Mr D Ford v Ingenica Solutions Ltd and Mr S O’Callaghan: 2201155/2023

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Case No 2201155/2023

Between

Mr D FordClaimant

Ingenica Solutions Ltd and Mr S O’CallaghanRespondent

Before

Employment Judge Mr D A Pearl

Mr L Murdin (instructed by Counsel) for claimant

Ms J Duane (instructed by Counsel) for respondent

Date 2 February 2024

JUDGMENT

[1]The Claimant was disabled within the meaning of the Equality Act 2010 by reason of two conditions:(a) Functional Neurological Disorder from a date no later than 3 March 2022, when it was first diagnosed, to 11 November 2022; and

(b) stress and/or anxiety from April 2021 to 11 November 2022.

REASONS

[1]This was the open preliminary hearing to determine “whether at the material time the Claimant had a disability within the meaning of the Equality Act 2010.” He was dismissed by the First Respondent (and I shall use the term ‘Respondent’ for the company) on about 11 November 2022. He had been a founder of the company. He relies on two conditions:(1) anxiety/stress from April 2021;

(2) Functional Neurological Disorder (‘FND’), which was diagnosed in early March 2022. I should add that of the various discriminatory acts complained of (there are principally seven) only one pre-dates that diagnosis, namely an alleged failure to pay a bonus in February 2022.

[2]The Claimant’s case is that he remained disabled up to the point of dismissal in November 2022 and, indeed, beyond that date. The Respondent suggests that he fails to meet the statutory definition at any time; and, alternatively, that by a date after March 2022, any qualifying impairment had ceased. Other arguments raised by the Respondent will be dealt with in my conclusions.

Facts

[3]I need to make factual findings and I am drawing these from a combination of the medical evidence, the documents and the Claimant’s evidence. This latter is to be found in his impact statement and the substantial evidence he gave when being cross-examined. There is a submission that in one particular respect, and, perhaps, generally, I should be cautious about accepting his evidence and should reject, in particular, evidence about his ability to drive. That is not a submission I can accept. I found the Claimant to be credible and measured in the evidence he gave. He was, in my judgment, careful not to mislead the tribunal. Thus, although he had a sound grasp of much of the chronology, there were a few points at which he readily accepted that he could not remember a date, especially if events were blurred in his mind at the time. I will come later to the driving issue, but, as will be seen, I consider his evidence in that regard to have been patently honest. I have found no reason to doubt any of the evidence he gave; and a great deal of it is consistent with the medical evidence, to which I now turn. FND

[4]Dr Murray, a Consultant Neurologist, first saw the Claimant on 19 January 2022, on referral from the GP. He took a detailed history. Relevant medical problems had begun in February 2021, with extreme tiredness, brain fog and other symptoms. These were severe and they worsened, to include a balance problem and other matters set out in the report. He presented with excessive fatigue and veered when walking. Dr Murray carried out a detailed neurological examination and found “a complex set of neurological symptoms” but was unable to record any conclusion, pending scans being performed.

[5]In his next report, of 10 February 2022, Dr Murray reported that the scan showed an unusual soft tissue anomaly in the neck. On 3 March, after further scans, he concluded that the Claimant “most likely has a Functional Neurological Disorder causing left hemiplegia.” He was not psychologically unwell “and he is clearly not making his symptoms up.” He discharged him from further neurology follow-up. I should note that Dr Murray was consulted privately and that the Claimant then reverted to the NHS. Any suggestion that he may have been symptom-free in March 2022 is incorrect. During the period February 2021 to June 2022, the Claimant arranged to receive physiotherapy, speech therapy and psychotherapy, and he attended those sessions.

