Mr M A Hassan v Barts Health NHS Trust and others: 2201691/2015 and others
JUDGMENT
The claimant’s three live claims before the Employment Tribunals (2201691/2015, 3202042/2015 and 3200734/2016) are all struck out under rule 37(1)(b) of the Employment Tribunals Rules of Procedure, because he has conducted these proceedings scandalously, unreasonably and vexatiously.REASONS
[1]It is rare for a judge to be required to determine an application for strike out based, at least in part, upon a contention that a party has engaged in assault and threatening behaviour towards members of the judiciary and the legal profession. That, regrettably, is the scenario facing me in this application. The claimant was convicted of criminal offences occurring in the context of a preliminary hearing held at Import Building (the regional office of the London East region of the Employment Tribunals) on 7 February 2019. Case numbers: 2201691/2015, 3202042/2015 & 3200734/2016 Page 2[2]I will first explain why I have dealt with this case personally. The Employment Tribunals of England and Wales are divided into ten regions for the purposes of administrative support from HMCTS and regional judicial leadership. Two such regions are London Central (based at Victory House) and London East (based at Import Building). This litigation has encompassed a hotly contested dispute – at both first instance and appellate levels – about the tribunal region that should properly determine the claimant’s various claims and applications, because of concerns that he has repeatedly raised about judicial fraud and corruption (in London Central, in particular). On one occasion referred to below, the Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) considered it arguable that a tribunal had given inadequate weight to the claimant’s expressed wish that his case should not be heard at London Central. On another occasion referred to below, the EAT considered that a tribunal had arguably erred in the sequence by which it had considered (or failed to consider) the claimant’s application for his case to be transferred to London East. These views were expressed at rule 3(10) hearings before the EAT.[3]The claimant has three live claims before the Employment Tribunals: one in London Central and two in London East. I have dealt with this case because, as President, I am not assigned to any region. My bailiwick is a national one, so no transfer decision is required for me to have conduct of this matter. Clerking support for the hearing was provided by a member of HMCTS staff in the London Central region, simply because that is where the bulk of the paperwork is based. Exceptionally, additional administrative support was provided by members of my own private office, who work for Judicial Office rather than HMCTS. Given the amount of documentation involved, additional time was arranged in chambers to conclude the judgment. The parties[4]The claimant is Mr Mohamed Ashraf Mahmoud Hassan Sayed, known professionally and in this litigation as Mr Hassan. He styles himself in the correspondence he sends to the tribunal and numerous other recipients as “The Whistleblower”. I will simply refer to him as the claimant. His claims are against Barts Health NHS Trust and some of its employees. For convenience, I will refer to the Trust and the two individual respondents as the singular “respondent”. The respondent has brought this application to strike out his claims, which is based chiefly upon the incident on 7 February 2019.[5]The claimant is a demonstrably intelligent man. He qualified in the practice of medicine in 1985, graduating from Ain Shams University in Cairo. He holds an MD. The provenance of this dispute is a ten-month period over a decade ago, between July 2012 and April 2013, when the respondent engaged him as a locum consultant gynaecologist in reproductive medicine and surgery.[6]The claimant has been supported throughout this long-running matter by his brother, Mr Ahmed Mahmoud Hassan Said El-Tawil (Mr El-Tawil). Mr El-Tawil styles himself in correspondence as the “Independent Professional Witness”. I will simply refer to him as the claimant’s brother. Case numbers: 2201691/2015, 3202042/2015 & 3200734/2016 Page 3[7]This litigation has generated hundreds of thousands of pages; to my knowledge as President, more than any other case heard by this jurisdiction in recent years. Emails and their attachments from the claimant and his brother – and many hundreds of them have been received over the years – often exceed one hundred pages of close type. These communications are invariably described as “Urgent” or “Highly Important”. They are prefaced with statements such as “Official Service on …” and followed by a list of individuals and office-holders to whom they have been sent. They are often copied to multiple ministers and Members of Parliament. They are verbose and repetitive, sometimes unintelligible, and laden with florid allegations of fraud, corruption and conspiracy. This has the effect of obscuring any applications they may contain. The tribunal’s administration has long since ceased printing them. Efforts by judges over many years to encourage focus and concision in written communications from the claimant and his brother have proved fruitless. Relevant history[8]These proceedings are convoluted, but it is essential to understand how the dispute has unfolded. What follows represents a summary, rather than findings of fact. I have separated the history into nine stages: • Stage 1 – period of employment and first High Court claim • Stage 2 – first claim to the Employment Tribunal • Stage 3 – second claim to the Employment Tribunal • Stage 4 – third claim to the Employment Tribunal • Stage 5 – fourth claim to the Employment Tribunal • Stage 6 – events of 7 February 2019 and stay of ET proceedings • Stage 7 – criminal proceedings • Stage 8 – lifting the stay of ET proceedings • Stage 9 – MPTS proceedings[9]There is some overlap between these stages resulting from the claimant’s appeals against decisions adverse to him. I have therefore provided a separate chronology as an appendix to this judgment, which may assist for cross-referencing purposes. Documents[10]References to “(R [page number])” are to the respondent’s bundle for this hearing (total 1,024 pages). References to “(C [page number]” are to a series of “document sets” provided by the claimant for this hearing (total 5,906 pages), with each set being preceded by a narrative explaining its contents.[11]I confirm that, as requested by the claimant, I have also read his appeal to the EAT against my recent case management decisions, his application to the European Court of Human Rights and the Criminal Cases Review Commission (although I have read them before), and the further written comments he provided to the tribunal on 16 August 2023. I have also read his response to further submissions from the respondent sent on 19 October Case numbers: 2201691/2015, 3202042/2015 & 3200734/2016 Page 4 2023. The tribunal has received many further emails from the claimant and his brother since the hearing, some of which relate to legal proceedings brought against me personally; it has not been necessary to consider them in detail. Stage 1 – period of employment and first High Court claim[12]The respondent engaged the claimant in July 2012 as a locum consultant to work in its centre for reproductive medicine. The claimant had by this time worked in the field of gynaecology for over 20 years. His engagement was initially under a fixed term contract of six months’ duration. In January 2013, it was extended by three months. In March 2013, the claimant applied for two consultant posts which were advertised in the department where he worked. The vacancies had arisen following the suspension of other consultants in the team. The claimant was shortlisted for interview but unsuccessful; both posts went to two other individuals. His locum role came to an end on 30 April 2013.[13]The claimant was aggrieved by this process. Representing himself, he applied to the High Court for an injunction (reference HQ13X02509). In those proceedings, he contended that he had not been given one of the posts because he was perceived as a troublemaker despite having superior qualifications and experience. Those proceedings came before Leggatt J (as he then was) on 8 May 2013. The respondent was represented by Ms Nadia Motraghi (now KC), who features elsewhere in this narrative as a victim of an offence. The claimant’s application for injunctive relief failed, on the basis that there was no arguable basis for contending that the selection process had been unfair or improper. According to the judgment, the claimant interrupted as it was being delivered (R 263); Leggatt J noted that the claimant felt “extremely strongly” about this case and was “very emotional” about it.