing. That email had not reached me. It appeared that a number of matters were raised which may have been superseded by the discussion on day one. We agreed that no action would be taken in relation to that email, or the applications made, unless the claimant renewed the application and made clear which, if any, he was proceeding with. He was asked to deal with that by the end of day two of the hearing.

4.10 The claimant confirmed when the hearing resumed on day three that he did not pursue any applications and did not wish to make any further applications.

4.11 On day 5, Sgt Riley changed part of her statement before adopting it. The part changed concerned whether the claimant was reversing on the date of the first driving incident. The Facts

5.1 On 1 September 2020, the claimant became a probationary police constable at the Metropolitan Police. Probation normally lasts for two years. At all times he was subject to the Police Regulations 2003. Regulation 12 provides for a period of probation for a newly appointed police constable, in this case two years. Regulation 13 provides that during the period of probation, the police constable’s service may be terminated at any time by the chief officer, in this case the respondent or the assistant commissioner, in circumstances where the chief officer - 5 - “considers that he is not fitted, physically or mentally, to perform the duties of his office, or that he is not likely to become an efficient or well conducted constable.” As noted above, I will refer to such terminations of service as dismissals.

5.2 The claimant’s service was terminated by notice given on 21 February 2024 following a regulation 13 meeting held before Assistant Commissioner Rolfe on 15 February 2024. His service ended on 20 March 2024.

5.3 During probation, a police constable’s progress is monitored. It is necessary to demonstrate competence, at least in part, by showing competency in certain tasks, such as completing arrests or undertaking a stop and search procedure. This is recorded through a system known as SORACs (student officer record of competence).

5.4 During his probation, the claimant sustained injury to his lower back whilst on active duty. He injured his back on 9 January 2022, shortly before he was due to join the response team.

5.5 On 11 January 2022, the claimant informed Sgt Ranns that an MRI scan had shown a “disc bulge.” He stated he was in great pain and was unable to undertake basic activities except moderate walking.

5.6 Sgt Ranns referred the claimant to occupational health. The report on 9 February 2022 noted low back pain with no incontinence. It recommended a return to work date of 18 February 2022. It recommended he did not resume full duties and had an office based duty avoiding any potential for confrontation. There should be a weekly review.

5.7 On 20 February 2022, the claimant’s emailed the respondent and stated he had spoken to occupational health regarding “a gradual return to nonoperational duties.”

5.8 He was due to return on 15 March 2022, but had a further period of absence following an operation on his nose.

5.9 Following an exchange of emails with Sgt Ranns, the claimant was allocated a desk job working on the “My Investigation Support Team” (MIST). Sgt Ranns maintained overall line management responsibility, but day-to-day the claimant was managed by Sgt Dominic Delmonico.

5.10 At all times when he returned to his duties with MIST he knew he was non-operational. This is referred to as “NANO” (no aid, no operations).

5.11 Those undertaking desk work who are NANO are not expected to undertake any operational activities, including leaving the office to interview or interact with witnesses or others. - 6 -

5.12 Prior to his return in April 2022, the claimant had undertaken some of the relevant competencies for SORAC. He still had some to complete. He was not able to complete them because he was not operational. It was necessary for him to complete all the competencies in order to demonstrate his suitability and to complete his probation.

5.13 Sgt Ranns held a regulation 12 meeting on 22 April 2022. During that meeting the claimant stated his GP believed recovery could be from six weeks to 6 months. Sgt Ranns confirmed he needed to complete his ERPT rotation (emergency response patrol team). His probation was extended from 1 September 2022, the end of the initial two-year period, until 1 March 2023. The first driving incident

5.14 On 5 June 2022, the claimant interviewed a witness outside the police station and travelled there in a police car. When he returned, there was an incident the detail of which is disputed. It is the respondent’s position that the claimant damaged a police vehicle. The claimant has at all times denied being in a collision or causing any damage to the vehicle.

5.15 It is common ground the claimant was driving a Hyundai a motor vehicle. The claimant returned the vehicle to the car park. Two police officers, one of whom was Sgt Riley, heard a loud bang outside their office window. Through the window, they saw the claimant’s vehicle had apparently collided with a post.

5.16 Sgt Riley spoke to the claimant and asked him to reverse the car back.

5.17 The claimant denied having had an accident and this caused Sgt Riley concern. This led to further investigation.

5.18 The logbook did not detail any pre-existing damage to the vehicle and the claimant stated he had not undertaken the driver required inspection before taking the vehicle out. The claimant accepts that there was some minor damage to the front number plate of the vehicle. Sgt Riley noted the claimant was NANO and should not have been using the vehicles. He had left the station without his PPE when he should have had, as a minimum, a radio, handcuffs, a handcuff key, PAVA spray and a baton. Given the claimant’s continuing denial, his confirmation he had not undertaken the required driver inspection, and the fact he should not have been driving, the matter was referred to the Directorate of Professional Standards (DPS).

5.19 It was found the claimant had been driving the vehicle and caused the damage. He was issued with four points on his police licence.

5.20 The claimant sought to appeal the decision but this was unsuccessful. - 7 -

5.21 I find that at all material times the respondent officers believed the claimant had collided with the post on 5 June causing damage to the vehicle, but had sought to deny this. I find there were sufficient the grounds on which to sustain the belief. I find, on the balance of probability, that the claimant was involved in an accident on 5 June, but failed to make full or frank disclosure to the respondent. Return to full-time duties

5.22 The claimant was able to return to full-time duties in November 2022. He joined the response team in February 2023 and at that time he was fully operational and subject to no restrictions because of his health. There were no specific restrictions because of the back injury. The claimant was able to return to driving duties. Completion of SORACS

5.23 The claimant did complete all tasks relevant to SORACS and ultimately they were signed off following his final submission to Sgt Catchpole on 16 August 2023.

5.24 The probationary police constable has primary responsibility for completing the relevant documentation evidencing the various required tasks. The SORAC forms are given to the relevant Sgt who signs each off, if satisfied the evidence is sufficient, and returns it to the claimant to form part of the ongoing record. That record is then submitted for final review.

5.25 There is some dispute as to what documents were given to whom and when. However, I do not need to go into the detail. It is common ground that the claimant was able to complete all the relevant tasks and obtain the relevant evidence which was signed off by the relevant sergeants following his presentation of evidence in August 2023. Regulation 13 procedure

5.26 The procedure governing the application of regulation 13 provided for a first case conference where it may be appropriate to agree a performance plan in order to encourage improvement. Following a period of assessment, this would lead to review and potentially further improvement plans. This may lead to a further review. If progress was unsatisfactory, this may lead to a reference to the BCU commander who could recommend termination. The BCU commander may then refer the matter for a final decision to the assistant commissioner. It is for the assistant commissioner to undertake a full review and to decide whether to terminate, or take any other action, including extending probation and recommending improvement plans. - 8 -

5.27 Regulation 13 is the authority whereby the services of the PC on probation may be dispensed with. Instigation of the regulation 13 procedure does not necessarily lead to termination.

5.28 There is a fast-track regulation 13 procedure. The relevant provision reads: On a small number of occasions, there will be sufficient evidence that the probationary officer is unlikely to become a well-conducted police constable or that they are inherently unsuitable to carry out the duties of a police officer. See the below heading on conduct and discipline. You will need to justify that there is no realistic prospect of improvement or where the incident is so severe that the full regulation 13 process would be inappropriate. You should discuss the case with your 2nd line manager and HR Case Management.

5.29 In the fast track procedure, there is no requirement to hold a case conference, but a fast-track regulation 13 notice must be served. Any recommendation for termination must still be forwarded to the BCU commander and ultimately considered and approved or rejected by the assistant commissioner.

5.30 Conduct and discipline can be considered, and this extends to all sanctions, warnings, or advice given. Where allegations against a probation officer could form the basis of misconduct, it is normal for there to be a misconduct process. That misconduct action is normally completed before completing the regulation 13 fast-track process. Misconduct can evidence a lack of fitness within the meaning of regulation 13.

5.31 The claimant was subject initially to a regulation 13 procedure and thereafter to a fast-track regulation 13 procedure. The initial regulation 13 procedure

5.32 On 8 December 2022, Inspector Branford held a regulation 13 meeting. On 21 November 2022, Sgt Ranns sent the claimant an invitation to regulation 13 case conference. She attach relevant documentation.

5.33 Sgt Ranns and Inspector Branford attended the meeting. The claimant was supported by a federation representative. At the meeting on 8 December 2022 Sgt Ranns confirmed the purpose of the meeting was to discuss the development plan.

5.34 The claimant confirmed he had not completed all SORACs. He was told it was necessary to complete the SORACs and the ERPT attachment.

5.35 This led to a development plan. Inspector Branford was concerned that the claimant appeared to be a long way from meeting his SOROCs and his probation was extended for a second time from 1 March to 1 - 9 - September 2023, to provide additional time to enable him to work towards completing the development plan.

5.36 A second case conference, being a further regulation 13 meeting, was arranged for 1 August 2023. This was chaired by Inspector Branford. At that time, the claimant had still not completed the remaining SOROCs. The position had become complicated by a serious allegation of misconduct. The claimant’s probation was due to expire on 1 September 2023 and inspector Branford implemented a further extension of the probation period from 1 September 2023, to 1 March 2024, the third extension.

