Ms A Obiagwu v Mr A Greystoke and Pantheon International Advisors Ltd: 2201555/2024
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Case No 2201555/2024
Between
Ms A ObiagwuClaimantMr A Greystoke and Pantheon International Advisors LtdRespondent
Before
Employment Judge NicolleIn person for claimantMr R O’Dair (instructed by counsel.) for respondentDate 18 July 2025
JUDGMENT
[1]The Claimant’s claim of harassment on account of the protected characteristic of sex pursuant to S 26 of the Equality Act 2010 (the EQA) succeeds. The claim of direct discrimination on account of sex pursuant to S 13 of the EQA fails and is dismissed.[2]A tribunal has the power to award compensation to an employee for injury to feelings resulting from an act of discrimination by virtue of s.124 (5) and s.119 (4) of the EQA.[3]The Vento bands for a claim presented on 5 February 2024 were as follows: Lower Band: £1100 to £11,200 Middle Band: £11,200 to £33,700 Upper Band: £33,700 to £56,200.[4]I consider that this case falls within the upper end of the middle Vento band and that £20,000 is appropriate. Interest on the award[5]In accordance with the Employment Tribunals (Interest on Awards in Discrimination Cases) Regulations 1996 (s.1996/2803) the Claimant is awarded interest under the EQA which is calculated based on the prevailing rate of interest under s.17 of the Judgments Act 1838 which for the applicable period is 8%.[6]Under Regulation 6 (1) (b) on an award of compensation interest shall be paid for the period beginning on the mid-point date and ending on the day of calculation.[7]Pursuant to Regulation 4(1) and 4(2) the mid-point date is halfway between the commencement date of the discriminatory act of 2 October 2023 and the date of the judgment of 18 July 2025 and is therefore 8 November 2024. This is therefore a period of 328 days.[8]Therefore based on an injury to feelings award of £20,000 interest, calculated at a rate of 8%, with the date of the prohibited act of 2 October 2023 and calculation date of 18 July 2025, giving a total of 328 days, is £1437.81 and therefore a total of £21437.81. The award for injury to feelings, given that it is unrelated to the termination of employment, is tax free.
REASONS
[9]Oral reasons in respect of both the liability and remedy decisions were given to the parties. Either party may request written reasons within 14 days of this judgment being sent to them. Claimant: Ms A Obiagwu 1st Respondent: Mr A Greystoke 2nd Respondent: Pantheon International Advisors Limited FULL MERITS HEARING AT LONDON CENTRAL Heard between 15-18 July 2025 Before: Employment Judge Nicolle For the Claimant: in person For the Respondents: Mr R O’Dair of counsel.[1]The claim of harassment on account of the protected characteristic of sex pursuant to S 26 of the Equality Act 2010 (the EQA) succeeds. The claim of direct discrimination on account of sex pursuant to S 13 of the EQA fails and is dismissed.[2]I consider that this case falls within the upper end of the middle Vento band and that an injury to feelings award of £20,000 is appropriate. Interest on the award[3]In accordance with the Employment Tribunals (Interest on Awards in Discrimination Cases) Regulations 1996 (s.1996/2803) the Claimant is awarded interest under the EQA which is calculated based on the prevailing rate of interest under s.17 of the Judgments Act 1838 which for the applicable period is 8%.[4]Under Regulation 6 (1) (b) on an award of compensation interest shall be paid for the period beginning on the mid-point date and ending on the day of calculation.[5]Pursuant to Regulation 4(1) and 4(2) the mid-point date is halfway between the commencement date of the discriminatory act of 2 October 2023 and the date of the judgment of 18 July 2025 and is therefore 8 November 2023. This is therefore a period of 328 days.[6]Therefore based on an injury to feelings award of £20,000 interest, calculated at a rate of 8%, with the date of the prohibited act of 2 October 2023 and calculation date of 18 July 2025, giving a total of 328 days, is £1437.81 and therefore a total of £21,437.81. The award for injury to feelings, given that it is unrelated to the termination of employment, is tax free.[7]Oral reasons in respect of both the liability and remedy decisions were given to the parties. The Respondents requested written reasons.
The Hearing
[8]Whilst the case had been listed as a Judge sitting with non-legal members there were no non-legal members available and a case management decision was made by Employment Judge Brown on Monday 14 July 2025 that the case should proceed on the basis of a judge sitting alone. The evidence was heard over the following three days.[9]There was a bundle of documents which was supplemented by extensive exhibits to the respective witness statements. It was a comparatively slim bundle with the evidential dispute between the parties largely being a question of whose evidence and credibility was to be accepted in relation to the disputed events. The Claimant gave evidence and she called Ms Buse Suglam (Ms Suglam) as a witness in her support. Mr Andrew Greystoke, the 1st Respondent, (Mr Greystoke) provided three witness statements with exhibits. Further witness evidence on behalf of the Respondent was given by Jing Zhou, a solicitor, (Ms Zhou), Armaan Kalhor, a solicitor, (Mr Kalhor) and Gemma Milne, administrator to include responsibility for HR, (Ms Milne). Statements were provided by the Respondent in the names of Nicholas Wallis, a client representative, (Mr Wallis) and Demi Finch, Mr Greystoke’s former executive assistant, (Ms Finch) and whilst I read their statements the probative value of evidence from witnesses not attending has a lower evidential level than those who attend and whose evidence can be challenged in cross examination. Findings of Fact
The Claim
[10]The claim form was submitted on 5 February 2024 following a period of early conciliation between 1 February and 5 February 2024. These dates are relevant as there is a time issue which need to address.[11]In her claim form the Claimant claims that she was unfairly dismissed and that she suffered sexual harassment, assault and emotional distress in respect of an alleged incident involving Mr Greystoke in Nice on 2 October 2023 (the Nice Incident or the Incident).[12]In the context of the primary allegation it is relevant to record that the Claimant was born on 1 May 1996 and is currently aged 29. Mr Greystoke is 83 and has been either a barrister or solicitor since qualifying in 1965. The Claimant’s employment[13]The Claimant was employed by the Respondent between 21 June 2023 and 6 November 2023 when her employment was terminated. The Respondent says she was dismissed on the grounds of unsatisfactory performance. The Claimant asserts that Nice Incident was a material factor in this decision and that is something I will return to.[14]The Claimant was engaged as a Corporate Projects Executive and whilst there is a job description in the bundle it is not necessary for me to set it out. In effect she was performing a legal role, with some financial input, in relation to corporate projects undertaken by the 2nd Respondent. The 2nd Respondent’s disciplinary and grievance procedure[15]The 2nd Respondent has a grievance and disciplinary procedure. The Claimant did not invoke a grievance and nor did the 2nd Respondent commence a disciplinary process regarding any deficiencies in the her performance. The Claimant’s absences[16]The 2nd Respondent had concerns regarding what they contend were the claimant’s unauthorised absences. The Tribunal was referred to an email from Ms Milne dated 3 July 2023 setting out the process for absences as a result of illness and the requirement to notify Mr Greystoke as soon as possible on the day of absence with her being copied on such communications. A letter to whom may concern regarding Mr Greystoke[17]The Claimant along with other employees was asked to prepare and submit a letter to whom it may concern regarding Mr Greystoke. There was some uncertainty as to the date of this letter but it was established that it was dated 30 August 2023. This related to a Prohibition Order pertaining to him the details of which are not necessary to set out. The Claimant says