[14]A witness statement signed by the respondent’s solicitor for the purposes of a subsequent costs hearing, accompanied by a statement of truth, explained why the respondent was unable to seek its costs on that occasion (R 270-271): Immediately following the handing down of the oral judgment, the claimant stood and sought to argue with Mr Justice Leggatt. The Claimant refused to stop remonstrating even after it was made clear to him by Mr Justice Leggatt that it was entirely inappropriate to do so after judgment had been given. Mr Justice Leggatt refused to hear any further comments and left the Court before Counsel for the Defendant had the opportunity to make an application for costs. The solicitor’s witness statement further recorded that, during the course of the hearing, the claimant’s brother was asked to leave as a result of his conduct.[15]The respondent separately applied for its costs and for the High Court claim to be dismissed. There is before me a solicitor’s note of a hearing before Master Cook on 16 July 2013, attended by the claimant’s brother rather than Case numbers: 2201691/2015, 3202042/2015 & 3200734/2016 Page 5 the claimant (R 280-284). This records that Master Cook described their attitude to the litigation as “unhelpful and hostile”, including making a formal complaint against the judge hearing it, and he declined to adjourn the hearing. The note also refers to threatening behaviour towards court staff. Master Cook struck out the High Court claim on the basis that there were no reasonable grounds for bringing it, and that the statement of case was an abuse of the court process. Master Cook ordered the claimant to pay the respondent’s costs. The claimant was unsuccessful in his appeal against that order. Stage 2 – first claim to Employment Tribunal[16]On 31 May 2013, the claimant presented his first claim against the respondent in the Employment Tribunals (2202703/2013). It was received, and handled, by the London Central region. The claim was articulated as a complaint of automatic unfair dismissal and detriment in respect of whistleblowing. He set out in his claim form how shocked he had been to see the poor quality of care that the respondent provided (as he perceived it) and how he had begun to raise his concerns with the leadership team. His concerns related, among other matters, to the risk of ovarian hyper-stimulation syndrome, which is a complication of fertility treatment where ovaries develop excess follicles as they respond to medication. The claimant referred to IVF patients becoming ill and said that the respondent covered up neglect and malpractice. He contended that these were protected disclosures. He said that these disclosures were the real reason for the respondent’s decision, communicated to him on 21 March 2013, not to appoint him to one of the vacant consultant posts referred to above. The claimant accused the respondent of “destroying his career and life” (R 307). The respondent resisted the claims.[17]A preliminary hearing for case management purposes was held on 5 September 2013 before Employment Judge Henderson. She noted that the claimant had shown no regard for the orders of the tribunal (R 289) and that, during the hearing, she had faced constant interruptions and disruption from him and his brother (R 293). She declined the respondent’s application to strike out the claimant’s claim as having no reasonable prospect of success, but she did order him to pay a deposit of £750 as a condition of continuing with his whistleblowing claims (R 295). She ended by urging the claimant to show respect and courtesy to the tribunal.[18]I mention in passing that among the claimant’s many baseless allegations of fraud made throughout his litigation is a contention that Employment Judge Henderson “has falsely alleged to be an Employment Judge” (see, e.g., C 3490, 3551, 4154). This appears to have followed an (admittedly odd) answer that the claimant received from the Ministry of Justice’s disclosure team in response to his freedom of information request, which was to the effect that they could find no records for such a person (C 360). Employment Judge Henderson is a fee paid judge of long standing. Nevertheless, the claimant applied the worst possible interpretation to this response from the disclosure team: he saw it as “irrefutable evidence” of criminality in the London Central ET region (C 4102), allegations which would later take a more sinister turn. Case numbers: 2201691/2015, 3202042/2015 & 3200734/2016 Page 6[19]At another preliminary hearing on 29 October 2013, held for case management purposes, Employment Judge Glennie noted that the claimant had described the respondent’s approach to the ordering of documents in the bundle as “malicious” and “fraudulent”, and that he and his brother expressed their disapproval of the tribunal’s approach by shouting at him (R 301).[20]The full hearing took place between 17 and 27 March 2014, with two further days in chambers. The claimant represented himself and was assisted by his brother. The panel was chaired by Employment Judge Lewzey. Ms Motraghi, referred to above, represented the respondent. By a 43-page reserved judgment sent to the parties on 2 June 2014, the tribunal dismissed the claim (R 303). Having heard evidence, the tribunal found, in terms, that the claimant appropriately received the lowest score of all the candidates in the interview process (R 329). It decided that he had made no protected disclosures (R 342). It dealt with the matter in the alternative; it decided that, even if the claimant had made protected disclosures, the real reason the respondent rejected his application for one of the vacant consultant posts was his poor performance at interview (R 344).[21]The tribunal recorded that the claimant and his brother did not heed directions about which of them should speak during the hearing and how questions should be asked of witnesses. Repeated interjections from the claimant’s brother during the hearing merited admonishment and both the claimant and his brother at various points shouted at the tribunal (R 312).[22]Separately, the claimant had raised concerns directly with the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA), which is the independent UK regulator of fertility treatment and research using human embryos. The HFEA concluded that there was no cause for concern. I shall return to this point later but, on multiple occasions since, the claimant has described the HFEA as corrupt and he has contended, with no evidence at all, that its officers are working with the General Medical Council, the police, the Crown Prosecution Service, the Employment Tribunals, the EAT, the Magistrates’ Court and the Crown Court in pursuit of “State Organised Crimes” (R 580).[23]After its successful defence of the claimant’s tribunal claim, the respondent applied for its costs. The tribunal dealt with the matter by way of written submissions. In a further judgment sent to the parties on 10 December 2014, the tribunal ordered the claimant to pay the respondent’s full costs, the amount to be determined by detailed assessment (R 348). Its reasoning was that the claimant had conducted the proceedings (and behaved during the hearing) in a disruptive and unreasonable manner (R 355) and that he had persisted with a weak claim in the face of a deposit order (R 356). The tribunal also rejected the claimant’s application for reconsideration.[24]The tribunal then carried out a detailed assessment of costs, as the ET rules of procedure empower it to do. The detailed assessment procedure was conducted by Employment Judge Goodman. She directed the claimant to provide to the tribunal, within 21 days, his points of disagreement with the respondent’s detailed bill of costs. He did not do so. A “default costs Case numbers: 2201691/2015, 3202042/2015 & 3200734/2016 Page 7 certificate” was therefore issued on 9 June 2015 in the sum of £80,739.59 (C 4473). The detailed assessment of costs did not end there. The tribunal accepted that a procedural irregularity had occurred in this process. So, on 21 December 2015, it gave the claimant a second opportunity to file points of disagreement with the respondent’s detailed bill of costs (C 3757-3760). Again, he failed to do so. The bill of costs was therefore validated a second time on 20 January 2016 (C 3761-3762). By now, combined with the High Court costs, the claimant owed the respondent £105,060.79 (R 133). This sum remains unpaid.