Mr S Lasdas v NTT Data UK Ltd and Expert Resource Recruitment Ltd: 2210425/2023

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Case No 2210425/2023

Between

Mr S LasdasClaimant

NTT Data UK Ltd and Expert Resource Recruitment LtdRespondent

Before

Employment Judge Wisby

In person for claimant

Date 14 July 2025

JUDGMENT

[1]The Claimant is ordered to pay the sum of £4000 (inclusive of any applicable VAT) to NTT DATA UK LIMITED in respect of the costs incurred by the First Respondent in defending this claim.

[2]The Claimant is ordered to pay the sum of £4000 (inclusive of any applicable VAT) to EXPERT RESOURCE RECRUITMENT LIMITED in respect of the costs incurred by the Second Respondent in defending this claim.

REASONS

[3]26 June 2025 was the reconvened costs application hearing that had been postponed on 13 June 2024 on medical grounds, further postponements due to the Claimant’s health have occurred in the interim period.

[4]Both R1 and R2 produced schedules of costs, R1 claims £16,500 in costs, R2’s costs schedule exceeds £20,000. R1 and R2 both stated that they were happy for the Tribunal to award costs on a summary basis if they were successful in their respective applications, and did not wish to proceed to a further hearing for a detailed cost assessment.

[5]I explained to the parties that I would hear from R1, then R2 without interruption. After a break I would hear from the Claimant who could also make submissions without interruption. I reminded the Claimant of this when he was trying to make representations at the wrong time. Due to typing sounds throughout the hearing I muted all other attendees other than the person who was speaking.

[6]A mid-morning break was held for approximately 30 minutes.

[7]The Claimant addressed me for approximately 20 minutes prior to the lunch break (which was one hour); he then had a further opportunity to give oral submissions between 2:00 and 4:00 pm, the Claimant spoke for the majority of that period. The respondents were given approximately 5 minutes for any concluding comments before I ended the hearing and reserved my decision.

[8]The Claimant continues to be frustrated that the Tribunal has not made a finding that he is owed sums for the days he alleges he works and that the Tribunal has not made findings about whether the reasons given by R1 for ending the assignment were legitimate or not, despite the fact that I've explained that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to go onto determine those things, since he was not found to be an employee or worker of either respondent. The Claimant steadfastly refuses to engage with this jurisdictional point and continuously reverts to matters that he considers were established at the preliminary hearing, such as the Claimant’s incorrect assertion that ‘fraud’ was established and that a witness committed perjury - these were not findings made by the Tribunal. Papers before the Tribunal

[9]The Tribunal was presented with: 9.1. A 469-page Costs Hearing Bundle; 9.2. From the Claimant, a 72-page document titled ‘Claimant’s Written Representations’ and a further 28- page document tiled ‘Supplementary Written Representations’; 9.3. Written submissions from R2; and 9.4. A copy of an ET Judgment and Reconsideration Judgment from a differ claim involving the Claimant.

Issues

[10]The hearing was listed to consider R1 and R2’s costs applications.

The Law

[11]The basic principle is that Employment Tribunals do not order one party to pay the costs which the other party has incurred in bringing or defending a claim. However, there are a number of exceptions to the basic principle.

[12]In the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules, the section on Costs Orders and Preparation Time Orders is contained in rules 72 to 82 of The Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024 (‘Rules’).

[13]Rule 74 deals with when a costs order may or should be made. Rule 74 states: “74.—(1) The Tribunal may make a costs order or a preparation time order (as appropriate) on its own initiative or on the application of a party or, in respect of a costs order under rule 73(1)(b), a witness who has attended or has been ordered to attend to give oral evidence at a hearing. (2) The Tribunal must consider making a costs order or a preparation time order where it considers that—(a) a party (or that party’s representative) has acted vexatiously, abusively, disruptively or otherwise unreasonably in either the bringing of the proceedings, or part of it, or the way that the proceedings, or part of it, have been conducted,

(b) any claim, response or reply had no reasonable prospect of success, or

(c) a hearing has been postponed or adjourned on the application of a party made less than 7 days before the date on which that hearing begins. (3) The Tribunal may also make a costs order or a preparation time order (as appropriate) on the application of a party where a party has been in breach of any order, rule or practice direction or where a hearing has been postponed or adjourned….”

[14]When considering the amount of an order, information about a person’s ability to pay may be considered.

[15]In AQ Ltd v Holden

[2012] IRLR 648

, the EAT held that, while the threshold tests remain the same whether a litigant is professionally represented or not, a tribunal should not judge a litigant in person by the standards of a professional representative. A litigant in person is unlikely to have professional adviser's objectivity and knowledge of law and practice and may be involved in legal proceedings for the only time in their life. Even if the threshold tests are met, the discretion whether to award costs is exercised having regard to all the circumstances, including the fact that a litigant in person may have brought proceedings with little or no access to specialist help and advice.

[16]It is inappropriate for a tribunal to make a costs order in an attempt to deter a claimant from bringing future tribunal proceedings.