in the letter that Mr Greystoke had continued to exhibit and teach her proper conduct and regulatory frameworks concerning the legal and financial sectors, that he had been a good teacher and supportive system and she referenced him continuing to teach her and others the way to conduct ourselves legally and ethical standards. She says Mr Greystoke has shown nothing but professional and general integrity and support for his colleagues, clients and those who he has built connections with. Ms Suglam says that she was asked to sign a similar letter. I do not consider that there is any basis for inferring that there was any level of duress to sign these letters. It is relevant that the letter predates the Nice Incident. The Nice Incident[18]The Claimant was assigned to a particular business project which involved her accompanying Mr Greystoke to meet with clients in Nice on 2 October 2023. A dinner took place with the clients that evening at a restaurant which Mr Greystoke said was a few hundred yards from the hotel. Alcohol was consumed at that dinner and in all probability alcohol had been consumed earlier in the day. The Claimant and Mr Greystoke returned to the hotel in mid evening, certainly no later than 9pm, without the clients who remained drinking in the restaurant.[19]Mr Greystoke says that there was no available meeting space within the hotel where he could have a post dinner debrief with the Claimant. The hotel had an external decking area but the parties, and it was not disputed, considered it too cold to comfortably sit outside. The breakfast area was closed. Mr Greystoke therefore suggested to the Claimant that she return to his room for a discussion regarding matters pertaining to the business transaction and any issues or action points arising from the dinner and the meetings earlier in the day. Mr Greystoke’s hotel room[20]There was considerable dispute between the parties as to the configuration of Mr Greystoke’s hotel room to include the number of doors and whether the curtains were drawn. The bundle included a photograph of a room at the hotel but not necessarily the room occupied by Mr Greystoke. On the penultimate day of the hearing the Respondent submitted a photograph received from the hotel which the parties agree represents the internal view of the room showing a double glass window with a separate door which enables external access or internal access by a key fob card. It is apparent from that photograph that there are net blinds but over the blinds a full heavy curtain can be drawn. There is a dispute between the parties as to exactly what the situation was with the curtains. Whether the curtains were drawn or un-drawn is relevant to Mr Greystoke’s assertion that if the curtains were open, or partially open, it would have been madness for any form of sexual harassment to take place given that people walking along the boardwalk to access their rooms. Mr Greystoke was in room number 1 and therefore anyone with a higher room number would pass along the boardwalk to access their room if accessing via the external entrance. It appears to be accepted by the parties, and I find, that the door on the right hand side of the room was open to view and in all probability the main double window was either completely covered with heavy drape curtains or at least partially covered by net curtains. The alleged incident[21]There is a fundamental evidential dispute between the parties as to what happened in the hotel room and it is therefore necessary to set out the respective evidence of the Claimant and Mr Greystoke. The Claimant’s version of events[22]The Claimant asserts that Mr Greystoke had been drinking during the day to a point that there was a slight slurring of his speech. She says that Mr Greystoke opened a bottle of champagne. Mr Greystoke initially disputed having done so but subsequently accepted that he had. The Claimant says that she declined the offer of champagne as she wanted an early night. She says that Greystoke poured himself a glass of champagne. She then states at paragraph 18 of her witness statement as follows: “Whilst I was typing he began rubbing my arm and back and said he thinks that I am beautiful and said if anyone were to ask to him if he would fuck me he would. I did not move out of shock and fear. He continued to inappropriately caress my back and arm and said that he knew when I came in for my interview that he found me beautiful. He then proceeded to ask me what I thought about his advances which alluded to sexual interactions. I was still frozen in shock and fear and had not looked up from my laptop.”[23]The Claimant says that after returning to her room she called Ms Finch and Ms Suglam on facetime and I will return to that. Mr Greystoke’s version of events[24]Mr Greystoke denies that anything improper took place. He says that during over 50 years as a lawyer and in business he has never been subject to an allegation of such inappropriate conduct. He contends at paragraph 52 of his 1st witness statement that the Claimant’s evidence is a tissue of lies wholly unsupported by evidence.[25]In paragraph 20 of his 1st witness statement he denied offering the Claimant a glass of champagne. He contends at paragraph 39 of his 3rd witness statement that the Claimant drunk a glass of champagne. It is not a significant issue as to whether the Claimant consumed champagne but there is a dispute in the evidence. On the balance of probabilities I accept the Claimant’s evidence that she either declined the champagne, or possibly given that she was only in the room relatively briefly might have taken a sip but not consume a substantial quantity.[26]In paragraph 12 of his 2nd witness statement he says that they sat at the desk with the curtains open allowing a view of the sea meaning that any passerby could see into the room. In his 3rd witness statement he refers to the boardwalk and at paragraph 38.2 says that the curtain was open and therefore full visibility would have existed from the boardwalk. At paragraph 41.3 he says the door was three to four feet away from the Claimant. The Claimant’s subsequent communications[27]The Claimant says that she was shocked and terrified and returned to her room and then face timed Ms Finch and Ms Suglam. Ms Finch goes to bed early and was already asleep so was not a participant in the call. The Claimant had a conversation with Ms Suglam and she also exchanged various messages with her and material elements of that exchange appear at page 59 in the bundle to include: “You missed a lot. Fucking bad. I’m gonna facetime”.[28]Ms Suglam responds: “Men don’t like rejection”.,[29]The Claimant goes on to say: “I think he will keep acting like nothing happened”.[30]On the following morning Ms Finch says: “Oh dear. Anita should I say something to Armaan and Jing about Andrew.” The Claimant responds: “ Nah don’t because I think Jing will say something about it to Gemma”. Ms Milne’s evidence[31]She asserts that the Claimant’s Instagram posts demonstrated that she was enjoying herself on the knee/Monaco trip. More generally the Respondents assert that her messages referring to a “fantastic trip” or that she had enjoyed it make it unlikely that any significant traumatic incident had taken place. Ms Suglam’s evidence[32]Ms Suglam was employed by the 2nd respondent as Mr Greystoke’s PA. In the Autumn of 2023 her employment came to an end as she commenced the Bar Professional Standards Course. She had wanted to maintain her role with the 2nd Respondent to provide funding for the course but not surprisingly this did not prove workable.[33]It was put to Ms Suglam that she had resentment to the Respondents thereby affecting the credibility of her evidence. She denies this. She accepts that the Claimant is her friend. Mr O’Dair put it to her that affirming rather than taking the oath compromised the credibility of her evidence given that she is a self-professed Christian. I reject that insinuation as it is entirely up to individual witnesses as to whether they take the oath or affirm and no adverse inference can be drawn as to the credibility of evidence by affirming rather than taking the oath.