[25]The claimant presented an appeal to the EAT, at that stage limited to(a) the liability judgment,(b) the costs judgment (that is, the judgment that costs should be awarded, not the detailed assessment thereof) and(c) the reconsideration decision. HHJ Richardson handed down a reserved judgment on 16 September 2015, following a hearing held on 1 May 2015 and 28 August 2015 under rule 3(10) of the EAT Rules (PA/0684/14, PA/0071/15, PA/0074/15 and PA/0097/15). He criticised the thousands of pages the claimant had sent the EAT in pursuit of his appeal (R 364). He allowed through to a full hearing certain of the claimant’s contentions about errors of law in the liability judgment (R 372-375), but he made clear that the claimant’s allegations of fraud and dishonesty on the part of the tribunal were without substance (R 376). He refused to allow the claimant’s appeals against the reconsideration decision to proceed to a full hearing before the EAT (R 383) but he did allow one ground of appeal against the costs judgment to go forward, because it was contingent upon the tribunal’s approach to liability (R 385-386).[26]An attempt to challenge HHJ Richardson’s decision in the Court of Appeal was dismissed in February 2016 by Lewison LJ. This was on the basis that the claimant’s allegations of misconduct and fraud were “baseless and scurrilous and have no foundation” (R 403). The claimant subsequently accused Lewison LJ of corruption, fraud and misconduct by “dishonestly concealing the criminal activities” of the respondent (e.g., C 3869-3870).[27]The full EAT hearing came before HHJ Shanks on 11 August 2016 (0277/15 and 0278/15). The claimant did not appear. HHJ Shanks proceeded in his absence. The judge made the following observation, which I quote because it exemplifies comments made by most judges who have encountered the claimant (R 403): There can be no doubt that the claimant is aware of this hearing and indeed he has put in a great deal of material in the last few days dedicated to showing that the hearing should be “frozen”, as he puts it, stayed or, I suppose, adjourned because he has made criminal allegations against almost everybody involved in the case (including me, rather surprisingly, since I only received the papers earlier this week) … There is also a suggestion that I should recuse myself because apparently I am a businessman and not a judge. I am quite satisfied that there is no basis for my recusing myself. Although HHJ Shanks expressed surprise that the Lewzey tribunal had found there to be no protected disclosures, he dismissed the appeal overall on the Case numbers: 2201691/2015, 3202042/2015 & 3200734/2016 Page 8 basis that it was open to the tribunal to have decided, in the alternative, that the claimant’s poor performance at interview was the real reason for his non-appointment to one of the vacant consultant posts (R 403-405). He also dismissed the claimant’s appeal against the decision to award costs; as already noted, the costs appeal was contingent upon showing that the liability judgment was flawed and, as the claimant had failed to show that, it fell away (R 405-406). The claimant appealed the judgment of HHJ Shanks to the Court of Appeal but permission was refused by Floyd LJ on 24 May 2017 as being totally without merit (R 434).[28]Even then, the matter found itself back before the EAT on 9 June 2017. A hearing had been convened to deal with an application by the claimant to set aside the judgment of HHJ Shanks on the basis that he was wrong to have proceeded in his absence. The application was heard by HHJ Hand QC. The judge began by noting that: … this application is not really concerned with why [HHJ Shanks] proceeded in [the claimant’s] absence. And although the [claimant] has complained about the events leading to that hearing, his broader application is based on the fact that various tribunals have failed to grasp that the respondent has behaved fraudulently and themselves have behaved fraudulently … He also noted that the claimant based his approach on the maxim that “fraud unravels all”. However, having considered the claimant’s contentions, HHJ Hand had no hesitation in deciding that they were baseless (R 429-442). He declined to set aside the judgment of HHJ Shanks.[29]As noted above, quite apart from the tribunal’s decision in principle to award costs, there was a subsequent process of detailed assessment. The conduct of that process, as supervised by Employment Judge Goodman, was also challenged before the EAT. There was a rule 3(10) hearing before HHJ Barklem on 12 and 13 April 2018 (PA/0080/16 and PA /0081/16). I mention it because, in his judgment, HHJ Barklem recorded other steps that the claimant had by then taken. For example, the claimant had sought disclosure of documents relating to the appointment of HHJ Hand, following his retirement as a Circuit Judge, as a temporary additional judge of the EAT. This was the basis for an assertion that the judgment of HHJ Hand was itself fraudulent. HHJ Hand had already indulged the claimant with an explanation for his appointment (C 1843). In the meantime, the claimant had asked the EAT to stay his appeal pending an “impeachment application” to the Supreme Court. The claimant had said that the rule 3(10) hearing had been “fraudulently fixed” due to the “criminal activities” of the EAT’s registrar. HHJ Barklem quoted correspondence from Simler J (as she then was, when President of the EAT) who, when rejecting the claimant’s application to adjourn the rule 3(10) hearing, had referred to a “deluge” of correspondence from him, containing “extensive and unnecessarily lengthy, repeated allegations” which was “consuming an inordinate and disproportionate amount of court and management time and resource for little or no purpose” (R 475, C 2491). Case numbers: 2201691/2015, 3202042/2015 & 3200734/2016 Page 9[30]In the end, HHJ Barklem was unable to conclude the rule 3(10) hearing. He noted that the claimant had effectively forced an adjournment upon the EAT by “talking the hearing out”. Given that the judge had already read into the case, he directed that it should be relisted before him when he was next sitting in the EAT later that year.[31]Simler J subsequently declined two applications to stay that re-listed rule 3(10) hearing (C 2890-2894). Following repeated failures by the claimant to provide his own availability for that re-listed hearing, his appeal in respect of the detailed assessment process was struck out (C 3436-3438). On 19 July 2018, Simler J refused him relief from that sanction (C 2895-2896).[32]The claimant continued throughout this period to correspond with the Employment Tribunal about his first claim. On 23 February 2018, my predecessor as President, Judge Brian Doyle, wrote to him to say that communications of such length and density were an abuse of process. On 9 October 2018, Judge Doyle told the claimant that, insofar as his correspondence might contain applications for case management orders or directions, they were obscured by its volume and repetitiveness (R 491). On 19 December 2018, having regard to what had by then transpired, Judge Doyle wrote to the claimant to say that his claim (i.e., his first claim) was now at an end with all rights of appeal exhausted, that any further correspondence from him in relation to it was an abuse of process, and that such correspondence would no longer receive any reply (R 239).[33]Even though that claim is at an end, it provides important background to understanding how the claimant’s litigation has continued to spread. Stage 3 – second claim to the Employment Tribunal[34]Separately, on 18 June 2015, the claimant had presented a second ET claim against the respondent (2201691/2015) and two further individuals, its medical director and its HR director. It related to the same period of employment. It is also the first of the three claims covered by the respondent’s current strike out application.