5.37 The regulation 13 procedure had been instigated around November 2022. In June 2023, there was a further driving conduct issue and it was necessary for inspector Branford to consider this. Ultimately, this led, in part, to the instigation of a fast-track regulation 13 procedure. It is necessary to give some detail about the alleged misconduct and other matters before considering the fast-track regulation 13 procedure. The second driving incident

5.38 The second incident related to the claimant’s alleged misuse of a police vehicle’s emergency blue lights. As a basic driver, he was not permitted to use blue lights when driving. Blue lights could be used when the vehicle was parked, for instance to alert the public to a hazard.

5.39 On 1 March 2023, the claimant requested to be excused driving duties. He stated he may learn “more from being an operator until I have passed my probation.” (The operator does not drive the vehicle.) The claimant did not request to be excused because of any issue with his back or for a reason related to disability.

5.40 At all material times, Sgt Ranns understood the claimant was permitted to act as a basic driver. She did not give any formal response. However, she stopped assigning the claimant driving duties and she requested that the other sergeants do the same.

5.41 On a few occasions, he was asked to undertake driving duties thereafter when this reflected an operational need, such as shortage of officers.

5.42 In May 2023, Sgt Catchpole was on foot patrol in Hyde Park. PC Persaud commented on the claimant’s driving, describing him as a bad driver who braked too hard, and drove erratically. She stated he regularly used blue lights. Sgt Catchpole noted that this was an accusation of misconduct and asked PC Persaud to discuss it no further, but to set out her observations in an email. PC Persaud sent her email on 9 May 2023. The email reported the claimant, who was a basic driver and not permitted to use blue lights when driving a police vehicle, repeatedly used blue lights during a journey when transporting civilians on 29 April 2023. Following her email, an investigation was undertaken. Each police car has an IDR – - 10 - essentially a box which tracks acceleration, breaking, speed, and use of blue lights. The relevant IDR demonstrated harsh braking, speeds of up to 42 mph, and frequent activation of the blue lights. The entire borough was situated within a 20 mile an hour speed limit zone. The matter was referred to the professional standards unit (PSU).

5.43 Sgt Mulley, who investigated on behalf of professional standard unit, did not consider it necessary or proportionate to interview the family who were in the car on 29 April 2023. She rejected the complaint set out her reasons in a letter of 23 August 2023. The PSU process led to the claimant receiving a warning in respect of his driving conduct.

5.44 Sgt Catchpole took over line management of the claimant from Sgt Ranns on or around mid-July 2023. She had not previously been involved in a regulation 13 procedure with probationers, albeit she had a lot of experience supporting probationary officers. The misconduct proceedings

5.45 The misconduct proceedings concerning the use of blue lights was chaired by Chief Inspector Benjamin Smith. The misconduct hearing took place on 30 October 2023.

5.46 Chief Inspector Benjamin Smith gave his outcome on 30 October 2023, which is recorded in writing.

5.47 Chief Inspector Benjamin Smith records that the allegation related to an incident on 29 April 2023 where the claimant repeatedly used blue lights when driving a police vehicle despite not being permitted to do so because he was a basic driver. He summarises the claimant’s position as follows: You admitted that you drove using your blue lights, but you state that this was a lapse of judgment, a lack of understanding of the driver policy, and that it is custom and practice for other basic drivers to drive using warning equipment in the manner you did. You state that this matter should sit at the level of reflective practice, rather that of misconduct. You believe that the officer who reported you did so maliciously.

5.48 He concluded that the breach of standards was clear and not disputed. He reviewed the breach.

5.49 He was troubled by the claimant’s “tendency to try and lay the blame for his failings on others.” He noted the claimant had failed to take full responsibility but instead sought to blame others including his supervisors and his colleague, and to claim that he did not understand the policy. He did not accept the claimant was unclear about the policy. He rejected the notion that there was some form of custom and practice which allowed lights to be used in order to make progress in a non-response situation. He noted the previous driving matter and the advice given to the claimant to refresh his memory on the driving policy. - 11 -

5.50 Chief Inspector Smith was particularly concerned the claimant had made allegations of dishonesty against PC Persaud; he found those allegations “deeply troubling.” He believed it was an extraordinary serious allegation which, if proven against PC Persaud, could found a claim gross misconduct. He found it hard to credit the suggestion that the allegation was malicious and false; he noted that her general report was clearly true; he noted that the fact the claimant wished to be excused driving duties was not a mitigating factor.

5.51 He concluded that the fundamental facts were admitted, being the use of the blue lights. . He considered there were aggravating factors which pushed the matter into the sphere of misconduct. He identified the aggravating facts as follows: there were multiple incidents during the shift; the claimant had previously been advised to review the driving policy; the claimant had demonstrated a lack of insight into the nature of the breach; and the claimant sought to blame others, particularly by making an “extraordinary serious allegation against a colleague.” The complaint against Sgt Riley

5.52 I should note it is not necessary for me to record the full detail of all the evidence that I have seen and considered, in relation to this matter, or any other. The claimant has raised numerous matters before the tribunal and some of that evidence is more directly relevant to claims that have been abandoned, for example, his request for transfer, and his reference to alleged comparators. However I have had regard to all the evidence. It would be disproportionate to set put all the detail.

5.53 On 2 August 2023, the claimant filed a grievance against Sgt Ranns and Sgt Riley. He alleged Sgt Ranns had poorly supervised him. He accused Sgt Riley of assaulting him whilst on patrol in February 2023. His accusation against Sgt Riley was of a criminal assault.

5.54 The claimant has continued to maintain his allegations against Sgt Riley. He refers to suffering pain and shock and emotional distress. He states he was traumatised.

5.55 The incident was not raised for approximately six months. It was raised the day after he was invited to the fast-track regulation 13 meeting.

5.56 The allegation was investigated. There was body cam footage which was viewed by a number of officers. His complaint was rejected.

5.57 In the meeting on 4 December 2023, Chief Inspector Carter said “I’ve seen the body worn video, and I cannot for the life of me… understand how you come to the conclusion that you have…”

5.58 As to the circumstances of the alleged assault, it is common ground that the claimant was on patrol. Sgt Riley had detained an individual who was behaving erratically. She was attempting to put on gloves and reached - 12 - out touching the claimant’s arm to encourage him to take hold of the detainee. The claimant accepts that was her intention. His complaint appears to be about the amount of force used and whether she gripped him, and if so whether that grip was too harsh.

5.59 Sgt Troni reviewed the appeal and reported on 3 November 2023. Sgt Troni did not interview Sgt Riley relying instead on what was considered to be objective reliable evidence, particularly the body cam video.

5.60 The allegation against Sgt Riley was rejected. I have considered the relevant reports. Accusation against PC Persaud

5.61 PC Persaud reported in her email the claimant’s use of blue lights on 29 April when he was not permitted to do so. As part of her report, she reported that the claimant had said “Please don’t tell the skippers, I could get in a lot of trouble.” The claimant did not accept he used those words and he accused PC Persaud of being malicious and of fabricating the allegation, an accusation he pursued particularly during the misconduct meeting on 30 October 2023.

5.62 The claimant made further allegations against PC Persaud including that she had activated the blue lights during the journey 29 April 2023. Regulation 13 meeting - 4 December 2023

5.63 Inspector Branford understood there to be two broad processes envisaged under regulation 13. The normal process would generally deal with attendance and performance. However, when matters of conduct were raised, a fast-track procedure may be appropriate. Inspector Branford noted the claimant’s probation had been extended several times and he was heading towards his fourth year as a probationer

5.64 He was also concerned that there were multiple misconduct issues.

5.65 He took advice from HR and from a senior colleague. He chaired the regulation 13 meeting on 16 August, which was attended by Sgt Catchpole, the claimant, and others including a federation representative. The claimant read out a prepared statement, which included allegations against other officers. Inspector Branford decided to recommend instigation of the regulation 13 fast-track procedure. As part of that, he issued a regulation 13 formal warning notice letter on 16 August 2023, which the claimant refused to sign. This letter confirmed the level currently achieved by the claimant was not acceptable and that it appeared it was unlikely he would become an efficient and well conducted constable. It stated the report would be sent to the BCU commander requesting that consideration be given to recommending termination by the assistant commissioner. - 13 -

5.66 On 31 October 2023, the day following chief inspector Ben Smith’s written warning for the second driving misconduct incident, Inspector Branford sent a recommendation to Chief Superintendent Andy Carter to dispense with the claimant’s services. He referred to the outcome of the misconduct meeting. This is a lengthy document which sets out the relevant history, including the misconduct report and outcome. He noted that the claimant’s grievances were still under consideration by PSU. He informed the claimant of his action.

5.67 On 4 December 2023, there was a further regulation 13 meeting chaired by CSI Carter. To the extent it is necessary to consider the detail, I will do so when looking at the individual allegations. The outcome was that CSI Carter recommended dispensing with the claimant’s services. It was that recommendation which was considered by Assistant Commissioner Rolfe, as she was at that time. I will continue to refer to her as Assistant Commissioner Rolfe.

5.68 As assistant commissioner for frontline policing she had authority to terminate the claimant’s services pursuant to regulation 13. She approved the extension of the probationary period. She received Mr Carter’s recommendation. She arranged a meeting with the claimant which, following postponement, proceeded on 15 February 2024. The claimant was accompanied by a federation representative.