[34]It is, however, in my opinion significant that whilst she is not a practising barrister Ms Saglam has completed the Bar Professional Standards Course and is currently a paralegal employed with the Crown Prosecution Service. It would have serious professional ramifications if she committed perjury in the evidence she gave to the Tribunal. In response to a question from me Mr O’Dair acknowledged that her evidence should perhaps carry greater weight given her legal background but at a lower level than if she were a full practising barrister.[35]It was put to Ms Saglam that her witness statement she had been heavily influenced by the Claimant. She accepted that she was with the Claimant when she wrote the statement but that it represented her version of events with some input from the Claimant as to material dates. Relevant sections include in paragraph 8 where she refers to the facetime communication with the Claimant at about 9pm on 2 October 2023 during which she says the Claimant was crying uncontrollably and initially unable to get her words out. She says that she tried to calm the Claimant down for about 20 minutes and that she explained what had happened and describes it in her own words as “explicit sexual harassment and extremely derogatory”. She says that the Claimant explained the hotel room layout. She asked the Claimant what she wanted to do about the incident and she said that she wanted to leave it as she felt her response to Mr Greystoke was not harsh and was enough to maintain a positive working relationship.[36]Ms Suglam goes on to give other background evidence regarding purported inappropriate conduct of Mr Greystoke. She says that he had a habit of drinking almost excessively to the point of slurring his words and not walking straight. She says that whilst acting as his PA she had seen WhatsApp messages between him and sex workers and that he used to leave the office to meet up with women even though he had been married for many years.[37]At the end of Ms Suglam’s evidence I asked her exactly what had been said by the Claimant which led her to make the statement that she considered it was explicit sexual harassment and extremely derogatory. I considered this to be an entirely proper question to put to the witness given that there is a material evidential dispute and what was said to her minutes after the alleged incident self-evidently is relevant to my assessment of the respective versions of events. She answered that the Claimant had said that Mr Greystoke had been rubbing her arm and back and saying words to the effect of I would fuck you or alternatively I would so have sex with you. Ms Suglam’s refusal to accompany Mr Greystoke on a business trip to Turkey in January 2024[38]In a message exchange in January 2024 Ms Suglam declined the opportunity to accompany Mr Greystoke on a four-day business trip to Turkey to undertake translation work referring to the Claimant’s experience and saying she was reluctant to spend time with him. The Respondents’ position regarding Ms Suglam’s evidence[39]The Respondents deny any such conduct. Mr Greystoke’s alleged excessive drinking[40]In relation to Mr Greystoke’s alleged drinking Mr Kalhor indicated that whilst he frequently consumes alcohol during the working day it is not to the point of inebriation. He typically has 2 or 3 glasses of wine at lunch time and it is not unusual, particularly if clients are in attendance, for a bottle of champagne to be opened at approximately 4pm. Mr Greystoke’s alleged communications with sex workers[41]He denies any communications with sex workers. Mr O’Dair, in any event, asserts that the allegation, even if it were accepted to be true, as a lawful interaction is irrelevant to an alleged sexual assault. This is a relatively rare incident where I either accept that such communications were seen by Ms Suglam or find that she, for whatever reason, has given false evidence. I have to balance the credibility of the respective witnesses and whether it is likely that Ms Suglam, as a former employee with no personal interest in the case other than being a friend of the Claimant, would give such false evidence particularly given that she is an aspiring barrister. I consider it unlikely that she would commit perjury and on the balance of probabilities accept her evidence that she viewed such communications. As to their relevance I will return to that in my conclusions. Ms Finch’s evidence[42]Ms Finch’s evidence carries lower probative value given that she has not attended to give evidence. She says that she was taken aback by the Claimant’s allegation. At paragraph 28 she refers to the Claimant saying that Mr Greystoke’s conduct had made her feel uncomfortable. She said that the Claimant should consider raising the matter with Ms Milne for guidance. She says that the matter was not raised with Ms Milne. Ms Zhou and Mr Kalhor’s evidence[43]Ms Zhou robustly rebutted any suggestion of impropriety by Mr Greystoke. She has accompanied him on approximately 10 business trips and has always found his conduct to be professional. Mr Kalhor has also accompanied Mr Greystoke on business trips and had no reason to question his conduct on those trips. Mr Wallis’ evidence[44]His evidence carries lower probative value given that he has not attended to give evidence. He attended the dinner on the evening of 2 October 2023. He says that at breakfast on 3 October the Claimant appeared bright, extroverted and vivacious. He says the Claimant expressed interest in a trip to Monaco and spent the day with his colleague, Mr Russell Crump, in Monaco before returning to London. At paragraph 18 he describes the Claimant as a “mature, but not a naïve individual, possessing a law degree”. The Claimant’s probationary period and performance[45]The Claimant successfully completed her probationary period on 10 October 2023 and this was confirmed in a letter from Ms Milne to include the following: “We are very happy with your performance and the consensus is that you have very good communication and people skills which is evident in client meetings and which Andrew complimented you on following your recent business trip to France. Mr Greystoke discussed the need for you to learn, plus thought processes to improve your legal drafting skills”.[46]The evidence of the 2nd Respondent’s witnesses was that whilst there was some reservations regarding elements of her performance that overall it was appropriate to give her the benefit of the doubt.[47]The Respondents say that after she completed the probationary period that there was a decline in the Claimant’s performance. Reference is made to an email from Mr Crump on 18 October at 15:27 chasing a letter of intent which needs to go out today and it was suggested that this was symptomatic of the Claimant’s delay in progressing matters. It was contended that her work was of poor quality and/or tardy and that her colleagues had to pick up the work as a result of her shortcomings. Performance management[48]During cross examination the Claimant repeatedly referred to deficiencies and unfairness in the 2nd Respondent’s performance and absence/ill-health processes. However it is not necessary for me to set these contentions out as this is not an issue before me as this not an ordinary unfair dismissal claim given that the Claimant does not have 2 years’ continuity of employment. It is only necessary for me to consider what factors were material to the Respondents in reaching the decision to terminate her employment. Mr Greystoke’s contentions regarding the Claimant’s allegedly deficient performance[49]Mr Greystoke’s third witness statement sets out quite a lot of detail regarding purported deficiencies in the Claimant’s legal drafting. This includes her working from home without approval, having unauthorised absences, lateness and criticisms from the client to include Mr Crump’s email of 18 October 2023. He refers at paragraph 70 to the Claimant lacking professionalism and failing to demonstrate the necessary skills.[50]Mr Kalhor and Ms Zhou gave evidence that there were concerns regarding the Claimant’s performance. They gave input and the decision to terminate her employment was unanimous together with Ms Milne and Mr Greystoke.