Mr A Kyriacou v Kwik-Fit (GB) Ltd: 1801024/2020
JUDGMENT
[1]The claimant’s complaints of public interest disclosure detriment are not well founded and are dismissed.[2]The claimant’s complaints of direct and indirect discrimination on the basis of religion or belief are also dismissed. Employment Judge JM Wade 3 September 2020 Case Number: 1801024/2020 1 EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS Claimant: Mr A Kyriacou Respondent: Kwik Fit GB Limited HELD AT: Leeds ON: 1 to 3 September 2020 BEFORE: Employment Judge Wade Mr Q Shah Mr G Corbett REPRESENTATION: Claimant: Miss N Jackson (lay representative) Respondent: Mr P Smith (counsel) Note: A summary of the written reasons provided below, corrected for error and elegance of expression, were provided orally in an extempore Judgment delivered on 3 September 2020, the written record of which was sent to the parties on 10 September 2020. A written request for written reasons was received from the respondent on 9 September 2020. The reasons below are now provided in accordance with Rule 62 and in particular Rule 62(5) which provides: In the case of a judgment the reasons shall: identify the issues which the Tribunal has determined, state the findings of fact made in relation to those issues, concisely identify the relevant law, and state how the law has been applied to those findings in order to decide the issues. For convenience the terms of the Judgment given on 3 September 2020 are repeated below:[1]The claimant’s complaints of public interest disclosure detriment are not well founded and are dismissed.[2]The claimant’s complaints of direct and indirect discrimination on the basis of religion or belief are also dismissed.REASONS
[1]By way of introduction this is a case about alleged whistleblowing detriment - the claimant, a mechanic, worked at the respondent’s Birstall branch and alleged being subjected to a disadvantage at work because he had blown the whistle by making protected disclosures to his employer. The claimant made these Case Number: 1801024/2020 2 allegations against the branch manager where he worked, Mr Polli and to a very limited extent against Mr Travis, the area manager. There was no complaint about dismissal because at the time the complaints were presented the claimant remained employed.[2]There was also a complaint of less favourable treatment because of religion (direct discrimination). That part of the Equality Act complaint was not pursued by the claimant in this hearing, but an alternative or secondary claim of indirect discrimination, concerning Sunday working, was pursued.[3]These were the only complaints determinable in the case. The case was not an opportunity to review all of the working practices at Kwik Fit and how its customers are treated, nor was it an opportunity to decide a constructive unfair dismissal complaint: the claimant resigned much later in 2020 for different reasons after this case had been brought to the Tribunal.[4]The discreet complaints and issues arising were confirmed on 6 August 2020 (at a second telephone case management hearing) to be: Public interest disclosure claims[5]What did the Claimant say or write? 5.1. In September 2019 the Claimant complaint to Mr E Polli, branch manager, about being required to spray antifreeze rather than weed killer in the yard 5.2. the Claimant refused to work on mobility cars because he had not received the necessary training to safely carry this out 5.3. the Claimant complained about being required to use oxyacetylene without the correct training 5.4. the Claimant raised that customers were being charged for parts which were not faulty or which had not in fact been fitted to their vehicles.[6]In any or all of these, was information disclosed which in the Claimant’s reasonable belief tended to show one of the following? 6.1. A criminal offence had been committed 6.2. The Respondent had failed to comply with a legal obligation to which it was subject 6.3. Health or safety of any individual had been put at risk 6.4. The environment had been put at risk (use of anti-freeze only)[7]If so, did the Claimant reasonably believe that the disclosure was made in the public interest?[8]If so, was that disclosure made to the employer? Detriment complaints[9]If protected disclosures are proved, was the Claimant, on the ground of any protected disclosure found, subject to detriment by the employer in that: 9.1. the Claimant was excluded from a work WhatsApp group 9.2. the Claimant’s managers would not speak to him directly Case Number: 1801024/2020 3 9.3. the Claimant was given an impossible task involving the moving of tyres 9.4. Mr Polli threatening the Claimant that he would be watching him on cameras 9.5. the Claimant being told that he had to work Sundays or go to another branch 9.6. the Claimant being told on 25 or 26 September by Mr Chris Travis that his training would be fast tracked if he would go to a different branch?