Ms B R HodgkinsonMr K LannamanMr Frew (instructed by counsel) for claimantMr Boyd (instructed by counsel) for respondentDate 26 March 2019
JUDGMENT
[1]The claims of unauthorised deduction from wages and maternity discrimination by deduction from wages are dismissed on withdrawal by the Claimant.[2]The claim for unpaid holiday pay is dismissed on withdrawal by the Claimant.[3]All claims of maternity discrimination other than discrimination by demotion are dismissed on withdrawal by the Claimant.[4]The claim of maternity discrimination by demotion fails and is dismissed. Case No. 1810534/2018[5]The claim of victimisation fails and is dismissed.[6]The claim of unfair dismissal by reason of maternity fails and is dismissed.[7]The claim for damages for wrongful dismissal fails and is dismissed.
REASONS
[1]Mrs Robson presented a claim to the Tribunal against her former employer, NCC Group Security Services Limited (“the Company”), relating to the way in which she had been treated around the time of her pregnancy and maternity leave.[2]During the course of the Hearing Mrs Robson clarified and amended the allegations that she was making. It is an implied term in every contract of employment that an employer will not without reasonable and proper cause act in a way that is calculated or likely to destroy or seriously damage the relationship of trust and confidence between the employer and the employee (Malik v BCCI SA [1998] AC 20). Mrs Robson clarified that she was alleging that various of the Company’s acts, including but not limited to various acts of alleged maternity discrimination and victimisation, amounted to a breach of that implied term and that when she resigned in response to them she had been constructively dismissed. She alleged that her dismissal was both an act of discrimination contrary to the Equality Act 2010 and an unfair dismissal under Section 99 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (ERA), because the principal reason for the Company’s conduct related to her pregnancy and/or her exercise of the right to maternity leave and/or her grievance about discrimination. Further, she claimed damages for breach of her contractual right to notice of termination.[3]During the course of the Hearing Mrs Robson withdrew an allegation of unauthorised deductions from wages, which was dismissed.[4]At the Hearing the Tribunal heard oral evidence from Mrs Robson herself. For the Company, it heard oral evidence from Mr John Mundell, UK Sales Director, Assurance Division; Mrs Jade Jagger, Human Resources Advisor; Mr Peter Farrell, Head of Sales for Managed Security Services and then Head of Sales for Partnership Accounts within the Assurance Division; and Mr Simon Reynolds, Sales Manager in the Client Development Team.[5]On the basis of that evidence and the documents to which the witnesses referred it, the Tribunal made the following findings on the allegations. Background facts[6]The Company is part of NCC Group plc, which provides worldwide cyber security consulting and risk management services, helping its customers to improve the digital security of their computer networks and reduce the threat of cybercrime.[7]Mrs Robson worked as a Senior Account Manager, selling the Company’s services to new and existing customers. At the time of her resignation from the Company she was paid a basic annual salary of over £74,000 and significant commission payments, giving her a total remuneration package, according to her Schedule of Loss, of over £130,000 a year. Before she went on maternity leave, her line manager was Mr Farrell. Breach of trust and confidence before maternity leave[8]Mrs Robson’s first set of allegations related to the Company’s actions in the period from 16 January to 22 February 2018, on which date she went on maternity leave. These actions were alleged to amount to, or contribute towards, a breach of trust and confidence.[9]Mrs Robson alleged that Mr Farrell did not explain until 16 February 2018 who was to look after her accounts during her maternity leave or if it was her responsibility to decide who would look after her accounts. During the course of cross-examination, Mrs Robson accepted that it was in fact her responsibility to identify someone to look after her accounts while she was on maternity leave. The Tribunal was satisfied she was aware at the time that this was her responsibility. Initially, she identified her colleague Ms Gardner for the role and then, at Mr Farrell’s suggestion, she approached Mr Adderley. The reason why Mr Farrell did not spell out to her that it was her responsibility to find someone to look after her accounts was because it was apparent to both Mrs Robson and Mr Farrell that it was. Mr Farrell’s conduct did not amount to or contribute towards a breach of the implied term of mutual trust and confidence.[10]Mrs Robson alleged that Mr Farrell did not tell her what information she should give to customers about who was taking over her accounts or who their contact should be during her maternity leave. On the evidence it heard, the Tribunal found that Mr Farrell did not give her that instruction because he did not consider it was his responsibility to do so. The Tribunal accepted that he had reasonable and proper cause for taking that position. As an employee on a remuneration package worth more than £130,000 a year, Mrs Robson could not reasonably expect her manager to have to spell out matters of this sort. She was able to give any customers with whom she was actively working when she began her maternity leave Mr Adderley’s contact details and leave a message to that effect on her corporate email and ‘phone accounts. Mr Farrell’s conduct did not amount to or contribute towards a breach of trust and confidence.