[6]The Claimant was certified unfit for work from 8 February 2021 to 16 May 2022. I need not cite the detail in paragraphs 20 and 21 of his impact statement, where he sets out the effects on daily life; these are consistent with the medical evidence I have referred to. From March to July 2022 he attended physiotherapy sessions to help with mobility and balance. Anxiety/stress

[7]It is important to note that the symptoms overlap with those described above. He first attended the GP with symptoms in mid-2018 and in February 2021 he suffered a major collapse. He was signed off work until 16 May 2022. Medication was prescribed, initially fluoxetine, then sertraline. Paragraph 8 of the impact statement sets out various effects on day to day activities, and I find this to be accurate evidence. By July 2022 the Claimant was fit to return to work. However, his condition worsened and he attributes this to the ongoing dispute at work with the Respondent. Again, I accept the evidence in the impact statement as to the effects on his mental health. It is clear that he was suffering from anxiety and stress. For avoidance of doubt, I am making no finding as to the cause of this. Generally

[8]In oral evidence, the Claimant was able to fill in many of the gaps in the chronology and also to give further detail about all aspects of his two conditions. As I have noted, I found his evidence to be moderate and accurate when dealing with the detailed cross-examination. He explained his adverse reaction to fluoxetine. Dosages of either fluoxetine or sertraline went up to 100 mg, but 50 mg of the latter was more normal. He pointed to the emails passing between him and the GP in March 2021 and the dosage then of 50 mg. These emails document the effect on his day to day activities and also the symptoms that he was experiencing at that time. He was imprecise about the dates when he was taken off medication between 2021 and 2022, but this does not affect his credibility. As he told me, and I accept, some of 2021 “is a blur.”

[9]It was suggested that the Claimant’s credibility could be impugned because of his unaccompanied attendance at a medical appointment, when he said that he was unable to drive. The criticism is without substance. He told me in his evidence that he would be driven either by his partner, Alison, or the neighbour, Mr Winstanley. When challenged in cross-examination, about an hour later, he maintained that Mr Winstanley had taken him to this particular appointment. Unsurprisingly, the neighbour had not accompanied him into the consultation room. I find that the Claimant has given evidence about all of this in a straightforward way and I have no hesitation in accepting it and in rejecting the Respondent’s submission concerning credibility.

[10]I am grateful for Ms Duane’s written and oral submissions and the short oral submissions from Mr Murdin and shall refer to them, where relevant, below.

Conclusions

[11]The relevant law is set out by Ms Duane and, as she observes, the Claimant must establish that at relevant times he had a physical or mental impairment; and that the impairment had a substantial and long-term effect on his ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities. (Section 6.) This is further defined in schedule I, para 2, and the effect is long-term if “it has lasted for at least 12 months”; or “is likely to last for at least 12 months.” I further note Ms Duane’s reference to the Guidance (see below) and the further guidance in case law from Adiremi

[2013] ICR 591

, Morgan v Staffs University, 2001, EAT and Herry v Dudley [2016]

UKEAT/0100/16

[12]This last case cited the well known passage from J v DLA Piper dealing with stress, anxiety and a ‘reaction to adverse circumstances.’ HHJ Richardson in Herry noted that there are cases where a reaction to life events perceived as adverse can become entrenched; “where the person concerned will not give way or compromise over an issue at work, and refuses to return to work, yet in other respects suffers no or little apparent adverse effect on normal day-to-day activities.” Tribunals are not bound to find a mental impairment n such a case. Stress/anxiety