[35]The claimant’s ET1 indicated that he was bringing claims relating to whistleblowing detriment and religious discrimination. In his particulars of claim, he went into considerable detail about the respondent’s alleged attempts to cover up malpractice and destroy his career and he identified various acts by the respondent, or failures to act, that he said were unlawful (R 13-46).[36]The respondent resisted the claim, contending that the tribunal lacked jurisdiction to determine the claim (by reference to the absence of Acas early conciliation and/or because the claim had been presented outside the statutory limitation period) and that it should be struck out because the claimant was estopped from proceeding (on the basis that the contentions had previously been determined, i.e., res judicata, or ought to have been raised in the previous claim, i.e., by reference to the principle in Henderson v Henderson) (R 53-58). The claimant contended that the London Central Case numbers: 2201691/2015, 3202042/2015 & 3200734/2016 Page 10 ET region (where the previous claim had been heard by the Lewzey tribunal) was conflicted, due to judicial misconduct and fraud, and that the matter should be transferred to a different ET region.[37]By letter dated 26 August 2015 – notably, before the respondent had sent its ET3 response form to the tribunal – the tribunal listed a preliminary hearing for 2 October 2015. Subsequently, on 9 September 2015, the tribunal wrote to the claimant, at the direction of Employment Judge Goodman, to say that his application for a transfer of his claim out of the region would be considered at a separate preliminary hearing on 20 October 2015. Following the hearing on 2 October 2015, Employment Judge Snelson decided that any claims based on events prior to 31 May 2013 (this being the date he presented his first claim) were estopped and should be struck out, while the remainder of the claimant’s claim, insofar as they might relate to subsequent events, should be stayed pending the outcome of his appeal to the EAT in respect of his first claim.[38]The claimant appealed to the EAT in respect of the tribunal’s directions as set out in its letters dated 26 August 2015 and 9 September 2015. Simler J dealt with the matter at a rule 3(10) hearing on 26 January 2016 (PA/0712/15). She referred in passing to the thousands of pages that the claimant had sent to the EAT (R 394). She decided it was an arguable error of law for the tribunal to have directed a preliminary hearing on 2 October 2015 before it had received the respondent’s ET3 response form (and before the tribunal had undertaken the process of “initial consideration” set out at rule 26 of the ET rules of procedure) and an arguable error of law for the tribunal to have deferred consideration of the claimant’s contention that the London Central ET region was conflicted until after the first preliminary hearing (R 395-396). Insofar as Simler J refused other grounds of appeal, this was the subject of a further unsuccessful appeal by the claimant to the Court of Appeal.[39]On 11 July 2017, the full EAT hearing came before Soole J (0042/16). The respondent did not attend the hearing to oppose the appeal, in interests of proportionality and saving costs. Soole J noted that the claimant continued to make “wild allegations of collusion and bias” on the part of the London Central ET region and the EAT. Nonetheless, he upheld the claimant’s appeal, deciding that it had been wrong for the tribunal to act as it did (R 458-468). The result was that the tribunal’s directions dated 26 August 2015 and 9 September 2015 were set aside, as was the subsequent judgment of Employment Judge Snelson dated 2 October 2015 which was dependent upon their validity. Despite what he described as the claimant’s strenuous opposition, Soole J remitted the transfer request back to London Central ET. He also dismissed the claimant’s application to adduce fresh evidence as totally without merit.[40]That remains the status of the second claim. There is an extant application by the claimant to transfer it out of the London Central ET region, and various extant applications by the respondent, but nothing else has happened on it. It is a live claim. In the letter dated 9 October 2018 to the parties referred to above, my predecessor as President said that it was appropriate to await the outcome of all extant appeals before it could progress further (R 491). It was Case numbers: 2201691/2015, 3202042/2015 & 3200734/2016 Page 11 later stayed following the incident on 7 February 2019, which I address in more detail later in this judgment. Stage 4 – third claim to the Employment Tribunal[41]On 2 October 2015, the claimant presented a third claim against the respondent and one further individual, its HR director, alleging religious discrimination and whistleblowing detriment. This time, he did so in the London East ET region (3202042/2015), making clear in his ET1 that it should not be transferred to the London Central ET region “in view of the committed fraud in its proceedings, orders, decisions and judgments” (R 73). The particulars of complaint occupied 49 pages (R 74-122). Again, it related to the same period of employment and, in terms, covered much the same territory as the previous claims.[42]The respondent filed an ET3 response form resisting the claims, contending that(a) any matters predating the first claim were estopped and therefore an abuse of process;(b) any matters post-dating the first claim were already the subject of the second claim, and which were stayed (as they were at that time) pending the outcome of the EAT appeal in the first claim and therefore an abuse of process;(c) insofar as the third claim raised matters in respect of the claimant’s period of employment in 2012-13, they were time-barred and/or estopped under the rule in Henderson v Henderson and therefore an abuse of process (R 132-133). The respondent also asked for the matter to be transferred to the London Central ET region.[43]On 8 December 2015, Regional Employment Judge Taylor stayed the third claim pending the conclusion of the appeal process (C 4467).[44]On 29 January 2016, the respondent wrote to both the London Central and the London East ET regions to request an order that the claimant should not send any further correspondence relating to the proceedings to any party (or to any third party) without the tribunal’s permission or invitation (R 254-256). I set out aspects of the respondent’s request below because of its ongoing relevance to its current strike out application. It stated: Throughout the period of the claimant’s litigation against the [respondent], he has sent prolific amounts of correspondence to the ET, to the EAT, to various employees, officers and directors of the respondent and to this firm. On innumerable occasions, he has been asked to refrain from doing so and he has been warned that his conduct is unreasonable and unacceptable. Notwithstanding these many warnings, in a sample period of 14 September 2015 to 25 January 2016 (a period of just 4 months), the claimant has sent the ET, EAT and the respondent approximately 69 emails, the majority of which run to over 10 pages, each with innumerable attachments. These emails are sent as a barrage, sometimes with as many as 9 per day. For example on 14 September, the Claimant sent 6 emails, on 19 November, he sent us 9 emails, on 13 January, he sent us 8 emails and on 24 January, he sent us 4 emails. Case numbers: 2201691/2015, 3202042/2015 & 3200734/2016 Page 12 Not only are the emails frequent and voluminous, in each case they are copied not only to the respondent’s representatives at this firm and the ETs, but also to individual members of staff at the respondent and to a large number of individuals and third parties entirely unconnected to the proceedings. In particular, his emails appear to be being copied to every current Member of Parliament, the Mayor, the police, the Independent Police Complaints Commissioner, various news and media outlets and a number of other public figures. Of most concern is that fact that in his emails the claimant makes repeated, unfounded allegations of serious criminal misconduct. Those allegations are made against the respondent and its employees (including against named senior individuals who have been accused of serious offences such as intent to cause grievous bodily harm, fraud and blackmail, without any foundation). Allegations are also made against this firm, the Employment Tribunal and the EAT. The allegations appear to be escalating in seriousness and are made without any foundation or evidence. The claimant’s correspondence has now reached such a level that it is causing alarm, distress and concern to individuals employed by the respondent. Those individuals are intimidated and threatened by the claimant’s conduct.