[11]Mrs Robson alleged that Mr Farrell did not inform her what would happen to the deals that she had worked on that were finalised, or “closed”, during her maternity leave. The Tribunal accepted that Mr Farrell had reasonable and proper cause for not expressly spelling this out: he knew that Mrs Robson already had this information, because it was set out in the agreement eventually reached between herself and Mr Adderley on the terms on which he would look after her accounts during her absence. Mr Farrell’s conduct did not amount to or contribute towards a breach of trust and confidence.[12]Mrs Robson alleged that Mr Farrell did not inform her how she would be contacted during her maternity leave regarding organisational changes and training. The Tribunal accepted that Mr Farrell did not inform Mrs Robson about this but that was because he had reasonable and proper cause not to tell her: he knew she would be receiving emails to her corporate email account about these issues and she had access to that account during her maternity leave. Mr Farrell’s conduct did not amount to or contribute towards a breach of trust and confidence.[13]Mrs Robson alleged that the fact that Mr Farrell did not give his final authorisation for her maternity plan until 16 February 2018 amounted to a breach of trust and confidence. Mr Farrell began discussing Mr Robson’s maternity arrangements with her in good time on 18 January 2018, at a point when he believed her maternity leave would not be beginning until the middle of March. It is true that he did not send Mrs Robson a final sign-off on her maternity arrangements until 16 February, which was only a few days before she went on maternity leave, but that was because of the delay caused by the need to find an alternative person to look after Mrs Robson’s accounts when Ms Gardner would not accept the terms that Mrs Robson proposed. Mrs Robson was aware of the reason for the delay. In the circumstances, the Tribunal did not accept that Mr Farrell’s conduct breached, or contributed towards a breach, of the implied term. Breach of trust and confidence during maternity leave[14]Mrs Robson’s next set of allegations related to the way Mr Farrell acted during her maternity leave, which she said amounted to, or contributed towards, a breach of trust and confidence.[15]Mrs Robson alleged that, in breach of an agreement he had made with Mrs Robson at their meeting on 18 January 2018, Mr Farrell failed to provide her with a monthly report on the projects she had worked on that were closing, the projects that had closed and when projects were due to be invoiced, so that she could make financial plans in relation to the income these would generate for her. In his evidence, Mr Farrell denied that any such agreement was reached at his meeting with Mrs Robson on 18 January. The Tribunal preferred his evidence to that of Mrs Robson on this point. Mrs Robson did not mention in her witness statement that these details had been agreed. Further, when clarifying her allegations during the Hearing, she initially said that the agreement had been made sometime between 12 and 16 February in a telephone call or at a meeting. Mr Farrell’s evidence, on the other hand, was clear and unequivocal that he gave no such undertaking to provide these details. The Tribunal considered it implausible that Mr Farrell would have agreed to provide this level of detail, given that it would have been a very timeconsuming exercise to produce it. The Tribunal accepted that later, in July, Mrs Robson did ask Mr Farrell for detailed information, and at that point Mr Farrell provided it. The Tribunal did not accept that Mr Farrell was guilty of any conduct that breached, or contributed towards a breach, of the implied term.[16]Mrs Robson alleged that Mr Farrell failed to provide an agreed system of communication with her during her maternity leave. The Tribunal accepted that Mr Farrell did not expressly discuss with Mrs Robson how the Company would communicate with her while she was on maternity leave. There was, however, reasonable and proper cause for this, namely that Mr Farrell and Mrs Robson both knew that she could and would be communicated with via her corporate email account whilst she was away. Mr Farrell’s conduct did not amount to, or contribute towards, a breach of trust and confidence.[17]During Mrs Robson’s maternity leave the Company undertook a reorganisation that affected her role. Mrs Robson alleged that Mr Farrell’s failure to inform her about her change of role or tell her that Mr Kemp had sent her an email on 29 May to advise her about this change amounted to a breach of the implied term. The Tribunal accepted that Mr Farrell had reasonable and proper cause for not alerting Mrs Robson to the email that had been sent to her corporate email account on 29 May; he knew that she had the opportunity to monitor and read all communications from the Company if she had wanted to do so by accessing her Company email account. Mr Farrell’s conduct did not amount to, or contribute towards, a breach of trust and confidence.