5.69 She read CSI Carter’s report prepared following the meeting on 4 December 2023. She also reviewed documents provided by the claimant. At the meeting, she considered the claimant’s complaints about unfair treatment. She noted he had declined the opportunity to enter mediation. Following the meeting she reviewed all evidence and decided to terminate the claimant’s service. She concluded she had no confidence the claimant would become a fully competent officer given his conduct and performance to that point. She understood the claimant had failed to complete a number of competencies. However, she found that there were conduct matters which were of greater concern. One had resulted in the claimant being given points on his licence and the other had led to a written warning. These were the two driving incidents. In addition, she was concerned the claimant had made serious allegation of assault against a senior officer, Sgt Riley, which she found to be wholly unsupported by the available video evidence.

5.70 Assistant Commissioner Rolfe concluded that the claimant’s service should be terminated and she wrote to him giving full details on 24 February 2024.

5.71 In her letter of termination she stated the following: Since your probation started you have been given two misconduct warnings, both relating to you driving a police car. You have been absent for significant periods of time due to sickness, all of which have been appropriately certificated by your GP. The most recent period of sickness absence commenced on 6th September 2023. In - 14 - October 2023, our Occupational Health colleague, Dr Mahmood reported your back condition was long term and he was, at that time, unable to give advice about workplace adjustments or recuperative duties. Dr Mahmood explained your return to work would be dependent upon the success of treatment from your primary NHS carers. In addition Dr Mahmood identified work related stress was contributing to your absence and he gave you details of the MPS Employee Assistance Programme confidential counselling services. I was very sorry to learn you remain off work because of sickness. I hope your ongoing treatment goes well and you recover soon. I have to make a decision upon whether you are likely to become an efficient, well conducted, fully operational Police Constable, within a reasonable period of time. I do not think you will. Comparators

5.72 In his evidence, the claimant sought to allege that he had identified three comparators. I have considered each. I do not need to deal with them in detail. The evidence presented is minimal. To the extent that the claimant has given any detail on any comparator, he has failed to demonstrate any is in the same or even similar material circumstances to the claimant. The most significant material circumstances affecting the claimant and his treatment revolve around his conduct, and none of the alleged comparators is of any real assistance. I have had regard to the treatment of the alleged comparators when reaching my conclusions. The law

6.1 Direct discrimination is defined in section 13 of the Equality Act 2010. Section 13 - Direct discrimination

(1) A person (A) discriminates against another (B) if, because of a protected characteristic, A treats B less favourably than A treats or would treat others.

(2) If the protected characteristic is age, A does not discriminate against B if A can show A’s treatment of B to be a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim

6.2 Shamoon v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary

[2003] ICR 337

is authority for the proposition that the question of whether the claimant has received less favourable treatment is often inextricably linked with the question why the claimant was treated as he was. Accordingly: employment tribunals may sometimes be able to avoid arid and confusing disputes about the identification of the appropriate comparator by concentrating primarily on why the claimant was treated as she was. (para 10)

6.3 Anya v University of Oxford CA

2001 IRLR 377

is authority for the proposition that I must consider whether the act complained of actually occurred (see Sedley LJ at paragraph 9). If the tribunal does not accept - 15 - the there is proof on the balance of probabilities that the act complained of in fact occurred, the case will fail at that point.

6.4 Harassment is defined in section 26 of the Equality Act 2010. Section 26 - Harassment (1) A person (A) harasses another (B) if— (a) A engages in unwanted conduct related to a relevant protected characteristic, and (b) the conduct has the purpose or effect of— (i) violating B's dignity, or (ii) creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for B.

(3) A also harasses B if- (a) A or another person engages in unwanted conduct of a sexual nature or that is related to gender reassignment or sex, (b) the conduct has the purpose or effect referred to in subsection (1)(b), and (c) because of B's rejection of or submission to the conduct, A treats B less favourably than A would treat B if B had not rejected or submitted to the conduct.

(4) In deciding whether conduct has the effect referred to in subsection (1)(b), each of the following must be taken into account— (a) the perception of B; (b) the other circumstances of the case; (c) whether it is reasonable for the conduct to have that effect.

(5) The relevant protected characteristics are— age; disability; gender reassignment; race; religion or belief; sex; sexual orientation.

6.5 In Richmond Pharmacology v Dhaliwal

[2009] IRLR 336

the EAT (Underhill P presiding) in the context of a race discrimination case, made it clear that the approach to be taken to harassment claims should be broadly the same. The EAT observed that 'harassment' is now defined in a way that focuses on three elements. First, there is the question of unwanted conduct. Second, the tribunal should consider whether the conduct has the purpose or effect of either violating the claimant's dignity or creating an adverse environment for him or her. Third, was the conduct on the prohibited grounds?

6.6 In Nazir and Aslam v Asim and Nottinghamshire Black Partnership

UKEAT/0332/09/RN

, [2010] EqLR 142, the EAT emphasised the importance of asking whether the conduct related to one of the prohibited grounds. The EAT in Nazir found that when a tribunal is considering whether facts have been proved from which a tribunal could conclude that harassment was on a prohibited ground, it was always relevant, at the first - 16 - stage, to take into account the context of the conduct which is alleged to have been perpetrated on that ground. That context may in fact point strongly towards or against a conclusion that it was related to any protected characteristic and should not be left for consideration only as part of the explanation at the second stage.

6.7 In Dhaliwal the EAT noted harassment does have its boundaries: We accept that not every racially slanted adverse comment or conduct may constitute the violation of a person's dignity. Dignity is not necessarily violated by things said or done which are trivial or transitory, particularly if it should have been clear that any offence was unintended. While it is very important that employers, and tribunals, are sensitive to the hurt that can be caused by racially offensive comments or conduct (or indeed comments or conduct on other grounds covered by the cognate legislation to which we have referred), it is also important not to encourage a culture of hypersensitivity or the imposition of legal liability in respect of every unfortunate phrase. We accept that the facts here may have been close to the borderline, as the Tribunal indeed indicated by the size of its award.

6.8 Harassment may be unlawful if the conduct had either the purpose or the effect of violating the complainant's dignity or creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for him.

6.9 A claim based on 'purpose' requires an analysis of the alleged harasser's motive or intention. This may, in turn, require the Employment Tribunal to draw inferences as to what that true motive or intent actually was: the person against whom the accusation is made is unlikely to simply admit to an unlawful purpose. In such cases, the burden of proof may shift, as it does in other areas of discrimination law.

6.10 Where the claimant simply relies on the 'effect' of the conduct in question, the perpetrator's motive or intention even if entirely innocent does not in itself afford a defence. The test in this regard has both subjective and objective elements to it. The assessment requires the tribunal to consider the effect of the conduct from the complainant's point of view: the subjective element. It must also ask, however, whether it was reasonable of the complainant to consider that conduct had that effect: the objective element. The fact that the claimant is peculiarly sensitive to the treatment does not necessarily mean that harassment will be shown to exist.

6.11 The requirement to take into account the complainant's perception in deciding whether what has taken place could reasonably be considered to have caused offence reflects guidance given by the EAT in Driskel v Peninsula Business Services Ltd

[2000] IRLR 151

, which concerned the approach to be taken by employment tribunals in determining whether alleged harassment constituted discrimination on grounds of sex. In Driskel the EAT held that although the ultimate judgment as to whether conduct amounts to unlawful harassment involves an objective assessment by the tribunal of all the facts, the claimant's subjective perception of the conduct in question must also be considered. - 17 -

6.12 Victimisation is defined in section 27 of the Equality Act 2010. Section 27 - Victimisation (1) A person (A) victimises another person (B) if A subjects B to a detriment because-- (a) B does a protected act, or (b) A believes that B has done, or may do, a protected act. (2) Each of the following is a protected act- (a) bringing proceedings under this Act; (b) giving evidence or information in connection with proceedings under this Act; (c) doing any other thing for the purposes of or in connection with this Act; (d) making an allegation (whether or not express) that A or another person has contravened this Act. (3) Giving false evidence or information, or making a false allegation, is not a protected act if the evidence or information is given, or the allegation is made, in bad faith. (4) This section applies only where the person subjected to a detriment is an individual.

6.13 Prior to the Equality Act 2010 the language of victimisation referred to less favourable treatment by reason of the protected act. Under the Equality Act 2010, victimisation occurs when the claimant is subject to a detriment because the claimant has done a protected act or the respondent believes that he has done or may do the protected act.

6.14 I have to exercise some caution in considering the cases decided before the Equality Act 2010. However, those cases may still be helpful. It is not in necessary to consider the second question, as posed in Derbyshire below, which focuses on how others were or would be treated. It is not necessary to construct a comparator at all because one is focusing on the reason for the treatment.