[45]On 23 February 2016, REJ Taylor lifted the stay in respect of the third claim, and she directed that it be transferred to the London Central ET region “for determination of the respondent’s application” (C 4468). The next day, the tribunal sent the parties a letter confirming the transfer of “the file in this case” (C 4470).[46]The claimant appealed the transfer decision to the EAT. That came before Slade J at a rule 3(10) hearing on 2 May 2018 (PA/0239/16) (R 484-490). She allowed six grounds of appeal through to a full hearing, which were articulated as follows:(1) The direction of the Regional Employment Judge of 23 February 2016 lacks clarity. It is not clear whether the hearing of the entire claim is to be transferred to London Central or whether it is to be transferred solely for the purpose of considering the application made by the respondent;(2) If the claim is to be transferred for hearing, the Regional Employment Judge erred in making an order without giving the claimant the opportunity to make representations on the order made. Representations were invited only on the proposal advanced by the respondent for a restraint on the claimant communicating with the parties or any third party;(3) Failing to comply with ET Rule 26 to consider the substance of the claim before the East London Tribunal after the ET3 was served; Case numbers: 2201691/2015, 3202042/2015 & 3200734/2016 Page 13(4) Failing to give reasons or a proper basis for the transfer, particularly so soon after a stay of proceedings had been ordered on 8 December 2015;(5) Failing to have regard to the substance of the claims before the East London ET and the Central London ET to ascertain whether it was necessary or appropriate to have them heard at the same Employment Tribunal;(6) Failing to have regard to the view expressed by the claimant in his claim form objecting to having his claim heard at the Central London Tribunal for reasons there given. Slade J did say that the claimant’s allegations of fraud were not arguable.[47]In the event, the matter did not proceed to a full EAT hearing. In the interests of proportionality and costs, the respondent did not contest the appeal (R 244). By an order dated 30 July 2018, the EAT therefore remitted the matter to the London East ET region to determine (C 5174). On 23 November 2018, the respondent wrote to the tribunal (R 242-247) to ask for a preliminary hearing to be listed to determine(a) whether the claimant’s third claim should be struck out on the grounds of estoppel, abuse of process and/or having no reasonable prospect of success;(b) whether it should be subject to the payment of a deposit;(c) whether all proceedings should be stayed until such time as the claimant had satisfied the outstanding costs orders of £105,060.79; and(d) if the whole claim was not to be struck out, consolidating it with both the second claim and the fourth claim (see below) for further consideration, such matters to proceed in the London Central ET region. The tribunal duly listed a preliminary hearing for those purposes on 7 February 2019 (C 4512-4513).[48]It was in that context that the matter came back before REJ Taylor on 7 February 2019, to which I will return. Stage 5 – fourth claim to the Employment Tribunal[49]Separately, on 4 August 2016, the claimant had presented a fourth claim against the respondent and its HR director, again alleging religious discrimination and whistleblowing detriment. This claim was again presented in the London East ET region (3200734/2016). The particulars of claim occupied 66 pages (R 151-216). Again, the claim related to the same period of employment and, in terms, covered the same territory as his previous claims. He again said that the “fraud” in the London Central ET region should prevent his claim from being heard in that region.[50]The respondent filed an ET3 response form resisting the claim. It made the point that the majority of the claimant’s complaints had been adjudicated and dismissed in the first claim, while nearly all the other complaints set out in his fourth claim were within the ambit of the second and third claims. It said that it could only identify two new complaints, which related to decisions by the respondent on 14 January 2016 and 25 March 2016 to reject applications from the claimant for clinical posts (R 225); and, insofar as he was Case numbers: 2201691/2015, 3202042/2015 & 3200734/2016 Page 14 complaining about those matters, his complaint was out of time. It made the same points as it had before about abuse of process. Finally, it requested the transfer of the claim to the London Central ET region.[51]A preliminary hearing took place before Employment Judge Hyde on 6 January 2017 (C 1724-1733). Ms Motraghi again appeared for the respondent. In a reserved judgment sent to the partes on 4 April 2017, the judge decided to stay the fourth claim pending the outcome of all extant appeals, and she therefore made no orders in relation to the claimant’s applications for disclosure and no decision in respect of the respondent’s points about jurisdiction, limitation and abuse of process. Recap[52]By way of recap, this was the position in respect of the claimant’s claims as he came before the Employment Tribunal on 7 February 2019 to attend a preliminary hearing, at Import Building, in respect of his third claim: • His first claim (2202703/2013) was at an end, with all rights of appeal exhausted. • His second claim (2201691/2015) had been remitted by the EAT to the London Central ET region for initial consideration under rule 26 of the ET rules and a decision on his application for the proceedings to be transferred to the London East ET region (supported by the claimant, opposed by the respondent) – and, thereafter, for decisions to be made on matters such as the respondent’s application for it to be struck out as an abuse of process. However, my predecessor as President had said that no further action would be taken until all extant appeals had ended. • His third claim (3202042/2015) had been remitted by the EAT to the London East ET region to consider afresh whether it should be transferred to the London Central ET region (opposed by the claimant, supported by the respondent) and, as noted above, with a preliminary hearing to be arranged to consider other applications made by the respondent such as whether it was an abuse of process. • His fourth claim (3200734/2016) had been stayed pending the outcome of all extant appeals.[53]The documents demonstrate that the claimant appeared at that preliminary hearing with a track record of ignoring judicial directions, disruptive behaviour at hearings, and deluging the tribunal, the EAT, the respondent and others with correspondence containing wild and baseless allegations. Stage 6 – events of 7 February 2019 and stay of proceedings[54]As to what transpired at that hearing, I will summarise or quote from the documents before me. Ms Motraghi’s statement was taken immediately afterwards by (and written by) a police officer. It includes the following (C 5118-5121): At 10:00am the claimant hadn’t arrived at the tribunal. We waited 15 minutes for the claimant to arrive and he still hadn’t. I was then Case numbers: 2201691/2015, 3202042/2015 & 3200734/2016 Page 15 called in by the clerk to see the judge. We started to go through the background of the claim so the judge could fully understand the claim as this was the first time she had heard the claim. At around 10:50am the clerk entered stating the claimant and his brother had arrived and were asked to enter. At this point I have stated to the judge my concerns regarding the claimant and brother due to their volatile behaviour and that I was pregnant and concerned for my safety and that of my unborn children due to the fact that in August 2013 the brother had to be removed by security due to his volatile behaviour and potential to lose control … Due to my concerns the judge had decided to place a security guard in the middle behind myself and the claimant in brother … this put me at ease. The claimant and brother when they entered were very loud, angry, shouting at the judge ... The brother has then for no reason slammed on the desk a set of paperwork to the size of about 2 full lever arch files which has made me jump a little bit as this was out of the blue. … The brother then started shouting where are the documents that belong to us. Judge replied “What documents?”