Ms N Jiwanji and others v East Coast Main Line Company Ltd and others: 1802527/2018 and others
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Case No 1802527/2018, 1802570/2018, 1803970/2018
Between
Ms N Jiwanji and othersClaimantEast Coast Main Line Company Ltd and othersRespondentDate 23 August 2022
REASONS
Relevant law
[1]The Tribunal has before it some 1,250 claims brought under section 145B of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 concerning inducements relating to collective bargaining. In the broadest terms, section 145B gives workers who are members of recognised trade unions the right not to have offers made to them by their employer, if the purpose of such offers is that terms of employment of those workers will no longer be determined by collective agreement negotiated by the trade unions.[2]The claimants were, at the relevant time for their claims, members of the Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers’ Union (“the RMT”). They were employed in various capacities by the first respondent, East Coast Main Line Company Limited, better known by its then trading name, Virgin Trains East Coast (“VTEC”). VTEC operated the InterCity East Coast rail franchise for services from London King’s Cross to Yorkshire, the North-East of England and Scotland. VTEC recognised the RMT, and other trade unions, for collective bargaining purposes. Most of the claimants have since transferred to the employment of the second and third respondents, London North Eastern Railway Limited (“LNER”) and Hitachi Rail Limited (“Hitachi”). LNER and Hitachi accept that they are liable for the claims by transferees to them under the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 2006 (“TUPE”).[3]The claimants contend that VTEC infringed section 145B by way of a communication with its workforce on 13 November 2017. Summarising it at this stage, that communication stated that VTEC would implement its 2017 pay and conditions award on 1 December 2017, with an entitlement for members of the RMT to opt out of receiving the award. The communication followed a collective bargaining process in which the other recognised trade unions involved in the process, the TSSA and Unite, accepted the award, but the RMT rejected it. The communication, the claimants say, in terms of section 145B, was an offer by VTEC which when accepted by those to whom the offer was made, would have the prohibited result that their material terms of employment would not be determined by collective bargaining. They say that this result was VTEC’s sole or main purpose when making the offer.[4]The respondents dispute that the 13 November 2017 communication was an offer within section 145B. They dispute that if accepted, it would have the prohibited result or that the purpose of making it was to achieve that result. They say that when the communication was sent, VTEC genuinely believed, and it was in fact the case, that collective bargaining about the award was exhausted. Thus, they say, the relevant terms would not have been collectively bargained, even had the offer not been made.[5]Section 145B is in the following terms: “145B Inducements relating to collective bargaining(1) A worker who is a member of an independent trade union which is recognised, or seeking to be recognised, by his employer has the right not to have an offer made to him by his employer if – (a) acceptance of the offer, together with other workers’ acceptance of offers which the employer also makes to them, would have the prohibited result; and (b) the employer’s sole or main purpose in making the offers is to achieve that result.(2) The prohibited result is that the workers’ terms of employment, or any of those terms, will not (or will no longer) be determined by collective agreement negotiated by or on behalf of the union.(3) it is immaterial for the purposes of subsection (1) whether the offers are made to the workers simultaneously.(4) …(5) A worker or former worker may present a complaint to an employment tribunal on the ground that his employer has made him an offer in contravention of this section.”[6]Section 145D provides that: “145D Consideration of complaint(1) …(2) On a complaint under section 145B it shall be for the employer to show what was his sole or main purpose in making the offer.(3) On a complaint under section … 145B, in determining whether the employer made the offer (or offers) or the purpose for which he did so, no account shall be taken of any pressure which was exercised on him by calling, organising, procuring, or financing a strike or other industrial action, or by threatening to do so, and the question shall be determined as if no such pressure had been exercised.(4) In determining whether an employer’s sole or main purpose in making offers was the purpose mentioned in section 145B(1), the matters taken into account must include any evidence – (a) that when the offers were made the employer had recently changed or sought to change, or did not wish to use, arrangements agreed with the union for collective bargaining; (b) that when the offers were made the employer did not wish to enter into arrangements proposed by the union for collective bargaining; or (c) that the offers were made only to particular workers, and were made with the sole or main purpose of rewarding those particular workers for their high level of performance or of retaining them because of their special value to the employer.[7]Section 145E sets out the remedies for breach of section 145B. If these claims succeed, the claimants are each entitled under section 145E(2) to a declaration and a fixed lump sum award of £3,907, this being the amount prescribed at the time of the contravention for the purpose of section 145E(3). Thus, if the claims succeed, the awards will total almost £5 million.[8]The Tribunal has to decide:8.1 Did VTEC, on 13 November 2017, make an offer to the claimants within section 145B(1) of the 1992 Act?8.2 If so, did or would acceptance of such offer, together with other workers’ acceptance of the offer, have the prohibited result under section 145B(2) of the 1992 Act that the claimants’ terms of employment, or any of those terms, would not (or would no longer) be determined by collective agreement?8.3 In particular, on the facts as found, was there objectively a real possibility that if the offer had not been made and accepted, the relevant terms would have been determined by a new collective agreement reached for the period in question?8.4 If the answer to issue 8.2 is yes, was VTEC’s sole or main purpose in making the relevant offer to achieve that prohibited result?8.5 More specifically, when it made the offer, did VTEC genuinely believe that the collective bargaining process had been exhausted? Procedural history and hearing[9]The proceedings have taken a long time to reach hearing. The claimants presented their claims in batches in January and February 2018. Following case management, the claims were listed for hearing beginning 1 July 2019. On 24 May 2019, however, the present Employment Judge directed that the claims be stayed pending the conclusion of the appeal initially to the Court of Appeal, then later to the Supreme Court, in the case of Kostal UK Limited v Dunkley (“Kostal”), as similar issues arose in that case. The Supreme Court delivered its decision in Kostal in October 2021 ([2021] UKSC 47), after which the parties were permitted to amend their claims and responses to take account of the decision before the proceedings were listed for this hearing. Much more will be said about Kostal later in this decision.[10]The Tribunal heard the claims over four days (including a reading day) between 11 and 14 July 2022, followed by deliberations on 18 July and 15 August 2022. The claimants were represented by Mr O Segal, Queen’s Counsel, who called sworn evidence from Mr S McGowan, former RMT Regional Officer. VTEC was represented by Mr J Galbraith-Marten, Queen’s Counsel, and LNER and Hitachi by Mr J Bowers, also Queen’s Counsel, who called sworn evidence from Ms P Bullock, VTEC’s, then LNER’s, Head of Employee Relations and Reward. The Tribunal had before it an agreed bundle of documents of 500 pages, and considered material from it which the parties introduced in evidence.[11]Immediately before the hearing, the claimants’ solicitors provided by email a list of claimants who were withdrawing their claims or for whom they were no longer acting because, although they did not have instructions to withdraw the claims, it appeared the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction due to the date the claimants had joined the RMT1. The Tribunal has by consent at paragraph 5 of its Judgment dismissed the former claims on withdrawal and at paragraph 6 of the Judgment has stayed the latter until further order. This is to allow the Tribunal time to contact these claimants to seek information about their intentions and entitlement to bring their claims, which require them to have been members of the RMT when the alleged offers were made on 13 November 2017. There is no suggestion that the position of those claimants is otherwise different from those whose claims have been determined by the Tribunal in this hearing.
Findings of fact
[12]Most of the material facts are not in dispute. Where there is any dispute, the Tribunal indicates how it has resolved the matter. References to page numbers are to the agreed bundle.[13]At the material time in November 2017, the first respondent, VTEC, operated the InterCity East Coast rail franchise for passenger train services from London King’s Cross to Yorkshire, the North-East of England and Scotland. It employed about 3,000 people, of whom 450 were train drivers and 400 management and executive grades. This left about 2,000 employees in VTEC’s customer experience, engineering and clerical grades, most of whom were members of the RMT. The claimants were employed by VTEC in various capacities in those grades.[14]The respondents do not dispute that in November 2017, the claimants, except for those few identified at schedules 4 and 5 to the Tribunal’s Judgment, were members of the RMT.[15]In June 2018, the second respondent, LNER, became the train operating company for the East Coast Main Line following the termination of VTEC’s franchise. All employees of VTEC, including the claimants in these proceedings except for a few who had left its employment between November 2017 and June 2018, transferred to LNER’s employment. Thereafter, on 11 November 2018, employees in the engineering function transferred from LNER to the employment of the third respondent, Hitachi, after Hitachi, the manufacturer of LNER’s fleet of new Azuma trains, became responsible for LNER’s maintenance activities. 1 They also advised the Tribunal of some typographical errors in or changes to certain claimants’ names, which are recorded in the schedules to this judgment.[16]LNER and Hitachi accept that under TUPE, they are responsible for the claims brought by those employees who transferred to them. There are 1,052 such claims against LNER and 202 against Hitachi, leaving 14 claims against VTEC. No issues arise otherwise from the transfers.[17]The railway industry has a long history and tradition of collective bargaining with trade unions. At the material time, VTEC recognised and collectively bargained with the ASLEF, TSSA, Unite2 and RMT trade unions in respect of employees other than management and executive grades. VTEC had not shown any hostility to or intention to vary or depart from the concept of collective bargaining with recognised trade unions including the RMT.[18]VTEC conducted collective bargaining with its recognised trade unions under the terms of an agreement between it and those trade unions called the “Great North Eastern Railway Limited Procedure Agreement 1” effective 1 January 2016 (275- 287) (“the Collective Bargaining Agreement ”or “CBA”). This agreement was the latest in a series of similar, although somewhat modified, agreements dating back to the days of British Rail.[19]The CBA provided at paragraph 7 for three tiers of collective bargaining: businesswide via a Joint Committee (Annex A) (279); function-specific on particular issues via Company Councils (Annex B); and locally (Annex C). Here the Tribunal is concerned with the Joint Committee process under Annex A, described from now as “the JNC”.[20]Paragraph 4 of the CBA (277) emphasised the importance of mutuality: “The processes of collective bargaining and joint consultation rest upon the concept of mutuality. Within the machinery and procedures established by this Agreement, mutuality will be underpinned by joint regulation of those questions appropriate for negotiation and by cooperation through discussion on those matters appropriate for consultation. The aim is to develop mutual trust between Great North Eastern Railway Ltd3 and its employees.”[21]By paragraph 2 of Annex A, the scope of the JNC was all employees outside management and executive grades whose terms and conditions were regulated 2 In strict terms the union identified as Unite was, as set out in the Collective Bargaining Agreement, the Railway Sub-Committee of the Confederation of Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions (‘CSEU’). CSEU is a federation of the Unite, GMB, Community and Prospect trade unions. However, it has been referred to in contemporaneous documents and throughout these proceedings as “Unite”, and the Tribunal will so identify it. 3 There is no significance in the different name given here. by collective agreements with trade unions. Under paragraph 3, membership of the JNC consisted of no more than eight Employer Side and eight Employees Side representatives, each of the four trade unions providing two representatives (of whom one was to be a full-time paid trade union official). Paragraph 6 provided that the JNC’s purpose was to provide a forum for negotiation and agreement on questions of general pay and general terms and conditions, with implementation of agreements on such questions referred to Company Councils or the local level. Paragraph 8 was in the following terms: “The Committee will endeavour to conclude negotiations by agreement and to hold negotiations in a timely manner. The procedure is exhausted once negotiations and discussions within the Committee have concluded. However, this would not preclude further discussions between an appropriate Manager or the Managing Director and a fulltime paid trade union official to consider what other steps might assist resolution of questions upon which there has been failure to agree.”[22]This was, therefore, single-table bargaining with four recognised trade unions. Neither the CBA nor particularly Annex A incorporated a specified procedure or structure for collective bargaining and negotiations, providing only that meetings of the JNC would be held as often as necessary and in any event within 28 days of a request. The document was silent as to voting or whether agreement must be unanimous or by majority of the members of the JNC or participating trade unions. There was no avoidance of disputes procedure (although there was such a procedure under Annex B, governing Company Councils). There was no mechanism within paragraph 8 for how, when and by whom it should be decided that negotiations and discussions within the JNC had concluded.[23]The terms of employment of VTEC’s employees in scope of the CBA, that is all employees except for management or executive grades, incorporated collectively bargained terms of employment in the following way (298): “27 Incorporation of Trade Union Agreements Your contract of employment is subject to such terms and conditions as may be settled from time to time, in relation to employees in your grade under Procedure Agreement 1: General Collective Bargaining established between the Company and recognised Trade Unions…”[24]In March 2017 VTEC began negotiations with the TSSA, Unite and the RMT about the 2017 annual pay award, to be effective from 1 April 2017, using the Annex A JNC process.[25]Although ASLEF, which represents train drivers, was a party to the CBA, it was not involved in the negotiations, having reached a separate two-year agreement with VTEC in 2015. It is unclear whether this was a permanent arrangement; Ms Bullock thought it was, although she acknowledged that the CBA had not been amended to remove ASLEF; the trade unions knew that ASLEF was still a party to the CBA and as will emerge, they aspired for all four unions to participate in negotiations and reach single pay deals covering all employees.[26]Paula Bullock, VTEC’s Head of Employee Relations and Reward, led the JNC negotiations for VTEC. She conducted the negotiations within the scope given to her by VTEC’s Executive Directors, and she sought authority if she needed to go outside that scope. She was an experienced negotiator with the railway unions, having spent her whole career in HR roles within the industry, including with VTEC since September 2015. Sean McGowan, RMT Regional Organiser, led for the RMT. He was also an experienced negotiator and had been a Regional Organiser with the RMT since January 2014.[27]There were meetings of the JNC about the 2017 pay award on 22 March 2017 (310-312), 23 May 2017 (313-316) and 15 June 2017 (317-319). It is unnecessary to describe these meetings in detail; they show after the first meeting a process of negotiation about offers and counter offers, covering percentage pay awards, single or two-year deals and offers with and without productivity “strings”. The process, as shown in the minutes, was that the trade unions conferred privately together in break-out meetings and put forward common responses; generally Mr McGowan took the lead. Although she did not have the exact numbers, Ms Bullock knew that the RMT had the largest membership within VTEC of the unions involved. No agreement was reached at these meetings.[28]The next meeting was on 30 August 2017 (339-340). Ms Bullock had expressed concern at the delay in arranging the meeting and had attempted to bring it forward but the trade unions resisted this, especially Mr McGowan, who expressed his views trenchantly, accusing Ms Bullock of bullying (335, 338).[29]In the meeting Ms Bullock proposed a two-year pay offer made up of either, in year 1, a 3% increase in pay and allowance without conditions, or a 3.2% increase with conditions about rolling sick pay, changes to sick pay entitlement for new entrants and commitment to use of mobile technology, and in either case, in year 2, an RPI-based increase. The trade unions rejected the offer, and put forward a counter-offer for one year only, made up of a 3.2% increase with agreement to rolling sick pay and commitment to mobile technology, but removing the proposed differential treatment of new entrants whilst agreeing to a review of absence management procedures. They included an additional stipulation that all trade unions, including ASLEF, should be part of the absence management review. Ms Bullock rejected the unions’ counter-offer, repeated her previous offer and asked the unions to put that offer to members by way of ballot, summarising VTEC’s position by letter dated 8 September 2017 (341-2), in which she described the offer as “full and final”.[30]Unite and the TSSA rejected the offer after ballots; the RMT’s Executive Council rejected it without a ballot. The unions advised Ms Bullock of this outcome in early October 2017 (349-351).[31]The Tribunal highlights three matters from the meeting on 30 August 2017: first, VTEC’s sick pay scheme was exceptionally generous, and VTEC wished to reduce its cost by moving to a rolling sick pay year. In the meeting, the union negotiators, including Mr McGowan, said they were prepared to accept the principle of rolling sick pay as part of the package; second, the unions’ demand that all trade unions should participate in the absence management review reflected a growing concern that the train drivers represented by ASLEF had (or might have) different and more favourable arrangements; third, Ms Bullock knew, as she confirmed in evidence to the Tribunal, that the trade unions had internal processes to follow, including balloting, to seek members’ views on proposals. She knew that whilst Mr McGowan (and the other representatives) could recommend acceptance of proposals to their unions’ executive and, ultimately, membership, they could not bind their unions or their members to any deal.[32]Following the unions’ rejection of the 30 August 2017 proposals, Ms Bullock agreed to their request for a further JNC meeting, which took place on 17 October 2017 (352-356). It was clearly a difficult meeting, lasting several hours.[33]This was the fifth negotiating meeting. Mr McGowan described the 2017 negotiations thus far as “unremarkable”. He did not consider five meetings as unusual when what was being negotiated was a pay deal for one or two years with productivity related terms and conditions. He suggested that negotiations over such matters would usually take place over “more like 5-10 meetings”, although he accepted in cross-examination that perhaps five would be more common. Ms Bullock told the Tribunal the number of meetings was unusual and the tone more hostile than she had experienced. The Tribunal’s impression is that there were more meetings than sometimes happened but not exceptionally so. Ms Bullock’s practice was that if agreement was not reached, or any proposals were taken away but rejected, as happened with the August 2017 offer, she would arrange a further JNC meeting as part of the continuing discussion and negotiation process. She said that if matters became stalled, she would ask the unions to agree that collective bargaining could go no further, although she had never encountered that situation in practice.[34]At the beginning of the meeting Ms Bullock put forward an offer of an increase of 3.2% in year 1, RPI in year 2, with the introduction of the rolling sick pay year, commitment to mobile technology and the absence management review. This was substantially the same as the trade unions’ August 2017 counter-offer, but for two years rather than one year only as the unions had proposed. The unions expressed concern about whether the rolling sick pay year would be introduced to all grades, and whether ASLEF would be invited to the absence management talks. Ms Bullock said that the deal would only apply to the parties to the negotiations, but the aspiration was to apply the rolling sick pay year to all grades, and she would invite ASLEF but could not require them to attend. Mr McGowan said that the unions would prefer a one-year deal which would enable ASLEF to re-join the single table bargaining in 2018 when their deal ended. He put forward an alternative proposal which he said the unions could recommend of a one-year deal of a 3.2% increase, the introduction of a rolling sick pay year, commitment to mobile technology and a review of absence management, with a floor increase of £650 for low earners.[35]During further negotiations, Ms Bullock expressed surprise that the unions would not accept proposals they had themselves put forward, and concern about the cost of the package given VTEC’s financial position. She said she was trying to reach a good deal which would enable employees to receive their back pay in time for Christmas, and commented that the contentious separate arrangements for new entrants were now withdrawn. Eventually, she put forward a revised offer of, in year 1, a 3.2% increase, the introduction of a rolling sick pay year, commitment to mobile technology and a joint review of absence management, with a floor increase of £600 for low earners, and in year 2, an RPI-based increase (“the 2017 Pay Deal”). At Mr McGowan’s request, she provided wording for the commitment to new technology and the absence management review, which the meeting discussed and agreed.[36]The respondents’ case is that Mr McGowan then agreed to recommend the deal for acceptance. The minutes of the meeting support this (356): “SM (Mr McGowan) and JW (Mr Wilks, the TSSA representative) confirmed that TSSA and RMT would be recommending the deal for acceptance. SJ (Mr Johnson, the Unite representative) said he would feed back to KM (Mr Mawer, the lead Unite representative).[37]As the Tribunal has already said, the union negotiators, including Mr McGowan, did not have power to agree a deal. Mr McGowan was required by the RMT’s procedures initially to obtain the comments of the Company Council, then refer the proposals to the union’s National Executive Committee, who would decide whether to refer it to the membership by ballot, with or without a recommendation whether to accept or reject, or to reject it outright (as had happened with the August 2017 proposals). Mr McGowan agreed in evidence that he was able to say whether he would recommend the proposals, but he soon disputed after the meeting that he had done so, and continued to dispute it in evidence to the Tribunal. He told the Tribunal that although he agreed to take the offer away and consult members, he did not say that he would recommend the offer. Ms Bullock’s evidence was that the minutes were accurate, and although she could not recall his precise words, Mr McGowan “shook my hand, and said he would recommend the offer for acceptance through their internal processes”.