6.15 When considering victimisation, it may be appropriate to consider the questions derived from Baroness Hale's analysis in Derbyshire and Others v St Helens Metropolitan Borough Council and others

2007 ICR 841

. However as noted above there is no requirement now to specifically consider the treatment of others. “37. The first question concentrates upon the effect of what the employer has done upon the alleged victim. Is it a 'detriment' or, in the terms of the Directive, 'adverse treatment'? But this has to be treatment which a reasonable employee would or might consider detrimental… Lord Hope of Craighead, observed in Shamoon v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary

[2003] IRLR 285

at 292, paragraph 35, 'An unjustified sense of grievance cannot amount to "detriment"'. - 18 - 40. The second question focuses upon how the employer treats other people… 41. The third question focuses upon the employers' reasons for their behaviour. Why did they do it? Was it, in the terms of the Directives, a 'reaction to' the women's claims? As Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead explained in Khan's case

[2001] IRLR 830

, 833, paragraph 29, this 'does not raise a question of causation as that expression is usually understood ... The phrases "on racial grounds" and "by reason that" denote a different exercise: why did the alleged discriminator act as he did? What, consciously or unconsciously, was his reason? Unlike causation, this is a subjective test. Causation is a legal conclusion. The reason why a person acted as he did is a question of fact.'”

6.16 Detriment can take many forms. It could simply be general hostility. It may be dismissal or some other detriment. Omissions to act may constitute unfavourable treatment. It is, however, not enough for the employee to say he or she has suffered a disadvantage. An unjustified sense of grievance is not a detriment.

6.17 The need to show that any alleged detriment must be capable of being objectively regarded as such was emphasised in St Helens Metropolitan Borough Council v Derbyshire

2007 IRLR 540

. Shamoon v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary

2003 IRLR 285

was cited and it was confirmed an unjustified sense of grievance cannot amount to detriment. That in our view remains good law. In Derbyshire, Lord Neuberger confirmed the detriment should be viewed from the point of view of the alleged victim. Rather than considering the ‘honest and reasonable test as suggested in Khan’ the focus should be on what constitutes a detriment. It is arguable therefore that whether an action amounts to victimisation will depend at least partly on the perception of the employee provided that perception is reasonable. It is this reasonable perception that the employer must have regard to when taking action and when considering whether that action could be construed as victimisation. Detriment exists if a reasonable worker would or might take the view that the treatment was in all the circumstances to his detriment. The detriment cannot be made out simply by an individual exhibiting mental distress, it would also have to be objectively reasonable in all the circumstances. The stress and worry induced by the employer’s honest and reasonable conduct in the course of his defence cannot, except in the most unusual circumstances, constitute a detriment. The focus should be on the question of detriment. Reasons for unfavourable treatment

6.18 When the protected act and detriment have been established, the tribunal must still examine the reason for that treatment. Of course, the questions of reason and detriment are often linked. It must be shown that the unfavourable treatment of a person alleging victimisation was because of the protected act. A simple ‘but for’ test is not appropriate. - 19 -

6.19 It is not necessary to show conscious motivation. However, there must be a necessary link in the mind of the discriminator between the doing of the protected act and the treatment. If the treatment was due to another reason such as absenteeism or misconduct the victimisation claim will fail. The protected act must be a reason for the treatment complained. It is a question of fact for the tribunal. Chief Constable of West Yorkshire police v Khan

2001 IRLR 830

HL is authority for the proposition that the language used in the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 is not the language of strict causation. The words by reason that suggest that what is to be considered, as Lord Scott put it, is "the real reason, the core reason, the causa causans, the motive, for the treatment complained of that must be identified." This in our view remains good law.

6.20 It is not necessary for a person claiming victimisation to show that unfavourable treatment was meted out solely by reason of his or her having done a protected act.

6.21 Lord Nicholls found in Najarajan v London Regional Transport

1999 ICR 877

, HL, that if the protected act has a significant influence on the outcome of an employer's decision, discrimination will be made out. It was clarified by Lord Justice Gibson in Court of Appeal in Igen and others v Wong and others

2005 ICR 931

that in order to be significant it does not have to be of great importance. A significant influence is an influence which is more than trivial. Subconscious motivation

6.22 The House of Lords in Nagarajan rejected the notion that there must be a conscious motivation in order to establish victimisation claims. Victimisation may be by reason of an earlier protected act if the discriminator consciously used that act to determine or influences the treatment of the complainant. Equally the influence may be unconscious. The key question is why the complainant received the treatment.

6.23 Section 23 refers to comparators in the case of direct discrimination. Section 23 Equality Act 2010 - Comparison by reference to circumstances (1) On a comparison of cases for the purposes of section 13, 14, or 19 there must be no material difference between the circumstances relating to each case.

6.24 Section 136 Equality Act 2010 refers to the reverse burden of proof. Section 136 - Burden of proof (1) This section applies to any proceedings relating to a contravention of this Act. (2) If there are facts from which the court could decide, in the absence of any other explanation, that a person (A) contravened the provision concerned, the court must hold that the contravention occurred. - 20 - (3) But subsection (2) does not apply if A shows that A did not contravene the provision. (4) The reference to a contravention of this Act includes a reference to a breach of an equality clause or rule. (5) This section does not apply to proceedings for an offence under this Act.

(6) A reference to the court includes a reference to-- (a) an employment tribunal; (b) …

6.25 In considering the burden of proof the suggested approach to this shifting burden is set out initially in Barton v Investec Securities Ltd

[2003] IRLR 323

which was approved and slightly modified by the Court of Appeal in Igen Ltd & Others v Wong

[2005] IRLR 258

. I have particular regard to the amended guidance which is set out at the Appendix of Igen. I also have regard to the Court of Appeal decision in Madarassy v Nomura International plc

[2007] IRLR 246

. The approach in Igen has been affirmed in Hewage v Grampian Health Board

2012 UKSC 37

Appendix (1) Pursuant to s.63A of the SDA, it is for the claimant who complains of sex discrimination to prove on the balance of probabilities facts from which the tribunal could conclude, in the absence of an adequate explanation, that the respondent has committed an act of discrimination against the claimant which is unlawful by virtue of Part II or which by virtue of s.41 or s.42 of the SDA is to be treated as having been committed against the claimant. These are referred to below as 'such facts'. (2) If the claimant does not prove such facts he or she will fail. (3) It is important to bear in mind in deciding whether the claimant has proved such facts that it is unusual to find direct evidence of sex discrimination. Few employers would be prepared to admit such discrimination, even to themselves. In some cases the discrimination will not be an intention but merely based on the assumption that 'he or she would not have fitted in'. (4) In deciding whether the claimant has proved such facts, it is important to remember that the outcome at this stage of the analysis by the tribunal will therefore usually depend on what inferences it is proper to draw from the primary facts found by the tribunal. (5) It is important to note the word 'could' in s.63A(2). At this stage the tribunal does not have to reach a definitive determination that such facts would lead it to the conclusion that there was an act of unlawful discrimination. At this stage a tribunal is looking at the primary facts before it to see what inferences of secondary fact could be drawn from them. (6) In considering what inferences or conclusions can be drawn from the primary facts, the tribunal must assume that there is no adequate explanation for those facts. - 21 -

(7) These inferences can include, in appropriate cases, any inferences that it is just and equitable to draw in accordance with s.74(2)(b) of the SDA from an evasive or equivocal reply to a questionnaire or any other questions that fall within s.74(2) of the SDA.

(8) Likewise, the tribunal must decide whether any provision of any relevant code of practice is relevant and if so, take it into account in determining, such facts pursuant to s.56A(10) of the SDA. This means that inferences may also be drawn from any failure to comply with any relevant code of practice.

(9) Where the claimant has proved facts from which conclusions could be drawn that the respondent has treated the claimant less favourably on the ground of sex, then the burden of proof moves to the respondent.

(10) It is then for the respondent to prove that he did not commit, or as the case may be, is not to be treated as having committed, that act.

(11) To discharge that burden it is necessary for the respondent to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that the treatment was in no sense whatsoever on the grounds of sex, since 'no discrimination whatsoever' is compatible with the Burden of Proof Directive.

(12) That requires a tribunal to assess not merely whether the respondent has proved an explanation for the facts from which such inferences can be drawn, but further that it is adequate to discharge the burden of proof on the balance of probabilities that sex was not a ground for the treatment in question.

(13) Since the facts necessary to prove an explanation would normally be in the possession of the respondent, a tribunal would normally expect cogent evidence to discharge that burden of proof. In particular, the tribunal will need to examine carefully explanations for failure to deal with the questionnaire procedure and/or code of practice.

6.26 The law relating to reasonable adjustments is set out at section 20 of the Equality Act 2010. Section 20 - Duty to make adjustments (1) Where this Act imposes a duty to make reasonable adjustments on a person, this section, sections 21 and 22 and the applicable Schedule apply; and for those purposes, a person on whom the duty is imposed is referred to as A. (2) The duty comprises the following three requirements. (3) The first requirement is a requirement, where a provision, criterion or practice of A's puts a disabled person at a substantial disadvantage in relation to a relevant matter in comparison with persons who are not disabled, to take such steps as it is reasonable to have to take to avoid the disadvantage. (4) … (5) The third requirement is a requirement, where a disabled person would, but for the provision of an auxiliary aid, be put at a substantial disadvantage in relation to a relevant matter in comparison with persons - 22 - who are not disabled, to take such steps as it is reasonable to have to take to provide the auxiliary aid. (6) Where the first or third requirement relates to the provision of information, the steps which it is reasonable for A to have to take include steps for ensuring that in the circumstances concerned the information is provided in an accessible format. (7) A person (A) who is subject to a duty to make reasonable adjustments is not (subject to express provision to the contrary) entitled to require a disabled person, in relation to whom A is required to comply with the duty, to pay to any extent A's costs of complying with the duty. (8) A reference in section 21 or 22 or an applicable Schedule to the first, second or third requirement is to be construed in accordance with this section. (9) …

6.27 In considering the reverse burden of proof, as it relates to duty to make reasonable adjustments, I have specific regard to Project Management Institute v Latif

2007 IRLR 579

we note the following: … the Claimant must not only establish that the duty has arisen, but there are facts from which it could reasonably be inferred, absent an explanation, that it has been breached. Demonstrating that there is an arrangement causing a substantial disadvantage engages the duty, but it provides no basis on which it could properly be inferred, that there is a breach of that duty. There must be evidence of some apparently reasonable adjustments which could be made.