[13]I reject the submission that the Claimant exhibited a reaction to adverse life events that falls short of a mental impairment; and/or which did not have the substantial and long-term effect, as defined by statute. I cannot accept the implied submission that this is the sort of case to which HHJ Richardson was referring in the above paragraph. It seems to me that such a conclusion runs counter to the clear chronology the Claimant sets out in the impact statement, from 2018 and, in particular, the events of 2021 after his collapse in February. The GP diagnosed anxiety. The Claimant describes the effect of his condition on his ability to carry out normal activities. Medication was undoubtedly prescribed and taken. I have accepted that fluoxetine was replaced by sertraline and, in my judgment, his inability to point to exact dates when the prescriptions were changed or amended is beside the point. (In addition, he underwent CBT, but this merely confirms that there was a genuine condition and has no further consequence.) The medication, in turn, brings in para 1(5) of schedule 1, the ‘deduced effects’ provision, although refined and detailed analysis is unnecessary. Before that provision comes into play, as it must in this case, the Claimant’s detailed evidence in paragraphs 7 and 8 of his impact statement is sufficient to establish the required substantial and long-term effect required by the Act. Any improvement, such that he was fit to return to work in July 2022 on a phased return, does not negative this conclusion. Indeed, the OH report of June 2022 (page 133) recommended a Workplace Stress Risk Assessment if, on his return, he felt any undue pressure. In the event, the improvement was not sustained and the mental condition worsened. I conclude that at all relevant times the Claimant’s condition of anxiety and/or stress amounted to a disability. FND

[14]The Respondent’s written submissions are relatively short and assert an evidential insufficiency. Ms Duane's oral elaboration incorporated two points, among others:(a) that the Claimant’s credibility was in doubt;

(b) that by the OH report of 17 June 2022, he was no longer experiencing any qualifying, physical or mental impairment. I am unable to accept these submissions concerning FND.

[15]The OH report (page 130) starts with the “acute neurological event” of February 2021, the substantial symptoms that followed and the events leading to the diagnosis of March 2022. The overlap with stress is noted where the treatments he had undergone were summarised: “Medication to treat underlying mood disorder. Psychotherapy to help manage symptoms and address stress. Physical and speech therapy.” The report concluded that by this date the Claimant had over 15 months “made a considerable improvement with regard to the speech difficulties and his mobility is improving. He has residual symptoms …" He could return to work as CEO, although some reasonable adjustments would be required. It is not surprising to see that the report also concluded that the condition may amount to a disability under the Act. “Mr Ford has a medical condition which has extended beyond one year and in the absence of medical treatment would have a substantial impact on his day-to-day activities.” The condition addressed in this report was FND. Although the wording used in the report departs from the statutory wording, the conclusion is clear and is, in my judgment, consistent with the statutory test. I consider that it was an almost inevitable conclusion that an OH practitioner would reach on the evidence before him or her at that time. In my position, having heard fuller evidence and considered documents, it is plainly a correct conclusion. The condition satisfied all the requirements of statute and had not ceased by June 2022, or thereafter. I disagree with the submission that there is any material inconsistency in the evidence. It follows that at all material times the Claimant was disabled within the meaning of the Act.

[16]In reaching these conclusions, I should note that I have considered the Guidance on the Definition of Disability, which is helpful. I accept that it is not necessary to establish the cause of a physical or mental impairment (A3 of the Guidance.) In this case, it is irrelevant. Nor does the impairment have to result from an illness. I also note A6. It is not always possible, and it is not necessary, to categorise a condition as either a physical or mental impairment. The underlying cause may be hard to establish, “There may be adverse effects which are both physical and mental in nature. Furthermore, effects of a mainly physical nature may stem from an underlying mental impairment, and vice versa.” This is apt here, because of the overlap I have noted in symptoms, such as brain fog, fatigue and anxiety, and the chronological overlap of symptoms of the two conditions. LIABILITY JUDGMENT 1. The first respondent unfairly dismissed the claimant contrary to s.98 Employment Rights Act 1996 “ERA”. 2. The first respondent made unlawful deduction from the claimant’s wages contrary to s.13 ERA 1996 in respect of 20 days annual leave and salary from 18 July to 11 November 2022. 3. The respondents discriminated against the claimant contrary to s.15 Equality Act 2010, “EqA”. 4. The respondents did not discriminate against the claimant contrary to s.19 EqA. 5. The respondents did not fail to comply the duty to make reasonable adjustments under s. 20/21 EqA. 6. The respondents did not directly discriminate against the claimant because of his disability contrary to s.13 EqA 2010. 10.1 Judgment – no hearing - rule 60 February 2018 Case No: 2201155/2023 7. The first respondent wrongfully dismissed the claimant. REMEDY JUDGMENT 1. The first respondent shall pay the claimant £25,000 as compensation for wrongful dismissal. 2. The first respondent shall pay the claimant in respect of unauthorized deductions from wages made up as followsa. In respect of annual leave £6,997.40, such sum being net of statutory deductions