[38]Whatever in fact happened, it is clear from subsequent events that Ms Bullock believed that Mr McGowan had said he would recommend acceptance. However, the Tribunal prefers Ms Bullock’s evidence, and finds as fact that Mr McGowan did say in the meeting that he would recommend the offer for acceptance through the RMT’s processes. First, this is consistent with the contemporaneous minutes of the meeting (356). Second, it is consistent with Ms Bullock’s letter sent the same day which referred to what he had said and which Mr McGowan did not immediately contradict (357, and paragraph 39 below). Third, Mr McGowan referred to sending the offer to the union’s National Executive Committee “for recommendation” (362); the Tribunal does not accept his evidence that the word “recommendation” denoted no more that a decision whether to recommend. Fourth, it is consistent with the TSSA’s later email about events that day (394). Finally, the Tribunal finds that Mr McGowan changed his position about what he had said at the meeting, for clear reasons (paragraph 44 below).[39]Immediately after the meeting on 17 October 2017 Ms Bullock emailed Mr McGowan with details of the “full and final” offer just made (357-358).The letter included this paragraph: “I understand from our discussions that you now intend to recommend this offer for acceptance to your respective executive committees, and subject to receipt of written confirmation of this offer we will prepare to introduce revised rates of pay within our December pay”. Mr McGowan does not dispute he received this letter, and it is notable that he did not immediately challenge what Ms Bullock said about his intention to recommend the offer.[40]On 18 October 2017 Mr McGowan emailed Ms Bullock twice (362-3). He asked her to send the terms of the offer to full-time officials “so I can send it into the National Executive Committee later for recommendation”, and also asked for details of the rolling sick pay scheme, as he had had a number of questions seeking clarification. He also asked for paid time off (which was agreed) for Company Council representatives to attend a meeting with him on 23 October 2017 to get “their thoughts and feedback” on the offer.[41]It is clear (364-368) that once Mr McGowan communicated the terms of the offer to those he represented, concerns were expressed to him about the lack of detail of the sick pay proposals, whether the Company Council would be consulted about the offer and why he was consulting about proposals that had previously been rejected. In responding to the concerns, he described the negotiators as “only messengers”, he said he wanted to explain how the offer came to be as it was before the Company Council decided whether was the best offer available, and he confirmed that the Company Council would vote on whether to accept the proposals before he sent his report to the National Executive Committee for decision.[42]On 18 October 2017 Richard Close, VTEC’s Head of Commercial Engineering, and Natalie Wilding, General Manager Central, updated the workforce (370-371) about the offer which had been made to the trade union representatives, saying: “We believe this is a fair offer and we’ll now wait to hear final confirmation from each of the unions. If accepted we will look to back pay in the December payroll”. Then on 20 October 2017 (372-373) Ms Bullock replied to Mr McGowan, sending him a “broad summary” of the rolling sick pay proposals and the wording agreed at the meeting on 17 October 2017 for the absence management review and commitment to technology.[43]At its meeting on 23 October 2017 the Company Council voted to reject the proposals. Their concerns were that ASLEF had been offered the same pay deal without conditions; in their view more could be done about pay; and insufficient detail had been given about the commitment to technology and the absence management review and whether these conditions would apply across all grades.[44]The same day, Mr McGowan emailed his report (477-478) to the RMT’s General Secretary, Mick Cash. Having referred to the National Executive Committee’s previous rejection of the August 2017 offer, he set out the terms of the improved October 2017 offer, saying that the offer almost exactly mirrored the offer “quite rightly rejected previously” because it would create a two-tier workforce. He recommended rejection of the offer on the basis it would create that two-tier workforce on the question of rolling sick pay. Curiously, and contrary to paragraph 40 of his witness statement, he did not mention the Company Council decision which had focussed on different issues.[45]The Tribunal finds that Mr McGowan was embarrassed that, having told Ms Bullock he would recommend acceptance, he found himself unable to do so faced with opposition from members to the proposals. This led to his trenchant and defensive reaction when challenged by Ms Bullock about the change of mind, and the confrontational style of his later communications to her and his membership about the proposals.[46]On 24 October 2017 the RMT’s National Executive Committee decided to ballot its members in VTEC with a recommendation to reject the offer. Mr McGowan communicated this decision to Ms Bullock on 26 October 2017 (385).Ms Bullock expressed disappointment: “I am however disappointed as you confirmed following our recent pay meeting on the 17 October that you would be recommending the final offer for acceptance. Whilst I appreciate that you have your own internal procedures to follow I would have appreciated a further conversation if the position had changed.” In response, Mr McGowan threatened legal action (383-384) if VTEC repeated what he described as “the lie” that he had agreed to recommend acceptance at the meeting on 17 October 2017. This led Clare Burles, VTEC’s People Director, to write to Mr Cash describing Mr McGowan’s communication style as “unacceptable”.[47]The same day, 26 October 2017, Derek Docherty, Chair of the Company Council, sent a lengthy message to RMT members within VTEC described as” a personal message from the RMT Lead Officer” (Mr McGowan) (374-381). It was on any showing strongly-worded; Ms Bullock described it in evidence as “inflammatory”. The Tribunal gives only a flavour of it. It asserted that VTEC had not provided any details of the “strings” attached to the pay offer and had “reneged” on its agreement to provide more details ahead of the Company Council meeting on 23 October 2017. It described the offer as “a blatant attack on your current terms and conditions” and the behaviour of the company as “arrogant and bullish” and “showing contempt“ for members’ intelligence. It criticised the “strings” attached to the offer, accusing VTEC of being “hell-bent on attacking you from every angle” and mounting “wave after wave of attacks on your pay and conditions of service”. There was more in the same vein. It compared the treatment of members with the treatment of train drivers who were not subject to the proposals and concluded “reject this insult of an offer”.[48]Ms Bullock saw Mr Docherty’s communication. She was concerned by it on several levels. She was surprised that Mr McGowan had gone from accepting the offer to showing what she described in evidence as “utter contempt” for it. She noted that although wording for the commitment to technology and absence management review had been agreed at the meeting on 17 October 2017, and further detail about rolling sick pay had been given on 20 October 2017, Mr McGowan was wrongly saying that no details had been given. She felt that the change in Mr McGowan’s attitude to the deal was “extreme”, and the management team was “completely shocked and confused”. She told the Tribunal in evidence that she had never come across a trade union official who would “shake hands on a deal” and then report it differently to their members and such behaviour if it happened generally would “make collective bargaining impossible”. She regarded Mr McGowan’s correspondence threatening legal action as “unprecedented”. She suspected (correctly, in the Tribunal’s view) that Mr McGowan had incorrectly accepted a deal which when relayed to his colleagues was rejected, causing him to lose face with his colleagues and explaining why he had reacted in such an emotive way. She did not know what Mr McGowan had in fact done in discussions within the union to recommend the offer, but drew conclusions from the tone and content of the 26 October 2017 communication.[49]On 27 October 2017 Jerry Wines, the TSSA’s lead full-time official, advised Ms Bullock (392-393) that his members had accepted the offer. On the same day, Mr Wines wrote to his members (394-395) confirming acceptance of the pay award, and commented at some length on events at the 17 October 2017 meeting and what the RMT had since communicated about them. Although the Tribunal is conscious of the possibility that inter-union rivalry and the need to justify the decision to recommend the award might have influenced his response, what Mr Wiles said is consistent with Ms Bullock’s evidence and the Tribunal believes it was accurate.[50]Mr Wines confirmed that all three unions had agreed at the meeting on 17 October 2017 to recommend acceptance of the offer, observing that ”It was accepted by all Unions that following months of very difficult discussions, this was the best settlement achievable through negotiation at this time….The facts are very different to what is being portrayed: all three Union negotiating teams did agree to recommend the offer in their respective internal consultation processes; written details of the conditions attached to the pay offer were circulated and agreed by all three Unions at the meeting; and the principle of moving to a rolling sick pay reference period was discussed during previous meetings and had not been identified by any Union as a dealbreaking issue due to the fact its impact is negligible and it is common practice in the industry.”[51]Mr Docherty responded later that day with a widely-distributed email (403-404), described by Ms Bullock in evidence as “insulting and inflammatory”, in which he addressed Mr Wines as having made a “piss poor, blatant attempt to nick our members” and told him “you may as well have been sat on management’s lap” and “that’s any trust between us done”. Mr Wines was upset by this; he forwarded the email to Ms Bullock, describing Mr McGowan’s behaviour as “bullying and harassment” and saying that the TSSA would not be attending any meeting where Mr McGowan was present until further notice.[52]On 27 October 2017 Ms Bullock emailed the workforce with an update on the pay negotiations and details of the offer (396-399). She stated that the TSSA had accepted the offer and Unite would soon ballot members with a recommendation to accept. She stated that the unions had agreed to recommend the offer for acceptance through their internal channels, but the RMT had changed its position and were recommending they reject the offer, about which she expressed herself as “surprised and baffled”. She concluded: “At a time when public sector pay caps are widely known, and average private sector pay increases are 2.8% I believe this is a fair offer – and many of you have said it is too. As we enter winter many of you have said the extra pay, which would be backdated to April 2017, would be more than welcome in December which is an expensive month for many of us. In order to pay you this in time for 1st December, RMT need to confirm the deal has been accepted in writing by 10th November, 2017.”[53]On 10 November 2017 Ms Bullock was advised that Unite members had voted to accept the offer (405-406). Then finally on 13 November 2017 Ms Bullock discovered from the RMT’s website that RMT members had voted to reject the offer, the outcome being confirmed formally to her on 14 November 2017 (409). In this communication Mr McGowan asked Ms Bullock to identify dates for “further meetings in order that further discussions can be held in relation to the pay claim”.[54]However, already on 13 November 2017 Claire Ansley, Customer Experience Director, and John Doughty, Engineering Director, had written to the workforce (407-408). This is the communication alleged to contravene section 145B and therefore the Tribunal sets it out in full, with only some administrative details omitted: “The result of Unite’s referendum is in and we’re pleased to say members have voted to accept the pay deal: a 3.2% basic pay increase (minimum £600pa), with productivity commitments in year 1 and an increase equivalent to RPI in year 2. This is great news and follows TSSA also accepting the offer for its members. The negotiations over the past eight months were challenging yet constructive, and we have a fair deal that we think gives you the award you deserve whilst balancing the needs of the business and our customers. The RMT has confirmed on its website members voted to reject the pay award, although the ballot is not verified independently. This is incredibly disappointing, and we’re surprised by this outcome as we made changes to the original pay offer based on feedback from you and representatives. We know that many of you would welcome backdated pay in time for Christmas. With all this feedback in mind we’re eager to give you what you deserve – and soon! Therefore all of you will see this award land in your bank accounts in December – often an expensive month for us all. (Details of when payment of the award would be made omitted) We hope you see this as good news. With challenging trading conditions, and economic growth predictions looking slower than expected, staff in many other industries would be envious of a 3.2% increase in year 1 pay. The public sector cap is well known, and average private pay increases are around 2.8%. However, if you’re an RMT member and do not wish to accept the two year pay award (as attached), please email {address omitted] by midday 24 November with the subject line “Pay Award Opt-out”. Alternatively you can send a letter to opt out of the award…. …. Please think carefully before making a decision and bear in mind that if you opt out in the hope the deal will improve – it won’t. As a reminder, details of the award and productivity conditions are attached. It also gives example pay increases over the two years.”[55]The speed with which VTEC reacted to the RMT ballot result by sending the communication the same day is striking. The Tribunal did not hear evidence from Ms Anstey or Mr Doughty, its signatories, about why they sent the communication. Ms Bullock told the Tribunal, and the Tribunal accepts, that although the decision to send the communication was made upon receipt of the ballot result, there were discussions before then about what to do, and the decision was made by the Executive Directors, upon her recommendation as “the subject-matter expert”. She described the decision as “a business decision that collective bargaining was completed, and we would write to the membership”.[56]The Tribunal has not seen any documentation of any kind to support the discussions and decisions within VTEC management leading to the 13 November 2017 communication. All the Tribunal can say is that it was precipitate, communicated the same day management knew RMT members had rejected the deal.[57]The implementation of the 2017 Pay Award from 1 December 2017 meant, for RMT members, that their pay and conditions, at least until the next pay award, would not be collectively bargained by the union which represented them4. If they opted out, not only would the same result obtain, but they would not receive the increased pay (including back pay from 1 April 2017) under the 2017 Pay Award (although the other conditions included in it would not apply to them).[58]The Tribunal will set out later, in its conclusions (paragraphs 144-5), its findings about why VTEC sent the communication to its workforce on 13 November 2017 and what its purpose was.[59]There were no further meetings of the JNC about the 2017 Pay Award.[60]Mr Cash wrote to Ms Burles and Ms Bullock on 15 November 2017. He referred to the communication of 13 November 2017, describing it as “the imposition of the pay award”, He said that a trade dispute would exist unless VTEC made a “significantly improved pay offer” (412).[61]Ms Bullock responded on 16 November 2017 (413-414): “I refer to your correspondence dated 15 November and your advanced notification that a dispute situation may soon arise between our two organisations. We have met with our trade union partners over many months to discuss and agree our collective pay award. We have revised our position in order to offer an RPI deal in 2017 and 2018. Whilst we have identified areas of productivity, each of these areas has been discussed in detail with RMT, TSSA and Unite in order to reach a final position where all parties including RMT indicated their intent to recommend the pay award for acceptance, through the normal channels. Through discussions we have shared information candidly in respect of our financial circumstances, and believe that we have been able to reach a position where we are able to offer a very good increase in pay for our people and, as a result of productivity improvement, one we also are able to afford. 4 Whether the terms could be regarded as collectively bargained through the other unions’ acceptance of them is an issue the Tribunal considers in its conclusions, although anticipating the outcome, the Tribunal finds that they could not. Given that we had exhausted collective bargaining on the issue and our people are understandably keen to receive their pay award which has now been agreed by other trade unions parties to the pay discussions, TSSA and Unite, this has led us to the decision to pay the increase generally across the relevant grades within the next available payroll on 1 December. In recognition of the RMT position, however, we have also provided the opportunity of an opt-out arrangement”. I am of course keen to avoid any trade dispute, this manner of action is rarely productive, rather it is damaging to any business, as well as upsetting and distressing for our people. As discussed previously, we are not in a position to improve on the offer discussed and previously recommended for acceptance by your trade union within our discussions on 17 October after many months of consultations and agreement by the other two unions. However as we remain uncertain as to the issues which resulted in your trade union withdrawing your previous recommendation and would welcome the opportunity to meet with you urgently in order to discuss this further. I await confirmation of your availability to meet and hope that we will be able to do so over the coming days.”[62]Contrary to Ms Bullock’s assertion at paragraph 75 of her witness statement that in this letter she was “stressing again” that collective bargaining was “exhausted”, this was her first assertion to this effect.[63]On 17 November 2017 Mr Cash wrote asking for an Avoidance of Dispute meeting (415). Then on 20 November 2017 he questioned how VTEC would implement different rates of pay arising from the opt-out (416). Ms Bullock responded the same day that the company would answer the questions at a future meeting, and stated (419) that the purpose of this meeting was VTEC’s intention to avoid any trade dispute and she hoped therefore that the RMT would not take steps to initiate a ballot for industrial action.[64]Ms Bullock duly met the RMT’s Assistant General Secretary, Steve Hedley, with Mr McGowan and Mr Docherty on 22 November 2017 in what Ms Burles later described as “an Avoidance of Dispute meeting” (455). This led to some further clarification but no change in substance to the company’s position, summarised in her letter of 23 November 2017 (422-423). She stated that it was helpful to understand the RMT’s rationale for not accepting the 2017 Pay Award. She gave further explanation about the commitment to technology, absence management review and rolling sick pay year, and as to the latter, stated: “I am not in a position to withdraw the rolling sick pay as a principle. However, within our absence management review we are prepared to consider alternative approaches which may negate the future changes to the sick pay year. We do of course need your commitment to this review with a view to introducing changes by 1 April 2018. If an alternative cannot be agreed by 31 March 2018, we will implement the rolling sick pay as outlined in the offer dated 17 October 2017 with effect from 1 April 2018.” Finally she confirmed that the pay offer was unchanged, and expressed the hope that the clarification would resolve the difficulties leading to the threat of a trade dispute and enable the union to reach the position to recommend the offer to members who had chosen to opt out.[65]The RMT remained dissatisfied with the position. Mr Hedley told Ms Bullock on 23 November 2017 “we are now in dispute” (424). Following this, on 1 December 2017, the RMT instigated a ballot for industrial action (432-434).[66]Whilst the ballot result (446-447) was in favour of industrial action, it did not achieve the legally-required minimum turnout threshold for industrial action and so no industrial action ensued.[67]On 20 December 2017, Ms Burles emailed Mr Cash offering the RMT the opportunity to accept the pay award on behalf of its members (448). However, she advised that if the offer was not accepted by 29 December 2017, it would be withdrawn, including back pay.[68]Further communications ensued between Ms Bullock, Ms Burles and RMT representatives, involving Mr Cash and Mr McGowan, including a lengthy meeting on 2 February 2018 (455-459). The minutes record that several issues were discussed at the meeting. These included the RMT’s continuing rejection of the 2017 Pay Award, the position of employees who had not opted out and Mr Cash’s assertion that RMT members were not individually bound by terms not collectively bargained, whether the pay award or the conditions attached to it could be renegotiated, and the section 145B claims which had not yet been served but had been intimated by Mr McGowan to Ms Bullock in January 2018 (451). Ms Burles agreed to consider what had been said and whether any changes could be proposed.[69]Following the meeting, Ms Bullock wrote to Mr Cash on 12 February 2018 (460- 462). She reiterated VTEC’s position that when it implemented the 2017 Pay Award on 1 December 2017, it considered that collective bargaining was exhausted after nine months of negotiations and acceptance by the other trade unions involved. She clarified the purpose of the letter of 20 December 2017. She expressed the hope that the parties could work together to reach final agreement on the issues. She offered to withdraw the rolling sick pay condition in return for the union’s commitment to tackle absence management issues including rolling sick pay. She also stipulated that the section 145B claims must not be pursued. If accepted by 16 February 2018, this would enable all RMT members, including those who had opted-out, to receive the 2017 Pay Award.[70]Mr Cash responded on 3 March 2018 (467). He indicated that the 12 February 2018 proposals were acceptable but the RMT would continue to support the section 145B claims arising from the imposition of the award. Correspondence between VTEC and the RMT continued during March and April 2018 but ultimately no agreement was reached at that time, with the sticking point being that the RMT would not countenance withdrawing support for the section 145B claims (467- 473). In the event, although VTEC did not introduce the rolling sick pay year for any employees, it was not until November 2018 that LNER (as the employer had now become) abandoned the demand for the claims to be withdrawn and the RMT accepted the 2017 Pay Award including full back pay for employees who had opted out.[71]Ms Bullock told the Tribunal that the initial discussions in November and December 2018 were in the context of avoiding a trade dispute, although she accepted that she had known already that if the ballot result in November 2017 was unfavourable, a trade dispute was likely to ensue. The amended proposals as to rolling sick pay in February 2018 were linked to the resolution of the section 145B claims as she did not think it was feasible to reach agreement if the RMT continued to support the claims. However, she acknowledged that VTEC wanted to resolve matters, as the business was facing a number of significant issues on the horizon, in particular the phased introduction of a new fleet of trains that would involve a significant change to the business and a large TUPE transfer arising from the franchise move to LNER. In that context, she said, the business offered a concession to try to resolve the outstanding pay issue and avoid any ongoing dispute, in particular any possible sizeable or lengthy litigation.[72]Finally, the Tribunal notes that in her letter of 9 March 2018 (468), Ms Bullock wrote that if the RMT did not agree to withdraw the section 145B claims, she would “draw the pay review to a close”. Further, on 6 April 2018 Ms Ansley wrote to staff (472-473) rehearsing the history of negotiations from June 2017 to date, including the two meetings in November 2017 and February 2018, and concluded that “after a year of negotiations” it could not keep revising its pay offer and therefore it could not see “where else there is to go with the 2017 pay talks and therefore the talks have come to a natural end”. The same day Ms Bullock wrote to Mr McGowan and Mr Cash (474), stating that because RMT would not withdraw support for the tribunal claims, VTEC intended “to now draw our pay discussions to a close”.