[10]Section 13: Direct discrimination because of religion 10.1. Has the Respondent subjected the Claimant to the following treatment falling within section 39 of the Equality Act, namely telling him that he would have to work on Sundays or move to another branch? 10.2. Has the Respondent treated the Claimant as alleged less favourably than it treated or would have treated the comparators? The Claimant relies on hypothetical comparators. 10.3. If so, has the Claimant proved primary facts from which the Tribunal could properly and fairly conclude that the difference in treatment was because of the Claimant’s Greek Orthodox religion? 10.4. If so, what is the Respondent’s explanation? Does it prove a nondiscriminatory reason for any proven treatment?[11]Section 19: Indirect discrimination in relation to religion 11.1. Did the Respondent apply the following provision, criteria and/or practice (‘the provision’) generally, namely the requirement of employees to work on Sundays? 11.2. Does the application of the provision put other people of the Claimant’s, religion at a particular disadvantage when compared with persons who do not share that faith in that they needed to observe their religion on Sundays? 11.3. Did the application of the provision put the Claimant at that disadvantage? 11.4. Does the Respondent show that the treatment was a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim?Evidence
[12]By way of evidence, for the claimant we have heard from Mr Kyriacou and from a former colleague of his at the branch in Birstall, Mr Robinson. On behalf of the respondent we heard from Mr Polli the branch manager at Birstall, and Mr Travis the area manager. We also heard from Mr Archer, a former colleague, and then from Mr Dagley and Mr Stretton who were involved in the hearing of the claimant’s grievance, but for the purposes of the complaints before us they largely dealt only with matters going to credit.[13]We had a very helpful file of documents in the case, which in this case is best referred to as corroborative evidence, or evidence relevant to the issues we have to decide.[14]There have been conflicts of fact. The way that the Tribunal makes findings often includes using documents (which includes copies of text and other messages) as corroboration for the oral evidence that we hear. A difficulty with this case is that there were not documents corroborating some allegations, and generally the documents submitted by the claimant have been unclear at times, and inconsistent Case Number: 1801024/2020 4 as to dates and allegations. We have weighed that in determining the weight to give to aspects of his evidence and the consequent findings that we have made.[15]We have also confined the findings that we have made to facts needed to determine the allegations and no more: we understand the claimant may present a claim in the County Court for personal injury - it is not in the interests of justice for this Tribunal to determine facts which may needed to be addressed in a different court.Findings of fact
[16]The claimant had previously worked as a driver for five years before he came to Kwik Fit; he had undertaken some technical qualifications as a mechanic/fitter or similar in the past.[17]In 2019 he was interviewed by Mr Travis for a role as a service technician, which had been advertised at the Birstall branch.[18]The respondent’s pay grading system includes: an “entry level” fitter (with little or no external qualifications), a “master fitter”, who might come to qualify as a service technician, service technicians and MOT testers. The latter are on the highest pay grade at a branch apart from the branch manager and have been through various training and assessment programmes.[19]There is also a bonus scheme. The bonus scheme is based on the branch’s sales performance, with managers being allocated 50% of any bonus pool and the rest of the pool being shared between the staff at that branch.[20]Service technicians at Birstall, where the vacancy arose, had previously worked Monday to Saturdays with Sundays being a day off, and also having a further day off in the week. That was because, at this branch, tyres, exhausts and brakes (treated as emergency type work doable by fitters) were done on Sundays, but general servicing work requiring a qualified technician, was done Mondays to Saturdays. That meant that service technicians were not required to work on Sundays. These arrangements mirrored customer expectations.[21]When the claimant was taken on as a service technician (the description of his post which appears in his contract of employment), he was expected to produce the evidence of his qualifications to secure the higher pay grade. In the event those qualifications were not forth coming or did not permit him to be fast tracked to the service technician higher grade, disappointing to both the claimant and Mr Tavis, and he remained at the master fitter grade. His post remained described as a service technician.