[18]Mrs Robson alleged that either Mr Farrell or Mr Reynolds had breached the implied term by not giving her details of a course on High Value Selling that had taken place during her maternity leave, and not asking her whether she was available to attend it. The Tribunal accepted Mr Farrell’s evidence, which was supported by that of Mr Reynolds, that line managers had no part in the decision-making on who should go on this course. Individuals were initially selected by more senior management in the Company, in conjunction with the Company’s in-house Training Academy, based on who currently had deals in the pipeline that they could be assisted to close with the benefit of training. That did not at the relevant time include Mrs Robson, although the Company’s plan was that in due course, all sales staff, including Mrs Robson, would be sent on the course. Whoever in fact made the decision not to give Mrs Robson details of the course or ask her whether she was available to attend it, the Tribunal found that there was reasonable and proper cause for the decision and that it did not, therefore, breach, or contribute towards a breach, of trust and confidence.[19]To summarise, the Tribunal found nothing in the way in which Mr Farrell or Mr Reynolds managed Mrs Robson’s maternity leave that, individually or cumulatively, breached the implied term of mutual trust and confidence. Maternity discrimination by demotion[20]Mrs Robson alleged that, during the reorganisation that occurred whilst she was on maternity leave, Mr Farrell changed her job role in a way that effectively amounted to a demotion and that he made that decision because she was exercising her right to maternity leave. She also alleged that in confirming that decision Mr Mandell also treated her unfavourably because she was on maternity leave.[21]When the Tribunal heard the evidence on this allegation it emerged that the alleged demotion consisted of Mrs Robson being allocated to the Client Development Team rather than the Partnership Team within the reorganised business. In support of her allegation that the treatment was because of her absence on maternity leave, she pointed out that Ms Gardiner and Mr Spearing, both previously senior account managers in the same team as her, were placed in the Partnership Team.[22]The Tribunal was provided with conflicting but largely unchallenged evidence from the parties on whether Mrs Robson’s commission earnings potential was higher or lower in the Client Development Team than it would have been had she been allocated to the Partnership Team. Nevertheless, the Tribunal was prepared to accept that being allocated to the Client Development Team amounted to unfavourable treatment, if only on the basis that the Partnership Team’s targets were higher and membership of it could therefore reasonably be viewed as having a higher status than membership of the Client Development Team.[23]Mr Farrell’s and Mr Mandell’s witness statements were unclear on the mechanism by which the decision on the team to which Mrs Robson was to be allocated was made. The documentation in the Hearing files, although voluminous, provided no clearer picture. During the course of their oral evidence, however, Mr Farrell and Mr Mandell both confirmed that the decisions on where to allocate employees was based on their recent sales revenue figures. The decisions were made by Mr Wickson, Mr Skelton, Mr Kemp, Mr St James and Mr McQuade, who were to be the Sales Directors and Heads of Sales for the teams in the new structure. As a Head of Sales for the Partnership Team, Mr Farrell was due to take part in the discussions. In the event, however, he was told not to do so because he was working from home supporting his wife who had a medical condition at the time. Mr Mandell, as a senior manager, subsequently approved the proposed allocations.[24]The figures that the Company provided showed that Ms Gardener and Mr Spearing had generated substantially more revenue than Mrs Robson. Ms Gardner had closed one deal recorded as worth £5.5m. Considerable time was taken at the Hearing on Mrs Robson’s challenge to whether Ms Gardener had actually closed that deal. In response, the Company produced paperwork from which the Tribunal was satisfied that the deal was properly attributable to Ms Gardener. The Tribunal accepted that the deal was done as agent for another business and the actual revenue generated for the Company was probably substantially less than the figure of £5.5m, although the Tribunal was not told how much lower. The Tribunal was provided with no details on whether or how other aspects of the sales figures for Mrs Robson, Ms Gardener and Mr Spearing were affected by deals having been done as agents for another business. The Tribunal was satisfied that, even if the revenue from this deal had been scaled back substantially to reflect that it was only the margin on the deal that represented revenue to the Company, Mrs Robson’s average sales in the eight months leading up to her maternity leave were less than Ms Gardener’s.[25]The Tribunal accepted the Company’s evidence that sales people in the new Partnership Team were expected to meet targets of around £250,000 per month and that, on the figures it had, the Company had grounds for believing that Mrs Robson’s past sales performance did not indicate that she had the potential to meet that target. The Tribunal concluded that the reason Mrs Robson was not allocated to the Partnership Team was not because she was on maternity leave but for a reasonable and proper cause: the Company did not consider that she would be able to meet the sales targets that had been set for that team.