[51]Ms Milne acknowledged that the 2nd Respondent does not generally have cause to terminate its junior executives. She referred to what she considered to be the Claimant’s lack of professionalism and distraction from the business. Ms Zhou refers to the Claimant’s sub-standard work, lack of professionalism and core time keeping. The Claimant’s ill health[52]The Claimant suffered significant ill health in late October 2023 to include a hospital admission on 21 October during which she had a blood transfusion following a very prolonged and heavy period when she lost significant blood. I accept that the Claimant was significantly unwell at this time. This would undoubtedly have had an impact on her ability to perform her work in a full and timely fashion. Medical evidence[53]There is very little medical evidence provided by the Claimant save for a letter from her GP dated 17 December 2024 which confirms that she had been admitted to hospital on 21 October 2023 for prolonged menstrual bleeding. It says that her heavy periods have since improved due to phycological and medical treatment but does not specify what that comprised. No medical evidence or GP records have been submitted regarding the trauma the Claimant says she suffered. The termination of the Claimant’s employment[54]In an email of 17:42 from Ms Milne on 6 November 2023 the Claimant was advised that her employment was being terminated.[55]The Claimant was provided with a positive reference from Mr Greystoke on 16 November 2023 but I do not consider that carries any particular significance. The Law Time limit for discrimination claims
The Law
[56]S123 of the EQA provides: (1) Proceedings on a complaint within section 120 may not be brought after the end of— (a) the period of 3 months starting with the date of the act to which the complaint relates, or (b) such other period as the employment tribunal thinks just and equitable. (3) (a) conduct extending over a period is to be treated as done at the end of the period; (b) failure to do something is to be treated as occurring when the person in question decided on it. (4) In the absence of evidence to the contrary, a person (P) is to be taken to decide on failure to do something— (a) when P does an act inconsistent with doing it, or (b) if P does no inconsistent act, on the expiry of the period in which P might reasonably have been expected to do it.[57]For acts extending over a period, it is relevant to consider whether a discriminatory regime, rule, practice or principle, which had a clear and adverse effect on a complainant, existed. There is a distinction between a continuing state of affairs and a one-off act with ongoing consequences.[58]Guidance was provided in analysing what constitutes conduct extending over a period in Hendricks v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner [2003] IRLR 96 to include per Mummery LJ in the Court of Appeal at paragraph 48: “the numerous alleged incidents of discrimination are linked to one another and that they are evidence of a continuing discriminatory state of affairs, by the concept of an act extending over a period”.[59]The appropriate test for a ‘continuing act’ is highlighted by Hendricks and demonstrates where the employer is responsible for an ‘an ongoing situation or a continuing state of affairs’ in Hendricks case of a period of some 11 years of police service and where the continuous acts of discrimination occurred, as opposed to a series of unconnected or isolated incidents.[60]Extension of time under s123 (3) is the exception rather than the rule Robertson v. Bexley Community Centre [2003] IRLR 434.[61]The checklist of factors in s.33 of the Limitation Act 1980 is a useful guide of factors likely to be relevant, but a tribunal will not make an error of law by failing to consider the matters listed in s.33 provided that no materially relevant consideration is left out of account: Neary v Governing Body of St Albans Girls’ School [2010] ICR 473. Section 33 requires the court to take into account all the circumstances of the case, and in particular the factors set out at s.33(3). Those factors which are relevant to the claim are:(a) the length of, and reasons for, the delay by the claimant;(b) the extent to which the cogency of the evidence is likely to be affected by the delay;(c) the promptness with which the claimant acted once she/he knew of the facts giving rise to the cause of action; and(d) the steps taken by the claimant to obtain appropriate professional advice once she/he knew of the possibility of taking action.[62]The Court of Appeal in Southwark London Borough Council v Afolabi 2003 ICR 800, CA, confirmed that, while the checklist in s.33 provides a useful guide for Tribunal’s, it need not be adhered to slavishly.[63]Discriminatory conduct occurring after a claimant has submitted a claim cannot be taken into account in considering whether there has been a continuing act of discrimination (although may be relevant to the second limb of the test (just and equitable)) Robertson v Bexley Community Centre t/a Leisure Link 2003 IRLR 434, CA). Sex discrimination and the burden of proof[64]Under s13(1) of the EQA read with s.9, direct discrimination takes place where a person treats the claimant less favourably because of sex than that person treats or would treat others. Under s.23(1), when a comparison is made, there must be no material difference between the circumstances relating to each case. S13 Direct discrimination (1)A person (A) discriminates against another (B) if, because of a protected characteristic, A treats B less favourably than A treats or would treat others. S39 Employees(2) An employer (A) must not discriminate against an employee of A's (B)— (c) by dismissing B; (d) by subjecting B to any other detriment.[65]In many direct discrimination cases, it is appropriate for a tribunal to consider, first, whether the claimant received less favourable treatment than the appropriate comparator and then, secondly, whether the less favourable treatment was because of sex. However, in some cases, for example where there is only a hypothetical comparator, these questions cannot be answered without first considering the ‘reason why’ the claimant was treated as she was.[66]Under s136, if there are facts from which a tribunal could decide, in the absence of any other explanation, that a person has contravened the provision concerned, the tribunal must hold that the contravention occurred, unless A can show that he or she did not contravene the provision.[67]Guidelines on the burden of proof were set out by the Court of Appeal in Igen Ltd v Wong [2005] EWCA Civ 142; [2005] IRLR 258. The tribunal can take into account the respondent’s explanation for the alleged discrimination in determining whether the claimant has established a prima facie case so as to shift the burden of proof. (Laing v Manchester City Council and others [2006] IRLR 748; Madarassy v Nomura International plc [2007] IRLR 246, CA). The Court of Appeal in Madarassy, a case brought under the then Sex Discrimination Act 1975, held that the burden of proof does not shift to the employer simply on the claimant establishing a difference in status (e.g., sex) and a difference in treatment. LJ Mummery stated at paragraph 56: “Those bare facts only indicate a possibility of discrimination. They are not, without more, sufficient material from which a tribunal ‘could conclude’ that on the balance of probabilities, the respondent had committed an unlawful act of discrimination.”[68]Further, it is important to recognise the limits of the burden of proof provisions. As Lord Hope stated in Hewage v Grampian Health Board [2012] IRLR870. “They will require careful attention where there is room for doubt as to the facts necessary to establish discrimination. But they have nothing to offer where the tribunal is in a position to make positive findings on the evidence one way or the other.” Conscious or unconscious thoughts of the alleged discriminator[69]An act may be rendered discriminatory by the mental processes, conscious or nonconscious, of the alleged discriminator: Nagarajan v London Regional Transport [1999] ICR 877, HL. In such cases, the tribunal must ask itself what the reason was for the alleged discriminator’s actions. If it is that the complainant possessed the protected characteristic, then direct discrimination is made out. If the reason is the protected characteristic, that answers the question of whether the claimant was treated less favourably than a hypothetical comparator; they are, in effect, two sides of the same coin. per Lord Nicholls: “In every case…it is necessary to enquire why the claimant received less favourable treatment. This is the crucial question. Was it on grounds of race? Or was it for some other reason, for instance because the claimant was not so well qualified for the job. Save in obvious cases, answering the crucial question will call for some consideration of the mental processes of the alleged discriminator. Treatment, favourable or unfavourable, is a consequence which follows from a decision.”