[22]The claimant was very well thought of by Mr Travis who declared the claimant had passed his probation review much earlier than he needed to, in June of 2019. By that stage the claimant had completed well over 20 online training courses on the respondent’s “SABA” Training and Career Development system. After passing his probationary period, the claimant had immediately undertaken further on line courses, included an introduction to motability work and also “barrel stacking of tyres”. He had previously completed the online manual handling training module.[23]The claimant alleged in this case that he had had a falling out with Mr Polli in the summer of 2019 (page 36) after a Fiesta related incident. That allegation did not appear in his October 19 grievance, nor in the complaints in the ET1 form to the Tribunal. We consider that the page 36 account is without corroboration and Case Number: 1801024/2020 5 entirely inconsistent with the chain of events that happened subsequently – in short it is not proven.[24]The chronology continues then after the claimant(a) joined the respondent;(b) passed his probationary interview with flying colours; and(c) had completed a great deal of online training and all seemed to be well.[25]Mr Polli had established a WhatsApp group called “the Birstall Boys” - all of the members of staff at the Branch were members, including Mr Polli. It was used to sometimes to convey rota information and generally let colleagues know information in the branch and enhance the team spirit.[26]On 23 August the claimant photographed his pay slip, uploaded it to the group, and said the following by message: “due to this shit wage as of rest of today ..no one ask me to do anything I’m not signed off to do”.[27]Unsurprisingly that message received no “thumbs up” responses or other acknowledgments from the group, in fact no other reaction, until there was a video forwarded the next day or a couple of days later by someone. Then, on 26 August, the claimant asked “what time do we start today?”. Mr Archer, a good colleague, replied “10”, and the claimant replied “cheers bro”.[28]On 31 August the claimant accepted that somehow or other he left the whatsapp group by quitting it on his telephone, inadvertently. That concession included the withdrawal of one of his allegations of detriment: that he had been removed from a WhatsApp group by Mr Polli. Our consequent finding of fact and the withdrawal addresses that allegation of detriment: it is dismissed.[29]The other relevant background at the end of August was that Mr Robinson, from whom we heard, had also been unhappy at work for reasons that are not necessarily clear. He had stopped turning up at the end of August, which had left the branch, a fitter short. Mr Polli was on holiday when the claimant’s pay related message was sent to the group.[30]On 26 August the claimant was at work when he received a call from his wife (from whom he is separated) and that resulted him shouting and swearing in the earshot of a customer. He was in the staffroom at the branch, but there was no door/barrier to prevent his outburst being heard by customers.[31]When Mr Polli returned from his holiday around 27 or 28 August (the bank holiday Monday), he and the claimant had a conversation about the whatsapp message: the claimant was again clear to him that he would not be carrying out any work for which he was not formally qualified or approved. Whether that was working as a service technician on motability cars, or for other customer’s cars, added nothing to the point: the claimant was not going to do work (service technician work) for which he was not formally trained and approved and for which he was not being paid (because his pay rate was limited to the fitter’s rate).[32]Mr Polli’s response to that was simply to say, “well look after me and I’ll look after you”, or words to that effect. This was not a sinister comment at all. Nor was it bribery. It was Mr Polli trying to cajole the claimant into not adhering rigidly to his “I won’t do things for which I’m not signed off”.[33]We make that finding informed not only by the character of Mr Polli, as we assessed it when he was giving evidence, but also that this was a manager who had a WhatsApp group for staff, and on which WhatsApp group the claimant felt Case Number: 1801024/2020 6 able to post an angry, venting message without fear of repercussion. Further he was clear that he meant what he said to Mr Polli when they met on Mr Polli’s return. In the mean time he was also happy enough to exchange pleasantries with Mr Archer.[34]At this stage the claimant was not feeling bullied or subject to any sinister kind of regime inflicted upon him by Mr Polli, quite the reverse. There was no bribery or coercion by Mr Polli. Mr Polli just wanted work done and he was prepared to extend workplace give and take to enable it to be done. The claimant, equally, was able to refuse to do work for which he was not formally qualified nor paid the service technician’s rate.