[17]Whether the origin of consideration of costs is the tribunal's own initiative, or an application, the same three-stage process must be adopted in all cases. Firstly, the tribunal must make findings of fact about the paying party's conduct. The tribunal must consider whether, on those findings, one or more of the statutory thresholds in Rule 74 are met (for example, a finding that there was breach of a tribunal order, that the conduct of proceedings was unreasonable in a particular respect, or that the claim had no reasonable prospects of success). The tribunal will need to explain in its reasons which aspects of any conduct fulfilled which part of the Rule 74 test. Secondly, if the Rule 74 threshold has been met the tribunal will go on to consider whether to exercise its discretion to award costs. In doing so the tribunal must take account of all the relevant circumstances including, where appropriate, the paying party's ability to pay any costs order. Thirdly, and only when the first two stages have been completed, a tribunal may proceed to consider the amount of the award payable and the form of any award, under Rule 76.

[18]A costs warning letter will not necessarily or automatically result in an order for costs being made, even where the party giving the warning is ultimately successful in obtaining a judgment in their favour. Whether it will do so will depend on the facts. But if a well-argued warning letter is sent, a failure by the claimant to engage properly with the points raised in it can amount to unreasonable conduct if the case proceeds to a hearing and the respondents are successful for substantially the reasons that were contained in the letter.

Findings

[19]On 6 December 2022 a hearing was held before at the East London Employment Tribunal in relation to the Claimant’s claim against Investigo Limited and the Secretary of State for Education, for unfair dismissal, a redundancy payment, notice pay, holiday pay, arrears of pay and ‘other payments’ (“East London Claim”). The hearing was to determine whether the Claimant was an employee or worker of either respondent. The Claimant gave evidence in that case that the arrangement was a tripartite arrangement involving his own limited company, Consultco Limited, of which he was a director. Oral Judgment was given by the Employment Judge that he was not an employee or worker of either respondent.

[20]The Claimant issued the ET1 in these proceedings on 21 June 2023. In his claim form he alleged that his employer was R1 and that the employment had been arranged by R1’s agent, R2. The Claimant made no mention of his arrangement with an umbrella company JSA Services Limited, trading as ‘Workwell’.

[21]On 4 July 2023 written reasons were provided by EJ Townley in respect of their Judgment in the East London Claim. That Judgment set out the statutory definition of an employee and a worker under the Employment Rights Act 1996, gave a summary of relevant legal considerations and summarised the position in tripartite situations. The Claimant had argued that the contract in place with the company that he was a director of was ‘fraudulent’. The Tribunal found no evidence before it to suggest that the tripartite arrangements entered into between the Claimant and the respondents in that claim were either false or a sham. As set out above it was held that the Claimant was not the worker or an employee of either respondent.

[22]On 22 August 2023 R2 wrote to the Claimant inviting him to withdraw his claim against it setting out that the Claimant was employed by Workwell and that any claim for unpaid amounts or unfair dismissal should be made against Workwell as his employer. The letter goes on to warn the Claimant: “I am sure that you will appreciate that Expert will need to devote further resources to respond to the claim in the event that it is not withdrawn. A response to the claim is due by 29 August 2023. So long as you withdraw your claim against Expert by 5.00pm 28 August 2023 (by giving written notice of withdrawal to the ET and to Expert by that time), Expert shall not pursue a costs application against you. Expert puts you on notice that in the event that the claim against Expert is not withdrawn by 5.00pm 28 August 2023 but it is withdrawn after that date or otherwise dismissed or struck out by the ET, Expert will claim from you (under rule 76(1)(a)-(b) Employment Tribunals Rules of Procedure 2013) the legal costs associated with it having to defend the claim. These legal costs are to be calculated in accordance with the principles set out in Re Eastwood (deceased)

[1975] Ch, 112

-house solicitor) and the subsequent authorities applying this decision (such as, for example, Ladak v DRC Locums

[2014] IRLR 851

and R (on the application of Kuznetzov) v. Camden LBC [2019] EHWC 3910 (Admin)). The applicable hourly rate for my time is £373 (i.e. what was previously the hourly rate of £317 in the case of Camden LBC), for the same reasons as those given in that case”, and “If you decline to withdraw your claim against Expert, please explain why it is that you contend that the ET will have jurisdiction to consider a claim by you against Expert.”

[23]On 22 August 23 the Claimant replied: “You have provided no proof that my employer was Workwell as you claim. Please provide at least some proof especially because you are threatening to charge me with your legal expenses”. Then shortly later he sent a further email stating: “I am asking you to withdraw your false claim and your threat by tomorrow 2.00pm. You have falsely claimed that I have been employed by Workwell (or however it's called). Please provide a proof in the form of a contract or even a letter from Workwell claiming that I have signed a contract with them. If you fail to do so, I will inform the court about your malpractices and I will seek legal protection. I will also check if I can raise a complaint to your professional body”. On the same day the Claimant emailed Workwell asking them to confirm he had not signed a contract with them, Workwell replied on 24 August saying that they had had verbal acceptance from him and that his presence on site can be considered as acceptance of the terms but he had not signed the contract (see copy of correspondence further below).