6.28 Archibald v Fife Council

[2004] ICR 95

may be relevant when there is a possibility of transfer to a new role. In the Archibald case, it was the substantial disadvantage in the specific employment which led to exposure to the secondary PCP, namely dismissal for lack of capability. Lord Hope put it in this way:

The law

[11]Mrs Archibald was employed by the council as a manual worker. It was an implied "condition" or an "arrangement" of her employment within the meaning of section 6(2)(b) that she should at all times be physically fit to do her job as a road sweeper. She met this requirement when she entered the council's employment on 6 May 1997. She underwent minor surgery in April 1999 as a result of which she became disabled. As a result she was no longer physically fit to do this job. This exposed her to another implied "condition" or "arrangement" of her employment, which was that if she was physically unable do the job she was employed to do she was liable to be dismissed.

[12]Her disability placed her at a substantial disadvantage in comparison with others in the same employment who were not at risk of being dismissed on the ground that, because of disability, they were unable to do the job they were employed to do. These persons, a limited class, were her "comparators". There was nothing that the council could have done by way of adjustment to the manual labour job to cure that fact that she was unable to do that job due to her disability. But she was not so disadvantaged that she could not conceivably have been employed by them at all. If she had been given a job to do which she was physically able to do, the disadvantage which she was under in comparison with others in - 23 - the same employment who were not at risk of being dismissed on the ground of disability would have been removed. 6.29 Archibald is not authority for a general proposition that in all situations competitive process should be removed for all disabled people. Baroness Hale made this point at paragraph 70. 70. … But it might be reasonable to expect a small modification either in general or in the particular case to meet the needs of a well-qualified and well-motivated employee who has become disabled. Manual grades are often technically lower than non-manual grades even if the difference in pay is minimal. The possibility of transfer to fill an existing vacancy might become completely illusory for a manual worker who became incapable of manual work but was assessed as very well fitted for low grade sedentary work if that person was always up against the problem presented by her background. We are not talking here of high grade positions where it is not only possible but important to make fine judgments about who will be best for the job. We are talking of positions which a great many people could fill and for which no one candidate may be obviously 'the best'. There is no law against discriminating against people with a background in manual work, but it might be reasonable for an employer to have to take that difficulty into account when considering the transfer of a disabled worker who could no longer do that type of work. I only say 'might' because it depends upon all the circumstances of the case … 6.30 A reasonable adjustment may be to transfer or in some circumstances to refrain from, or delay, dismissal. However underpinning this is the assumption that there could be transfer to an alternative position that the claimant suited to her and she was capable of performing. Section 15 - Equality Act 2010 6.31 Section 15 Equality Act 2010 provides –(1) A person (A) discriminates against a disabled person (B) if— (a) A treats B unfavourably because of something arising in consequence of B's disability, and (b) A cannot show that the treatment is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.

(2) Subsection (1) does not apply if A shows that A did not know, and could not reasonably have been expected to know, that B had the disability. 6.32 In Pnaiser v NHS England

[2016] IRLR 170

, EAT, Simler P at para. 31 gives extensive guidance on the general approach to be taken by a tribunal under s 15 in order to maintain its wide reach and not to confuse it with direct discrimination, which it is meant to supplement, not repeat. The following may be relevant to the approach: (1) Was there unfavourable treatment and by whom? (2) What caused the impugned treatment, or what was the reason for it?

(3) Motive is irrelevant. - 24 -

(4) Was the cause/reason 'something' arising in consequence of the claimant's disability?

(5) The more links in the chain of causation, the harder it will be to establish the necessary connection.

(6) This stage of the causation test involves an objective question and does not depend on the thought processes of the alleged discriminator.

(7) The knowledge requirement is as to the disability itself, not extending to the 'something' that led to unfavourable treatment.

(8) It does not matter in which order these matters are considered by the tribunal. 6.33 Causation must not be too loose. Section 15 requires the tribunal to isolate the 'something' in question and to establish whether the ‘something’ was caused by the disability and if that ‘something’ caused the unfavourable treatment2 (a two-stage test): In Basildon & Thurrock NHS Foundation Trust v Weerasinghe

[2016] ICR 305

, Langstaff, P said this at paragraph 26. 26 The current statute requires two steps. There are two links in the chain, both of which are causal, though the causative relationship is differently expressed in respect of each of them. The tribunal has first to focus on the words “because of something”, and therefore has to identify “something”— and second on the fact that that “something” must be “something arising in consequence of B’s disability”, which constitutes a second causative (consequential) link. These are two separate stages. In addition, the statute requires the tribunal to conclude that it is A’s treatment of B that is because of something arising, and that it is unfavourable to B. Conclusions

7.1 I will first deal with the claimant’s allegation of failure to make reasonable adjustments. The respondent concedes the claimant is disabled.

7.2 It is accepted the claimant sustained a back injury on 9 January 2022 which led to a herniated disc. He was absent from work as a result of a back injury from January 2022 until 15 March 2022. There was a short period of further absence because of an operation on his nose. He was thereafter absent again from September 2023 until his probation was terminated. However, the claimant was potentially fully operational from November 2022. Until his absence in September 2023. He joined response on full duties in February 2023.

7.3 It is conceded that the impairment was likely to last 12 months, and I treat the claimant as disabled as from the date of injury, 9 January 2022. The respondent had knowledge on 11 January 2022. It is accepted the impact was substantial, as set out in the occupational health report in October 2023. At the times the claimant was not operational, and he was affected 2 It must be a material cause. - 25 - by the impairment, it impacted on his ability to stand, sit, and use stairs. The claimant also suffered tiredness and there is reference in the October report to bladder incontinence, albeit it is unclear that this was connected to the back impairment.

7.4 I now consider the allegation of failure to make reasonable adjustments.

7.5 The claimant identifies three PCPs as follows:7.5.1 PCP one: the requirement that the claimant be fit for frontline duties including interaction with the public;

7.5.2 PCP two: the requirement the claimant attend for work; and

7.5.3 PCP three: the application of regulation 13 of the 2003 Police Conduct Regulations which may lead to termination of probation.

7.6 The respondent accepts that all of the alleged PCPs are applied by the respondent.

7.7 The claimant relies on the following alleged disadvantages caused by the three PCPs:7.7.1 The alleged substantial disadvantage in relation to PCP one is the claimant was not able to perform his duties.

7.7.2 The alleged substantial disadvantage in relation to PCP two is the claimant was unable to attend for work.

7.7.3 The alleged substantial disadvantage in relation PCP three is the inability to perform his duties and attend for work exposed the claimant to termination of probation period.

7.8 As for the first two disadvantages, the respondent’s position is that the arguments are essentially circular. The respondent refers to Rakova v London North West Healthcare NHS Trust

2020 IRLR 503

. I am not satisfied that Rakova identifies any new principle of law, or supports the respondent’s proposition.

7.9 It is necessary to identify the PCP. PCPs may interact. There may be a PCP that an individual is required to attend work and perform duties. If the disability prevents attendance, or limits the ability to undertake duties, this may lead to exposure to further PCPs such as absence management procedures or capability procedures dismissal.

7.10 As for PCP one, I accept that at certain times the claimant was unable to perform all of his duties. After the initial accident, he returned to work in April 2022 and was on limited duties. Inevitably this was a disadvantage, he needed to be on active duty in order to complete his SORACs. Ultimately, the disadvantage was the potential exposure to the operation of regulation 13 and his dismissal. The application of the regulation 13 is itself a form of PCP and is the mechanism by which a substantial disadvantage of dismissal applies. - 26 -

7.11 The claimant was not subject to disadvantage by PCP one after he became fit in November 2022, and thereafter resumed full duties in February 2023 and before he commenced his absence in September 2023. PCP one did not apply directly as he was undertaking his full duties. As he was undertaking full duties, he was able to demonstrate his competency. It follows that he potentially suffered disadvantage in the periods when he was not able to perform his full duties.

7.12 The second disadvantage is more complex. The disadvantage is twofold. First, The disadvantage of being unable to attend work impacted the claimant’s ability to demonstrate his suitability as a police officer, and thereby complete his probation, as he was unable to undertake full duties. Second, the failure to attend exposed the claimant to a further PCP, being the review procedure, as embodied in regulation 13, which could lead to his dismissal. This overlaps with the third alleged disadvantage.

7.13 I accept the third alleged disadvantage occurred. However, the PCP, as framed by the claimant, fails to capture the range of possibilities envisaged by regulation 13. Regulation 13 provides for an objective assessment of a police constable’s suitability to pass probation. That encompasses three broad areas: first is competence; second is attendance; third is the issues of integrity.