[35]The next day, 29 August, because a delivery of tyres had built up and the stock needed putting in order and moving up to appropriate racking, Mr Polli gave the claimant and Mr Archer the task of moving those tyres during the day. That was requested in the context that the claimant was not available to do servicing work for which he was not qualified, and nor was Mr Archer. Mr Archer offered to help the claimant earlier in the day but the claimant had said he was “ok”. The claimant did not then ask Mr Archer for help again with moving the tyres and Mr Archer did not repeat his offer of help. Mr Archer had been given other customer jobs to do.[36]By 3 or 4 o’clock in the afternoon the claimant told Mr Archer that he was suffering knee and back pain. The next morning the claimant had come into work and asked Mr Polli to record an injury from the previous day in the accident book. He told him he was in pain and he was going to the doctors. Mr Polli was doing a stock check around that time and he said (wrongly) he could not record an incident in the accident book because nobody had seen the accident happen and it had happened the previous day, if it had happened.[37]The claimant then found a colleague to advise him how to enter an accident on the online accident reporting form. He confirmed in his report that he did not ask for help in doing the tyre moving task, but assumed that others were busy. That report by the claimant then triggered an investigation by Mr Travis, who had to attend the branch to complete various pieces of paperwork in connection with it.[38]Mr Travis could not see the claimant because by then the claimant had been signed unfit for work by his GP. When he returned to work on 13 September that was the first opportunity that Mr Travis had to interview him. Mr Travis also had to interview him about a customer complaint which had been made about the swearing outburst on 26 August.[39]Mr Travis undertook meetings with the claimant that day about both matters. He was then very clear in his communications with HR that he considered there were a number of mitigating circumstances arising out of the claimant’s call with his wife; and that this was only grounds for “a slap on the wrist”. He told the claimant the same in his meeting with him. There would be “a disciplinary”, but nothing more serious and certainly that this was not an incident that would justify a suspension.[40]This approach was consistent with Mr Travis’ support for the claimant throughout his appointment in March, his probationary review and now through what might be described as a difficulty at work.[41]Mr Travis had also put Mr Polli right about the need to record the claimant’s back and knee incident irrespective of when the incident was alleged to have happened, and that it must be recorded in the accident book and Mr Polli did so. After Mr Case Number: 1801024/2020 7 Travis had completed the investigation with the claimant, Mr Travis included in his report his view that the injury was caused by the tyres being thrown upstairs, and incorrect manual handling, which was something that the claimant had said to him in respect of the smaller tyres, when they discussed the matter together face to face.[42]Sometime between 13 September and 26 September, Mr Polli told the claimant who had returned to work, and Mr Archer, to use antifreeze to clear weeds from the car park because an audit was coming up and the branch looked unkempt. The claimant said to Mr Polli: “I don’t use antifreeze”, or we shouldn’t be using antifreeze as weed killer”, or words to that effect. Mr Polli said in reply: “don’t tell anybody”, or words to that effect.[43]Contrary to Mr Polli’s evidence, we accept the claimant’s account about this particular matter because Mr Archer’s evidence (who we assessed as a witness of truth) was that he, Mr Archer, completed the task first, that is the claimant did not immediately start weedkilling, but that he did do so later. Mr Archer was very clear in his recollection about which part of the wall he had done, and so on, but his position about whether he had heard the claimant say, “we shouldn’t use it as weed killer”, was that he could not remember one way or the other. We also considered Mr Polli’s response that there had just simply been silence from the claimant after he had given the instruction, to be inherently unlikely. We also consider the claimant has been consistent throughout a number of documents as to the date and gist of this allegation, whereas Mr Polli considered the incident was earlier in the summer – we prefer the claimant’s various written accounts of it.