. The judge then stated I will not proceed whilst being shouted at … if this continues I will halt proceedings. The judge then went on to reassure the claimant that she hadn’t considered the respondent’s application to dismiss or stay at present. This didn’t persuade them and their actions continued throughout, shouting and being unreasonable in their behaviour, this continued until police were requested at about 11:25 hours … The judge stated that the case will continue to proceed and, if they didn’t like the response, they could leave. The brother again started shouting. The judge informed him he didn’t have permission to speak. The judge continued stating if they didn’t accept the authority of the tribunal they could leave. The claimant stated, no he was continuing, and had made his position clear. The judge stated she wanted them to leave and she was calling police, security was requested. Another 2 security guards entered and stood between myself and the brother … The brother continued to shout “this is before international courts”… The security guards tried to calm them down and encourage them to leave, the brothers didn’t leave. The judge then stated – if he refused to leave, myself and counsel will find another room to continue the hearing in, she then went to leave and gather her things, and stated for me to leave. With the claimant and brother continuing to shout no no no, I have gathered my papers, folder and other items which were heavy. The claimant then rushed around the table towards the judge. I have managed to move by the passageway, the brother then moved behind my table by the door and as the judge has moved to the passageway the claimant has moved towards her, took a step back as everyone was getting rather close and was worried, as the judge came towards me she has then for no reason fell headfirst in front of me … the room is all Case numbers: 2201691/2015, 3202042/2015 & 3200734/2016 Page 16 one level and no reason for her to fall apart from being pushed. She had her necklace ripped from her neck and I could see reddening around her neck, I think this was when I was pushed into the wall, I didn’t see who it was as I was looking at the judge, but it was one of the brothers. The security were trying to get the brothers out the way so we could leave, the security were physically trying to restrain the brothers … we have managed to get out the room and into another tribunal room … There was a man and woman in there. The claimant had pursued us and managed to get away from security into the second tribunal room … We managed to get to the clerk’s room … one brother shouted Ali Akbar [sic] and saw the claimant was chasing, we managed to get into the clerks room and with their help shut the door on the claimant.[55]REJ Taylor’s statement, taken immediately after the incident by a police officer, includes the following (C 5053): During the hearing both Mr Hassan and his brother (Mr A Hassan) were rude, loud, abusive and aggressive towards myself and other Tribunal staff present in the courtroom. I repeatedly warned them to control their behaviour, and for only one person to address the court. For the claimant, Mr Hassan confirmed to me that he did not accept the legitimacy of the Tribunal, to which I responded: “If you do not accept the legitimacy of the Tribunal, then you’re free to leave”, to which Mr Hassan responded by even more loud shouting and abuse directed at me. At this point I stated: “In that case, I’ll leave”. Mr Hassan and his brother then stood up as I was leaving the courtroom, shouted at me aggressively and then made towards me in an aggressive manner, barging the security guard as he advanced towards me. Mr A Hassan (the brother) managed to grab hold of my dress at the neck, causing a slight scratch on my neck. The grab had caused me to fall over onto my side. I then managed to get back on my feet. I noticed Ms Motraghi (the respondent’s counsel for Barts Health), who is pregnant with twins, look extremely distressed and upset. I managed to get myself and Ms Motraghi into another room via a back door, however I couldn’t open the door and Mr Hassan and his brother were making their way towards me and Ms Motraghi, so I pulled away and took Ms Motraghi with me back towards the main door, whilst the security staff fended off the doctors long enough for us to exit the courtroom. … as we left Tribunal Room 4, we were still being pursued by the brothers, and we were forced to turn left outside the corridor, away from the main office. Myself and Ms Motraghi then entered Tribunal Room 5, the brother followed us into this room. Inside this office were other members, including Duncan Ross. We all had to push against the door to close it, in order to prevent Mr Hassan and his brother entering the room. Case numbers: 2201691/2015, 3202042/2015 & 3200734/2016 Page 17 Throughout this incident both Mr Hassan and his brother were shouting at the top of their voice in an aggressive and abusive manner. My involvement with the two doctors ceased at this point.[56]Mr Ross was, at the time, a non-legal member of the Employment Tribunals (he has since resigned). He was present at Import Building on other judicial business. His statement, taken immediately afterwards by a police officer, includes this (C 5081): I was in tribunal room 5 with a colleague of mine and around 11:15 I could hear a lot of shouting and raised voices. I walked out into the hall and saw into court room 4. I could see Judge Taylor and security in the room, but could not see any other signs of a disturbance. I went back into room 5 and again a few moments I could hear loud shouting on what sounded like a bang. I went back into the hall and could see Judge Taylor coming out at room for and a middle eastern male following her shouting. Behind the male I could see a male on the floor along with two security guards. A security guard came out of room 4 following the middle eastern male. Judge Taylor walked past me and I stood in between her and this male … It seemed like the male was trying to get to Taylor and Taylor looked afraid at this point. Myself and the security guard stood either side of the male and Taylor then left the room. The male has then tried to follow Taylor, but I have stood in his path. The security guard has grabbed the male from behind so he couldn’t follow and the male has grabbed hold of my tie. The security guard pulled him away from me, but the male did not let go of my tie and dragged me along with him. I was pulled a couple times by the tie. Other security guards then came into the room and try to restrain this male. I was let go and I left the room. Officers arrive later on and I saw them with the male and informed them that he had assaulted me.[57]In later sentencing remarks, it was confirmed that Mr Ross suffered with sleeping problems thereafter and had considered requesting a transfer to a different tribunal (R, 759).[58]Statements were also provided by security officers and by the police officers who had attended the incident. Police evidence included an analysis of CCTV footage. The claimant has provided extensive material to me seeking to rebut these accounts; he considers that they are the result of corruption, fabrication and collusion. A flavour of his view can be gained from the subject matter of emails that, in the aftermath of this event, he began sending to multiple recipients (including the tribunal, the police and the Crown Prosecution Service); they were headed “Report on the collusion of police officers, in effecting the criminal set-up and physical assault on Mr M Hassan and Mr A Hassan” (C 5001). The claimant has subsequently described this incident as an attempt by the General Medical Council “and its affiliated tribunals” to murder him (C 5471). Case numbers: 2201691/2015, 3202042/2015 & 3200734/2016 Page 18[59]On 19 March 2019, the then ET President, Judge Doyle, directed that all ET proceedings involving the claimant be stayed pending the outcome of criminal proceedings arising from the incident on 7 February 2019 (R 494).