Relevant law
[73]The Tribunal set out the relevant provisions of section 145B of the 1992 Act at paragraphs 5-7 above. Two preliminary points should be made: first, the object of section 145B, broadly stated, is to penalise offers made by employers to workers who are trade union members which, if accepted, would have the result that one or more terms of their employment will not (or will no longer) be determined by collective bargaining; and second, the three key concepts within section 145B are(1) offer;(2) prohibited result; and(3) prohibited purpose. All three concepts are in issue in these proceedings.[74]Section 145B was incorporated into the 1992 Act as long ago as 2004. Its purpose was to give effect to the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in Wilson and Palmer 2002 IRLR 568 on Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The meaning and proper interpretation of section 145B has recently been determined by the Supreme Court for the first time in Kostal. The Supreme Court reached its decision by 3:2 majority, references below are to the decision of the majority, delivered by Lord Leggatt.[75]In Kostal, an employer had a formal Recognition and Procedure Agreement with the Unite trade union which set out a specified bargaining procedure. During collective bargaining which had not resulted in an agreement about pay, the employer made two sets of pay offers directly to its workforce which would allow employees to receive their Christmas bonus but would not have been collectively bargained. When it made the offers, the final stage in the agreed bargaining procedure had not taken place. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the offers would have the prohibited result within sections 145B(1)(a) and (2); it was conceded that the employer had made offers within section 145B(1), and that if it was established that the offers would have the prohibited result, the employer’s purpose fell within section 145B(1)(b). In consequence, the Supreme Court did not analyse the concepts of offer or purpose in detail.[76]The key conclusions of the Supreme Court were as follows:76.1 The exercise of statutory construction of section 145B sits within the context of “the modern case law”, including, in the field of employment law, the decision in Uber BV v Aslam [2021] UKSC 5, emphasising the central importance of identifying the purpose of the legislation and interpreting the relevant language in the light of that purpose (paragraph 30).76.2 Where a trade union is recognised, the right not to have an offer made by the employer applies where the result of acceptance would be that one or more terms of employment either(i) will not or(ii) will no longer be determined by collective agreement negotiated by or on behalf of the union (paragraph 33).76.3 It is crucial to have in mind section 145B(1)(a), which, when read together with section 145B (2), defines the “prohibited result”. It is that result which represents the mischief which the legislation aims to prevent or deter (paragraph 31). No minimum length of time is specified or can reasonably be read into section 145B(2) for which that result would have to persist in order to constitute the “prohibited result” (paragraph 34). It is sufficient that, on the particular occasion, the result will be the prohibited result, even if there is no long-term intention to end collective bargaining. The focus is on the result, not the content of the offers.76.4 To determine whether the result is the prohibited result defined in section 145B(2), it is necessary to look forwards from the notional date of acceptance of the offers to what will or will not happen thereafter. The period during which one or more terms will not be determined by collective agreement may be time-limited or open-ended, but it starts to run when the offers are assumed to have been accepted. It follows logically that the prohibited result is not a result capable of being achieved by the very acceptance of the offers irrespective of what happens afterwards (paragraph 41).76.5 The employer has a defence if it shows that its sole or main purpose in making the offers was not to achieve that result. The purpose of achieving the prohibited result is the “prohibited purpose”. It is, however, important to note that what constitutes the prohibited purpose is defined by reference to what constitutes the prohibited result. For that reason too, although the relevant provisions must be construed as a whole, the primary question must be to identify the nature and scope of the prohibited result.76.6 Where an employer has negotiated with the union and the parties have exhausted the procedure for collective bargaining without being able to reach agreement, there is no policy justification for preventing or deterring the employer from at that point making an offer directly to workers. There is accordingly no reasonable basis for attributing to Parliament the intention that acceptance of such an offer would have the prohibited result. The legality of such an offer cannot rationally depend on the employer having to show what its purpose was in making it. If the acceptance of such an offer is treated as automatically having the prohibited result just because the worker is being invited to accept terms which have not been collectively agreed, showing the purpose in making the offers cannot anyway provide a secure or stable defence to the employer. It could always be said that achieving a change in terms of employment which had not been collectively agreed was the employer’s main purpose in making the offers. Nor does section 145D(4) provide any basis on which a contrary argument could be made. In particular, section 145D(4)(c) could not apply to an offer made generally to the workforce after negotiations with the union had ended without a collective agreement (paragraph 46).76.7 As to where the line might in practice be drawn in deciding whether an employer had ‘by-passed’ collective negotiation with a recognised union, “there seems to me a strong case for saying that the obligation of the state to secure the right under art 11 to be represented by a trade union and for that union's voice to be heard entails that an employer which has recognised a trade union for the purpose of collective bargaining and agreed to follow a specified bargaining procedure cannot be permitted with impunity to ignore or by-pass the agreed procedure, either by refusing to follow the agreed process at all or by being free to 'drop in and out of the collective process as and when that suits its purpose’ (paragraph 61) .76.8 Finally, the Tribunal sets out paragraphs 63 to 72, in full: 63. There is an important feature of the wording of section 145B which both parties’ interpretations of the section leave out of account. In this respect, although diametrically opposed, they seem to me to share a common flaw. In both cases they treat the question whether an offer falls within section 145B(1)(a) and (2) as depending entirely on the content of the offer. On the claimants’ preferred interpretation, all that matters is whether the offer is to agree a change which has not been collectively agreed with the union to a term or terms of the individual worker’s contract of employment. On the Company’s interpretation, all that matters is whether the offer requires the worker to contract out of any collective bargaining rights. 64 Both interpretations fail to reflect the structure of section 145B. What is prohibited by the section is not the making of an offer which, if accepted, would constitute an agreement with a particular content. Rather, what is prohibited is the making of an offer which, if accepted, would have a particular result. Furthermore, and importantly, that result is not defined as one which follows simply from acceptance of the offer by the worker who is the subject of section 145B: it takes account additionally of any offers which the employer also makes to other workers and requires consideration of what would happen if all the offers made were accepted. This indicates that section 145B is concerned not merely with the content of individual offers but with the potential practical consequences of the employer’s conduct, considered in the round. The interpretations of section 145B for which the claimants and the Company contend both seem to me incapable of explaining why, in judging whether acceptance of an offer would have the prohibited result, it is necessary to assume, as required by subsection (1)(a), “other workers’ acceptance of offers which the employer also makes to them”. 65. I think it is possible to read section 145B in a way which gives meaning and effect to this significant feature of its language and does so in a way which is compatible with article 11. Once it is recognised that the question whether the acceptance of offers would have the prohibited “result” is a question of causation, it is evident that the state of affairs described in subsection (2) cannot be regarded as the “result” of acceptance of the offers if it would inevitably have occurred anyway, irrespective of whether the offers were made and accepted. In that case there would be no causal connection between the presumed acceptance of the offers and the state of affairs described in subsection (2). More specifically, in order for offers made by the employer to workers to be capable of having the prohibited result, there must be at least a real possibility that, if the offers were not made and accepted, the workers’ relevant terms of employment would have been determined by a new collective agreement reached for the period in question. If there is no such possibility, then it cannot be said that making the individual offers has produced the result that the terms of employment have not been determined by collective agreement for that period. In other words, it is implicit in the definition of the prohibited result that the workers’ terms of employment, or any of those terms, will not (or will no longer) be determined by collective agreement negotiated by or on behalf of the union when they otherwise might well have been determined in that way. 66. On this interpretation, there is no difficulty in applying section 145B in cases where the union is not yet recognised but is seeking to be recognised. In that situation the employer is free to make individual offers to workers in relation to a particular pay round without any risk of contravening section 145B because, at the time when the offers are made, there is no possibility of agreeing terms through collective bargaining. 67. Likewise, where there is a recognised union, there is nothing to prevent an employer from making an offer directly to its workers in relation to a matter which falls within the scope of a collective bargaining agreement provided that the employer has first followed, and exhausted, the agreed collective bargaining procedure. If that has been done, it cannot be said that, when the offers were made, there was a real possibility that the matter would have been determined by collective agreement if the offers had not been made and accepted. What the employer cannot do with impunity is what the Company did here: that is, make an offer directly to its workers, including those who are union members, before the collective bargaining process has been exhausted. 68. It was argued on behalf of the Company that it may be difficult to say with certainty whether the collective bargaining process has been exhausted in any particular case and that this interpretation therefore exposes employers to risks which they cannot afford to take and hence would unreasonably restrict their freedom of negotiation. I do not accept this. In my view, employers have two means of protection against that risk. The first is to ensure that the agreement for collective bargaining made with the union clearly defines and delimits the procedure to be followed. The Recognition Agreement made in this case does this sufficiently. I have quoted Stage 4 of the agreed procedure at para 5 above. If in the present case, following the meeting specified at Stage 3, the Company had written to the union representatives stating that the Company did not agree to refer the matter to ACAS, it is clear from the terms of Appendix 1 that the procedure would at that point have been exhausted. A second level of protection is provided by the requirement of section 145B(1)(b) that the section will not be contravened unless the employer’s sole or main purpose in making the offers is to achieve the prohibited result. If the employer genuinely believes that the collective bargaining process has been exhausted, it cannot be said that the purpose of making direct offers was to procure the result that terms will not be determined by collective agreement when that otherwise might well have been the case. 69. This interpretation of section 145B is further supported by section 145D(4)(a) of the 1992 Act. That provision identifies, as a matter which must be taken into account in determining whether an employer’s sole or main purpose in making offers was the prohibited purpose, any evidence: “that when the offers were made the employer … did not wish to use, arrangements agreed with the union for collective bargaining.” This supports the inference that, where the acceptance of individual offers would by-pass arrangements agreed with the union for collective bargaining, such acceptance would have the prohibited result. 70. In the present case the Company agreed when it entered into the Recognition Agreement to conduct annual pay negotiations with Unite and to follow the procedure outlined in Appendix 1 before making or proposing any change to terms and conditions of employment outside that process. The offers made directly to employees dishonoured that agreement because they were made before the process had been exhausted. Furthermore, the Company’s behaviour, potentially at least, treated less favourably employees who were not prepared to relinquish their right to have the agreed procedure for collective bargaining followed. In the case of each direct offer made during the collective bargaining process, the clear message was that, if the employee did not accept it, he would not receive the Christmas bonus (or an equivalent payment) calculated at 2% of basic salary. In the case of the second offer, there was also a threat to terminate the worker’s contract of employment unless the offer was accepted. It is hard to imagine how, on the assumption required by section 145B(1)(a) that all the direct offers were accepted, the negotiations with Unite could as a matter of practical reality have resulted in a better deal than the one which all the workers would thereby already have accepted individually. On the other hand, there was a real likelihood that any worker who did not accept the direct offers would be left financially worse off. That is indeed what happened, as workers who declined both offers did not receive the Christmas bonus (or any equivalent payment) for 2015. In these circumstances the Company’s conduct can fairly be characterised as a disincentive or restraint on the use by the claimants of union representation to protect their interests. The relevant use was the exercise of their right to be represented in collective bargaining conducted in accordance with the Recognition Agreement. 71. I conclude that, on the proper interpretation of section 145B of the 1992 Act, an offer would have the prohibited result if its acceptance, together with other workers’ acceptance of offers which the employer also makes to them, would have the result that the workers’ terms of employment, or any of those terms, will not (or will no longer) be determined by collective agreement negotiated by or on behalf of the union when, had such offers not been made, there was a real possibility that the terms in question would have been determined by collective agreement. That must ordinarily be assumed to be the case where there is an agreed procedure for collective bargaining in place which had not been complied with.” 72. In the present case, on the facts found by the employment tribunal the collective bargaining process outlined in the Recognition Agreement was still continuing when the first and second offers were made by the Company directly to the claimants. In those circumstances the tribunal was entitled to find that the offers were made in contravention of section 145B. I would therefore allow the appeal.[77]Thus(1) an employer cannot with impunity make an offer directly to its workers, including those who are union members, before the collective bargaining process has been exhausted;(2) an offer will have the prohibited result if its acceptance, together with other workers’ acceptance of offers which the employer also makes to them, would have the result that the workers’ terms of employment, or any of those terms, will not (or will no longer) be determined by collective agreement negotiated by or on behalf of the union when, had such offers not been made, there was a real possibility that the terms in question would have been determined by collective agreement (emphasis added). This is a test of causation. That must ordinarily be assumed to be the case where there is an agreed procedure for collective bargaining in place which had not been complied with; and(3) the effect of section 145B(1)(b) is that the section will not be contravened unless the employer’s sole or main purpose in making the offers is to achieve the prohibited result. If the employer genuinely believes that the collective bargaining process has been exhausted, it cannot be said that the purpose of making direct offers was to procure the result that terms will not be determined by collective agreement when that otherwise might well have been the case (emphasis again added).[78]Those are the key principles to be taken from Kostal. But what of the situation where there is no structured bargaining process, as there was in Kostal? The Employment Appeal Tribunal held in INEOS Chemicals Grangemouth Limited v Arnott & Others [2022] EAT 82 that in such cases the Tribunal’s task is to ascertain whether, objectively, negotiations are in fact at an end, and the employer’s purpose may be relevant in deciding that question : “64. Both parties were in agreement that where there is no structured agreement as in Kostal, the proper approach is to ascertain, objectively, whether or not negotiations were as a matter of fact at an end. I concur, and consider that this was the approach taken by the Tribunal in this case when they concluded that parties were close to an agreement. …. 66. It is worth reiterating that this is a case where the [collective bargaining arrangements] were not as structured as those in Kostal and therefore the argument for the company in the Supreme Court that ‘it may be difficult to say with certainty whether the collective bargaining process has been exhausted’ might have some resonance here. In such a case, the Supreme Court determined that the question of the employers’ purpose in making the offer becomes very relevant.”[79]Finally, it will be recalled that the concept of “offer” was not discussed in Kostal. The Employment Appeal Tribunal considered this in Ineos, and in the earlier case of Scottish Borders Housing Association Limited v Caldwell EA-2020-SCO000084-SH.[80]In Caldwell, the employer had over a two-year period negotiated with the recognised trade unions in relation to proposed changes to terms and conditions of employment, but was unable to reach agreement with the trade unions. It arranged meetings with its staff, from which they appeared willing to agree to the terms offered. The employer accordingly wrote on staff on 18 September 2019 to give them the opportunity to agree to amended terms, explaining how the proposed changes affected them and informing them that if they were willing to accept the variation to contract, they should sign and return their copy of the revised terms and conditions of employment by Wednesday 21 October 2019. Most employees agreed to the changes, but on 13 December 2019, the employer wrote to those who had not, stating that the new terms and conditions would come into effect on 16 January 2020. The claimants did not accept the proposed variation to their contracts of employment. The issue was whether the claims were in time, which required the letter of 13 December 2019 to have been an offer within section 145B.