[70]In Shamoon v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [2003] ICR 337, HL as set out by Lord Nicholls in at [11], and albeit assuming a difference of treatment (which the Claimant cannot do): “…employment tribunals may sometimes be able to avoid arid and confusing disputes about the identification of the appropriate comparator by concentrating primarily on why the claimant was treated as she was. Was it on the proscribed ground which is the foundation of the application? That will call for an examination of all the facts of the case. Or was it for some other reason? If the latter, the application fails. If the former, there will usually be no difficulty in deciding whether the treatment, afforded to the claimant on the proscribed ground, was less favourable than was or would have been afforded to others.” It is permissible for the tribunal to answer the hypothetical comparator question by having regard to how unidentical but not wholly dissimilar cases have been treated: Chief Constable of West Yorkshire v Vento (No.1) [2001] IRLR 124, EAT, per Lindsay J at paragraph 7; approved in Shamoon, per Lord Hutton at paragraph 81.[71]A benign motive is irrelevant when considering direct discrimination: Nagarajan at 884G-885D, per Lord Nicholls. It is irrelevant whether the alleged discriminator thought the reason for the treatment was the protected characteristic, as there may be subconscious motivation: Nagarajan at 885E H: “I turn to the question of subconscious motivation. All human beings have preconceptions, beliefs, attitudes and prejudices on many subjects. It is part of our make-up. Moreover, we do not always recognise our own prejudices. Many people are unable, or unwilling, to admit even to themselves that actions of theirs may be racially motivated. An employer may genuinely believe that the reason why he rejected an applicant had nothing to do with the applicant’s race. After careful and thorough investigation of a claim members of an employment tribunal may decide that the proper inference to be drawn from the evidence is that, whether the employer realised it at the time or not, race was the reason why he acted as he did. It goes without saying that in order to justify such an inference the tribunal must first make findings of primary fact from which the inference may properly be drawn. Conduct of this nature by an employer, when the inference is legitimately drawn, falls squarely within the language of s.1(1)(a). The employer treated the complainant less favourably on racial grounds.” Drawing of inferences[72]It is not sufficient for to draw an inference of discrimination based on an “intuitive hunch” without findings of primary fact to back it: Chapman and Anor v Simon [1994] IRLR 124.[73]The process of drawing inferences is a demanding task. If a tribunal is to make a finding of discrimination on the basis of inference, per Mummery J in Qureshi v Victoria University of Manchester [2001] ICR 863: “It is of the greatest importance that the primary facts from which such inference is drawn are set out with clarity by the tribunal in its fact-finding role, so that the validity of the inference can be examined. Either the facts justifying such inference exist or they do not, but only the tribunal can say what those facts are. An intuitive hunch, for example, that there has been unlawful discrimination is insufficient without facts being found to support that conclusion.”[74]In determining whether a claimant has established a prima facie case, the tribunal must reach findings as to the primary facts and any circumstantial matters that it considers relevant: Anya v University of Oxford and Anor [2001] IRLR 377 (CA). Having established those facts, the tribunal must decide whether those facts are sufficient to justify an inference that discrimination has taken place.[75]The less favourable treatment must be because of a protected characteristic and that requires the tribunal to consider the reason why the claimant was treated less favourably in accordance with the guidance in Nagarajan. The tribunal needs to consider the conscious or subconscious mental processes which led the respondent to take a particular course of action in respect of the claimant and to consider whether her gender played a significant part in the treatment: CLFIS (UK) Ltd v Reynolds [2015] EWCA Civ 439. Harassment[76]As a consequence of s212 (1) of the ERA it is necessary to consider allegations of harassment first (as if amounting to harassment they cannot amount to a detriment for direct discrimination).[77]Under s26, EQA, a person harasses the claimant if he or she engages in unwanted conduct related to a protected characteristic, and the conduct has the purpose or effect of(i) violating the claimant’s dignity, or(ii) creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for the claimant. In deciding whether conduct has such an effect, each of the following must be taken into account: (a) the claimant’s perception; (b) the other circumstances of the case; and (c) whether it is reasonable for the conduct to have that effect.[78]The first step in the analysis is to determine whether the respondent engaged in “unwanted conduct”. This means conduct that was unwelcome or uninvited from the subjective point of view of the claimant: Thomas Sanderson Blinds Ltd v English EAT 0316/10.[79]If the respondent is found to have engaged in unwanted conduct from the perspective of the claimant, the tribunal must consider whether such conduct was related to a relevant protected characteristic. This is a finding of fact for the tribunal: Tees Esk and Wear Valleys NHS Foundation Trust v Aslam and anor 2020 IRLR 395, EAT.[80]The tribunal must consider all comments and conduct in the relevant context, rather than considering these in isolation: Warby v Wunda Group Plc [2012] 1 WLUK 610.[81]Should the tribunal find that the defendant has engaged in unwanted conduct related to a relevant protected characteristic, it must consider whether the conduct has had the purpose or effect of violating B’s dignity or creating the proscribed environment. This is a disjunctive test, requiring only one limb to be met. Either limb will be met if the conduct is designed to, or does in fact, produce the relevant effect.[82]In Richmond Pharmacology Ltd v Dhaliwal [2009] IRLR 336, EAT, where Mr Justice Underhill (as he then was) gave this guidance: “An employer should not be held liable merely because his conduct has had the effect of producing a proscribed consequence. It should be reasonable that that consequence has occurred. The claimant must have felt, or perceived, her dignity to have been violated or an adverse environment to have been created, but the tribunal is required to consider whether, if the claimant has experienced those feelings or perceptions, it was reasonable for her to do so. Dignity is not necessarily violated by things said or done which are trivial or transitory, particularly if it should have been clear that any offence was unintended. While it is very important that employers and tribunals are sensitive to the hurt that can be caused by racially offensive comments or conduct (or indeed comments or conduct on other discriminatory grounds) it is also important not to encourage a culture of hypersensitivity or the imposition of legal liability in respect of every unfortunate phrase.’[83]General Municipal and Boilermakers Union v Henderson [2015] IRLR 451 provides that a single incident is unlikely to be sufficient to create an environment sufficient to give rise to an offence of harassment.