Mrs A Abhyankar v Cardiff and Vale University Local Health Board: 1602431/2024
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Case No 1602431/2024
Between
Mrs A AbhyankarClaimantCardiff and Vale University Local Health BoardRespondent
Before
Employment Judge A WilliamsIn person for claimantMr Islam-Choudhury (instructed by Counsel) for respondentDate 8 July 2026
JUDGMENT
[1]The claim for victimisation is not well-founded and is dismissed.
REASONS
[1]The background to this claim is as follows: 1.1. The Claimant is employed by the Respondent as a Consultant Paediatric Surgeon and has been since 2010. 1.2. Since December 2020, the Claimant has been suspended from work whilst the Respondent conducts a formal investigation into various conduct and clinical concerns via its Upholding Professional Standards in Wales Policy (‘UPSW’). 1.3. The UPSW process was placed on hold between December 2021 and February 2024 due to the Claimant’s periods of sickness absence. In addition, in May 2021 the Claimant submitted a claim for whistleblowing detriment and victimisation under the case number 1600708/2021. Following a final hearing from 3rd to 21st October 2022, a reserved judgment was sent to the parties by the Tribunal on 16th January 2023. 1.4. In February 2024, the Case Manager responsible for the UPSW process amended the Terms of Reference for the Investigating Manager to include Allegations elicited from the Employment Tribunal’s Judgment (‘the judgment’) as Allegations 10 and 11 (‘the Allegations’). 1.5. A new Case Manager was appointed in January 2024. In May 2024, following challenge by the Claimant’s British Medical Association representative, he decided to maintain Allegations 10 and 11 but made some amendments. The Claimant’s British Medical Association representative objected on the basis that it amounted to victimisation. The decision was maintained. 1.6. On 17th June 2024, the Claimant submitted an ET1 to the Tribunal on the grounds that these two decisions amounted to unlawful victimisation contrary to section 27 Equality Act 2010.[2]The Respondent denies all claims. It maintains that the Case Managers took their decisions because the Tribunal’s findings gave rise to genuine concerns about the Claimant’s conduct during those proceedings which were relevant to the ongoing UPSW process. In particular, there were findings which bore further investigation relevant to the Claimant’s honesty and integrity and ability to work collaboratively with colleagues, both standards of the General Medical Council’s Good Medical Practice that the Claimant may have breached and warranted further investigation.[3]The claim came before us on 6th-8th July 2026 and we gave our judgment and reasons orally on the final day. The Respondent made an oral request for written reasons and we therefore set out here our full reasons in writing.
The Hearing
[4]The Hearing came before us following two previous postponements of the final hearing. The Claimant represented herself with the support of her husband on Day 1 and a Mackenzie Friend, Mr Barwell, on Day 2. The Respondent was represented by Mr Islam-Choudhury. We heard oral evidence from the Claimant on behalf of herself and Nicola Robinson, Head of People and Culture, Professor Fegan, retired Consultant Haematologist and the first Case Manager, and Mr Coulthard, Consultant Urologist and the second Case Manager on behalf of the Respondent. They were all cross-examined by the Claimant.[5]Certain reasonable adjustments were agreed in advance of the hearing for the Claimant. They were to have a 15 minute breaks every 45 minutes, an electronic bundle and for a support person to sit adjacent to her to support her with paperwork, note taking, and to provide quiet advice. She applied on the day before the hearing for her support person to attend remotely, but this was refused. The Claimant conducted herself well and was comfortable throughout the hearing.
List of Issues
[6]The List of Issues was agreed in the Bundle at [7-8] and is reproduced as Appendix 1 to these Reasons.
Findings of Fact
[7]The relevant facts are as follows. The issue in this claim, by the time it came before us, was narrow and agreed as such. We therefore first set out the agreed facts by way of background and then set out our findings on the disputed matters. Where we have to resolve a conflict in the evidence, we explain how we did so at the material time. We reach our findings on fact on the balance of probabilities, that is, we are deciding what is more likely than not.