[81]It was accepted that the letter of 18 September 2019 was an offer. However, the Employment Appeal Tribunal found that the letter of 13 December 2019 was not. It was not a contractual offer. It intimated the employer’s intention to impose new terms, constituting an anticipatory breach of contract. That in turn entitled the claimants to rely on that breach for the purpose of any claim they wished to make. The Employment Appeal Tribunal held that if an employee accepted the terms, that was not an acceptance of an offer but was an acceptance of a repudiatory breach of contract. It held that an employer that intimates its determination to unilaterally impose new terms cannot be said to offer new terms under section 145B.[82]The Employment Appeal Tribunal’s reasoning in Caldwell appears heterodox; conventionally, a repudiatory breach of contract is accepted by resignation rather than by agreeing to the proposed terms. Caldwell was not considered, however, in Ineos, in which a different conclusion was reached on the question of offer. The Employment Appeal Tribunal said this, at paragraphs 55-59: “55. There is in this case a prior question to be determined, which was not one raised in submissions before the Supreme Court in Kostal, or addressed in the Judgment. That is because of the particular factual scenario which existed in that case, where there was no dispute that an offer had been made. Here the question arises as to whether or not an ‘offer’ was made in this case which would have the effect of engaging s.145B at all.56. Each party relied on the unchallenged findings in fact of the Tribunal for their own purposes. However, so far as the question of whether an ‘offer’ was made as envisaged by s.145B, the Tribunal concluded that it was. In so doing, it determined that the communication from the employers on 5 April 2017 was a statement of intention to vary employees’ contracts as to pay, and that in continuing to work, the employees accepted that variation. Before the Tribunal, the appellants’ submission was to the effect that there could be no offer because there had been no expectation of a ‘quid pro quo’ in return. By their conclusion, the Tribunal rejected that contention.57. That argument was not pressed before me, despite being adverted to in the appellants’ skeleton. This is unsurprising standing the conclusion of the Supreme Court in Kostal on this particular point that there is no requirement for a ‘quid pro quo’ to be implied into the legislation.58. Rather, Mr Burns focussed on the proposition that the letter of 5th April 2017, properly understood, was a unilateral promise, not requiring acceptance, which created an obligation collateral to that contained in the contract between the appellants and the claimants. Mr Segal developed the position advanced before the Tribunal on behalf of the claimants which was to the effect that the contract was a bilateral one which could only be varied by offer, acceptance and consideration (both acceptance and consideration arising or being inferred from the workers continuing to work under the new arrangements). This was the argument ultimately accepted by the Tribunal. Before me, that argument was amplified to be, in summary, that it would offend against basic principles of Employment Law to suggest that something as fundamental as the ‘work pay’ bargain between employer and employee could be varied in a way extraneous to that contract by making a unilateral promise creating an obligation collateral to that bargain.59. I agree with Mr Segal, both as a matter of principle, and on an analysis of the findings in fact made by the Tribunal. I can discern no error in the conclusion, in paragraph 111, that the word ‘offer’ should be given its ordinary meaning, and that the letter of 5th April 2017 was a statement of intention to vary employees contracts as to pay, which was accepted by the employees continuing to work. Although not expressly stated by the Tribunal, I am of the view that their conclusion is fortified by the express language of the letter of 5th April which states their intention to “implement our pay increase as described in our latest offer backdated to 1st January 2017 (emphasis added).” The plain reading of the letter is consistent with an implementation of an offer already made with the result that the employees’ contractual terms as to pay would be varied. The construction contended for by the appellants would be inconsistent with the language used in their own communication and ultimately artificial. The Tribunal reached a decision that was open to it on the facts it found established. There is nothing in the decision in Kostal which bears directly on, or is inconsistent with, this conclusion.”[83]On that basis, the Employment Appeal Tribunal found that the employer’s notification of its intention to implement the pay increase intimated in its most recent offer to the trade unions amounted to an offer within section 145B. As it explains in its conclusions, the Tribunal, faced with apparently conflicting decisions of the Employment Appeal Tribunal, prefers the analysis in INEOS to that in Caldwell. Submissions, discussion and conclusions[84]The Tribunal received very comprehensive written and oral submissions from Mr Segal, Mr Galbraith-Marten and Mr Bowers, for which the Tribunal is grateful. The Tribunal will structure its decision by referring to the submissions as necessary and setting out its conclusions on the issues before it. Those issues, as they appear at paragraph 8 above, are:84.1 Did VTEC, on 13 November 2017, make an offer to the claimants within section 145B(1) of the 1992 Act?84.2 If so, did or would acceptance of such offer, together with other workers’ acceptance of the offer, have the prohibited result under section 145B(2) of the 1992 Act that the claimants’ terms of employment, or any of those terms, would not (or would no longer) be determined by collective agreement?84.3 In particular, on the facts as found, was there objectively a real possibility that if the offer had not been made and accepted, the relevant terms would have been determined by a new collective agreement reached for the period in question?84.4 If the answer to issue 2 is yes, was VTEC’s sole or main purpose in making the relevant offer to achieve that prohibited result?84.5 More specifically, when it made the offer, did VTEC genuinely believe that the collective bargaining process had been exhausted?[85]Counsel each analysed the decision in Kostal in detail; having summarised the Supreme Court’s reasoning above, the Tribunal will not refer to their analysis unless necessary for its conclusions. 1. “Offer”: Did VTEC, on 13 November 2017, make an offer to the claimants within section 145B(1) of the 1992 Act? Submissions for the respondents[86]Mr Galbraith-Marten submits that the communication on 13 November 2017 was sent after notification of the TSSA and Unite ballot results. It was not, therefore, an offer. He contends that having reached agreement through collective bargaining with two out of three recognised unions, employees’ contracts of employment were varied pursuant to the express incorporation clause in their contracts. The agreed pay award was implemented in December 2017. However, because agreement had not been reached with the RMT, RMT members were given the option to opt out of the pay award.[87]Mr Galbraith-Marten says that whether a communication from an employer constitutes or contains an ‘offer’ for the purposes of section145B is a question of fact, see Caldwell in which the Employment Appeal Tribunal held that the unilateral imposition of new terms and conditions of employment cannot amount to an ‘offer’.[88]Mr Galbraith-Marten accepts that Caldwell is inconsistent with the later decision in Ineos, but the Employment Appeal Tribunal in Ineos did appear to accept at paragraph 59 that whether a communication from an employer constitutes or contains an ‘offer’ is a question of fact.[89]Mr Galbraith-Marten contends that Ineos is of no real assistance to the determination of the issues in these proceedings as it concerned a very different factual situation. In these proceedings, the members of two recognised trade unions voted overwhelmingly to accept the employer’s pay offer.[90]Mr Bowers also refers the Tribunal to Caldwell in which the unilateral imposition of terms was held not to be an offer because acceptance would not be acceptance of an offer but “acceptance of the repudiation” (paragraph 25). VTEC, he says, was varying terms in accordance with the agreement reached with the union majority in the single table bargaining.[91]Mr Galbraith-Marten developed his submissions orally. He says that in this case, there was no unilateral imposition of terms. There was an offer, in which RMT members were given the choice to opt out of the 2017 Pay Award. That award had been agreed by the TSSA and Unite and within the JNC, each union had an equal voice regardless of membership. The interpretation of the CBA is a matter of construction applying the usual principles. The unions represented a wide variety of people with different voices, and if unanimity was required, it should be spelt out, otherwise a small union could hold the rest to ransom.[92]Mr Galbraith-Marten referred to the decision of the Employment Appeal Tribunal in South Tyneside MBC v Graham UKEAT/0107/03 for a case where the Tribunal was required to construe a collective agreement and concluded that on its proper construction, there was no need to find that the agreement required unanimity of decision, as long as meetings were convened properly. He contends that the Tribunal must interpret the CBA to decide what the agreement means, accepting that there is no provision about unanimity or majority decision.[93]Finally, Mr Galbraith-Marten refers the Tribunal to the wording of the 13 November 2017 communication (407) and in particular, the words “we have a fair deal”. This, he says, communicates that VTEC believed a collective agreement had come into existence at the agreement of two of the three unions, and the company was now implementing it, subject to an opt-out. This was not making an offer; it was implementing an agreement. Submissions for the claimants[94]Mr Segal submits that the respondents’ case on this issue is hopeless. He says that the purpose of collective bargaining is, primarily, to vary the terms of workers’ employment contracts by negotiation. An employer who during collective bargaining has an offer refused by its recognised union and then implements its terms in respect of individual workers, is simply implementing its ‘offer’ to those workers.[95]Mr Segal submits that the key issue, both from a purposive perspective and by reference to the statutory language, is whether the employer’s implementation of the pay increase is capable of ‘acceptance’ by the relevant workers such that the ‘prohibited result’ arises: see 145B(1)(a). It would, he says, obviously defeat the purpose of section 145B if an employer could, during a collective bargaining process, avoid liability simply by implementing its offer unilaterally, as opposed to seeking express acceptance from its workers.[96]Moreover, Mr Segal submits, as a matter of well-established law, an employer which unilaterally implements a variation to the contracts of its workers, does make an ‘offer’ which requires acceptance by those workers – which acceptance can be, but is far from always, inferred by their continuing to work without protest. Without such implied acceptance by the workers’ conduct, the purported variation is of no effect.[97]Such acceptance, however, is particularly easy to infer where the variation takes immediate effect and/or is to the employees’ advantage, as in the paradigm instance of a pay increase.[98]Those principles were accepted in Ineos as applying in the context of section 145B, at paragraphs 58-59. In Ineos, Mr Segal says, a unilateral imposition of a varied term was an offer which was accepted by the employees continuing to work, and to the extent that Caldwell says anything different, it is clearly wrong and was in effect overruled in Ineos.[99]However, in this case, the offers expressly invited employees either to accept by continuing to work without opting out, or to opt out. On any view, those were offers capable of acceptance or rejection.[100]In his oral submissions, Mr Segal submitted that unilateral imposition of terms remains an offer which employees can accept by continuing to work or reject by protesting or resigning.[101]Mr Segal contended that the common-sense interpretation of the CBA is that there is no agreement unless all parties agree. If there was to be majority voting, as there was in Graham, there would normally be some form of proportional representation. He observes that in the communication of 13 November 2017 and in subsequent correspondence, there is no suggestion that the respondents thought there was already a collective agreement; he describes the contention as “the invention of lawyers”.[102]Finally, Mr Segal says that there could be no agreement to vary terms of employment of employees covered by sole recognition by way of agreements reached by other unions5.[103]The Tribunal can set out its conclusions relatively briefly. It agrees broadly with Mr Segal. It finds that the communication of 13 November 2017 was an offer for the purposes of section 145B. 5 Ignoring the position of train drivers for whom ASLEF was recognised but were not involved in the 2017 negotiations, VTEC solely recognised the RMT for on-board train employees; for all other groups of employees covered by the CBA, there was joint recognition of the RMT, TSSA and Unite.[104]Section 145B requires that the employer makes an offer to the relevant workers, but the term “offer” is not anywhere defined.[105]The first question is whether, on a proper construction of the CBA, a collective agreement had come into being upon the agreement of two of the three unions involved in the collective bargaining, such that VTEC was on 13 November 2017 implementing an agreement already made rather than making an offer capable of acceptance.[106]The Tribunal accepts that the ordinary principles of construction apply to collective agreements: Graham, paragraph 18. Although counsel did not direct the Tribunal to them, beyond agreeing that they applied, the general principles can be found in cases such as Investors Compensation Scheme v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 WLR 896 at 912 – 913, Chartbook Ltd v Persimmon Homes Limited 2009 HL 38 and Arnold v Britton 2015 UKSC 36 at paragraph 15 (Lord Neuberger). The Tribunal must identify the intention of the parties by reference to what a reasonable person having all the background knowledge which would have been available to the parties would have understood them to be using the language in the relevant document to mean, and is required to perform such exercise by focusing on the meaning of the relevant words of the provision being construed in their documentary, factual and commercial context. That meaning has to be assessed in the light of: "(i) the natural and ordinary meaning of the clause; (ii) any further relevant provisions of the [agreement]; (iii) the overall purpose of the clause and the [agreement]; (iv) the facts and circumstances known or assumed by the parties at the time the document was executed, and (v) commercial common sense, but (vi) disregarding subjective evidence of the parties' intentions."[107]The Tribunal finds that the natural and ordinary meaning of the word “agreement” in the CBA, in the absence of any provision as to voting, is that it means the agreement of all the parties to the collective bargaining arrangements. If there had been any intention that agreement should be by some form of majority, the Tribunal would have expected the CBA to have said so.[108]Throughout the CBA, the language used was of mutuality and consensus. Unlike in Graham, there was no proportional representation to reflect the different membership strengths of the unions. Neither the employer nor, together, the trade unions had majority representation. The purpose of the CBA was to create a mechanism for single-table bargaining between the employer on the one hand and its recognised trade unions as a whole on the other hand, in order to arrive at a single bargain which would be incorporated into the contracts of employment of all employees within its scope. It is notable that when ASLEF reached a separate agreement for its members, a discrete and identifiable group consisting of train drivers, it did so outside of the CBA mechanism. There was a mechanism in paragraph 8 for discussions between management and any of the unions on matters where dispute remained. Having regard to the nature and purpose of the CBA, it is inconceivable that the parties could have intended that terms of employment of all employees, whichever union represented them, could be decided by a bare majority of the unions involved.[109]Mr Galbraith-Marten directs the Tribunal to the words “we have a fair deal” in the 13 November 2017 communication (407). He suggests this means that VTEC believed a collective agreement had come into existence. The Tribunal does not agree. The words used cannot bear the weight Mr Galbraith-Marten places upon them. In the same communication, Ms Bullock refers to the other unions having “voted to accept the pay deal”, where she cannot have been using the word “deal” to denote a concluded agreement. There is nothing in any of the other contemporaneous correspondence which suggests the company thought an agreement had been reached.[110]The Tribunal therefore rejects the respondents’ contention that the agreement of the TSSA and Unite, being the majority of the unions participating in the negotiations, created a collective agreement binding on all employees by incorporation into their contracts of employment. The position is that following the failure of all parties within the JNC to reach agreement, no collective agreement existed in November 2017.[111]Agreeing then with Mr Segal’s submissions and preferring the analysis in Ineos to that in Caldwell, the Tribunal finds that the communication of 13 November 2017 was, properly analysed, a proposal by VTEC to make a unilateral variation to employees’ terms of employment, which employees could, in line with normal workplace practice, accept by continuing to work, or reject by resigning or by exercising their right to opt-out. It was an offer, capable of acceptance or rejection by those to whom it was made, and this was particularly so when it gave RMT recipients an express choice of opting-out. There was no requirement for some kind of quid pro quo.[112]Finally, the Tribunal agrees with Mr Segal that it would defeat the purpose of section 145B if employers could circumvent the requirements of the section simply by imposing a change in conditions unilaterally and arguing that they thereby did not make an offer to employees. “Offer”, in the workplace context, means a proposal, including a proposal amounting to a unilateral variation of terms and conditions, which employees can accept by continuing to work or reject by resigning. 2. “Prohibited result”: did or would acceptance of such offer, together with other workers’ acceptance of the offer, have the prohibited result under section 145B(2) of the 1992 Act that the claimants’ terms of employment, or any of those terms, would not (or would no longer) be determined by collective agreement? In particular, on the facts as found, was there objectively a real possibility that if the offer had not been made and accepted, the relevant terms would have been determined by a new collective agreement reached for the period in question?