[84]In line with Betsi Cadwaladr University Health Board v Hughes and Ors EAT 0179/13, mere offence is not sufficient to amount to a violation of dignity. Violation of dignity is a strong term that requires a serious and marked effect or intended effect.[85]When determining whether conduct has had either of the effects listed at section 26 (1) (b), section 26 (4) requires the tribunal to take into account: (a) the claimant’s perception (b) the other circumstances of the case, and (c) whether it was reasonable for the conduct to have that effect.[86]This is a mixed subjective and objective test. Per Richmond Pharmacology a claimant must actually feel that their dignity has been violated or a proscribed environment has been created. Where that is the case, the tribunal should then consider whether it was reasonable for the claimant to feel that way. Submissions Respondents[87]Mr O’Dair challenges the credibility of the Claimant’s evidence. He asserts that the claim under s.13 could not succeed because even if her case is correct, which he says it is not, her dismissal would be by reason of rejection of advances not by reason of her gender which would be only a but for cause of what happened. That position, and ultimately it may not be material, is I consider debatable.[88]There is authority in Martin v Lancehawk UKEAT 0525/03/2203 that would appear to support such a position but that involved an employee’s employment having been terminated where a consensual relationship came to an end. The EAT rejected Ms Martin’s argument that the tribunal should have applied a but for test, i.e. a but for the fact that Ms Martin was a woman she would not have been dismissed, holding that the correct test regarding causation was the reason why an employee had been treated in a particular fashion. Had she been male and a consensual relationship ended the same outcome would have been reached.[89]I consider that the current case is arguably distinguishable as it involves an allegation of sexual harassment. A female employee subject to sexual harassment is not in a consensual relationship and I do not consider it appropriate in those circumstances to say that a male employee in a similar situation with a female (or indeed male) manager would have been treated on the same basis.[90]However, this is not something which I need to make a determination on given the fact that Mr O’Dair has conceded, correctly in my opinion, that s.26(3) would in any event apply. Conclusions and discussion The Nice Incident[91]This is a relatively unusual case in effect there are two versions of events and only one can be correct. It is important to emphasise that my finding on this issue is on the balance of probabilities entails a civil standard of prove in that it is more likely than not. It is therefore nowhere near a criminal standard of proof. I consider that there are clear grounds to infer that an act of discrimination/harassment took place and therefore the burden of proof shifts to the Respondents. Having considered the parties’ respective versions of events I find that the Respondents have not rebutted the inference of discriminatory conduct. I find that the Claimant’s version of events is the more likely and I accept her evidence, supported by that of Ms Suglam, that she was subject to an inappropriate conduct from Mr Greystoke in his hotel room on the evening of 2 October 2023. I reach this finding for the following reasons.[92]I have carefully considered the credibility of the respective witnesses. I also take account of Ms Suglam attending voluntarily and giving evidence as to what she was told by the Claimant shortly after the incident on 2 October. I have evaluated what motivation the Claimant may have to make false statements to Ms Finch and Ms Suglam that evening. At that point she was not aware that her employment may be terminated. Indeed her probationary period was extended on 10 October 2023. She had been asked to accompany Mr Greystoke on a significant business trip and I do not consider that she would have had any reason to have an ulterior motive to make a false allegation against Mr Greystoke.[93]The contemporaneous messaging exchange, further corroborated by the evidence of Ms Suglam and in Ms Finch’s witness statement, strongly suggest that something had happened which had made the Claimant feel very uncomfortable.[94]I also take account of the circumstances of the Claimant being invited to Mr Greystoke’s hotel room rate. The 2nd Respondent’s witnesses all say that such an invitation on a business trip was perfectly normal. However, I do not accept that in 2025 it is advisable employment practice for a senior manager to invite a junior female employee to their hotel room whether to discuss business or otherwise. I also take account of the fact that alcohol had been consumed that day. Whilst Mr Greystoke says that there were important business matters to be discussed these have not been specified. I consider it would have been perfectly feasible for any such business matters to have been discussed whilst walking back from the restaurant, standing in the lobby of the hotel, at a pre-breakfast meeting or if necessary by an exchange of telephone and email communications.[95]Further the non-professional but more personal element of the meeting is demonstrated by a bottle of champagne being opened. That is inconsistent with a necessary professional debrief. I consider that Mr Greystoke failed to recognise the significant age and seniority differential between him and the Claimant and how she could have perceived that situation as making her feel inherently uncomfortable.[96]I accept the credibility of Ms Suglam’s evidence. I take account, albeit it is not something on which I make a direct finding, that Mr Greystoke had a general proclivity to a very informal and arguably outdated modus operandi in his interpersonal relationships within and around the workplace to include:a. what in 2025 would be seen as quite significant alcohol consumption during or around the working day; andb. allowing another employee to have access to his phone, and on the balance of probabilities, as already indicated, I accept Ms Suglam’s evidence that she observed communications between him and sex workers. Whilst not directly relevant it is nevertheless something I take into account, albeit I give it limited probative value, in my general findings;[97]I take account of the very significant 54 year age differential between Mr Greystoke and the Claimant which makes it very improbable that there can have been any reasonable grounds for a mistaken belief by Mr Greystoke that any overtures he may have made to her were likely to have been reciprocated and welcome. Factors arguably contrary to the Claimant’s version of events[98]I have taken account of factors that are arguably inconsistent with the Claimant’s version of events. The Claimant did not raise a grievance. She sent positive Instagram posts and messages to Ms Milne that did not refer the Incident. However, whilst these are relevant factors I accept that a woman in the Claimant’s position may, as she asserts, engage in self-questioning as to whether she had in any way contributed to or encouraged the situation. I accept that someone in her situation may well put on a brave face and carry on as if nothing had happened. That is typical of many victims of sexual harassment, and more generally sexual offences and domestic violence, and it does not follow that not raising a contemporaneous complaint, and demonstrating overt distress, means that no inappropriate conduct took place. There are many such incidents where the full emotional and psychological effect may not transpire until much later. Conclusion in relation to the Nice Incident[99]I therefore find that the Claimant was subject to an act of harassment on account of the prescribed ground of sex, and/or that Mr Greystoke had in relation to the Claimant engaged in unwanted conduct of a sexual nature and that the conduct had the purpose or effect of violating her dignity or creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for her. I consider it to be incontrovertible that her evidence of being touched on the arm and comments being made which directly related to her personal appearance and were overtly sexual, constituted unwanted conduct of a sexual nature and harassment on account of her sex. Whilst acknowledging that it was a one-off incident that can nevertheless in some circumstances constitute sexual harassment. I consider the reasons set out above, to include the very significant age and power differential between the Claimant and Mr Greystoke, and the obvious subjective, but also objectively reasonable, upset she experienced that the threshold for an act of harassment is fulfilled. The termination of the Claimant’s employment[100]I have considered the Claimant’s dismissal constituted less favourable treatment under s.13 of the EQA or a further act of harassment on account of sex pursuant to s.26.3 of the EQA. I find that it did not. Whilst I consider that there were grounds to infer that the Claimant’s dismissal was connected to the Nice Incident and the burden of proof shifts I accept the Respondents’ explanation nation that her employment was terminated for reasons unconnected to this Incident but rather on the grounds of the Respondents’ perception of her poor performance. I reach this finding for the following reasons.