BACKGROUND FACTS
[8]All Doctors within the NHS are required to be registered with the General Medical Council which issues formal standards in terms of expected conduct for all doctors. The standards relevant to this claim is Good Medical Practice (‘GMP’) 2013 which includes a duty to act with honesty and integrity. Paragraphs 65, 68, And 71 to 73 are relevant, and paragraph 72 in particular deals with the requirement to be honest and trustworthy when giving evidence to courts or tribunals.[9]In December 2020 the Claimant was suspended from her work as a Consultant Paediatric Surgeon when the Respondent began a formal investigation into her conduct and practice under the Upholding Professional Standards in Wales policy (‘UPSW’). In accordance with the UPSW, a Case Manager was appointed to the Claimant. The role of the Case Manager is set out in Paragraph 1.2 of the UPSW: … evaluate the nature of the problem or concern raised about a practitioner and to assess the seriousness of the matter based on available information. He/she will undertake an initial assessment of the concern(s) raised and will determine whether a formal investigation needs to be carried out or whether the issue can be resolved informally. Where it is determined that a formal investigation should be instigated the Case Manager will: - Formulate the Terms of Reference for an investigation - Appoint a Case Investigator …[10]The UPSW principles sets out that potential concerns about a practitioner’s conduct, capability or performance can come to light in a variety of ways and gives court judgments as an example.[11]In mid-March 2021 the first Case Manager in the Claimant’s UPSW process stepped down and was replaced by Professor Fegan. He was unknown to the Claimant at the time.[12]On 13 May 2021, the Claimant brought a claim in the Employment Tribunal for whistleblowing detriment and victimisation under claim number 1600708/2021 (having been consolidated with a duplicate claim, 1600710/2021).[13]That claim was heard by a Judge and two non-legal Members between 3rd and 21st October 2022. The Claimant submitted a 140 page witness statement in support of her claim and she gave oral evidence and was cross-examined over a period of one week. Reserved judgment was sent to the parties on 16 January 2023. The Respondent subsequently made an application for costs and the Claimant was ordered to pay 75% of the Respondent’s costs by a costs judgment dated 23rd October 2023.[14]Professor Fegan was aware of the Claimant’s Tribunal claim and he gave evidence on 19th October 2022. Some of the detriments relied upon by the Claimant related to his actions as Case Manager of the UPSW process. He attended the hearing on the one day that he gave evidence.[15]The UPSW process had been placed on hold when the Claimant raised a grievance in December 2021 and that pause was maintained whilst the Employment Tribunal proceedings were ongoing.[16]The UPSW process was re-started in February 2024. On 28th March 2023, Professor Fegan was sent the reserved Judgment by the Medical Director, Professor Jenney, who wrote: [429] In your capacity as Case Manager for Mrs Abhyankar’s UPSW investigation, I have attached a link to the Employment Tribunal judgment. Please can I ask that you consider the judgment and the findings of fact in accordance with the [UPSW][17]On 3rd April 2023 Professor Fegan replied: [430] … there are many places in this document where the judges question Mrs Abhyankar’s recollections and knowledge of events in very strong terms indeed. I think this is relevant to the UPSW I am undertaking and in particular the GMC standards 71, 72 and 74. I therefore plan to modify the ToR accordingly to take into accounts the judges opinions[18]Later that same day Professor Fegan wrote to Mrs Robinson who was supporting him as Case Manager and again stated: [432] … given some of the judges comments my feeling is that the GMC standards 71, 73 and 74 may also have been breached by AA, so I’m just seeing how best they can be incorporated into the ToR[19]On 12th April 2023 Professor Fegan sent Mrs Robinson a draft amended Terms of Reference. In his covering email he wrote: [434] …On reflection there are areas which lead me to have concerns about Mrs Abhyankar’s conduct during the ET process as highlighted by the judges and which potentially breech [sic] several GMC standards.[20]He attached a document titled ‘Draft additional amendments to ToR’ in which he identified certain paragraphs of the judgment, and which of the standards of Good Medical Practice were relevant. I do not set out each extract here but we were taken to the relevant paragraphs in the course of the hearing and they were as identified in Respondent’s Counsel’s opening note: 77, 224, 234, 255, 300, 324, 388, 390, 395, 411 and 412 (‘Allegation 10 – Honesty and Integrity’) and 234, 235, 297, 332 and 337 (‘Allegation 11 – Working collaboratively with colleagues’).[21]There followed a period of refining those allegations, during which Professor Fegan took legal advice on the Terms of Reference – privilege is not waived – and was supported by Mrs Robinson.[22]In early 2024, Professor Fegan stood down and Mr Coulthard was appointed as Case Manager on 31st January 2024. He was not known to the Claimant and he did not know about the Employment Tribunal proceedings. He did not discuss the case with Professor Fegan.[23]He accepts he had accessed the reserved judgment during his training as a Case Manager when he carried out a google search for the UPSW, but he had not read the judgment as it was not relevant to him at the time.[24]Mr Coulthard carried out a review of the most recent Terms of Reference. He cross-checked the quotations used in Allegations 10 and 11 from the Judgment. He was satisfied that the allegations as drafted met the threshold for investigation and so he maintained them, albeit he corrected some typos.