[24]By the relevant deadline (25 August 2023 for R1 and 29 August 2023 for R2): 24.1. R1 submitted its Response setting out it's denial that it was Claimant’s employer and that R2 acted as an intermediary. At that stage R1 set out that it considered the Claimant was a self-employed contractor, trading via the R2 and that there was no direct agreement in place between the Claimant and R1 for the supply of personal services. R1 set out that all payments were directed to R2 and that R2 had the obligation to compensate the Claimant. 24.2. R2 submitted its Response setting out that it had introduced the Claimant to R1 and that the Claimant’s placement at R1 was to be through an umbrella company i.e. that his employer would be an umbrella company nominated by the Claimant. R2 set out that the Claimant had nominated Workwell as his umbrella company and that he was employed by Workwell in relation to his placement at R1. The response set out: “the Claimant’s employer was Workwell any claim for unpaid amounts or unfair dismissal should be made against Workwell”.

[25]On 31 August 2023 R1 wrote to the Claimant, putting him on notice that should he continue to pursue his claims that R1 would make an application to the Tribunal for a costs order under rule 76, the letter sets out that rule and explained that the relevant definitions were in section 230(1) and 230 (3) Employment Rights Act 1996. The letter sets out that R1 considers the engagement was categorised by an intermediary presence and that the fact the Claimant provided consultancy services indirectly through an intermediary agent (R2) underscored the absence of a direct contractual relationship between R1 and the Claimant. The letter explains that ‘Inside IR35’ is significant from a tax perspective but does not determine employment rights or relationships and that the claim to be a direct employee of R1 is further not supported by the nature of an Inside IR35 arrangement, since it indicates the absence of a direct contractual employment relationship between the Claimant and R1 as the end client. The letter sets out R1’s understanding that the Claimant was a self-employed contractor providing services via R2 (R1 had not seen R2’s Response at this stage). The letter goes on to say: Your CV shows that you have engaged in many freelance roles and so we do not see how you have made the assumption that you are an employee for this contract. We hope that the above gives you some clarity for your claim and that you understand that you are unable to advance this claim against our client in the form that you have as you were not an employee of our client. A costs order may include fees (including legal fees), charges, disbursements or expenses that have been incurred by or on behalf of our client, including expenses that any witnesses incur in connection with attendance at the tribunal. There is no limit on the amount of the costs order that may be made against you if our application is successful, and the additional cost that will be incurred by our client in preparing for and attending a tribunal hearing will be significant. We estimate that our client's costs to conclusion in this matter will be between £9,000 - £11 ,000 (not including VAT). We are instructed to seek full recovery unless your claim is withdrawn against our client in line with this letter. The Claimant is advised to seek legal advice and given 14 days to withdraw or explain why he believes he was R1’s employee.

[26]On 31 August 2023, in response to the cost warning letter from R1 the Claimant wrote to the Tribunal requesting an intervention. The Claimant sets out in that correspondence that R1 was claiming that he was not working for them but for R2 and R2 was claiming he was not working for them but for an umbrella company. The Claimant sets out that the only contract he had seen and accepted is an e-mail from R2 with the job offer for R1. The Claimant states to the Tribunal he wanted to assure the Tribunal he has not accepted and\ or signed any other contract other than the aforementioned hence he challenged R2 after their cost warning letter and that R2 was unable to provide any contract or a letter from the umbrella or other company proving that he had signed a contract with any third company.

[27]R1 and R2’s responses were provided to the Claimant (and the other respondent) by the Tribunal in early September 2023.

[28]On 11 September 2023 R2 applied for a preliminary hearing to determine the issue of the Claimant’s employer, setting out that it considered the claim against it should be struck out as having no reasonable prospects of success, once again reiterating its position that the Claimant’s employer was Workwell.

[29]On 13 September 2023 R1 followed up on R2’s correspondence reiterating its application in its response to strike the claim out against R1 on the basis of no reasonable prospects of success and that it had a contract with R2 but no written or other arrangement directly with the Claimant and that it had not known how the Claimant traded with R2 but R2 had helpfully confirmed that the Claimant was employed by an umbrella company, Workwell, in which case the claim should be made against the Claimant’s actual employer being JSA Services Limited trading as Workwell. R1 goes on to say it cannot be the position that the Claimant was employed by any more than one relevant entity and supported the application for a preliminary hearing to determine employment status and to consider striking out the claim against R1 on the basis that had no reasonable prospects of success.

[30]Following correspondence between the parties on 29 September 2023, Employment Judge Joffe converted the final hearing into a one day public preliminary hearing to consider whether the Claimant was an employee or worker of R1 or R2, whether his claims should be dismissed against either or both respondents on the basis that he was not an employee or worker of that respondent and whether the Claimant’s unfair dismissal claim should be struck out as he had less than two years’ service. It was identified that if the claims were not dismissed the Employment Judge would go on to clarify the issues, list a full merit hearing and give case management directions for the full merits hearing; various directions were set for the preparation of the preliminary hearing including an order for disclosure by 16 October 2023. As a result of the listing of the preliminary hearing to determine jurisdiction there was no need to list a hearing or determine the separate strikeout application made by R1 and no determination of that specific application was made by the Tribunal. I do not find as submitted by the Claimant that his conduct in continuing the proceedings cannot be found to have been unreasonable on the basis that the Tribunal did not strike out his claim as having no reasonable prosects of success, since there was no hearing to determine this application.