[101]The position as far as the Claimant and Mr Greystoke was concerned was that it was largely business as normal following their return from Nice. Whilst the Claimant has referred to some evidence in her message exchange with a former partner which points to her relationship with Mr Greystoke having deteriorated I do not consider this sufficient to conclude that Mr Greystoke was motivated to take retaliatory action. Further, had he wished to do so the obvious and immediate occasion would have been to not extend her probationary period but rather enter employment at this point.[102]I also take into account and accept the evidence of Mr Kalhor, Ms Zhou and Ms Milne that there were various concerns regarding the Claimant’s performance. It may well be that those concerns were unfair, unwarranted or unduly harsh given her health issues but nevertheless I accept that they were genuine concerns held by these witnesses and that they had significant concerns regarding her performance. As such it was not Mr Greystoke’s sole decision to terminate her employment. The Respondents have therefore rebutted the inference of direct discrimination and/or harassment on account of sex. Jurisdiction on account of time[103]The time issue was not raised by the Respondents in the Grounds of Resistance or at the case management hearing. It was something I raised with the parties as a potential two stage approach may apply given the respective issues of the Nice Incident and the termination of the Claimant’s employment and there may therefore be a time issue pursuant to which the Nice Incident would be out of time if this were to succeed but her claim in respect of the termination of her employment did not.[104]I consider that it is that the claim was in time as the Claimant effectively applies a conjunctive element to the Nice Incident and her dismissal and therefore if the claim in respect of her dismissal was in time it was conjunctively linked to the Nice Incident. However, I do not consider it necessary to determine that issue as I consider that it is appropriate for me to exercise my discretion to extend. In reaching that decision I take account of the guidance provided by His Honour Justice Taylor in Mr J Logo v Payone GMBH [2025] EAT 95 that there should not be an overly prescriptive approach to time limits in harassment cases.[105]I take account of the respective prejudice to the parties. Inevitably there is prejudice to the Respondents given that they face a claim and liability in respect of a matter which would otherwise be out of time. However this is not a case where there has been significant delay and where witnesses’ memories have significantly faded. There would, however, be very significant prejudice to the Claimant if she was not able to obtain redress as result of such an incident. I accept the Claimant’s evidence that she only took the material step of contemplating and instituting ACAS early conciliation and Tribunal proceedings relatively late and clearly mindful of her dismissal date. I find that for a litigant in person that was a reasonable approach to adopt and consider that it would have been unduly prejudicial and excessive to have expected the Claimant to have appreciated a potential element severable element of the claim pertaining to the Nice Incident being out of time if seen as two separate and discreet matters rather than a conjunctive.[106]I also take account of the fact that the Claimant was self-evidently suffering significant adverse health during the material time and she asserts, albeit no supporting evidence has been provided, that she was suffering a degree of mental trauma. Given my finding on the Nice Incident I accept on the balance of probabilities that she was likely to have been suffering psychological and emotional health issues. I also take account her GP’s letter from December 2023 which states that her heavy menstrual bleeding would be assisted by psychological interventions. That suggests the Claimant had been experiencing adverse mental health. For all of those reasons I consider it appropriate to extend time.[107]Whilst not strictly necessary, had it been, I would have been inclined to the view that the claims as read conjunctively were, in any event, in time. However, given my finding that it is just and equitable issue to extend time that in effect is obiter to the primary rationale. Final
Conclusions
[108]This is self-evidently a sad case and I am very conscious of the implications of this judgment to the parties. Remedy hearing[109]Following the liability judgment I considered the question of remedy and specifically what award the Claimant should receive for injury to feelings. The Claimant’s evidence as to injury to feelings[110]Whilst the Claimant had not provided a witness statement specific to the question of injury to feelings there was some relevant material in her original witness statement. She gave further witness evidence and spoke for about 25 minutes as to the effect the Nice Incident had had on her. In summary she says that she froze when Mr Greystoke touched her whilst she was typing, that she is normally quite vocal about such matters and could not therefore retrospectively understand why she had not shouted out or done something at the time.[111]She questioned herself as to whether there was something that she had done in terms of her appearance or attire which may have sent the wrong messages and created a situation where Mr Greystoke thought it appropriate to behave in the way that he did. She tried to convince herself that she could let the matter go, but became increasingly unhappy with that approach, and decided that she needed to fight for herself.[112]She gave evidence as to the physical and mental effect on her of the Incident. She referred to significant weight gain going from approximately 60kg to 90kg during 2023 partly as a result of her stopping going to the gym. She had skin issues with huge pimples breaking out, her hair was falling out, she was eating junk food and her energy levels were low. She says that she felt very alone and that no one understood her situation. She refers to anger, upset and depression.[113]Mr O’Dair put it to the Claimant that there was no evidence of her seeking medical advice regarding the various conditions she refers to and specifically that of depression. It is relevant that in her schedule of loss she refers to sexual assault leading to emotional distress, mental health consequences, stress, anxiety and depression. The Claimant explained that from her cultural and community perspective that even in 2023/24 there is still, in her view, a stigma about going to a doctor regarding mental health issues. She referred to her Nigerian background and living in Peckham and the fear of ending up in the Maudsley and the potential stigma in respect of mental health issues.[114]There was a printout provided by the Claimant of various medical interventions she had undertaken which primarily relate to issues pertaining to blood loss, blood transfusion and heavy periods. The Claimant was unwilling to provide disclosure of attachments to that document which she says refer to mental health issues.