b. In respect of salary £49,038.46 such sum being net of statutory deductions 3. The first respondent shall pay the claimant £6,166.80 as a basic award for unfair dismissal. 4. The first respondent shall pay the claimant £571 as a compensatory award for unfair dismissal. 5. The recoupment provisions do not apply. 6. The respondents shall pay and be jointly and severally liable for compensation in respect of disability discrimination as follows:- a. £15,000 for injury to feelings not in connection with dismissal (pursuant to section 401 ITEPA 2003) b. £3,000 for injury to feelings in connection with dismissal (pursuant to section 401 ITEPA 2003) 10.1 Judgment – no hearing - rule 60 February 2018 Case No: 2201155/2023

c. £21,828.06 for financial losses

d. Interest of £2247.23 7. The first respondent shall pay the claimant compensation in respect of disability discrimination as follows:- a. £2,000 for injury to feelings not in connection with dismissal (pursuant to section 401 ITEPA 2003) b. Interest of £247.23 8. Accordingly, the total payable by both respondents to the claimant for which they are jointly and severally liable under this judgement is £20,153.28 9. The total payable by the first respondent under this judgement to the claimant is £113,449.60. REMEDY JUDGMENT having been sent to the parties and written reasons having been requested by the respondent in accordance with Rule 62(3) of the Employment Tribunals Rules of Procedure 2013, the following reasons are provided: REMEDY REASONS

Conclusions

[1]The remedy hearing proceeded directly after judgment was handed down on liability. The tribunal had sight of the same bundle.

[2]In respect of evidence the Tribunal heard from the Claimant who relied on his written witness statement and on his disability impact statement. The respondent led no oral evidence. The Tribunal also took into account the evidence it had heard at the liability hearing. Issues

[3]After discussion it was agreed that the only issues for the Tribunal to determine at the remedy hearing were in respect of compensation under s.15 Equality Act :(i) what if any loss of earnings the Claimant should be entitled to and

(ii) what if any injury to feelings he should be entitled to and

(iii) whether or not interest should be awarded. The tribunal was not required to make findings on other matters going to remedy. Loss of earnings

[4]Discrimination under s.15 Equality Act 2010 is a statutory tort, and thus compensation should seek to put the Claimant in the position he would have been had the discrimination not occurred. This inevitably involves a Tribunal in constructing what might have happened, in a “parallel universe” in which the discrimination did not occur. When assessing what earnings the claimant would have received absent the unlawful act, the Tribunal adopted the reasoning in Software 2000 Ltd v Andrews

[2007] ICR 825

. When seeking to re-construct what might have been, the tribunal has no choice but to speculate. Nevertheless, it must do so based on the evidence.

[5]Had the discrimination not occurred, the Tribunal found that the Claimant would have returned to work for the Respondent on an amended version of Doctor Poulter’s plan dated 17 June 2022 (a phased return 4 hours a day 4 days a week and building up to full time in 5 weeks being only 37 hours over 4 days). However the tribunal found that, based on the serious issues the claimant continued to suffer with his health, the adjusted return would have been slower and more gradual than Dr Poulter’s plan. The respondent would have carried out a stress risk assessment.

[6]The Tribunal considered what effect the claimant’s phased return would have had on the respondent’s headcount.

[7]Before the Claimant had fallen sick, the higher management function of the Respondent consisted of the Claimant and Ms Hall working in effect full time with a contribution by Mr O’Callaghan in the later stages. By July 2022 - when the Claimant would have been returning - Ms Hall was no longer there. Mr O’Callaghan remained working ten days a month. Mr O’Callaghan had restructured the respondent’s management function by putting in three directors reporting into his role and a significant amount of the operational management function had been delegated to them.