[31]On 21 September 2023 the Claimant wrote to the Tribunal in response to the applications made by the R1 and R2, stating that the Respondents were trying to mislead the Tribunal by claiming that: he was not working for either of them and that they owe him nothing. The Claimant stated in contrast to their claims he did have a contract with them and with nobody else. The Claimant set out his position that he said he would prove with evidence was that they both collaborated in a fraudulent manner to deny him what he was owed, that he would explain the fraudulent manner later and, that now the Respondents were trying to hide behind each other and together behind an alleged contract with an umbrella company that never existed. The Claimant sets out that the only contract that was agreed and that he was promised to have, was from R2, with reference to the correspondence sent from R2 to the Claimant on 23 December 2022. The Claimant sets out further that based on what he was told his understanding was he was going to be given a contract to sign with R2 in order to work for R1 and that an umbrella company was going to handle the accounting matters but that he was never sent the promised official contract and he never signed any other contract with anybody regarding the assignment. The Claimant set out that he considered there were three critical questions: 1) Had the respondents defrauded him and colluded in doing so? 2) Had the respondents falsely claimed that they did not have a contract with him but instead with an umbrella company? And, 3) Should they be rewarded for what they did? In respect to the defrauding allegation the Claimant focused on the reasons given about his approach to the work for the assignment being terminated, not the contractual arrangements in place. In respect of question 2 (whether the Respondents falsely claimed that they did not have a contract with them but instead with an umbrella company) the Claimant stated that the Respondents hadn't provided a shred of evidence regarding the alleged nonexistent contract with Workwell and, in relation to question 3, whether they should be rewarded for what they did, the Claimant states that the Respondents were relying on false and completely unfounded claims that he had a contract with an umbrella company despite not offering evidence of that.

[32]On 26 September 2023 the Claimant wrote to the Tribunal stating he presented evidence which proves that he was working for R1, having a contract with R2, who practically acted as the front man of R1, and that in contrast, the Respondents had provided no evidence of false and unsubstantiated arguments that he had a contract with an umbrella company. The Claimant refers to the Respondents using slander and lies against him in a fraudulent manner so as to justify retrospectively the non legitimate refusal to pay him for the days that he worked in his notice.

[33]Due to the lack of disclosure by the Claimant of documentation between him and Workwell, R2 applied on 2 November 2023 for a third-party disclosure order for Workwell to produce that correspondence. The Claimant did not support the request but stated: “Since everybody has expressed an opinion, my position is that the application made from the second respondent is unfounded because they haven't provided any valid reason, as what information they are looking for on top of the information they have received from the umbrella company and me, which already confirms that there was no signed contract between us nor any verbal agreement (as proved by the latest communications I have shared where I have clarified that there was never any verbal agreement about a contract too, something that they never denied although I asked them to do so if I was wrong). So, these written communications prove that there was no written or verbal agreement about a contract between me and the umbrella company. If the Respondents believed otherwise, they had every chance to ask the umbrella company to clarify it and they did, and the umbrella company answered, to me and to them, by confirming the above.” I understand that the correspondence that the Claimant was referring to is the following correspondence dated 22 and 24 August 2023 (which was in the bundle for the original preliminary hearing regarding employee status): On Thursday, 24 August 2023 at 13:29:57 BST, Workwell <support@workwellsolutions.com> wrote: Hi Sokratis, I hope this ﬁnds you well. Thank you for your email. In response, we only have verbal acceptance from yourself. Although, your presence on site can be considered as acceptance of the terms pursuant to clause 1.3 as stated below. " 1.3 You will be deemed to have accepted in full the terms of this contract on commencement of your ﬁrst assignment under this contract." However, I can conﬁrm we do not have a signed employment contract from yourself. If you need anything further, please do let us know. Kindest regards, Siv Mjali Compliance Co-Ordinator Tel: 01923 257 257 (Option 1) Web: www.workwellsolutions.com For information on our Data Protection and Privacy Policy, please click here ------------------- Original Message ------------------- From: Sokratis Lasdas Received: 22/08/2023 18:19 To: Workwell Subject: URGENT - Re: Termination of Contract - 2490313 Dear Jema et al, Can you please check and conﬁrm the fact that we never signed any contract? Can I please have your answer by the end of day tomorrow? Thanks, Sokratis Lasdas

[34]The request for a third-party disclosure Order was granted. On 10 November 2023 Workwell, as instructed, produced the correspondence that had taken place between it and the Claimant throughout January 2023, this disclosure included the documentation referred to in the Preliminary Hearing (“PH”) Judgment.