[113]The Tribunal begins with four preliminary observations.113.1 First, at one level, it is inescapable that if VTEC’s offer was accepted, the terms of employment of the relevant employees would not be determined by collective agreement, because for the period covered by the 2017 Pay Award, the terms would be imposed on them and not collectively bargained. But as explained in Kostal, that is not enough. The test is one of causation. In order for offers made by the employer to workers to be capable of having the prohibited result, there must be at least a real possibility that, if the offers were not made and accepted, the workers’ relevant terms of employment would have been determined by a new collective agreement reached for the period in question (Kostal, paragraphs 65, 71).113.2 Second, it is not the purpose of the statute that employers should be precluded from making offers direct to the workforce if collective bargaining has genuinely come to an end or reached an impasse. The legislation does not confer a right of veto on trade unions.113.3 Third, unless acceptance of the offer would have the prohibited result, the question of the employer’s purpose under section 145B(1)(b) does not arise at all.113.4 Fourth, it may be difficult to say with certainty whether the collective bargaining process has been exhausted in any particular case. In such cases, as observed in Ineos, the question of the employer’s purpose becomes more important in assessing the likelihood that the terms would have been collectively bargaining absent the offer. Submissions for the respondents[114]Mr Bowers says that the crucial issue resolves around whether at the time of the offer there was any realistic prospect of the negotiations being successfully concluded and more particularly what the employer genuinely believed about this. He accepts that the Tribunal should look at the relevant facts in the round to establish whether there was any realistic chance of the terms being collectively bargained in November 2017.[115]As to this, Mr Bowers says that:115.1 clearly the company was not motivated by anti-union animus and the widespread and intensive collective bargaining machinery continued in place (although he and Mr Galbraith-Marten accept that it would be sufficient if VTEC were bypassing the collective bargaining machinery on this one occasion);115.2 Mr McGowan’s conduct and behaviour was such, most notably in reneging on the commitment to recommend the deal for acceptance and his personal attacks and abuse and bad faith, that by the time VTEC wrote to employees on 13 November 2017 there was no realistic prospect of the negotiations being successfully concluded with the RMT;115.3 under the CBA, the collective bargaining mechanism was the JNC. There were no negotiations through the JNC after 13 November 2017. Whilst he accepted that the further discussions which took place after November 2017 were a form of collective bargaining, they were not collective bargaining within the JNC process, which was the process the parties had agreed. This was why Ms Bullock told Mr Cash on 16 November 2017 (423) that “we have exhausted collective bargaining on the issue”; she was referring to the JNC process;115.4 the language used by Mr McGowan shows that he did not genuinely believe there was any possibility of further negotiations. This was not just the language of, as he suggested in evidence, a plain-speaking Yorkshireman”;115.5 The description of the offer as a “final offer” is not relied on to any extent. However, VTEC decided there was no more negotiating room given that two of the three unions had agreed the deal, Mr McGowan’s “stirring the pot” in a most direct way, and the fact that the offer was in essence the deal with the unions had proposed in August 2017.[116]Mr Bowers says that it cannot be right that all parties in the JNC must agree that negotiations are at an end. It is not what the agreement says. He submits that Ms Bullock was right when she said in evidence that either side could decide that the process had concluded.[117]Mr Bowers submits that the facts in Ineos were very different; there the parties were found to have been close to agreement; and there was evidence of animosity between the parties and a desire on the part of the employer to be rid of the union.[118]Mr Galbraith-Marten accepts that the test whether the collective bargaining procedure is exhausted is objective. Otherwise there are dangers of the employer deciding itself when the procedure is exhausted. Therefore, if there is an offer, there is on the face of it a breach of section 145B, but the key issue is the employer’s purpose. If that purpose is not to deny employees a voice in collective bargaining, the employer should not be liable.[119]Mr Galbraith-Marten says that as the employer cannot decide itself that the procedure is exhausted; so neither can the union decide it is still live, thus the test is objective.[120]The Tribunal’s task, he says, is to look at all the facts and circumstances, including what the parties said or did at the time and Ms Bullock’s subjective belief. In this case, the evidence shows that Ms Bullock genuinely thought the process was at an end.[121]Mr Galbraith-Marten says that whether the parties were close to agreement is relevant, but not determinative. Small issues, he says, can wreck a deal. In this case, the parties appeared close to a deal, in that VTEC had offered the trade unions almost all they asked for, yet still the RMT rejected the deal. It may be that Mr McGowan simply exceeded his authority, but the question remains: why did he go so far the other way?[122]Mr Galbraith-Marten says that an employer is entitled to take the view that they are so fed up with progress that negotiations should end, but that view must be objectively valid. He says that in this case, the employer was entitled to walk away, when Mr McGowan was saying the package on offer was an assault on employees’ terms and conditions (374). Submissions for the claimants[123]Mr Segal submits that the purpose of section 145BB, as decided in Kostal, is that collective negotiation between employers and organisations of workers should be encouraged and promoted by making it unlawful for an employer to make offers to workers to vary their terms of employment in circumstances where had such offers not been made, there was a real possibility that the terms in question would have been determined by collective agreement.[124]He agrees with Mr Bowers and Mr Galbraith-Marten that the test of prohibited result is objective; was there a real possibility that the terms in question would be decided by collective bargaining. It is a simple test. Whilst the test of the employer’s purpose is subjective, that cannot negate the objective test of prohibited result by introducing the employer’s reason for acting.[125]Mr Segal contends that here can be no question but that, on the facts of this case, section 145B was infringed. In particular,(a) the CBA did not include any specified bargaining procedure;(b) at the time the offers were made there was an ongoing process of collective bargaining, without agreement having been reached between VTEC and the RMT, but with those parties clearly close to agreement, and an expectation on the part of both parties that there would be further talks given that negotiations had not resulted in agreement; and(c) VTEC’s purpose in making the offers was to drop out of the current collective bargaining process in order to have its offer on pay and productivity accepted directly by the workers.[126]Mr Segal references Ms Bullock’s subjective view that VTEC “had exhausted collective bargaining on the issue” (413), or that “pay negotiations had been exhausted and that collective bargaining with the RMT had broken down on this particular matter” (witness statement paragraph 70). He says that meant no more, in the context of there being no agreed collective bargaining process in the CBA, than that the company did not think (following what it saw as the RMT’s objectionable conduct) that there was anything to be gained by, or at least it felt no obligation on it to continue, further negotiation with the RMT. He says that an employer’s subjective decision that there was no reason to pursue further negotiations cannot be a relevant, let alone the decisive, factor in determining its main purpose in making offers which have the prohibited result. Were it otherwise, there would literally never be a case in which offers achieving the prohibited result were unlawful.[127]Mr Segal contrasts this case with Ineos. Applying the causation test is, he says, self-evidently, a question of fact for the Tribunal. The company’s offer in Ineos was genuinely its final position. It was prepared to dismiss and offer reengagement on the terms of that offer to any workers who refused it. In contrast with the present case, there was no suggestion, and certainly no finding by the Tribunal, that had collective negotiations continued, the parties might or would have reached agreement.[128]Mr Segal notes that the CBA did not include any specified bargaining procedure. It stated only that meetings shall be held as often as necessary. Paragraph 8 stated that the procedure was exhausted once negotiations and discussions within the committee have concluded. This cannot mean when the employer has decided negotiations and discussions have concluded, both as a matter of natural interpretation/common sense and because it would undermine the principle of mutuality on which the CBA is founded. The procedure is only exhausted, he says, if both parties have agreed a particular procedure such as a specified number of meetings, or if both parties agree that there is no further scope for agreement to be reached by negotiations, or perhaps if it becomes obvious that the parties cannot reach agreement because the final position of each is in reality immoveable and irreconcilable.[129]Mr Segal submits that the CBA does provide at paragraph 6 for unresolved differences/disputes to be dealt with through the “appropriate agreed procedures”: [277]. He accepts that no such procedures are spelt out in Annex A. However, it is clear that both parties knew and recognised that a trade union could give formal notification of a dispute ((412), which would trigger an Avoidance of Dispute meeting (415, 419, 455); and that “no form of industrial action will be undertaken until procedures have been exhausted” (276). The offer in this case was made before any such procedure had commenced, let alone concluded, as in Kostal.[130]Mr Segal says that at the time when the employer disengaged, the parties in fact were very close to agreement; both as a matter of analysis (the difference between the parties concerned only whether and/or the way in which rolling sick pay would be introduced, with both parties committed to addressing the underlying issue), and as a matter of fact (the disputed matter was resolved during two further short meetings).[131]Mr Segal comments that the meeting on 17 October 2017 was neither stated in advance to constitute the conclusion of the collective bargaining process, nor characterised as such during or even after that meeting, prior to the offer being made. On the contrary, immediately after that meeting the company wrote to affected staff saying simply that “This week we met with union representatives, in the spirit of collaboration, to discuss and agree a revised offer” (370). After 13 November 2017, the parties sought to resume meetings and did so quickly, such that the first such meeting (22 November 2017) took place about five weeks after the previous meeting on 17 October 2017; which was a similar or shorter period than between the meetings which had taken place between March and October. The content of the discussion at the November 2017 and the February 2018 meetings, as Mr McGowan put it in evidence, “proceeded seamlessly on from the collective negotiations between June and October 2017, with the same issues being canvassed and similar potential solutions being examined”, or, as Ms Bullock put it, the purpose of those meetings was “to get to common ground”, which was precisely the purpose of the earlier negotiation meetings.[132]Mr Segal says that this shows that when the offers were made, there was a real possibility that the matter would have been determined by collective agreement if the offers had not been made and accepted. He says that the only reason that the offers were made was because VTEC thought that Mr McGowan had reneged on a promise to recommend the latest proposed deal to its members. The fact that the offer made in October 2017 was described as full and final is nothing to the point; the August 2017 offer had been similarly described [341]. In any case, such a description by an employer cannot determine whether a collective bargaining procedure had concluded. An employer cannot avoid liability simply by describing an offer it makes to its workers during the collective bargaining process as ‘final’.[133]At the heart of the respondents’ defence to these claims, Mr Segal says, is the proposition, only articulated retrospectively, after the offers had been made, that there was a collective bargaining procedure which was concluded after five meetings, ending in October 2017; but that procedure was followed by two further collective meetings, where exactly the same matters were negotiated and in essence agreed, but which the respondents say should be seen as outside of that collective bargaining procedure.[134]Mr Segal says that this argument does not meet the causation test in Kostal, but is in any event artificial. The true position was set out at the time by VTEC, when, in her letter of 9 March 2018, Ms Bullock wrote that if the RMT did not agree to withdraw the section 145B claims, she would “draw the pay review to a close”. Further, on 6 April 2018 Ms Bullock wrote to staff rehearsing the history of negotiations from June 2017 to date, and concluded that “after a year of negotiations” it could not keep revising its pay offer and therefore it could not see “where else there is to go with the 2017 pay talks and therefore the talks have come to a natural end”. The same day Ms Bullock wrote to the RMT (474), stating that because RMT would not withdraw support for the tribunal claims, VTEC intended “to now draw our pay discussions to a close”.[135]Mr Segal also notes that, perhaps not realising the effect of this statement, Ms Bullock complains that the RMT was in breach of the CBA in seeking to initiate industrial action in December 2017 before “procedures have been exhausted”. He agrees. The procedures had not been exhausted.[136]Mr Segal describes the respondents’ contention that collective bargaining could not continue because the other unions who had been involved in the previous meetings had already reached agreement as misconceived. He contends that it is by no means uncommon for an employer which recognises more than one union in respect of a particular bargaining unit to reach agreement with one or more of those unions before reaching agreement with all of them. Negotiations can either continue with the initial constitution of participants, or separate negotiations can be conducted between the employer and the union(s) who have not yet agreed – as, of course, happened in this case in November 2017 and February 2018. He contends that where no agreement has been reached with the union representing most of the affected employees, negotiations are expected to continue unless some different procedure has been previously collectively agreed.[137]Mr Segal notes that the CBA provided for all recognised unions, including ASLEF, to participate in collective bargaining. However, VTEC had already concluded a sperate agreement with ASLEF.[138]Finally, Mr Segal drew attention that when in October 2018 LNER finally implemented the 2017 Pay Award to include the RMT, it did so on the basis that rolling sick pay was removed. Thus members of the TSSA and Unite unions benefitted from terms negotiated only with the RMT.[139]The Tribunal must decide if, when the offer was made, there remained a realistic chance that the relevant terms of employment would be collectively bargained. That involves consideration of all the relevant circumstances, including the collective bargaining arrangements between the parties, what the parties were saying and doing at the time and the subjective positions of the parties. However, an employer’s unilateral decision to end negotiations (or a union’s to seek to treat them as continuing) cannot itself be determinative; an employer cannot say that there was no chance terms would be collectively bargained because it was not prepared to negotiate any further, unless objectively it is clear the bargaining process was over (or, if it was not, that it lacked the required purpose because it genuinely believed negotiations were over).[140]The reasonableness or rationality of the parties’ positions is immaterial. However, their subjective positions at the time may evidence whether negotiations were at an end.[141]This brings into consideration why the decision was made to implement the 2017 Pay Award on 13 November 2017. Ms Bullock said this in her witness statement: “With regards to the negotiations, VTEC had put our final offer down on 17 October 2017, and as far as we were concerned that was the end of pay negotiation process. We were not planning at all to enter into new negotiations. VTEC never considered going around the pay negotiation table after a deal was struck with TSSA and Unite. Any additional negotiation under the collective bargaining agreement would require meetings with the other unions and this was something we were not willing to do having regard to the fact that TSSA, Unite, in principle, and at the time the RMT agreed to the deal. Collective bargaining was over on this pay round but not by any fault of ourselves (paragraph 67). There was no mutual understanding that bargaining would resume if the members rejected the offer. The collective bargaining process was exhausted. In particular, paragraph 6 of the Procedure Agreement 1 (264) states that “no form of industrial action will be undertaken until procedures have been exhausted”. I had considered that the RMT had breached the Procedure Agreement 1 by putting a ballot for industrial action to its members. The good faith negotiation between VTEC and the RMT had evaporated with the actions of Mr McGowan. Mr McGowan had agreed that the deal was to be recommended to its membership and they later reneged on this decision without explanation. I considered Mr McGowan’s increased vitriol to be counterproductive creating an environment of animosity (paragraph 69). I do not accept that VTEC made any “offer” to the RMT members other than giving them the option to opt out of the pay award if they wished to do so (pages 410-411). Again, the very purpose of giving the RMT members that option to opt out was not to cease or reduce collective bargaining with the RMT. On the contrary, the very purpose was to show respect to the fact that the RMT had by this point rejected the pay award and to allow RMT members to excuse themselves from the award if they wished to do so. The opt-out option was given very much because we did not have any intention of ending or reducing collective bargaining with the RMT. We were genuinely trying to fairly recognise a situation in which two out of three trade unions had endorsed the deal. As stated above, it was and is inconceivable that there will not be collective bargaining with the RMT on pay and on all other typical collective bargaining issues now and in future (paragraph 70).[142]The Tribunal finds this evidence troubling for several reasons. First, sections of it (for example, as to whether VTEC made an offer on 13 November 2017 or whether management intended to have any further discussions after the meeting on 17 October 2017) read as after-the-event argument of a position rather than evidence of fact. Second, it is internally contradictory; if, as she asserts, management believed collective bargaining was exhausted, why did she consider the RMT had breached the procedure agreement by calling an industrial action ballot, which required that procedures were not exhausted? Third, there is no documentary evidence from before or at the time of the offer to support her assertions about why VTEC’s management took the decision to impose the deal against the wishes of one of its recognised trade unions.[143]All of this means that the Tribunal views Ms Bullock’s evidence with some scepticism. But the Tribunal must still decide, on the evidence available to it, why management decided to issue the 13 November 2017 communication to its workforce.