[8]The tribunal found that the Claimant would have been able to have come back working no more than part time at 50%, with the support from Mr O’Callaghan and with the three directors doing many of his previous duties. The reason was that the claimant’s ill health would have limited his ability to return full time. His health was still by early 2024 very seriously affected. The Claimant’s evidence was that, even at his best in July 2022 he was not functioning on average one day a week, and this was unpredictable. Whilst a return to work may have mitigated his ill health, the tribunal found that it was unlikely to cure it completely. The most likely outcome was that the claimant would be able to work no more than 50% of a full-time role, even after a phased return.

[9]As there had been significant respondent redundancies during 2022, it was reasonable to assume that there would have been at least some commensurate reduction in the head count at the top management level, compared to that in October 2020. It would therefore have been likely that Mr O’Callaghan would have continued working for the Respondent but reduced to about six days.

[10]Upon return the Claimant would, in the absence of Ms Hall, have taken responsibility for much of the running of the company. Further as the co-founder and an employee - compared to Mr O’Callaghan who was brought in as a consultant - he would have felt things more deeply and been more involved. To put it another way, the buck would have stopped with him.

[11]The question for the Tribunal, therefore, was how the Claimant would have reacted to the situation. The Tribunal had no medical evidence in respect of the Claimant’s health after the Poulter report in June 2022. The Tribunal did not have sight of GP records, which the Tribunal would have expected to be available. The Tribunal had no medical evidence as to what the Claimant’s medical situation might have been had he returned to work. The claimant’s evidence was that, when he did not return to work, his health worsened considerably following June and July 2022; this was a longterm effect and continued during the tribunal hearing. Nevertheless, the final OH doctor, albeit only over the telephone, judged him fit to return to work in September 2022. The tribunal had no medical evidence as to what would have happened had he returned to work. The Claimant’s case was that the significant worsening of his condition would not have happened absent the discrimination and that he would have been able to return to work full time following a phased return.

[12]The Respondent would have carried out a stress risk assessment upon the claimant’s return. In view of the Tribunal, Doctor Poulter’s attitude to the way a CEO might avoid stress was unrealistic. Whilst stress coping mechanisms could be put in place, and some responsibilities moved around, there was no avoiding the fact that a CEO of struggling business, such as the respondent at this time, would be under very significant pressure. According to the Claimant’s evidence, it was the demands of the business that were the main precipitating factor in his falling ill in the first place. He said this in terms in his witness statement written in February 2024. He also stated this in his letter to his lawyers in January 2022, which was written materially closer in time to the events. According to his January 2022 letter, the main pressure was in effect keeping his investors happy. The investors sat on the board and had considerable control.

[13]In the medical evidence predating July 2022, the prognosis was essentially that it was going to be a long haul but it should lead to a reasonably full recovery. However, as of February 2024 unfortunately the Claimant was not close to a full recovery.

[14]In view of the Tribunal the most helpful evidence was that the demands placed on the claimant as CEO - especially from October 2021 to February 2022 - were such that in his own words he collapsed and he “broke”. As a result of this collapse he became very seriously ill for a very long time. The Tribunal accepted that the cause was predominantly the claimant’s work with the Respondent.

[15]In view of the Tribunal some of the demands which led to the claimant’s collapse would have been mitigated by the new structure set up by Mr O’Callaghan. The three directors taking away some of the CEO duties, and Mr O’Callaghan’s input would have given the Claimant some more resilience to deal with the remaining CEO duties.

[16]Nevertheless, the Tribunal found that as it was the job of CEO which had precipitated the disability. The investors were still on the board. Ms Hall resigned according to the Claimants account in January 2022 due to the pressure from investors, showing that the pressure from the investors had lasted from at least mid-2021 to early 2022. The tribunal saw no indication that this pressure would have reduced from June/July 2022 onwards.