[35]The preliminary hearing took place on 15 November 2023 and 16 January 2024; oral judgment was given at the end of the hearing. The Judgment was that the Claimant was neither an employee nor a worker of R1 or R2 and the Tribunal accordingly did not have jurisdiction to consider the Claimant’s complaints.

[36]R1 made a cost application on 12 February 2024. In broad summary that application is made on the basis: of R1’s contention that the Claimant’s claims had no prospects of success; R1 gave the Claimant sensible warnings with a clear explanation of applicable law that were met with derision or ignored; the Claimant advanced and progressed the claim when he either understood or should have understood that his claim had no prospects of success: that the Claimant acted abusively, disruptively and or unreasonably and or vexatiously in bringing his claim and in how he has conducted the proceedings; and, that conduct increased the first respondent's expenditure.

[37]On 12 February 2024 the Claimant wrote to R1 following their application for costs stating that R1 would answer to the relevant public authority which deals with cases of possible misconduct regarding providers of the public sector.

[38]Written Reasons for the PH Judgment were sent to the parties on 16 February 2024. The Written Reasons note: 38.1. “At several points during the hearing I had to ask for questioning to stop so that only one person was speaking at a time. I asked (and reminded) the Claimant to listen until the question had been put in full, then to answer, and that his responses during cross examination should be confined to answering the question put to him. I explained that there was an appropriate time for the Claimant to make the submissions that he wanted to about the case at the end of evidence. I offered the Claimant the opportunity to have breaks to compose himself when it appeared he was struggling to follow my directions due to his strength of feeling about the case.” 38.2. In respect of R2, at paragraph 37 in respect of its communications: “The email was not as clear as it could have been that the contract would not be with ERRL and he would not be paid by ERRL, this led to some confusion at that stage that could have been avoided with clearer communication”:

[39]In paragraphs 65 and 66, the Written Reasons set out: “65. The email from the Claimant to ERRL at 15:22 on 3 January 2023 stating: “Regarding the umbrella company, you can use Workwell” shows that the Claimant had agreed to Workwell being the company through which the work for NTT, as the end client, would (in relation to the Claimant) be contractually operated. I do not accept that he did not understand the basis on which Workwell would be operating and that, as per his submissions, his only understanding was that Workwell were providing an accounting service. 66. The Claimant’s position that no one (including him), in effect bothers to read the terms and conditions sent by companies online, is not a valid argument to show a contract was not in place with Workwell. In any event, the role of Workwell, as the intended legal employer in respect of the assignment to NTT was not hidden in small print. The fact Workwell, not ERRL or NTT, was to be the Claimant’s legal employer was set out clearly to the Claimant in the explanation of the role Workwell would play and the services it provides.”

[40]On 16 February 2024 the Claimant wrote further to R1 and R2’s representatives stating that after reading quickly the decision and reasons sent to the parties ‘I have to ask you another but this time very direct question: did you deliberately sabotaged my ability to defend my claim, in an additional way?’ This was in respect of the fact that recordings had not been uploaded to the Tribunal.

[41]On 14 March 2024 R2 made a costs application under Rule 76 (2) on the grounds that 1) the Claimant’s claim had no reasonable prospects of success and 2) the Claimant acted unreasonably in the way he conducted part of the proceedings namely as regards his failure to disclose relevant documents.

[42]On 15 March 2014 the Claimant wrote to the Tribunal following R2’s application for costs, stating that the Claimant was applying for costs for the amount R2 had stolen away. The Claimant said this application was made based on the “now proven deliberate lies and fraudulent practices they have used against me in order to steal away that money and also so to mislead the Judge at the preliminary hearing”. The Claimant was in receipt of the Written Reasons for the Judgment - no such findings had been made.

[43]On 5 June 2024 the Claimant wrote to R2 stating “just to let you know, starting from Mr. C and his perjury in the preliminary hearing, I'm going to seek criminal charges against him and all other who are responsible for the committed crimes of fraud, perjury, obstruction of justice and maybe more. You know for more than a year so you have been obviously backing up and probably encouraging for all this time his and his colleagues’ unlawful actions. This behaviour of your clients, especially of NTT data, is criminal by itself. I won't be scared by your clients strong connections. They are the ones who will have to think twice soon if they will keep supporting your client. I had enough”. This e-mail was sent in response to correspondence between R2 and the Claimant about the documentation it was appropriate to include in the bundle for the costs application hearing, R2 pointing out that the costs hearing was not a re-hearing of the original issue. The Claimant also emailed to say: “Your clients' dirty laundry is going to be exposed eventually even in the Parliament, this hearing is going to be only the start”. The Claimant’s language and the allegations in this correspondence are not reasonable (in finding that I have in mind that the Claimant is a litigant in person who feels strongly about his case). Discussion and further findings Has one or more of the statutory thresholds in Rule 74 are met?

[44]Did the Claimant act vexatiously, abusively, disruptively or otherwise unreasonably in either the bringing of the proceedings, or part of it, or the way that the proceedings, or part of it, have been conducted?