[144]The answer lies, in the Tribunal’s view, in Ms Bullock’s reply to a question from the Tribunal: “It was a business decision that collective bargaining was completed and we would write to the membership”. In other words, it was a unilateral business decision by VTEC’s management to treat collective bargaining as at an end and implement the pay award. It was not, in the Tribunal’s view, a business decision that collective bargaining was already at an end or, put another way, exhausted; rather, it was a business decision to conclude collective bargaining unilaterally because it no longer wished to participate in it. As, following this decision, the terms would not be collectively bargained, management could achieve their incorporation into contracts of employment only by unilateral imposition of them.[145]The Tribunal finds that there were several reasons for this business decision.145.1 Ms Bullock was upset by what she saw as Mr McGowan’s and, therefore, the RMT’s change of heart. She felt he had gone back on his promise and had not recommended the offer. She said so, not only in evidence to the Tribunal but in contemporaneous correspondence.145.2 Ms Bullock was also upset by the aggressive and hostile tone of communications Mr McGowan sent to her and to the RMT members he represented.145.3 Ms Bullock wanted the workforce to receive back pay in time for Christmas. She said so at the meeting on 17 October 2017, in her letter of 27 October 2017 and in the communication of 13 November 2017 itself. That required that payment be made in the December pay run. The only way to achieve this in time was to impose the terms, unilaterally.145.4 VTEC did not want to return to the negotiating table once the TSSA and Unite had accepted the deal. Ms Bullock felt that negotiations had gone on long enough, and the RMT had wrecked the negotiations by what she saw as its unreasonable conduct. The Tribunal does not accept that management concluded that further bargaining within the JNC could not take place once two unions had accepted the offer but the RMT had not. Rather, the Tribunal believes that management did not want to proceed in that way.145.5 Ultimately, the Tribunal finds that the reason why management sent the communication on 13 November 2017 was that they believed negotiations had gone on long enough, they did not wish to re-enter negotiations in the situation (which Ms Bullock accepted in evidence) that two of the three unions had accepted the offer, and in their view, agreement had been sabotaged by the RMT’s and Mr McGowan’s actions. Therefore, they decided that they did not wish to continue with collective bargaining.[146]The Tribunal finds that when the offer was made to the workforce, there remained a realistic chance that the relevant terms would have been collectively bargained. Its reasons are these:146.1 The CBA did not contain any structured bargaining process or specify how it should be decided that collective bargaining was exhausted, saying only that would occur once negotiations and discussions were concluded. That, the Tribunal finds, was a matter for the JNC . It was not open to VTEC to make that decision unilaterally for itself without any reference to the JNC. The negotiations and discussions had been within the JNC process, and it was for the JNC to decide they were concluded;146.2 Objectively viewed, the parties were close to agreement. Mr McGowan thought so at the meeting on 17 October 2017, as he agreed to recommend the deal. The contentious issues in the meeting were whether the deal should last one year or two years; whether ASLEF should join the absence management review; and the amount of the floor pay increase, where the parties were only £50 apart. The unions had accepted the principle of rolling sick pay. Objectively, whilst there were matters still to be resolved after the RMT rejected the deal, these were not, individually or collectively, fundamental matters that suggest a deal could not have been agreed through further negotiations;146.3 Objectively viewed, the negotiations had not reached an impasse. There was an ongoing negotiation process. Ms Bullock knew that the unions were required to seek members’ approval to the proposals, with the possibility of rejection. It cannot be said that negotiations were deadlocked when there had been no further discussions in the context of the RMT’s decision;146.4 Objectively viewed, there was no reason why the JNC could not have been re-convened. Single-table bargaining requires agreement by all parties. Therefore, agreement had not been reached. If the TSSA and Unite declined to participate, negotiations could have taken place with the RMT alone; this was contemplated by the second part of paragraph 8. This would have been, as Mr Galbraith-Martin conceded, collective bargaining; and any agreement could then have been ratified within the JNC in order to be incorporated in employees’ terms of employment;146.5 The Tribunal has carefully considered the language used by the RMT, particularly Mr McGowan, before the ballot. On the face of it, it does not suggest agreement was near. But it was the language of rhetoric. As an experienced negotiator, Ms Bullock will have been used to the language sometimes used in such situations. She correctly deduced why Mr McGowan was acting as he was. It can objectively be expected that if negotiations had resumed, these experienced negotiators would have focussed on what was outstanding between them;146.6 As it transpired, further discussions did ensue between VTEC and the RMT, resulting ultimately in a collectively-bargained agreement. Whilst there were other matters to be resolved, management were keen to resolve the outstanding pay and conditions issues and did not refuse to participate because the other unions had already reached agreement. As mentioned at paragraph 72 above, the language used by the parties during the discussions was of resolving the issue of the 2017 pay award;146.7 The Tribunal attributes no significance to the description of the offer as “full and final”. The same words had already been used for the August 2017 offer. In any event, the employer cannot circumvent section 145B by unilaterally describing an offer as final or shut out further collective bargaining which would otherwise take place.[147]The Tribunal finds, therefore, that acceptance of VTEC’s offer, together with other workers’ acceptance of the offer, would have had the prohibited result under section 145B(2) of the 1992 Act that the claimants’ terms of employment, or any of those terms, would not (or would no longer) be determined by collective agreement. The Tribunal finds that objectively, there was a real possibility that if the offer had not been made and accepted, the relevant terms would have been determined by a new collective agreement reached for the period in question. Therefore, the prohibited result exists in this case. 3. “Prohibited purpose”: If the answer to issue 3 is yes, was VTEC’s sole or main purpose in making the relevant offer to achieve that prohibited result? More specifically, when it made the offer, did VTEC genuinely believe that the collective bargaining process had been exhausted?[148]First, the Tribunal reminds itself of what was said in Kostal, at paragraph 68: “A second level of protection is provided by the requirement of section 145B(1)(b) that the section will not be contravened unless the employer’s sole or main purpose in making the offers is to achieve the prohibited result. If the employer genuinely believes that the collective bargaining process has been exhausted, it cannot be said that the purpose of making direct offers was to procure the result that terms will not be determined by collective agreement when that otherwise might well have been the case.”[149]Second, it is for the respondents to prove, under section 145D(2), what the sole or main purpose was in making the relevant offer.[150]Third, in determining the employer’s sole or main purpose, the Tribunal must have regard to the factors set out in 145D(4): “(a) that when the offers were made the employer had recently changed or sought to change, or did not wish to use, arrangements agreed with the union for collective bargaining; (b) that when the offers were made the employer did not wish to enter into arrangements proposed by the union for collective bargaining; or (c) that the offers were made only to particular workers, and were made with the sole or main purpose of rewarding those particular workers for their high level of performance or of retaining them because of their special value to the employer.” Respondents’ submissions[151]Mr Bowers reminds the Tribunal that the purpose of section 145B, as referred to in Kostal, is that “to avoid inflexibility … the law should allow employees to make offers where the sole or main purpose of the inducement is unconnected with the aim of undermining or narrowing the collective bargaining arrangements”.[152]Mr Bowers submits that following Kostal, the key question is what VTEC genuinely believed. There is no requirement, he says, that the belief must be reasonable. Here he says there was a genuine belief that negotiations had been concluded, given at least these factors:152.1 The belief that the RMT and Mr McGowan had reneged on the promise to recommend the deal, as Ms Bullock put it, “pay discussions were derailed by the RMT”;152.2 their protracted nature;152.3 that the single table bargaining was at an end, TSSA and Unite having agreed the deal;152.4 the serious breakdown of trust with Mr McGowan and the fact that he was stoking up the fire;152.5 the fact that the union had rejected proposals they had themselves put forward;152.6 VTEC’s financial position.[153]Mr Bowers says that VTEC had made its final offer; the RMT appeared to be in breach of the provisions of paragraph 6 of the CBA about joint responsibility; and there was a genuine business reason for implementing the pay deal in that agreement had been reached with the unions representing at least some of its employees.[154]Mr Bowers observes that the RMT must have thought the procedure was exhausted as it commenced an industrial action ballot. VTEC had business reasons for implementing, there was no ignoring or bypassing the procedure, nor had the employer ‘dropped in and out’ of collective bargaining.[155]Mr Bowers therefore submits that this was a classic case of implementation by an employer when the collective bargaining machinery was exhausted, and the prohibited purpose was not present.[156]Mr Galbraith-Marten does not agree that in Kostal, the Supreme Court played down the significance of “purpose”. Rather, at paragraphs 31 and 68, Lord Leggatt specifically referred to it as a defence. It was unnecessary to discuss further in Kostal, as purpose was not contested. However, an employer may genuinely believe an impasse existed, and make an offer direct to the workforce. In this case, VTEC’s purpose was accurately summarised in paragraphs 70 and 104 of Ms Bullock’s statement.[157]The Tribunal has already referred to paragraph 70 of Ms Bullock’s witness statement above. Paragraph 104 is in the following terms: “We decided to adopt what we had hoped was a reasonable and rational compromise approach in applying the award whilst allowing RMT members an opt-out. We did so with the aim of balancing the competing needs to implement an award agreed by two of the three trade unions after collective bargaining had been exhausted, whilst at the same time respecting the RMT position and avoiding any dispute or worsening of the relationship with that union.” Claimants’ submissions[158]Mr Segal submits that the observation made by Lord Leggatt at paragraph 68 of Kostal that: “If the employer genuinely believes that the collective bargaining process has been exhausted, it cannot be said that the purpose of making direct offers was to procure the result that terms will not be determined by collective agreement when that otherwise might well have been the case” must clearly refer to the situation where an employer believes that the procedure agreed by it with the union has concluded, that the final stage of that process has been completed.[159]Mr Segal contends that the respondents have misunderstood the law on ‘sole or main purpose’. It is immaterial that the respondents had no intention of abandoning collective bargaining with the RMT. Section 145B applies even if the offers made to workers who are union members are simply offers of a pay rise along with other changes to their terms of employment and do not require or request the recipients to agree to give up any collective bargaining rights (either indefinitely or at all).[160]Mr Segal’s short point is that, as at 13 November 2017 VTEC, frustrated by what it saw as the RMT reneging on its agreement to recommend its latest proposed pay deal to its members, no longer wished to use the arrangements agreed with RMT and the other unions for collective bargaining within Procedure Agreement 1 in respect of that round of pay talks.[161]That, Mr Segal says, is a relevant matter which the Tribunal must take into account within section 145D(4), namely evidence that when the offers were made, the employer had recently changed or sought to change, or did not wish to use, arrangements agreed with the union for collective bargaining. The Tribunal must take into account, in determining the employer’s sole or main purpose, that the acceptance of individual offers would by-pass arrangements agreed with the union for collective bargaining, in respect of that episode of collective bargaining (Kostal, at paragraph 69)[162]It is irrelevant whether VTEC was committed to collective bargaining with RMT and its other recognised unions in the next round of pay talks in 2018 or beyond.[163]Mr Segal says that it is clear that VTEC’s purpose in making the offers was to achieve the prohibited result of inducing the large majority of affected workers, who had just rejected the latest proposed deal in a ballot, to accept that latest deal outside of the collective bargaining process, essentially under threat of their not benefiting from a pay rise. It could not, at that time, achieve that result within the agreed collective bargaining process because the RMT had not agreed that offer; thus, clause 27 of the employees’ contracts did not apply to incorporate the terms of that offer. VTEC had two options:(1) continue the collective bargaining process; or(2) step outside of that collective bargaining process and make offers directly to the affected workers. It elected the second option because it wanted to achieve the prohibited result. That election was unlawful.[164]Section 145B(1)(b) provides that the employer’s sole or main purpose when making the offer must be to achieve the prohibited result.[165]Purpose was not in issue in Kostal, and there is no discussion of the concept beyond what is said briefly in paragraph 68. This is not to downplay the importance of purpose within section 145B. However, a fundamental consideration is whether the employer genuinely believed that collective bargaining was exhausted, and that was why it made the offer direct to the workforce.[166]The Tribunal does not agree with Mr Segal’s interpretation of paragraph 68 of Kostal that the employer’s genuine belief is limited to the exhaustion of the agreed collective bargaining process or procedure. The proposition is of general application; an employer cannot purpose something that it genuinely believes is already the case.[167]The Tribunal has set out at paragraphs 144-5 above its detailed findings about VTEC’s reasons for making the offer direct to the workforce on 13 November 2017, and refers to them as they are material to the employer’s purpose under section 145B(1)(b).[168]The Tribunal must take into account the matters listed in section 145D(4) in determining the employer’s purpose. The factors at section 145D(4)(b) and (c) do not arise on the facts of this case. However, the Tribunal has considered whether, when the offers were made, VTEC had recently changed or sought to change, or did not wish to use, the arrangements agreed with the union for collective bargaining, recognising that this is not decisive of the case but only a relevant factor.[169]VTEC had not changed or proposed to change the collective bargaining arrangements in the CBA. But the key consideration in this case is whether, on the evidence, VTEC did not wish to use those arrangements on this occasion.[170]The Tribunal has found that on 13 November 2017 VTEC did not wish to continue negotiations through the agreed JNC process (or indeed at all). There was no attempt by VTEC to reconvene the JNC or to consult its members about next steps in light of the RMT’s decision. The Tribunal references its conclusions as to VTEC’s management’s reasons at paragraphs 144-5.[171]This was not, the Tribunal finds, the result of a genuine belief on management’s part that collective bargaining was already at an end; it was a decision by VTEC’s management for those reasons that it did not wish to continue collective bargaining and, therefore, in order to implement the pay award, it would impose it unilaterally. That was its purpose in making the offers.[172]It is immaterial whether the employer’s decision was reasonable or unreasonable, or whether the RMT acted reasonably or unreasonably; the issue is only the employer’s subjective purpose. That purpose was to achieve the result that the terms of employment of the relevant employees would not be collectively bargained for the period of the 2017 Pay Award, in that, as a result of its decision to pull out of collective bargaining, implementation of the 2017 Pay Award would be accomplished by imposition on the affected employees rather than by collective bargaining.[173]The Tribunal finds for these reasons that VTEC’s purpose in making the offer to its workforce on 13 November 2017 was to achieve the result, on this occasion, that the 2017 Pay Award would not be collectively bargained, and, therefore, section 145B(1)(b) is satisfied.