[17]Despite a risk assessment and any mitigating adjustments, upon return the Claimant would still have been the person with primary, if not exclusive, responsibility for keeping the investors happy and dealing with, what in his view, were their unrealistic expectations.

[18]In view of the Tribunal, the Claimant would have sought to return to his previous role with a great deal of motivation and determination to succeed. However, even working half time, his health would not have improved sufficiently to permit him to carry out the CEO role in the high-pressured environment which had previously precipitated his health problems. The Tribunal accepted that the claimant was highly motivated to return and that he identified strongly with the company. His financial difficulties provided a further significant motivation as well as his desire to do something with his life. This was evident by the claimant’s pushing to return from February 2022. However, the same pressures which had led to his becoming seriously ill would not have gone away and would have recurred. Whilst those pressures would probably not have been as significant as when he fell ill, they would still have been enough to prevent him from carrying out the role.

[19]The Claimant would have come back on a half time basis. After three months, that is on 17 October, it would have become clear that regrettably the situation was not working and the claimant was not functioning effectively as the CEO. The Claimant might have been signed off sick, without sick pay, or he might have resigned. The Tribunal found it was more likely that he would not have done this because was committed to the company. He would have carried on working. Accordingly the Respondent would have put him through a capability procedure. In view of the Tribunal, a fair and reasonable capability procedure would have taken two months and would have resulted in a fair dismissal on capacity grounds on 17 December 2022. The Claimant would then have been entitled to six months’ notice and would have been paid up to 16 June 2023.

[20]The tribunal went on to determine the amount of notice pay. Whilst the Claimant would have come back half time, this would not have been a permanent contractual variation because the Claimant would have kept hoping for an eventual full-time return. Therefore, his contract would have remained that of a full-time employee and the notice pay would have been paid on a full-time basis. For the avoidance of doubt, the Claimant would not have been entitled to any bonus due in May 2023 because he would have been either already dismissed or serving his notice of termination.

[21]As compensation must put the Claimant in the position he would have been absent the discrimination, the award for loss of earnings must make allowance for the £25,000 awarded for breach of contract, to avoid double recovery.

[22]The Tribunal went on to consider whether the respondent had discharged the burden of showing that the Claimant had failed to comply with his duty to mitigate for the period up to 16 June 2023. In the absence of evidence of mitigation, the Tribunal had to determine what would have happened had the claimant mitigated his loss. The tribunal found that he would not have obtained alternative employment by 16 June 2023 for the following reasons. His age would have put him at a disadvantage. He had been dismissed for gross misconduct from a senior role from a company with which he had been associated for ten years and of which he was the co-founder. He had, prior to his dismissal, a poor sickness record.

[23]Accordingly, there was no deduction for any failure to mitigate. The Tribunal understood that it was the Claimant’s case that from 11 November 2022 until 16 June 2023 he had no income. The tribunal informed the parties that, if the Tribunal had misunderstood the claimant’s case, any such income would fall to be deducted. Injury to Feelings

[24]The Tribunal directed itself in line with the following well established factors.a. An award of injury to feelings is intended to compensate a claimant for the anger, stress and upset caused by unlawful treatment. It is compensatory not punitive, and the focus is on the actual injury suffered and not the gravity of the acts.

b. In respect of the general principles, these are laid out in the Prison Service v Johnson

[1997] IRLR 162

, para 27 and they remind the Tribunal that injury to feelings awards are compensatory and must be just to both parties. Feelings of indignation at the discriminator’s conduct should not inflate the award.

c. Awards on one hand must not be too low as to diminish respect for the policy of the anti-discrimination legislation. On the other hand, awards should be restrained for the same purpose.

d. Awards should bear some broad general similarity to the range of awards in personal injury cases and Tribunals should take into account the value of everyday life for the sum they have in mind. Tribunals should also bear in mind the need for the level public respect of awards made.