7.14 The claimant’s disability concerned his physical capabilities and restricted him in two broad ways. First, at times he was unable to attend work. Second, at times he was unable to perform active operational duties. As noted, regulation 13 envisages three broad areas relevant to completing probation. The first two areas concern the need to demonstrate competence and the need for attendance. For those matters, disability may lead directly to the disadvantage, and ultimately expose the probationer to termination under regulation 13. The third broad requirement of regulation 13 concerns integrity. The claimant’s disability, which is essentially a physical condition, was not relevant, at any time, to his integrity.

7.15 It follows that the duty certainly arose between January 2022 and November 2022. By November 2022, it appears he had made a full recovery, and ultimately he returned to full duties in February 2023. It follows that by February 2023 he was not suffering any direct substantial adverse effects, and the duty ceased then, subject to the need to make adjustments which may need to continue in order to remove or alleviate the continuing effects of the cumulative disadvantage caused by absence and restriction of duties, the most obvious example being the potential adjustment of extending probation to allow demonstration of competence.

7.16 By September 2023, he once again was absent for a disability related reason and the duty engaged again. - 27 -

7.17 To the extent that the operation of the regulation 13 procedure was concerned with integrity, the duty did not engage at any time. The disadvantage did not arise from the disability.

7.18 In light of this, I consider the adjustments identified. These are the adjustments contended for:7.18.1 adjustment one: by placing the claimant in the regulation 12 process (to extend probation) rather than the regulation 13 process (leading to termination);

7.18.2 adjustment two: by giving the claimant duties which did not require face-to-face contact with the public and which did not require the claimant to leave the station; and

7.18.3 adjustment three: by excluding him from driving duties from 2023.

7.19 I will consider each in turn.

7.20 As for the first adjustment, I do not accept that the regulation 13 procedure excludes a regulation 12 procedure. Regulation 12 provides for extension of probation. At all times regulation 12 was used and the claimant’s probation was extended.

7.21 What is envisaged by the claimant is that he should not have been subject to the regulation 13 procedure at all. I do not accept that would have been a reasonable adjustment to make. The claimant’s probation was extended on three occasions. On the first two occasions, it was extended because the claimant had difficulties operationally and had time off work. It was extended to give him an opportunity to demonstrate his basic competence. Ultimately, he was able to do that and he completed his SORACs, handing in the relevant documentation in mid-August 2023. The third occasion was prompted by the need to deal with the alleged misconduct.

7.22 His disability did disadvantage him by limiting his ability to demonstrate his competencies both when not on active duties and when absent. The respondent made reasonable adjustments to allow him to demonstrate those competencies, which included extending the period of probation under regulation 12. All that was reasonable was done.

7.23 There was real doubt that the claimant would either demonstrate appropriate attendance or demonstrate appropriate competence. It was appropriate that the regulation 13 procedure be instigated. Regulation 13 does not inevitably lead to dismissal. It provides for a system of review, extension, and support. That support included putting in place competency management, and that was attended to. Instigating the regulation 13 procedure was an integral part of reviewing and applying appropriate reasonable adjustments in a way that was rational and objective. The use of the regulation 13 process was, itself, a reasonable adjustment. - 28 -

7.24 Adjustment two is essentially the assertion the claimant should have been designated as NANO. That adjustment was made between April 2022 February 2023. His role in MIST was not operational and did not have the physical demands of a fully operational role in Response.

7.25 Between February 2023 and September 2023, the claimant was fit. It was appropriate to assign him to Response to allow him an opportunity to demonstrate the relevant competencies which may lead to his completion of probation. As he had no physical restrictions, he was not subject to a disadvantage, the duty did not arise, and it was not reasonable to make any specific adjustments to the role. He had been permitted time to recover in order to return to active duties so that he could demonstrate his competency.

7.26 After the absence starting in September 2023, the claimant did not return to work. He had already demonstrated his competency and had completed all matters relevant to SORACS. As he had had that opportunity, it was not necessary to extend time further to allow him to prove his basic competence. It would not have been reasonable to extend probation for that purpose.

7.27 Had the claimant been in a position to return to work, it may have been necessary for the respondent to consider whether there would have been relevant adjustments. However, the claimant did not return to work. Whilst a duty may have arisen to consider adjustments necessary to permit a return to work, or to modify the work that he would undertake, the duty was not breached because the claimant did not reach that point he was in a position to return to any work.

7.28 It follows that the duty to make reasonable adjustments did exist after January 2022, but the direct substantial disadvantage in the form of an inability to attend work or to perform all duties ceased around February 2023. Nevertheless it may be necessary to make adjustment of take account of the cumulative disadvantage caused. Here the question of extension of probation arises as the claimant had lost an opportunity to demonstrate his competence. I note that such an adjustment may be still be reasonable. Time was extended and there was no breach.

7.29 The duty clearly engaged again in September 2023, but for the reasons given there was no breach of duty and it would not have been reasonable to make adjustment to.

7.30 Adjustment three refers to driving duties.

7.31 When the claimant status was designated as NANO, he was not required to drive. It follows that the adjustment two was made for the period from April 2022 until he became fully operational again in February 2023. Thereafter, it would not have been reasonable to exclude the claimant from all driving duties. The claimant did make a request to be excluded driving duties so that he would have more time and opportunity to - 29 - demonstrate his competence. In order to achieve that, it was not reasonable to exclude him from all driving duties and the reality is the respondent acted in a reasonable and pragmatic way by severely restricting the number of occasions he was asked to be a driver.

7.32 I doubt that avoiding driving was necessary to allow the claimant demonstrate the relevant competencies. The claimant’s position must be compared to that of someone who is not disabled. The requirement to undertake driving duties had no greater effect on the claimant’s ability to demonstrate competency than it did on any probationer who is not disabled. It is arguable therefore that it was not reasonable to make the adjustment at all. However, the adjustment was made and his driving duties severely limited. This put the claimant in a better position than comparable employees who are not disabled.

7.33 The adjustment did not arise out of any specific disadvantage caused directly by the claimant’s disability. The only possible disadvantage was the potential restriction of opportunity to demonstrate his competencies. However, it is necessary for there to be a comparison. If the claimant was disadvantaged in his ability to be able to demonstrate competencies by having to perform driving duties, that disadvantage applied equally to all probationers, regardless of disability.

7.34 For the reasons given, I find the respondent did not breach any duty to make reasonable adjustments.

7.35 I should note that in the claimant written submissions he introduced a new proposed adjustment. He said he should have been allowed to work in a different capacity or be employed in a non-operational role. In his oral submissions, he clarified that the non-operational roles included being assigned to a civilian post.

7.36 This potential adjustment was not raised during the course of evidence. It was not put to any witness.

7.37 It is not necessary to plead potential reasonable adjustments. The tribunal may consider reasonable adjustments whether identified by the claimant at any time, suggested by the respondent, or identified by the tribunal. All that is required is there should be sufficient opportunity to give relevant submissions. However, where a potential adjustment is identified late in the day, it is necessary to consider what evidence there is in support. In this case, the claimant did not seek to introduce further evidence or recall any witness.

7.38 In considering this, I have regard to Archibald v Fife Council

[2004] IRLR 651

. There may be occasions when a disabled employee should be offered an alternative position without the need for competitive interview or a formal application process. However, the duty will not be breached if no such role exists, or of the employee is demonstrably not suitable for the role. - 30 -

7.39 There are a number of difficulties with the claimant’s submission. The claimant did not demonstrate, prior to the termination, that he was fit and able to return to work in any role. He did not identify an alternative role. He did not request transfer to a civilian role.

7.40 In any event, having regard to the reason for his dismissal, which I will come to, and which revolved around his integrity, it would not have been reasonable to return him to a non-operational position , as it was not reasonable to continue with his employment. I have heard no evidence about the possibility of transferring to a civilian role, but his failure to demonstrate appropriate integrity is likely to prove fatal to any appointment.

7.41 The principal reason for his dismissal revolved around his integrity and his conduct. Those matters were in no sense at all related to his disability. Had there been no issue with the claimant’s conduct or integrity, and had the claimant been able to return to work in any capacity, it may have been necessary to consider whether he should be assigned a non-operational role, or indeed a civilian role. However, that did not arise, and there was no breach of duty.

7.42 It follows that all claims of failure to make reasonable adjustments fail.

7.43 I next consider discrimination arising from disability, section 15 Equality Act 2010. There are two allegations of unfavourable treatment as follows:7.43.1 allegation one: by Sgt Abbie Ranns triggering the regulation 13 process in November 2022; and

7.43.2 allegation two: by dismissing the claimant.

7.44 For each, the claimant alleges that the matter arising in consequence of disability is the disability related absence.

7.45 I will consider first allegation one. As noted, the claimant was absent from work for two periods. The first from 11 January 2022 until 2 April 2022. This was disability related absence. From 15 March 2022 the reason for absence was the nose operation and was not in itself disability related absence. He was fully operational from February 2023 until September 2023, when he suffered a relapse of his back injury. Thereafter his absence which continued until the termination of the services was disability related.