[60]On 11 April 2019, the EAT wrote to the claimant to inform him that all his current appeals were also stayed, with no further actions being taken in respect of a further appeal he had recently presented (R 493). Stage 7 – criminal proceedings[61]Following the incident on 7 February 2019, the claimant was charged with common assault (against Mr Ross) and the public order offence of causing a fear of violence through threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour (against REJ Taylor and Ms Motraghi).[62]The claimant entered a plea of not guilty. Following a trial at Westminster Magistrates’ Court on 15 July 2019 and 7 August 2019, he was found guilty. At a subsequent sentencing hearing on 6 September 2019, he was given a custodial sentence of 18 weeks and required to pay compensation to his victims, plus CPS costs of £930 and the victim surcharge. The custodial sentence of 18 weeks represented three six-week sentences to run consecutively: six weeks for the common assault on Mr Ross (and compensation of £300); six weeks for the threatening behaviour towards Ms Motraghi (and compensation of £200); and six weeks for the threatening behaviour towards REJ Taylor (and compensation of £200).[63]The claimant served his custodial sentence at HMP Wandsworth. In material he has provided to me, the claimant refers to going on hunger strike for 45 days, followed by a further attempt being made by the General Medical Council and its “affiliated tribunals” to poison him when his hunger strike ended (C 5470). He has contended that the criminal trial was corruptly sent to Westminster Magistrates’ Court so that it could be heard by Chief Magistrate Arbuthnot (as she then was), as part of a “criminal set up” (C 5472).[64]The claimant appealed against both conviction and sentence. His appeal came before HHJ Sharkey at Snaresbrook Crown Court and was heard over a six-day period concluding on 19 April 2021. By this time, he had already served his sentence. One of the claimant’s contentions about judicial corruption arose from the fact that HHJ Hand had conducted jury trials out of Snaresbrook Crown Court prior to this retirement (see the opening comments of the claimant’s third, fourth and fifth “document sets”, referred to below).[65]The respondent has provided to me a copy of victim-related correspondence sent to Ms Motraghi confirming the outcome of that appeal (R 496-497), and also a transcript of the sentencing remarks of HHJ Sharkey (R 758-766). As will shortly be apparent, HHJ Sharkey had by this stage already presided over the jury trial involving the claimant’s brother; see below. This correspondence confirms that, on 19 April 2021, the claimant’s appeal against conviction was dismissed. His sentence was varied so as to include a restraining order by which he was(1) not to contact directly or indirectly REJ Taylor and Mr Ross Case numbers: 2201691/2015, 3202042/2015 & 3200734/2016 Page 19 and(2) not to attend the East London Employment Tribunal hearing centre for seven years. He was ordered to pay an additional £5,000 towards prosecution costs. There was no requirement for him to return to custody.[66]The transcript of the sentencing hearing notes the following: • The claimant “for the first time, and for the only time in these proceedings, has effectively refused to speak”; this was in relation to enquiries about his means when considering the issue of prosecution costs (R 760); • The claimant had not paid the compensation he had been ordered to pay to his victims (R 761); and • He declined to answer further questions from the judge about how he might pay the costs ordered, such as in instalments (R 762-763).[67]The claimant presented further appeals against his conviction, but I understand these to have been concluded or at least so far to have proved fruitless for him. He petitioned the European Court of Human Rights and applied to the Criminal Cases Review Commission. My office and the tribunal generally has been copied into emails beyond count from the claimant in which he has alleged corruption at Westminster Magistrates’ Court, Snaresbrook Crown Court, the Employment Tribunals and the EAT. One such accompanying document set amounted to 12,611 pages.[68]The claimant continued his scattershot approach to appeals, challenges and other correspondence in documents too numerous to reference. This included claims brought in the High Court against Westminster Magistrates’ Court and Snaresbrook Crown Court. With effect from 14 October 2021, the High Court (Chamberlain J), acting of its own initiative, made a two-year general civil restraint order against the claimant in respect of proceedings in the High Court and County Court (R 498-500).[69]Separately, criminal proceedings were brought against the claimant’s brother in relation to the incident on 7 February 2019. He elected a jury trial. This took place at Snaresbrook Crown Court from 8 to 17 December 2020, with HHJ Sharkey presiding. There were two counts on the indictment: assault occasioning actual bodily harm; and the alternative of battery.[70]I have been provided with a copy of the two facts that were agreed by the prosecution and defence and put before the jury, which were in these terms:(1) that the person who pursued REJ Taylor and Ms Motraghi along the corridor from tribunal room 5 was the claimant (and not his brother); and(2) that the claimant’s brother had no previous convictions. I have also been provided with the written legal directions that were put before the jury as part of the judge’s summing up. The judge gave the jury a written direction in relation to identification evidence, which included the following (and it should be noted that references to the “brother” are, in this context, the claimant): The Defendant’s defence is that he never assaulted Ms Taylor. The witnesses have falsely accused him and/or are mistaken in their identification of him. Case numbers: 2201691/2015, 3202042/2015 & 3200734/2016 Page 20 The prosecution allege that it was the Defendant who assaulted Ms Taylor, as alleged by Ms Taylor, and by the three security guards. The Defendant says it was not him. He did not see who, if anyone, assaulted her. He certainly does not say that it was his brother, but says he has been wrongly and falsely identified by the witnesses. Therefore, identification of him as the perpetrator of this assault is in issue. You will also have to look to see if there are any weaknesses in any of the identification evidence, or if there is any evidence which, if you accept it, might undermine the identification evidence. In particular, you should consider the speed in which the incident unfolded, and the fact that Ms Taylor identified the Defendant as pursuing her down the corridor when it is agreed that it was his brother.[71]The jury found the claimant’s brother not guilty in respect of both counts on the indictment. The final position in law, therefore, is that the claimant (and the claimant alone) was convicted in relation to the events at Import Building on 7 February 2019, and the criminal offences for which he was sentenced were common assault on Mr Ross and threatening behaviour towards both REJ Taylor and Ms Motraghi.[72]The claimant considers himself personally vindicated by the jury’s decision to acquit his brother. He has taken his brother’s acquittal as proof that the charges against him were fabricated. In multiple items of correspondence sent to the tribunal since then, the claimant has used a particular phrase (or a variation of it): that the “falsity of the allegations” against him has been “irrefutably factually determined by the jury’s verdict”.[73]Further, in addition to complaints of personal misconduct that seem to have been made against almost every judge involved in dealing with him, the claimant contended that REJ Taylor’s allegations against him have now been shown by the jury’s verdict to be fabricated and, as such, they constitute misconduct that should lead to her removal from office. This is why his correspondence includes reference to the Judicial Conduct (Tribunals) Rules 2014. His brother’s acquittal also prompted an increase in correspondence from the claimant to multiple recipients (including the respondent, this tribunal, the police, the CPS and Snaresbrook Crown Court) – too many to reference with page numbers – referring to corruption and, occasionally, to attempts by these “perpetrators”, acting in collusion, to murder him. These actions have, in his view, been in retaliation for him raising concerns about patient welfare when working for the respondent over a decade ago. Stage 8 – lifting the stay of ET proceedings[74]On 1 June 2021, the respondent asked the ET to lift the stay of proceedings so that its strike out application (originally made on 20 February 2019, Case numbers: 2201691/2015, 3202042/2015 & 3200734/2016 Page 21 following the incident on 7 February 2019) could be considered. Regrettably, due to pressures on the ET system arising from the pandemic, its application was overlooked. However, on 1 September 2022, I wrote to the parties with regard to the remaining live proceedings: the second claim (2201691/2015), the third claim (3202042/2015), and the fourth claim (3200734/2016). In that letter, I proposed to lift the stay of proceedings and to list a preliminary hearing to consider the respondent’s application.