[26]Mrs Robson asked the Tribunal to accept that Mr Farrell would have influenced the decision about the team in which she should be placed because he was concerned about the impact on his own remuneration of her inability to generate sales for the Partnership Team during her absence on maternity leave. The Tribunal found that argument unconvincing. Even if Mr Farrell had sought to influence the decision in any way for that reason, he was only one of the more junior managers due to be involved in the decisions on whom to allocate where, being a Head of Sales rather than a Sales Director. He was also unlikely to have been able to get others to agree to a decision that would be in only his interests. Further, at the time the allocation decisions were being made Mrs Robson was due back to work in three months’ time, at the beginning of September. It is unlikely that the business would made a longterm decision on a team allocation that would otherwise not be in the Company’s commercial interests simply because Mrs Robson was due to be absent for a few weeks.[27]The Tribunal was referred to emails between the managers involved, particularly Mr Wickson and Mr Skelton, that showed they were concerned about Mrs Robson’s team allocation. The Tribunal considered, however, that these emails indicated only that these managers were concerned about managing Mrs Robson’s expectations on her return to work, in that she would be dealing with different accounts to those that she had been managing before she went on leave and was likely to be discontented as a result; they did not undermine the other evidence of the business rationale for the decision nor indicate that it related to her maternity leave.[28]In summary, the Tribunal accepted that the decision not to allocate Mrs Robson to the Partnership Team was disappointing and upsetting for her, since she viewed it as a demotion. The Tribunal nevertheless concluded that the Company had a reasonable and proper cause for its decision, which was not Mrs Robson’s maternity leave, and so it did not amount to either maternity discrimination or a breach of trust and confidence. Victimisation[29]Mrs Robson alleged that Mr Mandell’s decision to invite her to attend an investigatory meeting on 21 September 2018 was an act of victimisation because of her grievance she had lodged on 15 August 2018, in which she had alleged that she had been the subject of maternity discrimination.[30]Mr Mandell accepted that at the time he directed that Mrs Robson be invited to an investigatory meeting he knew about that grievance. The Tribunal accepted his evidence, however, that he acted not because of that grievance but because he had been told by Mrs Jagger that Mrs Robson had revealed during her grievance meeting that she had sent emails attaching confidential custom data to her personal email accounts. The Company’s business is cyber security. Mr Mandell is a senior manager in the Company. It was entirely credible and predictable that he would take this matter very seriously.[31]In support of her allegation, Mrs Robson pointed out that Ms Kitchen, who worked in the Company’s Human Resources department, and Mr Farrell had themselves sent emails with attachments containing confidential customer data to Mrs Robson’s personal email account but no action had been taken against them. There was no evidence, however, that Mr Mandell was aware of those matters. Mr Mandell had reasonable and proper cause for his decision which was unrelated to Mrs Robson’s grievance and the Tribunal concluded that it neither breached trust and confidence nor amounted to an act of victimisation.[32]Mrs Robson’s second allegation of victimisation was that on or before the 26 September 2018 and because of her grievance Mr Mandell had instructed the Company’s solicitors to write to her threatening High Court proceedings if she did not confirm she had deleted the confidential information. By this date Mrs Robson had already resigned from the Company. She had not, despite being asked to do so on more than one occasion, confirmed that she had deleted the confidential information. The Tribunal accepted Mr Mandell’s evidence, which was clear and credible, that he considered it essential to protect the Company’s interest by instructing the Company’s lawyers to write to Mrs Robson in the terms that they did. His actions were not because of her grievance. Further, given Mrs Robson’s failure to respond to earlier requests, Mr Mandell had reasonable proper cause for his decision, which did not amount to a breach of trust and confidence. In any event, even if it had breached trust and confidence, Mrs Robson could not rely upon it in relation to her claims based on constructive dismissal because by this date she had already resigned. Summary and conclusions[33]Because the Tribunal did not accept that the Company was guilty of any conduct that, individually or cumulatively, breached the implied term of trust and confidence, it did not accept that Mrs Robson had been constructively dismissed. She resigned because she was disappointed and upset about being allocated to a team in the new structure that she considered amounted to a demotion.