[44]Equally, earlier on in the year it was not in dispute that the claimant had used oxyacetylene without appropriate training. It was also clear from Mr Polli’s interview during the claimant’s grievance investigation, that Mr Polli had not understood fully that it was wholly problematic and outwith the respondent’s policies for the claimant to be using oxyacetylene at all, when he had not passed the separate training course which was required to be undertaken after online training at a different site. For all these reasons we accept the claimant’s account about the anti-freeze exchange. We consider Mr Polli was not as well acquainted as he should have been about the use of chemicals generally.[45]From 25 September the claimant had known that he would face a disciplinary hearing in respect of the customer complaint. He may not by then have been as certain that it would result in only a “slap on the wrist”, or warning, because a letter to him inviting him to a disciplinary hearing referred to the potential for dismissal for the alleged disciplinary offence.[46]The claimant was not suspended. He was at work throughout that two week period in September and he retained his position of not doing service technician work for which he was not signed off. At times he was allocated to work again moving tyres, because they still needed to be moved and also at that time Mr Archer was away on holiday.[47]On 26 September, or thereabouts, Mr Polli had presented a rota for the following month, that is October, and that scheduled the claimant, as was permitted in accordance with his contract of employment, to work on Sundays. The reason for that was that the site was a fitter down (Mr Robinson) and it was not fair for Mr Archer, in consequence, to be allocated to work every Sunday (previously Mr Case Number: 1801024/2020 8 Archer and Mr Robinson had worked alternate Sundays with Mr Polli or the MOT tester alternating to work alongside them).[48]That was Mr Polli’s reason for scheduling the claimant. He did not know that the claimant was a practising member of the Greek Orthodox church, nor the consequences of that. When the claimant protested about having to work Sundays, Mr Polli was in contact with Mr Travis. Mr Travis then came up with a solution which was that the claimant could move to the Leeds Regent Street branch, which was much nearer to the claimant’s home and that would enable the possibility of a transfer, or cover, from a fitter at the Regent Street branch to cover Sundays at Birstall.[49]The words that Mr Travis used when discussing this with the claimant were: “go down there and I’ll look after you”, or words to that effect and, “I’ll make sure you get through your training”. That was entirely consistent with his previous support for the claimant in trying to progress him through his career track to service technician as efficiently as he could. Mr Travis thought that he had solved a problem, and he did not detect any difficulty in that conversation with the claimant. The next day the claimant presented a fit note identifying both knee and back pain, which he later described as having come from working doing tyres again that week.[50]The claimant was then absent from work consistently with fit notes reflecting knee and back pain for some months before those fit notes identified a mental health problem. The back and knee issues were said to be resolved by January or February 2020.[51]The chronology after that, involving the claimant’s ultimate resignation, is not relevant to this Tribunal because it is not part of the claim.[52]On 11 October 2019 the claimant submitted a grievance to the respondent about various matters. That document is relevant to this Tribunal because it identifies what was in the claimant’s mind at 11 October; he had told his friend Miss Jackson about events and she helped him by drafting that grievance. The respondent’s investigation, determination and appeal is also of limited assistance to us because it records evidence given by colleagues at the time about some allegations (for example Mr Polli’s evidence about Oxyacetylene, to which we have referred above. Otherwise it does not help us with the causation and other questions we have to determine. The law, discussion and conclusions[53]The relevant provisions are encapsulated in the list of issues above. The first question for us is whether the claimant (within the meaning of the Employment Rights Act Sections 43B) said or wrote things, that is disclosed information, tending to show in his reasonable belief that the environment had been put at risk, or that individuals’ health and safety had been endangered. Did the claimant make protected disclosures?