[75]On 10 November 2022, having reviewed the correspondence received from the parties, I directed that a two-day preliminary hearing be listed for 28 February 2023 and 1 March 2023, and conducted on a fully remote basis. Following requests from the claimant for varying reasons, which do not need to be repeated here, that hearing was subsequently relisted for 17 and 18 April 2023, relisted again for 5 and 6 July 2023, and then relisted again for 15 and 16 August 2023.[76]On 3 July 2023, I received notification from the claimant’s brother that I had been named as a respondent in High Court proceedings that he had commenced. The claimant – still subject to a general civil restraint order – was named as an interested party. The other named respondents included my predecessor as President, Judge Doyle; REJ Taylor; Mr Ross; Ms Motraghi; solicitors representing Barts NHS Trust; and three named security guards at Import Building. This claim made allegations against me such as abuse of power, fraud and corruption. By an order dated 11 July 2023, Master Davison struck out the claim on the basis that it was “a collateral attack on the decision or decisions of the Employment Tribunal” and because the claim was prohibited by section 2(5) of the Crown Proceedings Act 1947; it was certified as totally without merit. The claimant’s brother has since applied to have that order varied or set aside, That process is ongoing.[77]I declined on two occasions to recuse myself from this hearing; these decisions, and others I have made, are the subject of one or more appeals to the EAT. I refer to the orders and directions, with reasons, sent to the parties on 6 July 2023; they should be read with this judgment. Stage 9 – MPTS proceedings[78]The General Medical Council (GMC) has statutory purposes that include investigating concerns raised about a doctor’s behaviour, health or performance. The Medical Practitioners Tribunal Service (MPTS) is a statutory committee of the GMC. The GMC may, as a result of its investigations, refer to the MPTS the question of whether a doctor is fit to practise medicine in the United Kingdom, and the MPTS has the power to restrict or remove a doctor’s right to practise medicine.[79]On 23 April 2019, and following the incident on 7 February 2019, the respondent referred the claimant to the GMC. From the documents provided by the claimant, I can infer that, in addition to attempted further appeals against his conviction, brought as judicial review claims in the High Court, he also brought judicial review claims against the GMC arising from its decision Case numbers: 2201691/2015, 3202042/2015 & 3200734/2016 Page 22 to bring proceedings against him – at least until such time as the High Court imposed a general civil restraint order on him.[80]The MPTS hearing eventually got underway at the end of 2021. It was listed for five days, chaired by Miss Larrinaga, sitting with Mr McKeon (lay member) and Dr De Marco (medical member). It went part heard on three occasions, eventually taking 13 days: 13 to 17 December 2021; 21 to 22 December 2022; 14 to 15 February 2023; and 1 to 4 August 2023. It is recorded that the claimant was not represented throughout, and that he was not present on the final three days of the hearing.[81]The MPTS’s decision was published shortly prior to the hearing before me, and was shown to me by the respondent. The MPTS ordered the claimant’s erasure from the medical register due to his impaired fitness to practise. This was the most severe available sanction.[82]The MPTS did not publish its reasons for its decision until the following month. On 21 September 2023, the respondent provided a copy of the published reasons and asked me to take them into account when considering my reserved judgment. The claimant objected and, by an email sent on 19 October 2023, he explained why. The document and its attachments were 56 pages long but his position is captured effectively by this sentence at the beginning: “… the MPTS and MPT tribunal are merely committees of the GMC (which are neither impartial nor independent, nor have proper constitutional standing; but merely instruments in the hands of corrupt GMC officers used for achieving their criminal objectives)”. The three members of the MPTS panel are described as “criminal perpetrators”.[83]I have read the published reasons for the MPTS’s decision, the respondent’s application and the claimant’s response, but they add nothing of substance to the issues that were discussed at the preliminary hearing. The only points I have noted are:(1) in resisting the allegation that his fitness to practise was impaired, the claimant contended that he was not the person to which the certificate of conviction by Westminster Magistrates’ Court related;(2) despite being provided with numerous opportunities to make submissions, the claimant continued to maintain that he was the victim of a criminal conspiracy and that all allegations against him had been fabricated; and(3) in the absence of any remorse on the part of the claimant, and no evidence of attempts to remediate his conduct, the panel considered that there remained a significant risk of repetition of the conduct giving rise to the conviction. The claimant’s position at this hearing[84]I have not thus far quoted much from the claimant’s correspondence. However, his position can be ascertained from the covering notes to the “document sets” he provided for this hearing. With the benefit of the summary provided in this judgment, these extracts may now be more comprehensible.[85]The covering note identifies the first document set (C 2-343) as containing the following material: Case numbers: 2201691/2015, 3202042/2015 & 3200734/2016 Page 23 The Protected Disclosures which the Whistleblower and the Independent Professional Witness had made during 2013-2016 to Barts Trust, the HFEA, DOH, the GMC, the Police, the DPP, the MPs … disclosing the ongoing deliberate malpractices and other criminal activities in Barts NHS Trust endangering the patients’ lives and abusing the public assets; the disclosures upon which Whistleblowing proceedings had been launched under the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998, and because of which the Whistleblower and the Independent Professional Witness have been framed in the criminal set-up of 7/2/19 by the perpetrators from that NHS Trust and from the tribunals (to cover up the malpractices and criminal activities in Barts and to cover up the related corruption and fraud in the tribunals). This is the same criminal objective which Barts and its solicitors seek to achieve by seeking to strike out the Whistleblowing claims upon the false allegations of those perpetrators whose falsity has been factually determined by the Jury’s Verdict of 17/12/20 upon Jury Trial on 8-17/12/20, and whose falsity the President of the Employment Tribunals is bound to declare upon the official complaint under the Judicial Conduct (Tribunal) Rules 2014 about the misconduct of the involved REJ and ET judges/members.[86]The covering note identifies the second document set (C 345-1064) as containing the following material: Documents demonstrating the corruption and fraud in Barts NHS Trust and in Central London Employment Tribunal, manifested in its fraudulent proceedings and its orders/judgments on the first whistleblowing claim made/obtained by fraud. Their corruption and fraud disclosed by these documents extended to abusing the statutory function of the Lord Chancellor under Regulation 8 of the ET Regulations 2013 (by hiring a person who is not a judicial-office-holder to falsely pretend to be an