[174]In these circumstances the Tribunal’s unanimous decision is that the three elements of section 145B of offer, prohibited result and prohibited purpose are each satisfied, and, therefore, these claims succeed, and the claimants are entitled to an award under section 145E. Schedules 1, 2 and 3 below set out which claims succeed against which respondent. Regional Employment Judge Robertson 23 August 2022 (Amended under rule 69 of the Employment Tribunals Rules and Procedures 2013 on 16 December 2022) (East Coast Main Line Limited) Title Forename Surname Case No Ms Caroline Coulson 1802840/2018 Mr Paul Eric Darby 1802869/2018 Mr William Devine 1802889/2018 Ms Karina Fisher 1802967/2018 Mr Raymond Knight 1803225/2018 Mr Thomas McNally 1803373/2018 Mr Anthony Murray 1802425/2018 Mr Ronald Park 1803495/2018 Mr Peter Rae 1803567/2018 Mr William Slater 1803683/2018 Mr Robert Henry Swales 1803749/2018 Mr Alun Douglas Thomas 1803771/2018 Ms Pamela Beatrice Thompson 1803776/2018 Mr Nathan Alexander Webb 1803830/2018 (London North Eastern Railway Limited) Title Forename Surname Case No Mr Nicholas William Ackroyd 1802570/2018 Mr Luke Brian Ackroyd 1802572/2018 Mrs Olabisi Olasimbo Adesina 1802575/2018 Mr Godwin Agbaje 1802576/2018 Mr Owen Agnew 1802577/2018 Mr Zulqurnain Ahmed 1802578/2018 Ms Ashwaq Ahmed-Kyungu 1802579/2018 Mr Paul John Alder 1802581/2018 Mr Findlay Alderson 1802582/2018 Mr Aftab Ali 1802584/2018 Mr Awais Ali 1802583/2018 Mr Rahman Ali 1802585/2018 Mr Michael Allsopp 1802586/2018 Mr Jason Mark Ampleford 1802587/2018 Mr David Anderson 1802588/2018 Mr Ross Anderson 1802591/2018 Ms Wendy Anderson 1802592/2018 Mr Graeme David Anderton 1802593/2018 Ms Denise Andrews 1802594/2018 Mr Alan Andros 1802595/2018 Mr Paul Vincent Angelosanto 1802596/2018 Mr Wilson Appah 1802597/2018 Mr Gordon Archibald 1802598/2018 Ms Nicola Ann Archibald 1802599/2018 Mr John Ardron 1802600/2018 Ms Margaret Armoo 1802601/2018 Ms Lauren Armstrong 1802606/2018 Mr Lewis Armstrong 1802605/2018 Mr Mustafa Armutcuoglu 1802607/2018 Miss Lianne Myumi Arnison 1803877/2018 Mr El Houssine Arsalani 1802608/2018 Mrs Claire Ashdown 1802609/2018 Mr Nicholas Ashley 1802610/2018 Mr Nigel Askew 1802612/2018 Ms Felicia Assim 1802613/2018 Ms Carolyn Atwell 1802616/2018 Miss Jennifer Austin 1802617/2018 Mr Prince Baafi 1802618/2018 Ms Feyi Babalola 1802619/2018 Mr Ashley James Paul Banks 1802621/2018 Ms Claire Louise Banks 1802622/2018 Miss Shinell Baptiste 1802623/2018 Mr Stuart Robert Barber 1802624/2018 Mr William Stanley Barber 1802625/2018 Mr Simon Paul Bardney 1802626/2018 Ms Sue Elizabeth Barfield 1802627/2018 Mr Kevin Barham 1802629/2018 Mr Mark Barker 1802631/2018 Mr Martin Howard Barker 1802633/2018 Ms Lorraine Barnard 1802634/2018 Mr Diane Barnes 1802546/2018 Mr Tristam Barnes 1802635/2018 Mr Malcolm Barnett 1802636/2018 Mr Edward Barr 1802637/2018 Miss Remy Barr (now Cairns) 1802638/2018 Ms Simone Barr 1802639/2018 Mr Lee Barrett 1802640/2018 Ms Lyn Barrett 1802641/2018 Ms Claire Bates 1802642/2018 Mr Steven Baxter 1802643/2018 Mr Liam Neil Bayles 1802644/2018 Mr Morgyn Beattie 1802648/2018 Mr Ryan Scott Beattie 1802649/2018 Ms Annmarie Beattie 1802647/2018 Ms Sharon Beaumont 1802651/2018 Mr Steve Beaumont 1802650/2018 Ms Carol Beckett 1802652/2018 Ms Shelley Beckett 1802654/2018 Mr Brendan Begley 1802655/2018 Mr Liam Robert Bell 1802659/2018 Mr Philip Lee Bell 1802661/2018 Mr Barry McKenzie Bell 1802656/2018 Miss Daisy May Bell 1802657/2018 Ms Emma Bell 1803083/2018 Mr Paul Bell 1802660/2018 Mr Anthony Bennett 1802664/2018 Ms Leanne Bennett (now 1802665/2018 Caldwell) Mr Taylor Bennie 1802667/2018 Mr Simon Alexander Bentley 1802668/2018 Mr Shkelzen Beqiri 1802669/2018 Ms Mehaelal Alina Beta 1802671/2018 Mr Andrew David Beveridge 1802672/2018 Mr Tito Bianco 1802673/2018 Mr Shihab Biplu 1802674/2018 Mr Paul Birks 1802675/2018 Ms Gemma Rachel Birnie 1802676/2018 Mr Kenneth Black 1802677/2018 Mrs Pamela Black (now Shiels) 1802678/2018 Ms Stephanie Black 1802679/2018 Mr Stuart Black 1802681/2018 Mr Ryan Blackadder 1802682/2018 Mr Mark Anthony Blackburn 1802683/2018 Mr James Blackie 1802684/2018 Mr Kevin Blair 1802685/2018 Mr Joseph Blakeborough 1802687/2018 Mr Stephen Blakey 1802688/2018 Ms Denise Joan Blas 1802689/2018 Mr Jimmy Board 1802690/2018 Ms Matilda Boateng 1802691/2018 Ms Samantha Boddington 1802692/2018 Ms Ramona Bodor 1802693/2018 Mr Radoslaw Michal Bogdanowicz 1802694/2018 Ms Kay Bonner 1802696/2018 Mr Mark Boon 1802697/2018 Ms Suzanna Boon 1802698/2018 Mr Thomas Booth 1802699/2018 Mr Iain Richard Bostock-Frith 1802701/2018 Mr Barry Michael Bouch 1802702/2018 Ms Corinne Bourdon 1802703/2018 Mr Robert John Bousfield 1802704/2018 Mr David Bowman 1802706/2018 Mr Nathan Boyd 1802708/2018 Ms Christine Boyle 1802709/2018 Ms Claire Lorraine Bradley 1802711/2018 Mr David Brady 1802712/2018 Ms Dawn Bratton 1802715/2018 Mr John Paul Breach 1802716/2018 Mr Garry Brennan 1802717/2018 Ms Hayley Brennan 1802718/2018 Mr Olivia Bridge 1802719/2018 Ms Debbie Briggs 1802720/2018 Ms Charlotte Jane Brock (now 1802721/2018 Scotland) Mr Shaun Adam Brooke 1802724/2018 Ms Cheryl Ann Brooks 1802725/2018 Mr Mark Brooks 1802726/2018 Mr Ryan Broom 1802727/2018 Ms Sandra Brophy 1802728/2018 Mr Terry Brotherton 1802729/2018 Mr Christopher Paul Brown 1802732/2018 Mr Anthony Brown 1802730/2018 Mr Ben Brown 1802731/2018 Mr Ian Brown 1802733/2018 Ms Maria Brown 1802734/2018 Ms Bernadette Browne 1802735/2018 Ms Caroline Bruce 1802736/2018 Mr Carl Brian Brunning 1802737/2018 Ms Gina Brunning 1802739/2018 Ms Holly Brunton 1802740/2018 Mr Thomas Brydon 1802742/2018 Ms Mandy Buchanan 1802745/2018 Ms Laura Buchanan 1802744/2018 Ms Angela Buddo 1802746/2018 Mr David Philip Bunn 1802747/2018 Mr Brian Burke 1802748/2018 Ms Ash Joanna Burnell 1802750/2018 Ms Rachel Olivia Burnett 1802751/2018 Mr Dennis Burrell 1802754/2018 Ms Amy Louise Butler 1802755/2018 Ms Deborah Ann Butler 1802756/2018 Mr Melvyn Caddick 1802759/2018 Mr John Morgan Cahill 1802760/2018 Mr Stephen Cain 1802532/2018 Ms Pauline Callaghan 1802763/2018 Ms Rachel Cameron 1802764/2018 Mr Stewart Lee Cameron 1802765/2018 Ms Karla Campbell 1802768/2018 Ms Michelle-Ann Campbell 1802769/2018 Mr Alan Campbell 1802766/2018 Ms Donna Campbell 1802767/2018 Ms Susie Campbell 1802770/2018 Mr Michael Canagasabey 1802545/2018 Ms Claire Canavan 1802771/2018 Ms Joanne Davena Cantrill (now Lavery) 1802772/2018 Ms Karen Carden 1802773/2018 Mr Robert Cardownie 1802775/2018 Ms Gwenneth Bronwen Carey 1803822/2018 Ms Alison Caroline Carnevale Paterson 1802776/2018 (now Thomson) Ms Georgina Carrick (now Collins) 1802777/2018 Ms Gemma Michelle Carrington 1802779/2018 Ms Kathryn Carroll 1802780/2018 Mr Scott Carruthers 1802781/2018 Mr Andrew Carter 1802782/2018 Ms Maria Carter 1802783/2018 Mrs Alison Jayne Casling 1802784/2018 Ms Carly Casling 1802785/2018 Mr Craig Cassells 1802786/2018 Mr Glen Casson 1802787/2018 Ms Andrea Cawood 1802788/2018 Mr Terrence Channer 1802789/2018 Mr Alan Stuart Charters 1802792/2018 Mr Thomas Clare 1802795/2018 Mr Chris Clark 1802797/2018 Ms Donna Clark 1802800/2018 Mr Duncan Clark 1802798/2018 Mr Maria Clark (now Laws) 1802801/2018 Ms Amy Clarke 1802802/2018 Ms Gillian Claye 1802803/2018 Ms Charlotte Clayton 1802804/2018 Ms Rebecca Jade Clayton 1802805/2018 Mr Kevin John Cleary 1802807/2018 Ms Justine Samantha Cleary 1802806/2018 Ms Pamela Jean Cleckner 1802809/2018 Ms Susan Clegg 1802810/2018 Ms Kelly Cherie Clements 1802811/2018 Ms Jennifer Clifford 1802808/2018 Ms Yvette Louise Clough 1802812/2018 Mr Ronald Graham Coats 1802813/2018 Mr Chris Cockerham 1802814/2018 Mr Alan Coe 1802815/2018 Mr Duncan Cohen 1802816/2018 Mr Mark Collingwood 1802817/2018 Mr Alec Collins 1802818/2018 Mr Nelson Angus Combe 1802819/2018 Mr James Richard Connolly 1802820/2018 Mr Christopher Cook 1802823/2018 Ms Amanda Nicole Cook 1802822/2018 Ms Autumn Cook 1802821/2018 Mr Jamie Cook 1802824/2018 Mr Michael Cook 1802825/2018 Ms Nicole Cooke 1802826/2018 Mr Peter Cooper 1802829/2018 Mr Simon Cooper 1802830/2018 Mr Jordan Erik Cooper 1802827/2018 Mr Miles Cooper 1802828/2018 Ms Vicki Elaine Cooper 1802831/2018 Mr Kevin Copeland 1802832/2018 Mr Steven Copeland 1802833/2018 Ms Lauren Cormack 1802835/2018 Ms Kathy Corsbie 1802836/2018 Ms Hannah Coulbeck 1802837/2018 Mr Andrew John Coulson 1802838/2018 Ms Rebecca Cozens 1802844/2018 Mr Robert Gordon Craig 1802845/2018 Ms Emma Louise Crawford 1802848/2018 Mr Graham Morrison Crighton 1802849/2018 Mr Douglas Cringles 1802850/2018 Mr Benjamin Crisp 1802851/2018 Ms Jodie Crisp 1802853/2018 Ms Lorraine Crossley 1802855/2018 Ms Marie Tereasa Cullen 1802857/2018 Ms Leah Robson Cunningham 1802858/2018 Ms Rosie Cunningham 1802859/2018 Mr Simon Cunningham 1802860/2018 Ms Donna Currie 1802861/2018 Ms Lorna Currie Gooding 1802863/2018 Mr Cristiano Cuzziol 1802865/2018 Mr Daniel Gordon Dalzell 1802867/2018 Ms Sarah Danks 1802868/2018 Mr Gary Davidson 1802871/2018 Mr Stephen Davidson 1802873/2018 Mr Adam Davies 1802875/2018 Mr Alan Davies 1802876/2018 Mr Daniel Dawson 1802877/2018 Mr Philip Dawson 1802878/2018 Ms Susan Day 1802879/2018 Mr Christophe De Pessemier 1802880/2018 Mr Jonathan Deacon 1802881/2018 Mr Martin Dean 1802882/2018 Ms Diana Del Pozo Sotillo 1802884/2018 Mr Karl Denham 1802885/2018 Mr Michael Denton 1802886/2018 Ms Nicola Denton 1802887/2018 Mr Alan Devine 1802888/2018 Mr Barnabas Dhokwani 1802891/2018 Mr Nelson Dhokwani 1802892/2018 Mr Ahmad Dibnah 1802893/2018 Ms Coreana Louise Docherty 1802896/2018 Mr Derek Docherty 1802897/2018 Miss Jay Dodds (now Jepson) 1802899/2018 Ms Ana Dogaru 1802528/2018 Mr Brian Doherty 1802900/2018 Mr Martin Donald 1802901/2018 Miss Angela Doran 1802902/2018 Ms Kayleigh Marie Douglass 1802905/2018 Mr Adam Dowling 1802907/2018 Mr Malcolm Dowson 1802908/2018 Mr Paul Doyle 1802909/2018 Ms Louise Drake 1802911/2018 Ms Michelle Draycott 1802912/2018 Mr Stuart Drummond 1802913/2018 Mr William Drummond 1802914/2018 Mr Scott Dudfield 1802915/2018 Mr Daniel Duncan 1802916/2018 Mr Thomas Duncan 1802917/2018 Ms Lisa Leanne Dunn 1802918/2018 Ms Carol Ann Durrant 1802921/2018 Mr Connor Dutton 1802922/2018 Mr Michael Dye 1802923/2018 Mr Benjamin Dyson 1802924/2018 Mr Peter Eaglesham 1802925/2018 Ms Sophie Easton 1802928/2018 Mr James Grant Edward 1802929/2018 Ms Angela Modupe Ejaita 1802931/2018 Mr Darren Ellerby 1802932/2018 Ms Anna-Louise Ellington 1802933/2018 Ms Michala Elliott 1802934/2018 Ms Sarah El-Shoubashi 1802936/2018 Mr John Arif Emmanuel 1802937/2018 Mr Kelly Emmerson 1802938/2018 Mr Thomas David Emmerson 1802940/2018 Mr Paul Emmerson 1802939/2018 Mr James Emmott 1802941/2018 Mr Derek England 1802942/2018 Mr Euan Stewart Erskine 1802943/2018 Mr Peter Etherington 1802944/2018 Ms Tracy Jane Etherington 1802945/2018 Mr David Evans 1802947/2018 Ms Lisa Evans 1802948/2018 Mr David William Evans 1802946/2018 Mr Jeffrey Evinou 1802950/2018 Ms Christine Exley 1802951/2018 Mr Asher Farman 1802954/2018 Mr Daniel Mark Fawcett 1802955/2018 Ms Lynn Fawcett 1802956/2018 Ms Simone Fearon 1802957/2018 Ms Lisa Fenwick 1802958/2018 Ms Sharon Field 1802962/2018 Mr Joe Finn 1802963/2018 Ms Jenifer Yvonne Finn 1802964/2018 Mr Steven David Finn 1802965/2018 Mr Richard Mark Firth 1802966/2018 Mr David Fitches 1802968/2018 Ms Lorna Flanagan 1802969/2018 Ms Beverley Flatt 1802970/2018 Mr Robert Fleming 1802971/2018 Mr Stuart Edgar Fletcher 1802972/2018 Ms Laura Flynn 1802973/2018 Mr Steve Follit 1802974/2018 Ms Karen Forbes 1802975/2018 Ms Carol Ford 1802977/2018 Mr Robert Ford 1802978/2018 Ms Hayley Forrest 1802979/2018 Mr Gareth Stewart Fowler 1802981/2018 Mr Neil Fox 1802982/2018 Mr James Murray Fraser 1802983/2018 Mr Kenneth Fraser 1802984/2018 Ms Karen Fraser 1802985/2018 Ms Rachael Fraser 1802986/2018 Ms Sarah Freckleton 1802987/2018 Ms Geraldine Fregene 1802988/2018 Mr Ritchie Frost 1802989/2018 Ms Samantha Louise Froude 1802990/2018 Mr Greig Fulton 1802991/2018 Ms Domenica Fusco 1802992/2018 Ms Lindsey Gallagher 1802994/2018 Mr Mark Galsworthy 1802995/2018 Mr David James Gannaway 1802996/2018 Ms Jacqueline Gannaway 1802997/2018 Ms Aurora Garcia Diaz 1802998/2018 Ms Joanne Gardner 1802999/2018 Ms Janine Garnett 1803000/2018 Mr Shaun Anthony Garrett 1803001/2018 Mr Kevin Garthwaite 1803002/2018 Mr Andrew James Garvie 1803004/2018 Ms Elizabeth Gasken 1803005/2018 Ms Joanne Gatenby 1803006/2018 Ms Kathleen Gaughan 1803007/2018 Mr Simon Gavaghan 1803008/2018 Ms Justina Gawel (now 1803009/2018 Mackowiak) Mr Dean Geddis 1803010/2018 Ms Pavla Georgievova (now 1803013/2018 Mannifield) Mr Sergio Gil Grancha 1803015/2018 Mr James Gordon Gilbert 1803016/2018 Ms Naomi Giles (now 1803017/2018 Patterson) Mr Istvan Gilicze 1803019/2018 Ms Lorraine Gill 1803020/2018 Mr Stephen Gillies 1803022/2018 Mr Graeme Peter Gilroy 1803024/2018 Ms Michelle Gilroy 1803025/2018 Mr Matthew Gipson 1803026/2018 Mr Ian Kenneth Glen 1803028/2018 Ms June Glendinning-Mills 1803029/2018 Mr David Sydney Glennie 1803030/2018 Mr David Glover 1803031/2018 Ms Julie Anne Gooding 1803033/2018 Ms Jacqueline Gordine 1803034/2018 Ms Ann-Marie Gordon 1803035/2018 Mr Michael Gordon 1803036/2018 Mr Steven Gordon 1803037/2018 Ms Janet Gough 1803039/2018 Ms Katy Elizabeth Gough 1803040/2018 Mrs Hannah Grainger 1803041/2018 Mr Andrew Gray 1803043/2018 Ms Caroline Gray 1803723/2018 Mr Kevin Gray 1803047/2018 Mr Jonathan Gray 1803045/2018 Mr Maurice Green 1803048/2018 Mr David Gregory 1803050/2018 Mr Jeffrey Grey 1803051/2018 Ms Rebecca Grey now (Carson) 1803052/2018 Ms Elizabeth Gribben 1803054/2018 Mr Neil Grogan 1803055/2018 Mrs Orlette Guardascione 1803056/2018 Mr Salvatore Guardascione 1803057/2018 Mr Meral Gungor 1803058/2018 Ms Stacey Guthrie 1803062/2018 Mr Gerald Guthrie 1803060/2018 Ms Karen Guthrie 1803061/2018 Mr Ian Gwilliam 1803063/2018 Ms Anne Haining 1803065/2018 Mr Christopher Hall 1803066/2018 Mr Leslie Hall 1803068/2018 Ms Melinda Hallas 1803070/2018 Mr Ross Hallewell 1803071/2018 Ms Joanne Hammond 1803075/2018 Mr Lorraine Hammond 1803076/2018 Ms Becki Hancock 1803078/2018 Ms Jacquelyn Hancock 1803079/2018 Mr Michael James Hannon 1803081/2018 Mr Aminul Haque 1803082/2018 Mr James Arthur Hare 1803084/2018 Miss Elizabeth Harkness 1803085/2018 Ms Yvonne Wendy Harrison 1803090/2018 Mrs Darren Harrison 1803088/2018 Miss Julie Ann Harrison 1803089/2018 Miss Gonca Has 1803091/2018 Mr James Haslam 1803092/2018 Mr Lenroy Haughton 1803093/2018 Mr Andrew Hawkins 1803094/2018 Mr Robert Mark Hawkins 1803096/2018 Mr Keith Hawkins 1803095/2018 Mr Joseph Terence Heatherington 1803097/2018 Ms Angela Heaton 1803098/2018 Ms Elizabeth Hemple 1803099/2018 Ms Annmarie Henderson 1803100/2018 Ms Helen Henderson 1803102/2018 Ms Zoe Henderson 1803104/2018 Ms Joan Valerie Hendry 1803105/2018 Mr Michael John Herman 1803106/2018 Ms Ruth Herring 1803107/2018 Mr Keith Herron 1803108/2018 Ms Amy Louise Heslington 1803109/2018 Mr Martin John Hick 1803111/2018 Ms Alexandra Hick (now Naylor) 1803110/2018 Mr Mark Higginbottom 1803112/2018 Mr Kyle Higgins 1803113/2018 Ms Nicola Janie Higgins 1803114/2018 Ms Leeanne Higginson 1803116/2018 Ms Barbara Higgs 1803117/2018 Mr Edward Hill 1803120/2018 Ms Avril Hill 1803118/2018 Ms Clare Hill 1803119/2018 Mr Stephen Hinds 1803123/2018 Mr Bernard Tak Kei Ho 1803124/2018 Mr Jonathan Neil Hodge 1803126/2018 Ms Laura Jayne Hodge 1803127/2018 Mr Alan Hodgson 1803128/2018 Mr Philip Hodgson 1803129/2018 Mr Robert George Holland 1803131/2018 Ms Lorraine Holmes 1803132/2018 Ms Amanda Jane Honour 1803133/2018 Mr Edward Honour 1803135/2018 Ms Sharon Horbury 1803137/2018 Ms Leanne Horwood 1803139/2018 Mr Kevin Howe 1803140/2018 Mr Robert Thomas Howes 1803141/2018 Ms Jacqueline Howlett-Smith 1803143/2018 Mr Robert James Hoye 1803144/2018 Mr James Alexander Huby 1803145/2018 Mr Steve Hucknall 1803146/2018 Ms Lindsey Angela Hudson 1803147/2018 Mrs Lea Anne Hughes 1803148/2018 Mr Ben Nils Hume 1803150/2018 Mr Peter Neville Humphries 1803151/2018 Ms Susan Hunt 1803152/2018 Ms Amanda Hunter 1803153/2018 Ms Anne-Marie Hunter 1803154/2018 Ms Natalie Rose Hurdus 1803156/2018 Mr Matthew Owen Hurst 1803157/2018 Mr Clive Husband 1803158/2018 Ms Louise Hussein 1803159/2018 Mr James Robin Watson Hutton 1803160/2018 Ms Janice Elaine Imlah 1803161/2018 Miss Keli Irwin 1803164/2018 Mr Rahnum Ishtiaq 1803165/2018 Miss Nikki Jackson 1803167/2018 Ms Francine Maria James 1803168/2018 Ms Samantha Jameson 1803169/2018 Ms Kimberly Jamieson 1803170/2018 Mr Yathavan Jenanachandran 1803171/2018 Ms Carolyn Jepson 1803172/2018 Mr Daniel Jepson 1803173/2018 Ms Jolene Jewitt 1803174/2018 Ms Nimu Aleem Jiwanji 1082527/2018 Ms Nicola Jayne Johnson 1803180/2018 Mr Richard Adeniyi Johnson 1803181/2018 Mr Adrian Philip Johnson 1803175/2018 Mrs Caroline Johnson 1803176/2018 Mr Daniel Johnson 1803178/2018 Mr David Johnson 1803177/2018 Ms Joanne Kathryn Johnson 1803179/2018 Ms Victoria Johnson (now 1803182/2018 Holmes) Mr Steven Johnstone 1803184/2018 Ms Emma Louise Jones (now Stacey) 1803185/2018 Mr Gareth Paul Jones 1803186/2018 Ms Sally Ann Jones 1803189/2018 Ms Holly Jones 1803187/2018 Mr Robert Jones 1803188/2018 Ms Dorothy Mary Jordan 1803191/2018 Mr Ian Robert Jordan 1803192/2018 Ms Claire Lorraine Jowett 1803193/2018 Mr Titani Emmanuel Kamphandira 1803194/2018 Mr Ibrahim Kanu 1803196/2018 Mr Bakul Kapadia 1803197/2018 Mr Thomas Kaplanis 1803198/2018 Mr Lee Kay 1803200/2018 Mr Alan Thomas Keary 1803201/2018 Mrs Nada Keary 1803202/2018 Mr Ian Keith 1803204/2018 Ms Christine Kelly 1803205/2018 Mr Wayne Anthony Kelly 1803206/2018 Mr Richard Anthony Kemp 1803207/2018 Ms Claire Kemper (now 1803208/2018 Thompson) Mr Scott Kemper 1803209/2018 Ms Margaret Kennedy 1803210/2018 Ms Lynn Kenneway 1803211/2018 Ms Mary Elizabeth Kenny 1803212/2018 Mr Alan Kettlewell 1803214/2018 Mr Christopher Kindlan 1803217/2018 Mr Raymond John King 1803219/2018 Mr Richard Patrick King 1803220/2018 Mr Robert Kingsnorth 1803221/2018 Ms Tracey Kirkbright 1803222/2018 Mr Kester Kissane 1803223/2018 Ms Michelle Knighton 1803228/2018 Ms Lisa Knighton 1803227/2018 Mr Ian Knott 1803229/2018 Mr Elton Kociraj 1803231/2018 Ms Barbara Kouame 1803232/2018 Mr Christopher Krakowski 1803233/2018 Ms Victroria Krapp 1803234/2018 Ms Bethany Lacey (now Brown) 1803235/2018 Ms Stephanie Laidler 1803236/2018 Ms Stacey Lake 1803238/2018 Ms Pauline Lamont 1803241/2018 Ms Claire Lancaster 1803242/2018 Mr Kenneth Lang 1803244/2018 Mr Matthew Langdown 1803245/2018 Ms Elaine Patricia Langford 1803246/2018 Ms Julianna Laszlo 1803247/2018 Ms Luisa Lauren 1803248/2018 Ms Alison Law 1803249/2018 Mr Craig Lawrence 1803250/2018 Mr Craig Lawson 1803252/2018 Ms Sandra Lee 1803255/2018 Mr Kenneth Leech 1803256/2018 Ms Melanie Leeming 1803257/2018 Ms Beverley Lee-Moulding 1803258/2018 Mr Duncan Leishman 1803259/2018 Mr Mark Lemmon 1803260/2018 Mr Tristan Leonard 1803261/2018 Ms Roxsanne Lesieur 1803262/2018 Ms Anneka Lewis 1803264/2018 Ms Keely Liddell 1803265/2018 Ms Lisa Anne Lilley 1803266/2018 Mr Paul Lippeatt 1803267/2018 Mr Ian Littlefear 1803270/2018 Mr John Littlewood 1803272/2018 Ms Michelle Livingstone 1803273/2018 Ms Hayley Lockerbie 1803275/2018 Ms Mandy Lockhart 1803277/2018 Mr David Lockwood 1803278/2018 Mr Raymond Lockwood 1803279/2018 Mr Darren Brian Lodge 1803280/2018 Ms Suzanne Adelene Love 1803281/2018 Mr Philip Lowe 1803282/2018 Ms Sheila Ann Lowther 1803284/2018 Mr Darren Joseph Lumber 1803285/2018 Ms Emma Lycett 1803286/2018 Mr Derek Thomas Lynas 1803287/2018 Mr Delroy Lynch 1803288/2018 Mr William Lynch 1803290/2018 Mr James Lyons 1803291/2018 Ms Catherine MacDonald 1803292/2018 Ms Kathryn Mace 1803295/2018 Mr David Duncan MacLauchlan 1803297/2018 Mr Gavin MacLean 1803298/2018 Mr Norman MacLeod 1803300/2018 Mr Kenneth MacLeod 1803299/2018 Mr Andrew MacNair 1803301/2018 Mr Scott MacRae 1803302/2018 Mr Paul Maddison 1803303/2018 Miss Samira Madkour-Ali 1803304/2018 Ms Anna Maggs (now Fenton) 1803305/2018 Mr Ingemar Magnusson 1803306/2018 Ms Kathleen Mary Maguire 1803307/2018 Mr Philip Maher 1803308/2018 Mr Sharef Malik 1803309/2018 Ms Brenda Mallinson 1803310/2018 Mr James Mallinson 1803311/2018 Mr Anthony Mallon 1803312/2018 Mr Rodger Maningding 1803315/2018 Ms Ruta Mankeviciene 1803316/2018 Mr Jonnie Manners 1803317/2018 Mrs Claire Manning 1803318/2018 Mr Freddy Maremeni 1803320/2018 Ms Sofija Maricic 1803321/2018 Mr Zimele Maroti 1803322/2018 Mr David Marris 1803323/2018 Ms Hayley Marsay 1803324/2018 Ms Joanna Marsden 1803326/2018 Mr Gary Marsden 1803325/2018 Mr Lee Marshall 1803329/2018 Ms Alison Marshall 1803327/2018 Mr Graeme Marshall 1803328/2018 Mr Lee Martin (now 1803330/2018 Naughton) Ms Debrah Mason 1803331/2018 Mr Jack Robert Mason 1803332/2018 Mr David Maughan 1803334/2018 Mr Martin John Maytum 1803335/2018 Ms Carrie McCann 1803338/2018 Ms Lorna McClarence 1803339/2018 Mr Martin McCleary 1803340/2018 Mr Shaun McCrudden 1803343/2018 Mr David McCutcheon 1803344/2018 Ms Jane McDaid 1803345/2018 Ms Alison McDermott 1803346/2018 Mr Daniel McDonald 1803347/2018 Mr John Vincent McDonald 1803348/2018 Ms Keeleigh McDougall 1803350/2018 Mr Chris Ramsay McDowell 1803351/2018 Ms Brigid McElroy 1803352/2018 Mr Darren McGowan 1803354/2018 Ms Izabela McGowan 1803355/2018 Mr Ross Thomas McGowan 1803356/2018 Ms Teresa Gemma McGowan 1803357/2018 Ms Sharron McGrath 1803358/2018 Mr Brian McGroarty 1803362/2018 Ms Claire Anne McGroarty 1803363/2018 Ms Elena McHugh 1803365/2018 Ms Eileen McKenna 1803367/2018 Mr Daniel McLaughlin 1803370/2018 Ms Zoe McNamara 1803374/2018 Mr Stephen Christopher McNichol 1803375/2018 Mr Neal McNulty 1803376/2018 Mr Andrew McStay 1803380/2018 Ms Carole McVay 1803381/2018 Ms Tracy Ann McVeigh 1803382/2018 Mr Simon Mehdi 1803383/2018 Ms Paula Melvin-Cadger 1803384/2018 Ms Clara Mennie 1803385/2018 Ms Leanne Mennie 1803386/2018 Ms Roseann Mennie 1803387/2018 Ms Amanda June Middlemas 1803388/2018 Ms Denise Middleton 1803389/2018 Mr Ryan Miller 1803392/2018 Mr Neil Milne 1803394/2018 Mr Sarfraz Mirza 1803395/2018 Mr Michael Mishner 1803396/2018 Mr Daryl Thomas Mitchelhill 1803397/2018 Mr Adam Mitchell 1803398/2018 Ms Karin Mitchell 1803400/2018 Ms Angela Mitcheson 1803401/2018 Ms Collette Modral 1803402/2018 Ms Helen Moffitt 1803404/2018 Mr Derek Moloney 1803405/2018 Ms Donna Moorehead 1803406/2018 Ms Chloe Moorhouse 1803407/2018 Ms Natalie Moorhouse 1803408/2018 Ms Janice Mordue 1803409/2018 Ms Patricia Morgan 1803410/2018 Mr Craig Morrison 1802541/2018 Ms Sheila Morrison 1803411/2018 Ms Amanda Moss 1803412/2018 Ms Sheron Elizabeth Moss 1803413/2018 Mr Boualem Moussouni 1803414/2018 Ms Anna Mowat-Reay 1803415/2018 Ms Jill Muff 1803416/2018 Mr Thomas Mulcahy 1803417/2018 Mr Andrew Mulholland 1803418/2018 Mr Thomas Mulholland 1803419/2018 Mr Stephen Mullen 1803420/2018 Mr David Stuart Munro 1803422/2018 Ms Elizabeth Murphy 1803424/2018 Mr Liam Murray 1803426/2018 Ms Lorraine Musgrove 1803427/2018 Ms Natasha Mushonga 1803428/2018 Mr Eidris Mussa 1803429/2018 Mr Yasir Mussa 1803431/2018 Mr Hanif Mussa 1803430/2018 Mr Steven Muter 1803432/2018 Ms Christine Monica Myers 1803434/2018 Ms Melanie Myers 1803435/2018 Ms Susan Napier 