[45]It is clear to me that the Claimant is genuinely upset and aggrieved about the lack of payment to him.

[46]No one has suggested to me that the Claimant has been paid for any work he may have done for NTT. As I explained however several times to the Claimant, unless there is a finding that he was actually a worker or employee of a respondent, the question of whether he is owed money and, if so, what amount cannot as a matter of law be considered by the Tribunal. It is a 2-stage process when an entity denies that the claimant is its worker or an employee. The Claimant did not bring a claim against Workwell. The Claimant actively has maintained at all points that he was not an employee or worker of Workwell. The Claimant did not get past stage 1 of there being a finding that he was a worker or employee of either respondent he was pursuing, enabling the Tribunal to then exercise its jurisdiction to consider the issue of whether sums were owed to him.

[47]Given the findings of fact made, the Claimant’s claim to be an employee or worker of R1 or R2 had no reasonable prospects of success from the outset. However, that should then be distinguished from whether the Claimant ought reasonably to have been aware of that at the time he raised his claim. Giving the Claimant the benefit of the doubt that he did not have in his possession at the time he raised the Claim the correspondence referred to in the Judgement between him and Workwell and given that he had not corresponded with Workwell about his contract with them at the point he submitted the ET1 I do not consider that the original claim itself can be legally described as vexatious. Also giving the Claimant the benefit of the doubt that at the point he raised his claim he genuinely believed Workwell had no relevance in the contractual arrangements for employment purposes and he did not have contrary evidence immediately before him, coupled with the confusion I found in the Judgment was initially caused by an instance of the Second Respondent’s communications, at the point of the ET1 then I do not consider it to be appropriate for me to conclude that the Claimant knew or ought to have known that the Claim had no reasonable prospects of success (as opposed to little reasonable prospects).

[48]Returning to 74(2)(a) the question then falls to be answered did the Claimant act vexatiously, abusively, disruptively or otherwise unreasonably in the way that the proceedings, or part of it, have been conducted?

[49]By 22 August 23 the Claimant was on notice that R2 considered that his employer in respect of the assignment was Workwell and that any claim for unpaid amounts or unfair dismissal should be made against Workwell as his employer. The Claimant, however, simply denied this and asked for proof as opposed to reflecting on that information. The Claimant emailed Workwell and Workwell’s response on 24 August 2024 was that he had verbally accepted the terms they had offered. The Claimant sought further clarification from Workwell that there was in fact no verbal agreement, but Workwell did not respond and did not state to the Claimant that he was right. The Claimant was therefore on notice that Workwell considered that there was a contract in place with him, even if he had not signed the employment contract itself. Instead, the Claimant simply adamantly refused that a contract with Workwell was in place and threatened to raise alleged malpractices by R2’s legal representative.

[50]Taking on board the Claimant is a litigant in person and felt strongly about his case and the warning about costs given, even if his immediate response to R2 could be viewed as being in the heat of the moment, there was still no reflection by the Claimant in the period after the costs warning about whether, in light of the information set out in the costs warnings and the response from Workwell about his verbal and deemed acceptance of the contract with them, that he was pursuing the wrong legal entities. The lack of consideration of the contractual position, in particular in light of the knowledge he had gained from the East London Tribunal decision, the explanation in the costs warning letters and the correspondence from Workwell was in my view unreasonable conduct.

[51]On 31 August 2023 the Claimant wrote to the Tribunal stating following both costs warning letters (he had not seen the Responses at that point) that he had not accepted and\or signed any other contract with any third party. The Claimant had not therefore reflected at all on the fact, even on his own case, he had entered into a relationship with Workwell for payroll purposes and was either in unreasonable denial about this or deliberately failing to mention that relationship.

[52]The Claimant (and the relevant other Respondent) received copies of the Responses in early September 2023, this provided him with additional information to reflect upon.

[53]By 13 September 2023 the Claimant is sent further correspondence from R1 stating that the claim should be made against the Claimant’s actual employer, being JSA Services Limited trading as Workwell. R1 goes on to say it cannot be the position that the Claimant was employed by any more than one relevant entity. Once again, the Claimant appears not to have reflected on this correspondence, instead he continued in doggedly in the proceedings against R1 and R2. As explained above his position was set out again to the Tribunal on 21 September 2023, stating that the Respondents were trying to mislead the Tribunal and in contrast to their claims he did have a contract with them and with nobody else - once again failing to mention the involvement of Workwell, or Workwell’s position that the Claimant had verbally accepted their contractual terms.

[54]By 21 September 23 the Claimant in correspondence with the Tribunal mentions Workwell for accounting purposes but continues to state that R1 and R2 are alleging a contractual relationship between him and Workwell that they have no evidence of.

[55]In relation to copies of the relevant correspondence originally between the Claimant and Workwell (“Workwell Correspondence”), the Claimant stated at the costs hearing that he did not have all of this correspondence since it went into his spam folder and was deleted from there - therefore he did not have access to it (an explanation that I am skeptical about given he did respond to and action some of that correspondence as set out the PH Judgment). The Claimant’s lack of support for the third-party disclosure application for full disclosure of the Workwell Correspondence and indeed his seeming failure to request this correspondence directly from Workwell himself (which would not have presented Workwell with the data protection concerns they had about providing the documents to a third party, leading to R2’s necessary application for a disclosure Order) in the circumstances was not reasonable.