[25]These Terms of Reference were finalised and produced as the February 2024 version [476]. Allegations 10 and 11 quoted entire paragraphs from the judgment and then applied those paragraphs to relevant paragraphs of the GMP as follows: ‘Accordingly, it is alleged Mrs Abhyankar acted in breach of:…’[26]On receipt of the Terms of Reference, the Claimant’s British Medical Association representative, Mr Robinson, wrote to Mr Coulthard on 29th February 2024 alleging that Allegations 10 and 11: [501] …amounts to victimisation and serves as a legal detriment because of Mrs Abhyankar bringing employment tribunal proceedings against the organisation. These allegations must be immediately revoked. The ET has made no findings that Mrs Abhyankar has acted in bad faith, that she has acted dishonestly or without integrity. Not has the ET made a judgment that she has failed to work collaboratively with colleagues[27]As a result of this letter and further correspondence from Mr Robinson, Mr Coulthard carried out a full review of the position and obtained legal advice in respect of the allegations in May 2024. Having taken advice, - privilege is not waived - he removed sub-allegations (d) (e) (f) (h) (i) and (j) of Allegation 10 but he decided to maintain the remainder of the Allegations. On 31st May 2024 Mrs Robinson wrote to the Claimant to advise her of Mr Coulthard’s decision. On 17th June 2024 the Claimant submitted her ET1 claim form to the tribunal. DISPUTED FACTS[28]By the time the matter has come before us, the Claimant has made it clear that she accepts the findings of the Tribunal in the first claim, and accepts that they are binding on her, on the Respondent and this Tribunal. She does not seek to challenge those findings, and she hasn’t done so by way of an appeal or any other means.[29]The central issue in the claim, which was, by the time it came before us, welldefined and well-understood by all parties, and as defined in the agreed list of issues, was why: 29.1. On 21st February 2024, Professor Fegan took the decision to update the Terms of Reference to include Allegations 10 and 11 29.2. On 31st May 2024, Mr Coulthard refused to remove the allegations, or all of the sub-allegations in Allegation 10. THE CLAIMANT’S CASE[30]The Claimant struggled to articulate in the hearing before us why she says those decisions were taken. Much of her cross-examination of the Respondent’s witnesses was taken up by examining the appropriateness of ‘reframing’ the Tribunal’s findings in the first claim as disciplinary concerns within the GMP context. When she was expressly given the opportunity under cross-examination to set out her case she simply said that she did a protected act and she was victimised as a result. She said the whole process of drafting and finalising the additional allegations in the Terms of Reference was inextricably linked with the protected act and the reframing of those findings into potential GMP violations are a direct outcome of the protected act.[31]She is, of course, right, in that had she never brought the first claim, Allegations 10 and 11 would never have been included in the Terms of Reference. There is, in that sense, a clear causal connection. But despite it having been explained to her throughout these proceedings – and despite her written closing submissions apparently displaying her understanding of the concept – we are still somewhat in the dark as to the Claimant’s case on the reason why, and she has given different versions of her position.[32]During her oral evidence, she was openly asked whether she was saying Professor Fegan had deliberately retaliated against her because she had brought the claim. She gave a vague answer in which she said she was not saying he deliberately retaliated against her, but that we must look at all the evidence before we decide. This implies to us that the Claimant herself was unsure what her case was on this central issue. She was asked an even more open question – ‘tell the tribunal what your case is’ – and she said the treatment she received is that the findings of the Tribunal were morphed and said to be GMP breaches which is secondary to her protected act. This is no more than a causative link, it does not explain what she says the reason why is.[33]Then, during her cross-examination of Professor Fegan, she put a positive case to him that he included Allegations 10 and 11 because he wanted to put the judgment in context of a serious breach of GMP because he was not happy that he and the organisation had been questioned. However, in her written closing submissions, she said that she did not suggest that Professor Fegan acted out of a wish to retaliate. She went on to say – for the first time, because it has not been stated either in her evidence or put to the witnesses in cross-examination – that Professor Fegan was not a neutral assessor, and his prior involvement in the Claimant’s first claim and the UPSW process more generally rendered him biased, whether consciously or unconsciously.[34]She said that Mr Coulthard did nothing more than conduct an artificial review of Professor Fegin’s new Allegations 10 and 11 when he became Case Manager. These are not matters that were clearly put Mr Coulthard during crossexamination, which focused largely on the semantics of the way in which the Tribunal’s findings in the Judgment were set against the GMP standards and whether it was right to do so. It is also not how the Claimant put her claim in her own oral evidence.[35]Whilst the Claimant was unrepresented, she is an intelligent and articulate person who is familiar with Tribunal proceedings and how they work, and ought to have been able to give a consistent and coherent account of what her own case on the central disputed issue is.