7.46 When Sgt Ranns triggered the regulation 13 procedure, the claimant had not been absent from work because of disability since 15 March 2022. Sgt Ranns triggered the regulation 13 procedure on or around 21 November 2022. She invited the claimant to a meeting on 8 December 2022. At that meeting, there was no reference to his absence. He had only completed around half of his student record of competencies (SOROCs). It was for that reason the process was triggered. It was not triggered directly for his absence. His failure to complete the - 31 - competencies arose in part as a consequence of disability; when absent he could not demonstrate those competencies associated with active duty .

7.47 The allegation is narrow. The matter said to arise in consequence of disability is the absence, not the restriction on his ability to demonstrate competence. I accept absence may have contributed to a delay in demonstrating the competencies. I am not satisfied that the negative effect of absence on his ability to demonstrate competence was continuing at the point the regulation 13 procedure was instigated. There is insufficient evidence to establish the relevant chain of causation. I find that this allegation fails because the necessary causative link is not made out on the evidence.

7.48 Lest I be wrong, and there be sufficient causation, I will consider the question of justification below.

7.49 The second allegation of unfavourable treatment is dismissal in considering that, I must look at the thought processes of Assistant Commissioner Rolfe. To the extent that she may have adopted, information, opinions, or recommendations from others, which may reflect consideration of disability related absence, it may be necessary to consider the influence of disability related absence on those decisions. Ultimately, the question is one of causation and there may be more than one link in the relevant chain of causation.

7.50 To succeed, there must be some causational link between Assistant Commissioner Rolfe’s decision to dismiss the claimant and his disability related absence. I do not consider that the disability related absence need be sole or principal reason, it may suffice that it is a material reason.

7.51 Asst Commissioner Rolfe’s reasons are set out, in some detail in her termination letter. In addition, she amplifies on her reasons in her statement. There are three broad strands: first, was the claimant’s absence, which had resumed on 6 September and was continuing for an uncertain period; second, was the claimant’s misconduct; and third, was the claimant’s wholly unsupported allegation of assault against Sgt Riley.

7.52 The disability related absence is referred to. Assistant Commissioner Rolfe pointed to two episodes, the most recent of which was ongoing. Concerns about the claimant’s ongoing attendance form part of her reasoning. However, it is clear that the other matters were of more concern. The fact that the disability related absence was not the sole or principal reason for dismissal is not in itself a defence to the section 15 claim. However, the other concerns which led to dismissal, may be relevant when considering whether the treatment was a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.

7.53 It is necessary to identify the aim and consider whether it is legitimate. The principal of proportionality requires an objective balance to be struck - 32 - between the discriminatory effect of the measure and the needs of the undertaking. The more serious the disparate adverse impact, the more cogent must be the justification for it. It is for the me to weigh the reasonable needs of the undertaking against the discriminatory effect of the employer’s measure and to make my own assessment of whether the former outweigh the latter. There is no ‘range of reasonable response.’

7.54 The respondent clarified its justification defence on 24 March 2025.

7.55 The respondent identifies the legitimate aims as follows: “ensuring an adequate level of attendance and performance from officers;” and ” ensuring minimum standards of conduct and performance from its officers.”

7.56 I accept that both were aims. I accept that both are legitimate. In his submission, the claimant accepts the aims exist and are legitimate.

7.57 Here, the means employed to achieve the aims was dismissal. Dismissing employees who are unable to attend, or attend sufficiently regularly is a means of achieving the first aim. Dismissing a constable who does not exhibit appropriate standards of conduct and performance is a means of achieving the aim, as it removes individuals who do not exhibit the relevant minimum standard of conduct.

7.58 When considering whether this respondent acted proportionately in relation to these circumstances, I must consider the facts of this case. It is necessary to identify the discriminatory conduct. Here, the discrimination occurs to the extent that the disability related absence caused the dismissal. To the extent that the disability absence was because the dismissal, it was discriminatory, and the justification argument must be addressed by the respondent. Assistant Commissioner was concerned more by the claimant’s conduct and his actions in making allegations, without proper or reasonable grounds, against other officers. She had the benefit of reviewing the comprehensive report from Inspector Branford and was fully aware of the circumstances of the first driving incident and the second. She was aware the claimant had made an allegation of assault against Sgt Riley which was unsupported. She took time to familiarise herself with the facts. She viewed the relevant video footage of the alleged assault. Her concerns revolved around the claimant’s integrity, and she shared Inspector Branford’s concern that the claimant had a propensity to make unfounded allegations against officers when his conduct was, legitimately, question. It is that behaviour which she considered to be incompatible with being a police officer and which caused her to reach a conclusion that the claimant was not fitted to perform the duties of his office.

7.59 It would appear that Assistant Commissioner Rolfe may have believed that the claimant had not shown all relevant competencies. It is now common ground that he had. However, I find that the completion or non-completion of those competencies was not material to her decision to dismiss. I find it - 33 - was the claimant’s conduct, and his inappropriate complaints about other officers, which caused assistant Rolfe to dismiss.

7.60 When considering proportionality, and whether use of the means was proportionate, it is relevant to have regard to the totality of the facts. Here the operative reason for the dismissal was not the discriminatory reason. The fact that some consideration was given to continuing past absence does nothing to lessen the importance of, and impact of, the claimant’s misconduct in relation to the driving matters and the inappropriateness of making unreasonable and unjustified allegations against others, including Sgt Riley. The respondent is entitled to require its police constables to demonstrate honesty and integrity.

7.61 In relation to the first driving offence, I am satisfied that the claimant failed to demonstrate integrity and honesty. I am satisfied, on the balance of probability, that he drove the car into collision with the pole and thereafter sought to prevaricate and mislead. That demonstrated a lack of honesty and a lack of integrity. In relation to the second incident, having considered all the evidence, I am satisfied, on the balance of probability, that the claimant knew, at all times, that he was a basic driver and that use of the blue hazard lights, when driving, was not permitted. I reject his evidence that he believed, in some manner, that there was either an actual policy, or a custom and practice that he was permitted to use blue light when driving, even as a basic driver. He could point to no conversation, document, or practice of any other officer on which he could base his belief. Moreover, he had been required to re-familiarise himself with the driving policy, and if there was any room for doubt, he should have made enquiry. On the balance of probability, I am also satisfied that he made it plain to PC Persaud that he knew that he was not permitted to use the blue lights. The claimant sought to mislead the respondent and by so doing he demonstrated a lack of honesty and integrity.

7.62 I am satisfied, on the balance of probability, that the claimant sought to mislead the respondent by alleging that PC Persaud made malicious allegations against him. I am also satisfied on the balance of probability that, and in raising an allegation of criminal assault against Sgt Riley, the claimant sought to deflect allegations of misconduct against himself by making unfounded allegations of misconduct against Sgt Riley. The claimant’s conduct demonstrated a lack of honesty and integrity.

7.63 In this case, I am satisfied that the means adopted, namely dismissing the claimant, were a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. The respondent entitled to consider the honesty and integrity of those who aspire to be police constables; careful assessment is necessary and vital for preserving public confidence.

7.64 In reaching my conclusions, I have considered the question of the obligation to make reasonable adjustments. There is no connection between the claimant’s failure to demonstrate integrity and his disability. Had there been no issues of misconduct against the claimant, it may have - 34 - been appropriate to consider whether further time should be given to the claimant, or whether he should have been appointed as a police officer and given non-operational duties, or even transferred to being a civilian role. However, the proportionality is not undermined by failing to make those adjustments given the claimant’s failure to demonstrate basic honesty and integrity.

7.65 Finally, I should consider proportionality in the context of the initial triggering of the regulation 13 procedure. I have already considered the relevant aims. Those aims were legitimate. I have some doubt that triggering regulation 13 procedure, even though it may be unwelcome, is unfavourable. For the reasons I have already given it was the context in which reasonable adjustments are considered. The triggering of the regulation 13 procedure led to a remedial action in the form of reasonable adjustments. Starting a process which leads to an active consideration of reasonable adjustments is advantageous to the claimant, appropriate to the respondent and its use of resources, and provides a process whereby an individual who has had difficulties may be able to demonstrate competency. Its use in this case was proportionate.

7.66 It follows that the claim of discrimination arising in consequence of disability fails.

7.67 I next consider the allegations of harassment. I will consider each allegation in turn. Allegation three: by Inspector Michael Branford making comments on 4 December 2023 described by the claimant as follows: Mr Branford when asked by the superintendent to comment on my back injury, he said “He’s been in the job for just over three years now. His sickness was initially limited, but he was not deployable for the best part of a year. and obviously since September he’s had a relapse, quiet clearly we have someone in their probation.. we need operational cops, there comes a point where we have to say well he is not ﬁt to be an operational constable, that’s what we need we have got enough people with back injuries with no end”

7.68 I accept that the words were used. The first question is whether the conduct was unwanted. The claimant had a degree of antipathy towards inspector Branford and I accept that he found the comments unwanted. I find there are no facts from which I could conclude that it was Inspector Branford’s intention to harass the claimant. He was reporting facts and identifying the need for resources to be available to the force. Part of the respondent’s aim revolves around delivering an appropriate service to the public, and there may be challenges when officers are not operational. Recognising those difficulties is not in my view potential evidence of an intention to harass. - 35 -

7.69 Given the claimant’s absence, in part, related to disability, I am satisfied that there is sufficient relationship between the comments and the disability.