[56]By 10 November 2023 the parties were all in receipt of the Workwell Correspondence. Giving the Claimant the benefit of the doubt (despite my skepticism) that in fact he no longer had that correspondence himself prior to Workwell producing it as per the Tribunal’s Order, the Claimant then had time to read and review that documentation and consider his position further ahead of the preliminary hearing. If I am incorrect that a reasonable litigant in person should have considered if he was pursuing the wrong entities at an earlier stage, I consider that at this point, with all of the relevant documentary evidence to hand, it was unreasonable conduct for the Claimant not to reconsider his position.

[57]When I raised the question of whether there should in fact only be two Respondents at the start of the preliminary hearing on 15 November 2023 the Claimant adamantly maintained at that point (and throughout the proceeding) his position that he was not a worker or employee of Workwell and that that entity was only relevant for payment processing purposes. The failure by the Claimant, at that point, even as an unrepresented litigant in person, to reflect, based on: the legal position explained to him via the East London proceedings; the information in the cost warning letters; the position set out to him by Workwell in August 2023; and, the correspondence he now had copies of with Workwell - that his claim should in fact be against Workwell (as per the position that had been set out by then by R1 and R2) was not reasonable.

[58]Hypothetically had Workwell denied for some reason (despite the correspondence with him) that it was the Claimant’s employer, then proceeding with a claim against all 3 entities as respondents may have been appropriate to protect his position but the Claimant refused in any way to consider/concede that he may have been a worker or employee of Workwell.

[59]I consider that the Claimant’s correspondence on 16 February 2024 to R1 and R2 asking if they deliberately sabotaged his ability to defend his claim was unreasonable. Whilst a litigant in person may in reality communicate inappropriately from time to time in the heat of the moment, the issues of the recordings had been discussed at length at the preliminary hearing (and had been addressed by EJ Joffe in correspondence ahead of the preliminary hearing). The Claimant was given the opportunity to produce evidence from those recordings on the second day of the hearing (which was several weeks later so he had plenty of time to prepare that evidence) but he had not taken it.

[60]Since the Tribunal granted the Claimant’s application for a witness order on the basis that there was the possibility that that witness could give relevant evidence about the issue of control, I do not find that the Claimant’s conduct in applying for that order was unreasonable.

[61]It has been submitted that the Claimant’s approach to compliance with Tribunal Orders and compliance with Tribunal deadlines was unreasonable, however I do not consider that I have enough information about each instance of noncompliance to be able to conclude that the Claimant’s behaviour was unreasonable in each instance – for clarity, that is not to say however that I find that the Claimant acted appropriately or reasonably.

[62]It has also been submitted that the Claimant’s behaviour during the preliminary hearing was unreasonable and disruptive and that his behaviour resulted in the hearing going part heard. It is correct that the Claimant’s phone made alarm sounds on several occasions despite me asking him to turn it off, and that the Claimant did not take direction from me well (in that: he did not appropriately listen and reflect on what I was explaining to him, he did not take on board what was being asked of him in relation to when it was appropriate for him to make submissions, nor did he immediately stop an interruption he was making when I asked him to - which led to me having to request that he stop talking at that point in time, several times over). At times the Claimant’s refusal to follow the directions I was giving to him was unreasonable (such as his failure to stop talking over the representatives when it was not his turn to speak). I am, however, cognisant of the Claimant’s strength of feelings about the lack of payment to him. Litigants in person are often passionate and stressed in hearings and the employment Tribunal does not hold them to the same standard as professional representatives. There were various matters to consider and even if the Claimant had not strayed at times into unreasonable conduct during the hearing, on balance I think the hearing would have gone part heard in any event. Exercise of discretion

[63]Having found that the Claimant did act unreasonably (in particular by, but not limited to, pursing the claim against R1 and R2 with no reflection by him at various stages of the proceedings on the contractual role and relationship between him and Workwell) then I must consider if in all the circumstances whether to exercise the discretion to award costs, this includes where appropriate, considering the paying party's ability to pay any costs order. Claimant’s ability to pay

[64]The Claimant was reluctant to provide information about his financial means. I explained that I was not making a decision that day but reserving my decision therefore if he wished his financial situation to be taken into consideration, in the eventuality that either R1 or R2’s application was granted (I made it quite clear that no decision had as yet been made – because it had not) there would not be a further opportunity for him to provide me with that information and any decision would have to be taken by me without consideration of his financial situation.

[65]The Claimant provided no documentation about his financial means but he did go on to explain that he had been out of work for some time but was now on an inside IR35 contract, with a day rate of £550 (from which deductions needed to be made for PAYE tax as well as fees to the umbrella company). The Claimant explained he rented his home and his rent is £600 per month. He stated he has long term debts amounting to €800,000 (without taking interest and other matters in consideration) and that this was because Greece does not have the equivalent of bankruptcy proceedings. The Claimant said he also owed family members money and that he currently has approximately £20,000 in savings.