[54]The claimant relied on four potential protected disclosures alleged to have been made, but because they were not clearly set out in the claimant’s submissions ordered in advance of this hearing, the Employment Judge managing this case directed that this Tribunal would decide what it was that the claimant wrote or said to Mr Polli (and when). Case Number: 1801024/2020 9[55]As to allegation 5.1 above, it will be apparent from our findings that we accept that sometime around 13 or 14 September, but in any event before 26 September, the claimant said to Mr Polli that antifreeze should not be used as weed killer or words to that effect. We also consider the comment was orally conveying of information, which tended to show in the claimant’s reasonable belief that the environment was likely to be damaged. That is inherent in the claimant’s statement. It is also inherent in this statement that the claimant believed he said so in the public interest - the claimant did not set out his evidence in these terms but we give him the benefit of the doubt and consider he made a protected disclosure that day.[56]As to allegations 5.2 and 5.3, we consider that it is clear from our findings that when the claimant said to Mr Polli in his whatsapp message and subsequently orally, about not carrying out work unless he was formally qualified for it (whether that was use of Oxyacetylene, whether it was work on mobility cars, or work on any other cars), he did not at the time say so reasonably believing he said it in the public interest. The height of his state of mind was simply his frustration and anger that without the relevant training his pay was less than he would wish - until that was arranged for him he would not do tasks for which he was not qualified.[57]As to 5.4, there is no evidence of that allegation until after the written grievance when the claimant took part in interviews in connection with the grievance. The claimant’s evidence was also unclear as to whether it was his allegation or observation or that of a different manager or cover manager earlier in the chronology. On balance we cannot find proven the claimant’s allegation of having made a protected disclosure about customers being charged for parts which did not require replacement. Was the claimant subjected to detriments on the grounds of having made protected disclosures?[58]Having found one of the alleged disclosures proven, we come to consider the alleged detriments and whether they were on the grounds of having made the disclosure. As to allegation 9.1, that the Claimant was excluded from a work WhatsApp group, this is dismissed for the reasons above – the claimant accepted he must have removed himself from the group.[59]As to 9.2, the allegation that Mr Polli cold shouldered the claimant and would not speak to him. It is absolutely apparent in the chain of events that the claimant was being spoken to by Mr Polli and by Mr Travis, after the anti-freeze comment, not least when they tried to resolve the Sunday working issue. Added to that, the tenor of the claimant’s earlier WhatsApp message was not that the claimant was feeling excluded, but that he was aggrieved about his pay. We accept Mr Polli’s evidence that there was no cold shouldering - there was no reason for him to do so after the claimant made the anti-freeze comment for the remaining week or so that he remained in work. This complaint is dismissed.[60]As to allegation 9.3, that the Claimant was given an impossible task involving the moving of tyres, this is not the factual matrix. Tyre stacking was not an impossible task; it was a routine task at the branch involving storing and maintaining the tyre stock. The claimant and Mr Archer were given that task on 29 August, which was before the anti-freeze disclosure – there can be no causal link. As it happened the claimant worked alone on it on but the task was allocated to two people for the simple reason that it needed doing. It was not allocated to victimise the claimant or punish him. On the second occasion, in September, again the reason the task Case Number: 1801024/2020 10 was allocated was because it needed doing. The reason it was allocated only to the claimant on the second occasion was because Mr Archer and Mr Robinson were not there, which left the branch with only one or possibly two staff (the manager and the deputy manager/MOT tester) who could carry out all work on cars. This complaint is also dismissed.[61]The fourth detriment allegation is that the claimant said that Mr Polli had said to the claimant that he would be watching him on CCTV, which the claimant believed could be done from Mr Polli’s phone. This remark was by Mr Polli in the last week of September when the claimant was working moving tyres again. He was up in the tyre bay when the comment was made and we accept Mr Polli’s evidence that this was said in a joking fashion – that is that although the claimant was out of his physical line of sight, he could still keep an eye on him. This allegation was not made in the claimant’s grievance and we consider the reason it is not there is not oversight, but because the claimant at the time thought nothing of it – he considered it to be a flippant and perhaps humorous remark and not something which was at all threatening to him at the time. This complaint is dismissed.