[34]As Mrs Robson had not established that she was dismissed within the meaning of that term in Section 95(1)(c) ERA, her claim of unfair dismissal failed and was dismissed.[35]The Tribunal was not satisfied on the evidence it heard that any of the Company’s treatment of Mrs Robson was because of her pregnancy or maternity leave. Her claims of maternity discrimination therefore failed and were dismissed.[36]The Tribunal was not satisfied on the evidence it heard that Mrs Robson was treated unfavourably in any way because of her grievance. Her claims of victimisation therefore failed and were dismissed.[37]As the Tribunal concluded that Mrs Robson resigned, her claim that the Company breached her contract by constructively dismissing her failed and was dismissed. Case No: 1810534/2018 EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS Between: Mrs J Robson and NCC Group Security Services Ltd Claimant Respondent Heard at: Leeds Before: Employment Judge Cox Members: Ms B R Hodgkinson Mr K Lannaman On: 25 September 2019 Representation: Claimant: Mr Frew, counsel Respondent: Mr Boyd, counsel COSTS ORDER[1]The Respondent’s application for an Order that the Claimant pay towards its costs incurred in defending the claim is granted.[2]The Claimant shall pay the Respondent £10,000 on or before 30 June 2020. EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS Claimant: Mrs J Robson Respondent: NCC Group Security Services Ltd Held at: Leeds on: 25 September 2019 Before: Employment Judge Cox Ms B R Hodgkinson Mr K Lannaman Representation: Claimant: Mr Frew, counsel Respondent: Mr Boyd, counsel COSTS ORDER:[1]The Respondent made an application that the Claimant should pay towards its costs in defending this claim.[2]The first issue was whether there were grounds for making a Costs Order falling within Rule 76 of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure. The Respondent argued that the Claimant had acted unreasonably in the way she conducted the proceedings and that her claim had had no reasonable prospect of success, giving grounds for a Costs Order under Rule 76(1)(a) or (b). If there were grounds for making an Order, the second issue was whether the Tribunal should exercise its discretion to make an Order. If there were grounds for an Order and the Tribunal considered that it was appropriate to make one, the third issue was what sum should be ordered. In deciding whether to make an Order and, if so, in what amount, the Tribunal had a discretion to have regard to the Claimant’s ability to pay (Rule 84). Unreasonable conduct of the proceedings[3]The Respondent argued that the Claimant had conducted the proceedings unreasonably by refusing an offer of £11,348 to settle the claim.[4]As the Tribunal explained in the reasons for its decision, the Respondent’s witness statements and documentation did not make clear how the decision to allocate the Claimant to the Client Development Team was made. It was reasonable for her to pursue that allegation to the Hearing on the basis that she had a reasonable prospect of succeeding in establishing that the decision amounted to maternity discrimination and also provided a basis for her claim of unfair and discriminatory constructive dismissal claim. An offer of £11,348 was less than the compensation for loss of earnings and injury to feelings that she might reasonably have expected to have been awarded if this allegation succeeded. The Tribunal does not accept that she was acting unreasonably in refusing the settlement offer.[5]The Respondent argued that Mrs Robson had acted unreasonably by not complying with her duty to disclose documents relating to her employment with her new employer, Fujitsu, and the timing of her booking of a holiday to be taken after her employment with the Respondent ended. The Tribunal accepts these documents were relevant to the timing of and the reasons for the Claimant’s decision to resign and should have been disclosed. The first and general Order for disclosure had a compliance date of 17 January 2019. These documents were not disclosed then. The Respondent therefore made an application for an Order for specific disclosure and the resulting Order was made on 14 February 2019 with a compliance date of 20 February 2019. Even that Order was only partly complied with on 20 February 2019 and not fully complied with until shortly before the Hearing began on 18 March 2019.[6]The Tribunal accepted that this did amount to unreasonable conduct: these clearly were relevant documents which should have been disclosed several weeks earlier than they were and were not fully disclosed even when an Order for specific disclosure was made. The Tribunal therefore had grounds for making a Costs Order on that basis.[7]Turning to the issue of whether it should exercise its discretion to make an Order, the Tribunal considered the nature, effect and gravity of the Claimant’s unreasonable conduct (McPherson v BNP Paribas (London Branch) [2004] EWCA Civ 569). The Tribunal noted that all the relevant documents were supplied to the Respondent in time for the Hearing. At the Hearing, the Respondent did not make any application for an adjournment or a postponement on the ground that the late disclosure meant it had not been able to prepare adequately for the Hearing. In these circumstances, the Tribunal did not consider it appropriate to make a Costs Order on these grounds. No reasonable prospect of success[8]The Claimant withdrew a number of her claims but not until the Hearing, namely: her claim of unauthorised deduction from wages, maternity discrimination by deduction from wages and unpaid holiday pay. During the Hearing she also withdrew all her claims of maternity discrimination other than discrimination relating to her alleged demotion, but continued to argue that these acts amounted to a breach of the implied term of mutual trust and confidence for the purposes of her claims of unfair and discriminatory dismissal.