1803437/2018 Mr Naseer Naseer 1803438/2018 Ms Philippa Nash 1803439/2018 Ms Tara Nash 1803440/2018 Mr Piotr Nawrocki 1803441/2018 Mr Richard Ndikumana 1803442/2018 Ms Debra Neal 1803443/2018 Ms Elena Alina Necula 1803446/2018 Ms Dawn Margaret Neish 1803447/2018 Mr Antony Newman 1803448/2018 Ms Wendy Newton 1803450/2018 Mr David Nicholls 1803452/2018 Ms Alexandra Nichols 1803455/2018 Ms Angela Nichols 1803453/2018 Mr Michael Nichols 1803456/2018 Mr David Nicol 1803458/2018 Mr Frank Vickery Nicol 1803459/2018 Ms Vivian Mukoma Nkhata 1803460/2018 Mr Paul John Noblett 1803465/2018 Ms Ada Nowakowska 1803466/2018 Mr Phemelo Ntshabele 1803467/2018 Ms Bridget Nuamah (now 1803469/2018 Kakra) Ms Kelly Nye 1803470/2018 Ms Katherine Oates 1803471/2018 Mr Brian O'Brien 1803472/2018 Miss Linsey Beth O'Brien 1803473/2018 Mr John O'Connell 1803474/2018 Mr Kieran O'Donnell 1803476/2018 Mr Mark O'Donnell 1803477/2018 Ms Pamela Elizabeth O'Donnell 1803478/2018 Mr Richard Alexander Ogden 1803479/2018 Mr David Ogg 1803480/2018 Mr Feyisitan Omolabi 1803481/2018 Mr Kevin Ong 1803482/2018 Ms Amy O'Reilly 1803483/2018 Mr Aaron Anthony O'Sullivan 1803484/2018 Mr Roy Stephen James Outing 1803485/2018 Mr David Andrew Owen 1803487/2018 Ms Michelle Owen 1803488/2018 Mr Alan Page 1803490/2018 Mr Keith Page 1803491/2018 Mr Glenn Palmer 1803492/2018 Mr Paul Panesar 1803493/2018 Ms Karen Paparesti 1803494/2018 Mr Darren Lee Parker 1803496/2018 Mr Nick Ian Parker 1803498/2018 Mr Raju Patel 1803504/2018 Mr Mohmed Zuned Patel 1803502/2018 Mr Ridwan Abdul Hamid Patel 1803503/2018 Mrs Sagufta Banu Patel 1803505/2018 Mr Scott Paterson 1803510/2018 Mr Neil Charles Paterson 1803509/2018 Mr Christoper Paton 1803511/2018 Mr Thomas Paton 1803512/2018 Mr Jack Paul 1803513/2018 Ms Sarah Louise Paul 1803514/2018 Mr Craig Thomas Peacock 1803515/2018 Mr Richard Pearce 1803516/2018 Mr Ryan John Pearsall 1803517/2018 Ms Sophie Elizabeth Pearson 1803520/2018 Mr Craig Pearson 1803518/2018 Ms Suzanne Pearson 1803519/2018 Ms Christine Peat 1803521/2018 Mr Tom Peirce 1803522/2018 Ms Amy Teresa Penfold 1803523/2018 Mr Darren Penman 1803524/2018 Mr Nigel Penman 1803525/2018 Mr Christopher Perkins 1803526/2018 Ms Katrina Louise Peterson 1803527/2018 Ms Nicoleta Petrica 1803528/2018 Ms Nicoleta Petrisor 1803529/2018 Ms Lyndsey Alexandra Petty 1803530/2018 Mr Israel Philips 1803531/2018 Mr David Phillips 1803532/2018 Ms Ella Phillips-Jones 1803533/2018 Mr James Phillpott 1803534/2018 Ms Helen Pickering 1803535/2018 Ms Michaela Louise Pickles 1803536/2018 Ms Sonja Pietersen 1803537/2018 Mr Kevin Pikett 1803538/2018 Mr Philip Pilkington 1803539/2018 Mr Arthur Malcolm Pinchin 1803540/2018 Mr Paul Michael Pinkney 1803541/2018 Ms Ruby Pino 1803543/2018 Ms Elma Pinon 1803544/2018 Ms Rachel Place 1803545/2018 Mr John Popham 1803547/2018 Ms Ditirwa Poroga 1803548/2018 Mr Luis Pose-Rodriguez 1803549/2018 Mr Calum Potter 1803550/2018 Ms Pauline Pownall 1803552/2018 Mr Domiziano Pozzi-Carioti 1803553/2018 Ms Lynette Preen 1803554/2018 Ms Nicola Louise Price 1803556/2018 Ms Samantha Proud 1803557/2018 Mrs Rita Pulavska 1803542/2018 Mr Marcin Pulawski 1803558/2018 Mr Tom George Pulford 1803559/2018 Ms Shelley Purdham 1803561/2018 Ms Nicola Pyle 1803563/2018 Mr Malcolm Pyle 1803562/2018 Mr Brian Quinn 1803564/2018 Mr Thomas Quinn 1803565/2018 Mr Simon Gary Race 1802571/2018 Mr Robert Kenneth Rainey 1803569/2018 Mr Mahen Ramrajsingh 1803570/2018 Mr Thrishna Ramrajsingh 1803571/2018 Ms Michelle Ramsay 1803572/2018 Mr Richard Ramsey 1803574/2018 Ms Kimberley Rankin 1803575/2018 Ms Deborah Rankine 1803576/2018 Mr Tejan Rashid 1803577/2018 Mr James Liam Rawcliffe 1803579/2018 Mr Stuart Rawcliffe 1803580/2018 Mr Syed Imran Raza 1803581/2018 Mr Daniel John Read 1803582/2018 Ms Emma Reed 1803584/2018 Mr Max Reid 1803588/2018 Mr Paul Reiling 1803589/2018 Ms Fiona Anne Renney 1803590/2018 Mr David Michael Rennison 1803591/2018 Ms Sara Orquidea Rangel Ribeiro 1803594/2018 Ms Christine Heidi Richardson (now 1803596/2018 Marriott) Mr Andrew Richardson 1803595/2018 Ms Karen Richardson 1803597/2018 Ms Jane Karen Richmond 1803598/2018 Mr Aaron Riding-Brown 1803600/2018 Ms Erika Riley 1803601/2018 Ms Helen Riley 1803602/2018 Mr John Martin Robb 1803603/2018 Mr Malcolm Carl Roberts 1803606/2018 Mr Steven Stuart Roberts 1803607/2018 Mr Anthony John Roberts 1803604/2018 Ms Margaret Roberts 1803605/2018 Ms Joanne Robertson (now 1803610/2018 Fenton) Mr Ross Iain Robertson 1803611/2018 Mr Alan Robinson 1803612/2018 Ms Daniela Robinson 1803613/2018 Ms Diane Robinson 1803614/2018 Ms Marrianne Robinson 1803615/2018 Mr Philip Robinson 1803616/2018 Ms Rosemary Robinson 1803617/2018 Ms Susan Elizabeth Robinson 1803618/2018 Mr Glen Rochester 1803619/2018 Mr Mathew Rogers 1803621/2018 Ms Emma Ronan 1803622/2018 Mr Stephen Rooney 1803623/2018 Mr John Ross 1803627/2018 Ms Jane Ross 1803626/2018 Ms Kelly Eleanora Rowley 1803628/2018 Ms Katherine Rowley 1803629/2018 Ms Rachel Rowley 1803630/2018 Ms Lisa Rudzinski 1803631/2018 Mr Oluwole Enoch Runsewe 1803632/2018 Mr Collette Russell 1803633/2018 Mr Terence David Russell 1803634/2018 Mr Bryan Trevor John Rust 1803635/2018 Mr Connor Rutherford 1803636/2018 Mr Mathivarna Sabaratnam 1803637/2018 Mrs Cheryl Sadler 1803639/2018 Ms Lianne-Robyn Salter 1802904/2018 Mr Mark Salvona 1803640/2018 Mr Christopher John Samuels 1803641/2018 Ms Katie Sanderson 1803643/2018 Mr Javed Sath 1803644/2018 Ms Kerry Sawers 1803646/2018 Mr Malcolm Scorer 1803647/2018 Mr Craig Robertson Scotland 1803648/2018 Ms Lauren Scott 1803652/2018 Mr David Scott 1803649/2018 Mr Sam Scott 1803653/2018 Ms Claudia Serban 1803654/2018 Mr Abdul Shaik 1803655/2018 Mr Michael Sharman 1803656/2018 Mr Kenneth Sharpe 1803657/2018 Mr Lee Micheal Sharratt 1803658/2018 Mr Darren Shawcroft 1803659/2018 Ms Caroline Louise Sheard 1803660/2018 Mr Stephen Sheard 1803661/2018 Ms Deborah Sheils 1803662/2018 Mr Mark Andrew Shepherd 1803663/2018 Ms Beryl Sheppard 1803664/2018 Ms Lisa Sholder 1803666/2018 Ms Sophie Sholder 1803667/2018 Ms Lyndsey Michelle Shooter 1803668/2018 Ms Nicolette Short 1803669/2018 Mr Masotja September Sibandze 1803670/2018 Ms Malgorzata Joanna Sielska 1803671/2018 Mrs Ewelina Siemieniuk 1803672/2018 Mr Paul Simons 1803673/2018 Ms Helen Marie Simpkin 1803674/2018 Mr Gary Simpson 1803675/2018 Ms Louise Simpson 1803676/2018 Mr Peter Stuart Simpson 1803677/2018 Mr Parmjit Singh 1803678/2018 Mr Nathan John Skinner 1803679/2018 Miss Iwona Skulska 1803680/2018 Ms Kelly Slee 1803682/2018 Mr Matthew Smith 1803693/2018 Mr Paul Alan Smith 1803695/2018 Ms Sharon Smith 1803697/2018 Ms Sharon Lesley Smith 1803700/2018 Mr Alan Smith 1803684/2018 Mr Andrew Smith 1803685/2018 Mr Craig Aitken Smith 1803686/2018 Mr Hugh Smith 1803688/2018 Ms Karen Smith 1803689/2018 Ms Kellie Smith 1803691/2018 Ms Lisa Marie Smith 1803692/2018 Mr Stephen Smith 1803698/2018 Ms Vanessa Elizabeth Smith 1803701/2018 Mr Chris Snaith 1803702/2018 Mr Ian James Sneddon 1803703/2018 Mr Robert John Snelling 1803704/2018 Mr Kevin Soakell 1803705/2018 Ms Bethany Claire Soards 1803707/2018 Mr Graham Spence 1803710/2018 Mr Sean Spoors 1803711/2018 Mr Grant James Spring 1803712/2018 Mr Andrew Squires 1803713/2018 Mr Patrick Lewis Stacey 1803714/2018 Mr William Stacey 1803715/2018 Ms Joyce Audrey Stafford 1803716/2018 Mr Bryan Richard Stancliffe 1803717/2018 Ms Donna Marie Stanway 1803718/2018 Ms Tracey Marie Steel 1803720/2018 Ms Claire Louise Stephenson 1803721/2018 Mr Peter Stevenson 1803722/2018 Mr Gary Stewart 1803724/2018 Mr James Stewart 1803727/2018 Ms Sonia Stewart 1803729/2018 Ms Julie Stewart 1803726/2018 Mr Douglas Stones 1803730/2018 Ms Leane Storey 1803731/2018 Ms Sandra June Strachan 1803733/2018 Mr William Strang 1803734/2018 Mr Adam Straughan 1803735/2018 Mr Andrew Straughan 1803736/2018 Mr Gavin Straughan 1803737/2018 Ms Elaine Stretton 1803738/2018 Mr David Strickland 1803739/2018 Mr Andrew Peter Strong 1803740/2018 Ms Vikki Strong 1803741/2018 Ms Jacqui Stuart 1803742/2018 Mr Peter Timothy Suggitt 1803743/2018 Mr Umran Sultan 1803744/2018 Ms Elaine Summerill 1803745/2018 Ms Rachel Victoria Summers 1803746/2018 Mr Graham Sutherland 1803747/2018 Ms Mary Margaret Sutherland 1803748/2018 Mr Conrad Sysa 1803750/2018 Mr John Trevor Taafe 1803751/2018 Mr William Taggart 1803752/2018 Ms Paula Tait 1803753/2018 Ms Gabriela Tanase 1803754/2018 Mr David Taylor 1803758/2018 Mr David William Taylor 1803757/2018 Mr Greg Taylor (now Wilkie) 1803759/2018 Ms Jacky Taylor (now Barker) 1803762/2018 Mr Julian Taylor 1803761/2018 Mr Matthew Taylor 1802543/2018 Ms Anna Judi Taylor 1803755/2018 Mr Ben Taylor 1803756/2018 Mr Geoff Taylor 1803760/2018 Mr Lee Andrew Taylor 1803764/2018 Mr Scott Taylor 1803765/2018 Mr Stephen James Taylor 1803766/2018 Mr Robert Terry 1803767/2018 Ms Wendy Thackray 1803768/2018 Mr Alan Christopher Thomas 1803770/2018 Ms Claire Thompson 1803773/2018 Mr Gary Thompson 1803774/2018 Mr Philip Martin Thompson 1803777/2018 Ms Sheila Thomson 1803782/2018 Mr Gregor Thomson 1803779/2018 Ms Kathryn Thomson 1803780/2018 Ms Sarah Thomson 1803781/2018 Mr Liam Thornton 1803783/2018 Mr Daniel Thorpe 1803784/2018 Mr Paul Thorpe 1803785/2018 Mr Steve Tiffin 1803786/2018 Mr Stephen Paul Tiplady 1803787/2018 Ms Sharon Toner 1803788/2018 Ms Linsley Tones 1803789/2018 Ms Melanie Tosh 1803790/2018 Ms Amy Jane Treadwell 1803792/2018 Mr Thomas Trehy 1803793/2018 Mr Wayne Truman 1803794/2018 Ms Jacqueline Turnbull 1803797/2018 Ms Julie Turpin 1803798/2018 Ms Jeanette Tyers 1803799/2018 Mr Prakash Valambhia 1803800/2018 Ms Jacqueline Sharon Valley 1803801/2018 Mr Paul Varley 1803802/2018 Ms Karen Vaughan 1803803/2018 Mr Sean Veal 1803804/2018 Miss Mihaela Velicu 1803805/2018 Mr Leighton James Vellam 1803806/2018 Ms Janet Verity 1803807/2018 Ms Carmen Villafranca 1803808/2018 Mr Aleksandar Vuletic 1803809/2018 Ms Sharon Wadeley 1803811/2018 Mr George Matthew Waitt 1803812/2018 Ms Karina Wallace 1803813/2018 Mr David Walls 1803815/2018 Mr Daniel Ward 1803818/2018 Ms Geraldine Ward 1803819/2018 Ms Carol Wass 1803820/2018 Ms Kathleen Waters 1803821/2018 Ms Alana Watson 1803823/2018 Mr Allan Peter Watson 1803824/2018 Ms Geraldine Watson 1803825/2018 Mr Timothy Watson 1803826/2018 Mr Richard Murray Webster 1803831/2018 Mr Robb Weir 1803833/2018 Mr Colin Robert Weldrick 1803834/2018 Mr Patrick Wells 1803835/2018 Ms Angela West 1803836/2018 Mr Ian Alexander Westwater 1803837/2018 Ms Tracy Westwater 1803838/2018 Mr Jon White 1803841/2018 Mr Kevin White 1803842/2018 Ms Sadie White 1803845/2018 Ms Wendy White 1803846/2018 Ms Emma Louise White 1803840/2018 Mr Grahame Whitehead 1803847/2018 Mr Mark Whittaker 1803848/2018 Ms Kate Whitworth 1803850/2018 Ms Kristina Carolyn Whitworth 1803849/2018 Mr Anthony Whyke 1803851/2018 Ms Jemma Whyman 1803852/2018 Ms Donna Wilkie 1803853/2018 Ms Heather Wilkinson 1803856/2018 Ms Kelcey Wilkinson 1803858/2018 Mr Daniel Leonard Williams 1803859/2018 Mr Joseph Williams 1803861/2018 Ms Katie Williams 1803863/2018 Mr Donald Williams 1803860/2018 Mr Jude Alexander Williams 1803862/2018 Mr Philip Andrew Williams 1803864/2018 Mr James Williamson 1803866/2018 Ms Claire Wills 1803867/2018 Ms Susan Wills 1803868/2018 Mr David WinfIeld 1803870/2018 Miss Kinga Wisniewska 1803871/2018 Mr Stephen John Witchard 1803872/2018 Mr Winston George Witter 1803873/2018 Mr Michal Wojcik 1803875/2018 Miss Kerry Wood 1803876/2018 Mr Michael Anthony Wood 1803878/2018 Ms Maxine Woodman 1803879/2018 Ms Kelly Woods 1803880/2018 Mr Gary Woodward 1803881/2018 Ms Lucy Woodward 1803882/2018 Mr Shaun Antony Worrall 1803883/2018 Ms Cindy Worth 1803884/2018 Ms Lesley Worthington 1803885/2018 Mr Robert Worthington 1803886/2018 Ms Dawn Wraith 1803887/2018 Mr Gary Wray 1803888/2018 Ms Lynne Wright 1803889/2018 Ms Melanie Wright 1803890/2018 Mr Marc Wroe 1803891/2018 Mr Andrew Wyatt 1803892/2018 Mr Steve Wyllie 1803893/2018 Mr Harry Yates 1803894/2018 Ms Julie Yearham 1803895/2018 Mr Robert Yorkston 1803896/2018 Ms Caroline Young 1803897/2018 Ms Claire Young 1803898/2018 Mr Shaun Youngs 1803091/2018 Ms Helen Zato 1803902/2018 (Hitachi Rail Limited) Title Forename Surname Case No: Mr Bruce Adamson 1802574/2018 Mr Jimmy Alalade 1802580/2018 Mr Liam Amos 1802535/2018 Mr Gordon Anderson 1802589/2018 Mr John Anderson 1802590/2018 Mr John McKenzie Armstrong 1802603/2018 Mr Jason Wayne Armstrong 1802604/2018 Mr David Ashton 1802611/2018 Mr Derek James Attenburgh 1802614/2018 Ms Karen Georgina Attenburgh 1802615/2018 Ms Eleanor Bell 1802658/2018 Mr Paul Bennett 1802666/2018 Mr Matthew Bond 1802695/2018 Mr George Reid Borthwick 1802700/2018 Mr Lee Garrett Bowden 1802705/2018 Mr Keith David Boyd 1802707/2018 Mr Christopher Bradley 1802710/2018 Mr Alan Stewart Braidwood 1802713/2018 Mr Kevin Brogan 1802722/2018 Mr Thomas Brogan 1802723/2018 Mr Jamie Bryant 1802741/2018 Mr Nathan Bryce 1802538/2018 Ms Shannen Bryce 1802539/2018 Mr Scott Buchan 1802743/2018 Mr Glenn Burn 1802749/2018 Mr David Allen Burns 1802752/2018 Mr John Burns 1802753/2018 Mr Patrick Butshingi 1802757/2018 Mr Ian Byrne 1802758/2018 Mr Ryan Andrew Cairns 1802762/2018 Mr David Cairns 1802761/2018 Mr Nathan Chappell 1802790/2018 Mr Paul Charlesworth 1802791/2018 Mr William Cherry 1802793/2018 Mr Aidan William Christie 1802794/2018 Mr Campbell Clark 1802796/2018 Mr Thomas Coyle 1802843/2018 Mr Stewart Craigie 1802846/2018 Mr Gary Lee Cranston 1802847/2018 Mr Alexander Cruickshank 1802856/2018 Mr Stuart Currie 1802862/2018 Mr Cezary Cyran 1802866/2018 Mr Darrin Davidson 1802870/2018 Mr James Davidson 1802872/2018 Ms Valerie Deegan 1802883/2018 Mr James Devlin 1802890/2018 Mr Norman Dickson 1802894/2018 Mr Jamie Docherty 1802898/2018 Mr Ian Dougan 1802903/2018 Mr Colin Dower 1802906/2018 Mr Patrick Doyle 1802910/2018 Mr Steven Dryburgh 1802534/2018 Mr William Dunn 1802533/2018 Mr Ross Duns 1802920/2018 Mr Christopher Easby 1802926/2018 Mr Mark Edwards 1802930/2018 Mr David Ellis 1802935/2018 Mr James Fairley 1802952/2018 Mr Daniel Crawford Fallon 1802953/2018 Mr Jack Ferguson 1802959/2018 Mr John Bear Ferris 1802960/2018 Mr Scott Thomas Forbes 1802976/2018 Mr Andrew Forsyth 1802980/2018 Mr William Freeland 1802542/2018 Mr Martin George 1803012/2018 Mr John Gibson 1803014/2018 Mr Bernard Gilhooley 1803018/2018 Mr James Gillen 1803021/2018 Mr Ian Gilmour 1803023/2018 Ms Denise Gladstone 1803027/2018 Mr Henry George Gobourne 1803032/2018 Mr David Gormley 1803038/2018 Mr Alan Grant 1803042/2018 Mr James Gray 1803046/2018 Mr Gordon Greenan 1803049/2018 Mr David Haggarty 1803064/2018 Mr John William Hall 1803067/2018 Mr Colin Hamilton 1803072/2018 Mr Stephen Hamley 1803074/2018 Mr Robert Hammond 1803077/2018 Mr James Harper 1803086/2018 Mr Greg Henderson 1803101/2018 Mr Scott Alexander Henderson 1803103/2018 Mr Hubert Alain Hillah 1803121/2018 Mr Keith Steven Hoatson 1803125/2018 Mr Craig Holburn 1803130/2018 Mr James Douglas Horn 1803138/2018 Ms Elaine Howie 1803142/2018 Mr Patrick Hughes 1803149/2018 Mr Paul Hunter 1803155/2018 Mr Ian Inkster 1803163/2018 Mr Mark Johnstone 1803183/2018 Mrs Agnieszka Kanadys 1803195/2018 Mr Keith Kerr 1803213/2018 Mr Mathu King 1803218/2018 Mr Gary Knight 1803224/2018 Mr Kevin Ian Knox 1803230/2018 Mr Robert Laing 1803237/2018 Mr Aaron Lamont 1803239/2018 Mr Ciaran Lamont 1803240/2018 Mr Stewart James Lawrie 1803251/2018 Mr Peter Laycock 1803253/2018 Mr James Learmonth 1803254/2018 Mr Darren Letson 1803263/2018 Mr Robert Liddell 1802537/2018 Mr Stewart Lister 1803269/2018 Mr Sean Littlejohn 1803271/2018 Mr Daniel Lobb 1803274/2018 Mr John George Lockhart 1803276/2018 Mr Ross Love 1802540/2018 Ms Linda Lynch 1803289/2018 Mr Scott MacDonald 1803294/2018 Mr Kevin Malone 1803314/2018 Mr James Mansell 1803319/2018 Mr Callum David Matthews 1803333/2018 Mr Fraser McBay 1803336/2018 Mr Sean Michael McCabe 1803337/2018 Mr Ian Stephen McCormick 1803342/2018 Mr Gerard McCormick 1803341/2018 Mr Scott Henderson McDonald 1803349/2018 Mr David McGregor 1803359/2018 Mr Jamie McGregor 1803360/2018 Mr Mark McGregor 1803361/2018 Mr Lewis McGrory 1803364/2018 Mr Darren McKay 1803366/2018 Mr Alexander Duthie McKenzie 1803368/2018 Ms Caroline McKernan 1803369/2018 Ms Jasmine Kimber (now 1803216/2018 McLean) Mr Alexander Millar McLeod 1803371/2018 Mr Richard Brian McManus 1803372/2018 Mr James Murray McPhail 1803377/2018 Mr Callum McPherson 1803378/2018 Mr John McQuillian 1803379/2018 Mr Darren Miller 1803390/2018 Mr Graham John Miller 1803391/2018 Mr Graeme Mitchell 1803399/2018 Mr Raymond Alfonse Moffat 1803403/2018 Mr David Moir 1802531/2018 Mr Andrew Murdoch 1803423/2018 Mr Edward Myckanuik 1803433/2018 Mr Connor Napier 1803436/2018 Mr Paul Robert Nealon 1803445/2018 Mr Kevin Nicholas 1803451/2018 Mr Paul Nicholson 1803457/2018 Mr Adam Lee Noble 1803462/2018 Mr Alexander Noble 1803461/2018 Mr John O'Donnell 1803475/2018 Mr Oluyemisi Omotayo 1803970/2018 Mr Tom Ovens 1803486/2018 Mr James Owens 1803489/2018 Mr James Parker 1803497/2018 Mr Andrew Paterson 1803506/2018 Mr Greg Paterson 1803508/2018 Mr David Paterson 1803507/2018 Mr Matthew Potter 1803551/2018 Mr David Rae 1803566/2018 Mr Peter Raeburn 1803568/2018 Mr Scott Ramsay 1803573/2018 Mr Andrew Reid 1803585/2018 Ms Caitlin Reid 1803586/2018 Mr Christopher George Reid 1803587/2018 Mr Keiron Renton 1803592/2018 Mr Kris Renton 1803593/2018 Mr Alan Robertson 1803608/2018 Mr Jamie Robertson 1803609/2018 Mr Arron Ross 1803624/2018 Mr Douglas Ross 1803625/2018 Mr Kenneth Sawers 1803645/2018 Mr James Scott 1803651/2018 Mr Jason Scott 1803650/2018 Mr Louis Sheridan-Bruce 1803665/2018 Ms Audrey Smillie 1803683/2018 Mr Derek Smith 1803687/2018 Mr Peter Mark Smith 1803694/2018 Mr Kevin Smith 1803690/2018 Mr Stuart Smith 1803699/2018 Mr David Sowersby 1803709/2018 Mr Cameron Stemp 1802536/2018 Mr Matthew Stewart 1802530/2018 Ms Jennifer Stewart 1803725/2018 Mr Peter Strachan 1803732/2018 Mr Robert Thom 1803769/2018 Mr Christakis Thomas 1803772/2018 Mr Keith Thompson 1803775/2018 Mr Boubacar Traore 1803791/2018 Mr Clifford Tuitt 1803795/2018 Mr Andrew Tunmore 1803796/2018 Ms Tracey Waddell 1803810/2018 Mr Kevin Walls 1802529/2018 Mr Raymond Ian Walls 1803816/2018 Mr Thomas Walls 1803817/2018 Ms Pamela Joan Watt 1803827/2018 Mr Declan Watters 1803828/2018 Mr John Webb 1803829/2018 Mr John Weddell 1803832/2018 Mr David White 1803839/2018 Mr Lester White 1803843/2018 Mr Stephen Wilkie 1803854/2018 Mr Stephen Williams 1803865/2018 Mr Kenneth William John Wilson 1803869/2018 Mr Derek Young 1803899/2018 Mr Robin Young 1803900/2018 (Claims dismissed on withdrawal) David Samuels 1803642/2018 Amanda Armstrong 1802602/2018 Ross Stewart 1803728/2018 Diane Bessaha 1802670/2018 William Devine 1802889/2018 Cheryl Bendle 1802662/2018 Gareth Bendle 1802663/2018 Rashpal Kaur-Kahlon 1803199/2018 Cheryll Fyffe 1802993/2018 Wendy Thompson 1803778/2018 Carina Dobson 1802895/2018 Jed Davie 1802874/2018 Agnieszka Wlodarczyk 1803874/2018 Amy Keegan 1803203/2018 Dylan Clark 1802799/2018 Jacqueline Wilkinson 1803857/2018 Liam Inkson 1803162/2018 Stephen Black 1802680/2018 Steven Peter Brammer 1802714/2018 Philip James Garthwaite 1803003/2018 Debbie Killen 1803215/2018 Jamie MacDonald 1803293/2018 Karen Lisa Partridge 1803499/2018 Karun Patel 1803501/2018 Nicholas Pope 1803546/2018 Scott White 1803844/2018 Cain Morrissey Wilkinson 1803855/2018 Karen Curry 1802864/2018 Dionne Victoria Gray 1803044/2018 Lauren Redpath 1803583/2018 Julie Rodham 1803620/2018 Sobia Rasool 1803578/2018 John Millie 1803393/2018[34]Michael Olley 1802544/2018 (Claims dismissed on withdrawal as duplicate claims) Name on Schedule Claim Number Ms Feyi Babalola 1802620/2018 Ms Sue Elizabeth Barfield 1802628/2018 Mr Kevin Barham 1802630/2018 Mr Mark Barker 1802632/2018 Ms Carol Beckett 1802653/2018 Mr Stuart Black 1802680/2018 Mr Carl Brian Brunning 1802738/2018 Ms Karen Carden 1802774/2018 Miss Georgina Carrick 1802778/2018 Mr Duncan Clark 1802799/2018 Mr Benjamin Crisp 1802852/2018 Mr Christopher Easby 1802927/2018 Ms Lisa Evans 1802949/2018 Mr Dean Geddis 1803011/2018 Miss Rebecca Grey 1803053/2018 Mrs Angela Nichols 1803454/2018 Mrs Jane Karen Richmond 1803599/2018 Ms Donna Marie Stanway 1803719/2018 Mr Ross Stewart 1803728/2018 Ms Jacky Taylor 1803763/2018[21]Ms Karina Wallace 1803814/2018 (Claims to be stayed) Name on Schedule Claim Number Jesse Acquah-Hayford 1802573/2018 Steven Handley 1803080/2018 Chavon Noble 1803464/2018 Stewart John Partridge 1803500/2018 Stuart Andrew Mullin 1803421/2018 John Hamilton 1803073/2018