Mrs S Namaganda v The Secretary of State for Justice: 2210741/2023
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Case No 2210741/2023
Between
Mrs S NamagandaClaimantThe Secretary of State for JusticeRespondent
Before
Employment Judge P KlimovIn person for claimantMr P Smith (instructed by counsel) for respondentDate 29 November 2025
JUDGMENT
The unanimous judgment of the Tribunal is as follows:[1]The claimant’s complaint of direct race discrimination with respect to allegation 5 is not well-founded and is dismissed.[2]The claimant’s complaint of direct race discrimination with respect to allegations 1 – 4 was not presented within the applicable time limit. It is not just and equitable to extend the time limit. That part of the claim is therefore dismissed for want of jurisdiction.[3]In the alternative, the claimant’s complaint of direct race discrimination with respect to allegations 1 – 4 is not well-founded and is dismissed.[4]Therefore, the claimant’s entire claim fails and is dismissed. As recorded in the Agreed List of Issues (pp. 35, 36 of the Hearing Bundle). Case Number 2210741/2023
REASONS
[1]By a unanimous decision, announced at the end of the hearing on 8 November 2024, the Tribunal dismissed the claimant’s claim. The Tribunal found that:[1]The claimant’s complaint of direct race discrimination with respect to allegation 5 is not wellfounded and is dismissed.[2]The claimant’s complaint of direct race discrimination with respect to allegations 1 – 4 was not presented within the applicable time limit. It is not just and equitable to extend the time limit. That part of the claim is therefore dismissed for want of jurisdiction.[3]In the alternative, the claimant’s complaint of direct race discrimination with respect to allegations 1 – 4 is not well-founded and is dismissed.[4]Therefore, the claimant’s entire claim fails and is dismissed. 2. The claimant left the hearing while the Tribunal was still announcing its judgment. After the judgment had been fully announced, the respondent’s counsel indicated that the respondent wished to apply for a costs order. As recorded in the Agreed List of Issues (pp. 35, 36 of the Hearing Bundle). 3. The Tribunal made the following orders:[1]At the end of the final hearing, on 8 November 2024, the respondent said that it was making a costs order application against the claimant. However, because the claimant had left the hearing before the Tribunal’s judgment was fully announced, she was not present to respond to the application. In the circumstances it was agreed that the respondent will present its costs order application in writing to the Tribunal and the claimant.[2]If the claimant wishes to contest the respondent’s costs order application, she must within 21 days of the date of the respondent’s written costs order application send to the Tribunal and the respondent her representations on the respondent's application. If the claimant wishes the Tribunal, when deciding the application, to take into account her ability to pay, she must submit all relevant information as to her financial means (regular income and outgoings, savings, other capital and assets, existing and pending financial liabilities). Such information must be supported by documentary evidence (pay slips, bank statements, self-assessment tax returns, etc).[3]Both parties must indicate their preferences for the application being decided on paper or at a hearing, and by Employment Judge Klimov sitting alone or the full panel.[4]Both parties submitted requests for written reasons for the liability judgment. On 4 December 2024, I refused both requests for being submitted outside the 14-day period, stipulated in Rule 62(3) of the then in effect 2013 Rules of Procedure.[5]On 10 December 2024, the respondent submitted a short costs order application, the operative part of which read: Written Costs Order Application At the Final Hearing on 8 November 2024, the Respondent made an oral application for a costs order following the judgment made in its favour which was confirmed in writing to the parties on 15 November 2024. As the Claimant was not in attendance to hear the Respondent’s application on 8 November 2024, we confirm that the Respondent applied under Rule 77 of the Employment Tribunal Rules of Procedure 2013 for a costs order. The application was made after the Tribunal dismissed all of the complaints and determined that they not well founded. Four out of five of the complaints were confirmed to be out of time and an extension of time was not considered just and equitable. The Tribunal also noted the Claimant had failed to consider other non-race related reasons for the treatment complained of. On the basis of the Tribunal’s judgment, the Respondent considers the Claimant acted unreasonably in bringing the proceedings and, in accordance with Rule 76(1), seeks an award of its costs incurred in defending the claim. The Respondent will provide a detailed schedule of its costs to the Tribunal and Claimant on direction from the Tribunal.[6]Unfortunately, due to an administrative error there was a delay in dealing with the respondent’s application, for which I apologise. The application has been passed to me only on 14 November 2025, following the respondent chasing it on 31 October 2025.[7]The Tribunal case file does not contain any correspondence from the claimant with respect to the respondent’s application. I, therefore, proceeded on the basis that the claimant did not wish to submit any representations in opposition.[8]I also considered whether the application should be decided by me, sitting alone, or the original full Tribunal panel should be convened to consider it. Having regard to the Practice Direction issued by the Senior President of Tribunals on 29 October 2024, and the accompanying Presidential Guidance, I decided that, in the circumstances, I should decide the application sitting alone, because it would be disproportionate and not in accordance with the overriding objective to convene the full panel to deal with this matter. I also took into account the fact that the respondent did not express his preference for the application to be decided by the full panel, despite being invited to do so by my case management orders of 8 November 2024.[9]The respondent’s application is very brief and lacks any proper detail, in particular why the respondent contends that the claimant bringing the proceedings was her acting unreasonably within the meaning of Rule 76(1).[10]The fact that the claimant’s claim was found by the Tribunal not well-founded does not automatically mean that she was acting unreasonably in bringing her claim.[11]As was explained by LJ Mummery in Yerrakalva v Barnsley Metropolitan Borough Council and anor 2012 ICR 420, CA [emphasis added] 41. The vital point in exercising the discretion to order costs is to look at the whole picture of what happened in the case and to ask whether there has been unreasonable conduct by the claimant in bringing and conducting the case and, in doing so, to identify the conduct, what was unreasonable about it and what effects it had.[12]In the absence of any proper particulars from the respondent of the alleged unreasonableness in the claimant’s conduct of bringing the proceedings, I cannot sensibly make a finding to that effect, and I decline to do so.[13]For completeness, I have reviewed my hearing note and the oral reasons announced by the Tribunal at the hearing. Whilst the Tribunal was critical of some of the claimant’s allegations, and its overall conclusion (in the alternative to the time limit) was that the claimant had failed on the facts to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, at no point did the Tribunal say that it considered the claimant’s bringing these allegations was unreasonable conduct on her part.[14]I also note that some of the matters which formed part of the claimant’s evidential case (Ms Bennett’s grievance against Mrs MacKinnnon), were subject to the respondent’s internal investigation, which resulted in the appeal outcome decision that the comments made by Mrs MacKinnon to Ms Bennett about her headwear and appearance “were discriminatory in so far as they had a particular cultural and racial significance and were insensitive to [Ms Bennett’s] personal circumstances”.[15]Although ultimately the Tribunal decided that this fact was not sufficient as a proper foundation to drawn adverse inferences that Mrs MacKinnon’s treatment of the claimant was consciously or unconsciously motivated by the claimant’s race, nevertheless, this fact alone goes not show that it cannot be said that the claimant’s claim was entirely baseless and it was unreasonable for her to bring it.[16]For all these reasons, I find that the respondent’s costs application is not wellfounded. It fails and is dismissed.