e. It is settled law that an award of injury to feelings is awarded in line with the bands set out in Vento v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire 2003 [IRLR102]. This divided the compensation into three bands, the top band, the middle band and the lower band.

f. The Tribunal must concentrate on the injury to the claimant rather than the respondent’s act and the Tribunal reminded itself that different individuals react in very different ways to what may be a very similar act or acts. However, a one-off act is, all things being equal, likely to result commonly in injury to a person’s feelings than a long catalogue of mistreatment, and vice versa.

g. It is for the claimant to prove the nature and extent of the injury to feelings.

[25]The tribunal agreed with the Claimant’s submission that compensation should fall within the Vento middle band, which at the material date was £9,900 to £29,600. This was a serious case but it did not merit and award in the highest band.

[26]The Tribunal took into account the Claimant’s evidence at hearing, his written witness statement and his disability impact statement. The Claimant spoke convincingly of his profound sense of loss of the business, once he realised that he was not going to return. He was not simply an employee who had worked for the company for ten years. He had helped found the business and had put a lot of himself into the business over ten years and he was involved in it not only financially but emotionally. Whilst this business was not his only commercial operation, it was very much his main focus.

[27]Further, the Claimant was in a vulnerable position when he was subjected to the discrimination due to his medical condition. Whilst the Tribunal found that he would not have been well enough to come back to work permanently, the tribunal accepted that there is a significant difference between an employee who is given a chance and it does not work out, and an employee – such as the claimant - who is never given a chance at all. The tribunal accepted the claimant’s evidence that his health had suffered as a result of the discrimination.

[28]It is trite law that it is impossible to put the damage done to a person’s feelings, their sense of injustice and distress, into money terms. Nevertheless, considering the matter holistically, compensation fell in the middle of the middle band. The Tribunal accordingly awarded £20,000 for injury to feelings.

[29]The Tribunal did not adjust this sum for any contributory fault because this was not an exceptional situation, see First Great Western Ltd -v- Waiyego

[2018] UKEAT 0056_18_0612

. The Tribunal had found that the Claimant’s misconduct did not amount to gross misconduct and there were no other circumstances rendering the matter exceptional.

[30]The Tribunal went on to determine how to divide the compensation for injury to feelings of £20,000 between the different acts of discrimination as follows:a. The Tribunal agreed with the Claimant’s submission that the majority of the injury was caused by the refusal to return to work. The Tribunal accordingly awarded £14,000.

b. In respect of the failure to pay salary, the tribunal took the view that whilst this was mainly a consequence of the refusal to return, there was a separate injury to the Claimant’s feelings because he did not receive money when he was in a difficult financial situation. It awarded £2,000.

c. The Tribunal took the view that the injury flowing from the grievance was limited but it was one of the events that made the Claimant realise that he was not going to return to work. The Tribunal awarded £1,000.

d. In respect of the disciplinary procedure and dismissal, the Tribunal accepted the Claimant’s contention that he knew he was going to be dismissed before the procedure started because the respondent had already refused his return to work. The dismissal was a simple consequence of this refusal. Nevertheless, it marked the certain end of his relationship with the respondent and the Tribunal awarded £3,000.

[31]The Tribunal did not accept the Respondent’s contention that to award interest would be a serious injustice. It agreed with the Claimant’s submission that it had heard no evidence going, for instance, to financial hardship in the case of either Respondent. It had not been provided with any financial documents in respect of either Respondent. Accordingly, the tribunal awarded interest on compensation for loss of earnings in accordance with the principles in Reg 6(1)(b) IT(IADC) Regs 1996 and for injury to feelings in accordance with the principles in Reg 6(1)(a) IT(IADC) Regs 1996 . Calculations

[32]After discussion with the parties, the parties worked together on the calculations necessary to finalise the tribunal’s award, which were recorded in the tribunal remedy judgment.