[62]Coming on to the firth detriment allegation – the claimant being told he had to work Sundays or go to another branch. The claimant has to establish that he was put at a disadvantage. His evidence about that was that he had “settled in” to the Birstall branch and having to move was to his disadvantage. Even if that is right, and there is something about settling in to an environment or congenial employment which is of value, the claimant was offered a relocation to a far more proximate depot or branch, which was clearly to his advantage for several reasons, both in the time of travel to work and the cost of it. He could not gain say that in answering questions from Mr Smith or to the Tribunal and could not explain at all why the chain of events we describe above was detrimental to him. We therefore find there was no detriment in the chain of events about Sunday working which we have found above.[63]If we are wrong that that, the reason for placing the claimant in the rota to work alternate Sundays with Mr Archer was because Mr Robinson had left; and the reason for the offer of alternative work at Regent Street Monday to Saturday only, was clearly because Mr Travis was trying to solve a practical problem which had arisen from the claimant’s need to attend Church. Neither element of this allegation was to punish the claimant because he had made the anti-freeze disclosure. It is untenable as an allegation in the circumstances of this branch at the time and is dismissed.[64]As to the sixth allegation (Mr Travis’ remark) the claimant has to prove that this was to his disadvantage, that it was something reasonably he could be aggrieved about. Mr Travis had demonstrated his support for the claimant on at least three occasions by this stage and this was simply another occasion. To say that he would enable him to progress his career if he moved, was nothing more than that.[65]If we are wrong that it could in some way to his disadvantage to suggest to him that there was a quid pro quo for moving to Regent Street (ie his training), that was not proposed by Mr Travis on the grounds that the claimant had mentioned antifreeze in the car park to Mr Polli, but simply because Mr Travis was trying to encourage the claimant to work with him to fix the practical problem that had arisen. The sixth detriment complaint also fails. Case Number: 1801024/2020 11[66]For the reason Miss Jackson explained, namely that the concept of less favourable treatment because of religion had been explained to her on the most recent telephone hearing, and she accepted that the chain of events concerning allegation 6 above, was not such as to support less favourable treatment because of religion and this was not pursued and is dismissed.[67]The indirect discrimination complaint was pursued: the respondent’s practice of requiring employees to work a seven day week including Sundays was a practice which put the claimant and other people of the claimant’s religion at a particular disadvantage.[68]The claimant has established this is the case because we accept his evidence of the length of attendance at his place of worship on a Sunday (which accounts for four or five out of the seven hours the branch is open). It is clear that if a member of staff of the Greek Orthodox church was required to work ordinary opening hours on a Sunday that would prevent attendance at the extended hours regular worship. That was clearly an important aspect of faith in this case, in comparison, for example with the Catholic requirement for attendance at Mass for an hour or so, or a similar other length of worship in other faiths.[69]A question for us is whether the claimant can establish detriment from the PCP interacting with his faith. We repeat the comments above about the potential detriment of settling in to one branch, to then move to another, but with the gain in time and reduced cost that would involve. For the same reasons we do not consider the claimant has established Section 39 (2)(d) detriment. If we are wrong about that, the respondent has shown that its requirement for seven day working is a proportionate means of achieving its legitimate aim of servicing customer needs, that is, it was appropriate and reasonably necessary to include a seven day working requirement in the claimant’s contract in circumstances where, when balancing that against the discriminatory effect of that requirement, implementation was addressed flexibly, and by agreement and consideration of alternatives. The claimant was not, in fact, ever required to work a Sunday in October or thereafter. Mr Travis proposed a solution which, for reasons of his ill health, the claimant did not take up. For these reasons the indirect discrimination complaint also fails. These are unanimous decisions of this Tribunal.