[66]Bearing in mind all of the circumstances and giving consideration to the Claimant’s financial position I have decided that it is appropriate to make a costs order against him. Despite debts the Claimant has savings and he is in work. Had the Claimant reviewed his position Workwell could have been added as a respondent to the claim and unless Workwell denied it was his employer (which would have been surprising, particularly in light of Workwell’s email of 24 August 2023) R1 and R2 would not have needed to incur the full costs of a 2- day preliminary hearing. I have separately also identified other instances of unreasonable conduct in respect of which I consider a cost order is appropriate.

[67]As a result of the findings above I proceeded to then consider what the amount of the costs award should be. Taking into account all of the circumstances and the Claimant’s financial means I consider a cost award of £4000 to each Respondent is appropriate. RECONSIDERATION

Findings

[1]Whilst the Claimant disagrees with the decision originally taken by me in respect of employee and worker status, that was not a decision taken in the preliminary hearing regarding costs. Accordingly, his challenge to that original decision is not a matter which can amount to a valid ground for reconsideration of the Costs Judgment.

[2]I am satisfied that the relevant conduct of all the parties in the proceedings was taken into account by me. The fact that employment/worker status needed to be found as a matter of jurisdiction for an unlawful deduction of wages complaint to proceed has been explained many times now. Evidence has not been considered as to whether wages were in fact due to the Claimant, as the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to do that. For clarity, issues concerning evidence in the preliminary hearing regarding worker/employee status (such as the audio recording and email evidence available to the Claimant but not referred to at the original hearing) has already been addressed in relation to that original decision. ‘Fraudulent termination’ was not an issue before the tribunal for reasons that have been explained previously (whether there was a sham contract however was considered).

[3]The decision made in respect of the award of costs was not made by relying on a single email from Workwell regarding verbal acceptance of the contract, as has been suggested. The full reasons for the decision have been set out in writing to the parties.

[4]The reason that the strike out application was not determined and the implications of that were considered by me when I reached the Costs Judgment - relevant to the decision taken is addressed in the written reasons for the Costs Order Judgment. 5. ‘Whistleblowing’ was not an issue to be determined by me at the original preliminary hearing. The issue before the employment tribunal in relation the original preliminary hearing was purely that of worker/employee status – not whistleblowing matters.

[6]The reasons why I did not recuse myself from the Costs Hearing have been set out already – I am satisfied that the Claimant’s frustration and view that I should have rescued myself do not amount to a valid ground for reconsideration of the Costs Judgment.

[7]The Costs Judgment does not set out every procedural step that took place prior to the preliminary hearing on 15 November 2023 and 16 January 2024. The Claimant’s application to amend to include a claim of ‘employment fraud’ was considered and addressed at the preliminary hearing on 15 November 2023. I do not consider the fact that amendment application was made provides a valid ground for the reconsideration of the Costs Judgment. I am satisfied that that amendment application does not undermine the basis and rationale for the Costs Judgment.

[8]The Claimant was given ample time at the preliminary hearing on 26 June 2025 to address all of the points raised by the Respondents, including the points raised regarding the relevance of the East London Claim. The submitted relevance of that claim was set out in the Respondent’s written costs application and was not sprung upon him.

[9]Enforcement action of the Judgment has not been taken in these proceedings. I have however treated the Claimant’s request for a stay pending the outcome of his appeal as a request for a reconsideration of the payment period: the normal approach is for a stay not to be granted simply because an appeal is made; the Respondents’ costs applications have taken over a year to be heard; the Claimant’s appeal did not progress to a substantive hearing through the sift (there is, however, as I understand it, a postponed 3(10) hearing pending); the decision on costs was taken on a wider basis than just the outcome of the decision regarding worker/employee status that is currently the subject of appeal; it is in the interests of justice for there to be finality in the proceedings and I bear Rule 3 in mind; should the Claimant’s appeal go on to be successful (or any other applicable appeal be successful) the EAT will no doubt make appropriate orders; there is no evidence of potential irremediable harm as a result of the Judgment not being varied; the interests of justice require the consideration of the situation from the Respondents’ perspective as well as the Claimant’s; the costs awarded were incurred by the Respondents a significant time ago; I have considered the balance of harm and the basis put forward as to why the Claimant considers this element should be reconsidered and I consider that less injustice in the circumstances occurs by not varying the Judgment to place a stay on payment. In summary, having considered the reconsideration application with care, I am satisfied that it must be refused. The discretion to reconsider decisions was not created to give disappointed parties a second (or third) bite of the cherry. It must not be permitted to undermine the cardinal principle there needs to be finality in litigation. Written reasons were provided setting out the rationale for the decision taken. With Rule 3 in mind, there is nothing in what is now said by the Claimant which indicates that it is in the interests of justice to re-open matters. This application is refused as there is no reasonable prospect of the decision being varied or revoked. Approved by