[9]In the reasons for its decision, the Tribunal explained why it had concluded that a large majority of the Claimant’s allegations relating to breaches of trust and confidence and victimisation were without merit. The facts and matters upon which the Tribunal based its conclusions on these allegations were all known to the Claimant at the point when she presented her claim. The Tribunal was satisfied that these allegations had had no reasonable prospect of success from the outset. There were only two allegations that were arguable. One related to the decision on the team to which the Claimant was to be allocated and the other related to the decision on who was to be offered a place on the high value selling course.[10]In pursuing the many other allegations that had no reasonable prospect of success, however, the Tribunal was satisfied that the Claimant acted unreasonably, and that there were grounds for making a Costs Order under Rule 76(1)(a) or (b).[11]These allegations added very substantially to the length of the Hearing and the preparation time for it and so caused the Respondent to incur significant and unnecessary costs. The Tribunal was satisfied that it was appropriate to exercise its discretion to make a Costs Order against the Claimant. Quantum[12]The Tribunal considered the amount of the Costs Order. The Claimant did not challenge the schedule of costs that the Respondent submitted, which totalled £82,211, other than in respect of the attendance of a solicitor at the Hearing in addition to representation by counsel. The Tribunal accepted that those sums should be discounted. Whilst the attendance of a solicitor may have been desirable from the Respondent’s perspective, it was not, objectively assessed, an expense that it would be reasonable for it to recover. The total sum claimed for the attendance of a solicitor was £9,284.80. Deducting that from the schedule of costs gave a figure of £72,926.21.[13]At the costs Hearing, the Respondent conceded that it should reduce the amount it was claiming by 50% to reflect the fact that it accepted that the strength of two of the Claimant’s allegations could be assessed only after evidence had been heard at the Hearing. That reduced the amount the Tribunal might award to £36,463.10.[14]The Respondent also claimed its costs in relation to the costs application. The Claimant argued that the Tribunal should exercise its discretion not to award any costs in relation to the costs Hearing because the Respondent had not made its concession and reduced its claim by 50% until the costs Hearing itself. The Tribunal accepted that it should take the Respondent’s late concession into account but was satisfied that, even if the concession had been made earlier, there was at best a 50% chance that the claim for costs could have been settled without the need for a Hearing. The Respondent claimed £5,100 in costs for the costs Hearing. Discounting the £2,000 claimed for preparation, attendance and travel for the solicitor who attended the costs Hearing left a figure of £3,100. The Tribunal then reduced that sum by 50% to reflect the possibility of a settlement of the costs application if the Respondent’s concession had been made earlier and arrived at a figure of £1,550.[15]In summary, the Tribunal concluded that the amount of the Respondent’s costs that it was appropriate to take into account when deciding the quantum of the Costs Order was £38,013.10. Ability to pay[16]The Tribunal decided to exercise its discretion to consider the Claimant’s ability to pay.[17]From the evidence the Claimant gave at the costs Hearing on her household’s financial position, the Tribunal found that whilst she had no savings, she did have £67,500 worth of equity in the family home. She had non-mortgage debts of £56,500, leaving her with £11,000 of net assets. The Claimant had a new job and her husband was also working, as a self-employed electrician. Their joint net income was in the region of £5,000 a month. The Claimant gave evidence on the family expenditure. Whilst some of that expenditure was on what might be viewed as luxury items such as gym membership and horse-riding lessons for the children, the Tribunal accepted that the family currently had little disposable income to spare at the end of the month. The Tribunal was also satisfied, however, from a letter submitted in evidence from the Claimant’s new line manager, that she was doing well in her new job and was likely to reach the targets set for her in the new incentive plan year beginning on 1 April 2020, so she had the potential to earn substantial sums in her new job in the future.[18]Taking all the facts and circumstances into account, the Tribunal decided that the Claimant’s limited financial means did not make it inappropriate to make a Costs Order at all but did indicate that the quantum should be reduced substantially. The Tribunal therefore reduced the award from £38,013.10 to £10,000 and gave the Claimant until 30 June 2020 to pay.