7.70 When considered the effect, it is not every reference to a protected characteristic, or a matter which may be related to a protected characteristic, which will give rise to liability. The words employed in section 26 Equality Act 2010 are strong. It refers to violating dignity or creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment, which I will refer to generally as harassment. In considering whether there should be a recommendation to dismiss the claimant, it was appropriate to review all the circumstances, and to do so within the context of the respondent’s legitimate aims and needs. The claimant may have perceived the reference as being harassment. I find it was not reasonable for the conduct to have that effect. This allegation fails. Allegation four: by Inspector Branford making an application for fast-track termination of the claimant’s probation utilising regulation 13 on or around 31 October 2023.

7.71 I accept that inspector Branford recommended the fast-track regulation 13 procedure. I accept the claimant found the conduct unwelcome. I do not accept that there is any fact from which it could be found that inspector Branford’s purpose was to harass the claimant. It is clear that his purpose was to start a legitimate and appropriate procedure in which the claimant’s conduct would be considered. He did so because there had been a clear allegation and ultimately a clear finding of misconduct against the claimant.

7.72 I do not accept that the fast-track procedure was instigated because of the claimant’s absence or his disability. It was instigated because of the claimant’s misconduct, particularly in relation to the second driving incident. For the reasons already given, the conduct relevant to the driving incidents and his unjustified allegations against other officers was not in any sense related to disability. It follows the allegation fails for that reason.

7.73 In any event, whatever the claimant’s perception, it was not reasonable for it have the effect of harassment. This was a reasonable and legitimate procedure employed following the claimant’s own misconduct. It follows that this allegation fails. Allegation five: On 4 December 2023, by managers being Sergeant Abbie Ranns and Inspector Michael Branford attending the regulation 13 meeting.

7.74 I accept that Sgt Ranns and Inspector Branford attended the meeting on 4 December. I do not accept that there are facts from which I could find it was the purpose to harass. It is clear their intention was to take part in the meeting and they both believed that they should attend and it was legitimate for them to do so. Viewed broadly, it is possible to say that the - 36 - meeting had some connection with disability given that disability absence was, at least in part, the background to the initial regulation 13 procedure, and this was a continuation of it. However, the main reason related to the claimant’s conduct.

7.75 I am not satisfied that there was a clear breach of any procedure. Their attendance appears to be within that envisaged by the relevant procedure. In any event, breach of procedure would not be conclusive. The relevant question is one of effect. It was appropriate that CSI Carter should be fully acquainted with the relevant facts. I am satisfied that both Sgt Ranns and Inspector Branford behaved appropriately and reasonably and presented the relevant circumstances and evidence in order to assist CSI Carter. I am not satisfied that the claimant perceived this as harassment, however unwelcome he found it. In any event, it is not reasonable for the conduct to have that effect. This allegation fails.

7.76 I next consider the allegations of harassment relying on the protected characteristic of age.

7.77 The claimant makes the following allegation. Allegation six: by Inspector Michael Branford, in the meeting on 4 December 2023, commenting that PC Sophie Persaud is 22 years old and would have no reason to lie, it being the claimant’s case it is implied he was lying.

7.78 It is accepted the conduct occurred.

7.79 I find there are no facts from which I could find that the intention was to harass. The comment must be viewed in context. I am satisfied that inspector Branford was showing a degree of incredulity and this was based on a number of factors. PC Persaud’s allegation of use of the blue lights was, as admitted by the claimant, essentially true. Her allegation that he had used the blue lights was supported by the instant data recorder (IDR). The claimant was alleging that she was malicious in particular by reporting his comment asking her not to inform “the skippers.” It was in that context that he questioned whether she would lie. As part of that consideration, he recognised that she was a new officer and that making allegations against other officers may, at the least, put her in an uncomfortable position. He was questioning why she would make a false and malicious allegations about a comment made by the claimant when the evidence of his conduct in using the lights was clear. In that context his reference to her age was short hand for her being a new constable starting on a career. He was questioning why she would jeopardise her career by making an untruthful allegation.

7.80 The reference to her age was a reference to her experience and seniority. It is not every reference to a protected characteristic which will lead to liability for harassment. The comment must be viewed in context. The law should not impose on individuals arbitrary and unreasonable standards or thereby impose arbitrary and unrealistic constraints on what - 37 - are essentially reasonable, considerate, and appropriate interactions. In no sense whatsoever was inspector Branford saying he believed PC Persaud because she was young and disbelieved the claimant because he was older. He was looking at her circumstances, and the available evidence, in the round and exploring what motive she may have to behave maliciously, as the claimant had alleged.

7.81 It may be that Inspector Bradford’s choice of words was poor and ill advised. However, the points he raised were appropriation and legitimate. It is not reasonable to find that his behaviour had the effect of harassment and I reject the allegation.

7.82 I next consider the allegation of direct age discrimination. Allegation seven: by Inspector Branford and other unspecified individuals believing PC Persaud rather than the claimant.

7.83 There is no fact from which I could find that either PC Persaud’s age, or the claimants, had any influence on Inspector Branford’s, or any other officer’s, conclusion that PC Persaud was to be believed regarding the second incident. In reaching that conclusion, I have noted the direct reference to age, as explored in the allegation of harassment. Frequently, a direct reference to age could be a fact from which the burden would shift. However, that will be fact dependent and I do not consider that it causes the burden to shift in this case, given the context in which it was used a shorthand.

7.84 In any event, I have considered and accepted the respondent’s explanation.

7.85 The claimant admitted to using the blue lights. There was overwhelming comprehensive evidence recording the speed of the vehicle and the use the lights. Inspector Branford formed his belief based on the cogent evidence before him, and not because of any protected characteristic.

7.86 This allegation fails.

7.87 I next consider the allegation of victimisation.

7.88 The claimant relies on two alleged protected acts: first, the written grievance of 2 August 2023; and second, his oral comments made on 16 August 2023 consistent with the written grievance. The respondent accepts that they were protected acts. Allegation eight: by Inspector Michael Branford fast tracking the regulation 13 process at the meeting on or about 16 August 2023.

7.89 This allegation fails. First, there is no evidence Inspector Branford was aware of the claimant’s grievance before 16 August, or evidence that he believed the claimant would raise a grievance. The claimant lodged his - 38 - grievance on 2 August. It was acknowledged on 7 August. There is no evidence inspector Branford had knowledge of it.

7.90 In any event, I accept inspector Branford’s explanation for why the fasttrack procedure was initiated. Inspector Branford considered the matter on 1 August 2023. He noted the claimant was a probationer heading towards his fourth year. There were multiple misconduct issues. It was those misconduct issues which caused him to believe the fast-track process was appropriate. That remained inspector Branford’s consistent approach throughout. It was a rational and reasonable approach and I accept his explanation on the balance of probability. Allegation nine: by Inspector Michael Branford on or around 1 November 2023 recommending the claimant’s services be dispensed with.

7.91 I accept by this time that Inspector Branford, on the balance of probability, knew that the claimant had raised grievances.

7.92 However, I find that there are no facts from which I could conclude that his action was because of any protected act. In any event, even if the burden shifts, I have accepted Inspector Branford’s explanation. He had already decided to proceed with the fast-track regulation 13 procedure because of the claimant’s misconduct issues. Therefore, on 1 August 2023, the possibility of recommending dismissal was already in his mind. He proceeded carefully and appropriately. He took advice from HR and from a senior officer about the correct procedure. He waited until the misconduct investigation concluded. The misconduct investigation concluded at the end of October. It was critical of the claimant. Inspector Branford then proceeded with his recommendation, as there were no material change of circumstances to undermine his initial view. This allegation fails. Allegation 10: by Inspector Michael Branford on 4 December 2023 accusing the claimant of trying to end Sgt Kate Reilly’s career by making untrue allegations.

7.93 This allegation could be rejected as the factual circumstances are not made out; it is an overstatement of the position. Inspector Branford stated the claimant’s actions were potentially jeopardising the careers of both Sgt Riley and PC Persaud.

7.94 To succeed, there must be facts from which I could find that Inspector Branford’s comments, if interpreted in the way suggested by the claimant, were because of the protected acts relied on. If in that situation the burden shifted, I would have to be satisfied that inspector Branford had failed to establish his reason.

7.95 However, I find that the burden does not shift. In any event I am satisfied that Inspector Branford has given a truthful explanation which, in no sense whatsoever, either consciously or unconsciously, was influenced by the - 39 - protected acts. He made comments about the effect on Sgt Riley and PC Persaud because the claimant had made allegations against them which appeared to be unsupported by appropriate evidence. The claimant alleged that Sgt Riley had assaulted him. This was contradicted by the relevant video evidence. The claimant had alleged PC Persaud had made a malicious and untruthful allegation about his alleged comments concerning “the skippers.” Both those allegations, if proven, could demonstrate that Sgt Riley and PC Persaud had acted dishonestly and that could lead to allegations of misconduct. Their careers would be jeopardised. Inspector Branford made the comment because it was true, and it raised concerns about the claimant’s own conduct, which it was appropriate to explore.

7.96 It follows that the allegations of victimisation fail.

7.97 I have considered all the allegations on their merits. None has succeeded. In the circumstances, it is not necessary to consider whether any were presented out of time, and if so whether time would be extended.