[115]I was referred to the letter from her GP dated 17 December 2024. The Claimant says that he is a Nigerian man, has been the family doctor since her childhood and is at a level of familiarity whereby she refers to him as uncle. She says that she did tell him about the Incident, which is consistent with my note of her evidence at the liability stage of the proceedings. I therefore accept her evidence that she did communicate the Incident, and its effect on her, to him. Further, that is supported by his reference to her heavy periods and mood having improved due to psychological and medical treatment. The Law Injury to feelings[116]A tribunal has the power to award compensation to an employee for injury to feelings resulting from an act of discrimination by virtue of s.124 (5) and s.119 (4) of the EQA.[117]The purpose of the award is to compensate the complainant for the anger, upset and humiliation caused by the discrimination.[118]As set out in Prison Service v Johnson [1997] IRLR 162:• Awards should be compensatory and just to both parties.• Awards should not be too low as this would diminish respect for the antidiscrimination legislation.• Awards should bear some broad general similarity to the range of awards in personal injury cases.• In exercising their discretion tribunals should remind themselves of the value in everyday life of the sum they had in mind by reference to purchasing or earnings and should bear in mind the need for public respect for the level of awards made.[119]The judgment of Justice Mummery in Vento v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [2002) EWCA Civ 1871 refers at paragraph 65 to the higher band being appliable for the most serious cases where there has been a lengthy campaign of discriminatory harassment on the grounds of sex or race and the middle band for serious cases which do not merit an award in the higher level.[120]I need to take account of the following factors:• The discrimination must cause the injury.• Knowledge of the discrimination is not necessary.• The need for foreseeability of injury to feelings is not necessary.• The award should compensate the claimant’s injury and not punish tortfeasor for the manner of discrimination. Justice Taylor in Shakil v Samsons Limited [2023] EAT 192, and specifically paragraph 16.2, is that the purpose of an award is to compensate the claimant rather than punish the respondent.[121]A tribunal should identify the discriminatory treatment for which an award is made, make findings of fact about the injury to feelings because of the discriminatory treatment and explain where the injury to feelings award falls within the Vento bands.[122]The parties accept that the applicable bands are lower band £1,100 to £11,200, middle band £11,200 to £33,700 and upper band £33,700 to £56,200. Submissions Respondents[123]The Respondents accept that there should be an award at the top lower or lower middle band of Vento. Mr O’Dair says it was a one-off incident and not the most serious. The Claimant was willing to go on working. He says that the claimant’s stress and depression is not medically evidenced. Further, he says that the causes of the Claimant’s stress are multi-faceted with her experiencing stress as a result of project issues and not solely as the result of Nice Incident. Claimant[124]The Claimant says that she felt exploited having been taken advantage of by someone she trusted. She says there was a relatively short period before her leaving of her own volition or being dismissed. She says that she was, as evidenced by communications with her former partner, looking to exit the business but was dismissed prior to doing so. She said she needed to carry on working as financially she was dependent on the job. She says that there should be an award at the upper middle or lower upper Vento band. Conclusions[125]I consider that an appropriate award in this case is £20,000. I reach that decision for the following reasons. I acknowledge that this was a one-off incident. Nevertheless, I consider that it was a serious incident. I refer to a submission made on behalf of the Respondents at the liability stage that it was not necessarily a binary situation, in that something may have happened, but it may not necessarily have been sexual harassment. I reject this contention. Firstly, the age differential of 53 years between Mr Greystoke and the Claimant is such that it is wholly unrealistic to suggest that could have been a case of an un-reciprocated pass by a male employee to a female colleague. Additionally there was a very significant disparity in their seniority and the Claimant’s economic dependence on her professional relationship with the Respondents. It should have been obvious to Mr Greystoke that any approach, not that any admission is made by him that such was made, would not have been reciprocated or welcomed. That in my view is a significant aggravating factor justifying a significant award given the trauma the Claimant has suffered.[126]Whilst there are some deficiencies in the absence of supporting medical evidence I nevertheless accept the Claimant’s evidence that she suffered significant long lasting emotional trauma as a result of the Incident. The fact that she did not immediately and visibly exhibit significant trauma to her colleagues and the world at large does not preclude her having experienced such trauma.[127]I acknowledge that there is no direct medical evidence showing a causative link between her depression, anxiety, stress or the various physical symptoms she says she suffered such as weight gain, hair loss and low energy and the Incident. I accept that contributory factors to both mental and physical health conditions can be multi-faceted. I acknowledge that in all probability she was experiencing stress connected to the project work and this may have contributed to her mental health issues. Further, it would almost certainly have been the case that the very significant issues she was experiencing with her heavy periods and blood transfusions contributed to her stress and more general mental health issues.[128]It is in my view common, as the Claimant asserts, that many victims of sexual assaults and domestic abuse carry on as normal as they wish to maintain the veneer of normality as far as their family, friends and colleagues are concerned. I also accept her submission that she was economically dependent on her job and resigning immediately as a result of the Incident would have compromised her earnings but also her future employability.[129]I consider that the Claimant has suffered significant ongoing trauma. Whilst this was a one-off incident it nevertheless had a profound effect on her physical and mental wellbeing. I consider that the extent of her trauma would have been reasonably foreseeable and not disproportionate given what she refers to as the abuse of trust, the power imbalance and the shock she felt and what she refers to as freezing, not knowing what to do and subsequent self-recrimination for a long time after the Incident.[130]Therefore I consider that a significant award is appropriate, albeit not in the top Vento band, as this is not as per the guidance by Justice Mummery a prolonged and most serious category. Taking Into account all relevant factors to include the value of money, proportionality and comparability with personal injury awards I consider £20,000 is appropriate.[131]This award relates to injury to feelings other than in the connection of the termination of employment and is therefore subject to the accrual of interest at 8%. This applies from the mid-point being the date half way between the Incident on 2 October 2023 and the date of the judgment 18 July 2025. This gives a mid-point of 8 November 2023. Therefore, 328 days at an 8% interest rate gives £1,437.81 interest and a total award of £21,437.81.[132]Whilst it is not my role to advice on the tax treatment the award for injury to feelings, given that it is unrelated to termination of employment, is likely to be regarded as tax exempt, and therefore should paid as a gross non-taxable sum.