[36]In addition, the Tribunal paused during the Claimant’s cross-examination of the Respondent’s witnesses to explain the importance of putting her case to the witnesses and noted that she had not as yet done so, before giving her an opportunity to conclude.[37]We set out that background in order to clearly explain that the Claimant’s case as to the reason why remains unclear to us, and it is against that background that we make the following findings. RESPONDENT’S EVIDENCE[38]The Respondent’s witnesses were all credible and we place significant weight on their oral and written evidence. All three were straightforward historians, and did their best to assist the Tribunal.[39]Both Professor Fegan and Mr Coulthard, we find, were clearly well-aware of their duties and obligations as Case Managers. Mrs Robinson also understood her role was to support the Case Managers but not to influence or advise them on the Terms of Reference or indeed any of their decisions. We find that the decisions were purely those of the Case Managers.[40]The two Case Managers, we find, clearly understood the status of the Tribunal’s judgment and its potential relevance to the UPSW. They understood that concerns about a medical professional’s conduct can arise from court judgments, as identified in the UPSW.[41]There was no sense or indication in their oral evidence that either of them had pre-judged the investigation that was due to take place. As they said repeatedly, they simply considered that the Tribunal’s findings gave rise to potential breaches of the GMP Code which warranted investigation. Mr Coulthard in particular in his Witness Statement sets out a detailed analysis of the relevant paragraphs of the Judgment and how it might amount to a potential breach of GMP, and which standards in particular.[42]Neither Case Manager made an immediate referral to the GMC for these potential breaches. The absence of such a referral is something the Claimant relied upon to suggest that the concerns identified were not genuine because, as she said in her written submissions, ‘had the Respondent genuinely concluded that the Claimant had breached the GMC’s standards, it could have referred her directly…’ That is a misunderstanding of Professor Fegan and Mr Coulthard’s decisions – they had reached no such conclusion, and were simply preparing the Terms of Reference for an investigation to be carried out by another person. That is something they both repeated throughout their oral evidence and we find as a fact that they went no further, in their mind, than to assess as they should whether the findings warranted further investigation.[43]That is consistent with the correspondence at the time of the making of the decisions which we set out above, in which Professor Fegan in particular does not express any view as to whether the relevant standards have in fact been breached. CLAIMANT’S EVIDENCE[44]Elements of the Claimant’s oral evidence before us mirrored some of the findings of the Tribunal in the first claim. For example, there was a dispute between her and Mr Islam-Choudhury during cross-examination as to whether some of the Tribunal’s findings were relevant to the GMP standards of ‘honesty and integrity’. He thoroughly took the Claimant to each of the relevant paragraphs in the Tribunal’s judgment which formed the basis for Allegations 10 and 11, and phrases such as ‘unsubstantiated allegations’ [224] ‘untrue’ [255] ‘the Claimant has asserted something that is not correct’ [300] or an agreement with Counsel’s submission that the Clamant ‘skewed’ events to suit her own narrative [324]. The Claimant repeatedly refused to accept that such findings were relevant to whether she has breached the GMP’s standards of honesty and integrity on the basis that the Tribunal had made no express finding and had not used the word ‘dishonest’. There was a wilful refusal to accept the simple proposition that honesty and integrity is a broader concept than simply whether someone has intentionally lied, and that as a regulatory concern it might extend to phrases such as the ones the Tribunal used despite there being no express finding of dishonesty.[45]The Claimant’s case in this respect was based on a misconceived idea that the Tribunal’s findings about her conduct in bringing and pursuing the first claim are irrelevant to the wider disciplinary process unless there was an express finding of a breach of the GMP standards. It is not only misconceived, but internally inconsistent, because the Claimant repeatedly accepted during her own oral evidence and in her presentation of her claim that the Tribunal is not concerned with matters of medical practice or the GMP and is not required to make such findings. The Claimant refused, unreasonably we find, to accept that the Tribunal’s findings were potentially relevant or brought into question her conduct within the context of the GMP and the standards to which medical practitioners are held.
CONCLUSION
[46]We find, accepting his evidence in its entirety for the reasons set out above, that Professor Fegan was neither consciously or sub-consciously biased by the fact that the Claimant had brought the first claim and that the reason he amended the Terms of Reference was because having carefully read the Judgment three times he considered those findings raised issues concerning the Claimant’s conduct and behaviour which needed to be properly investigated.[47]The fact that he had been the Case Manager prior to the ‘pause’ did not give rise to any bias, as we have seen nor heard any evidence that the grievance which led to the ‘pause’ related to or was relevant to him in any way.[48]It is correct that he gave evidence in the first claim, and the Claimant had made allegations of detriment relevant to his conduct as Case Manager. That is a fact that could give rise to an inference of bias, conscious or unconscious. However, Professor Fegan’s evidence was given on the one day he attended the hearing and he had no further dealings until the reserved judgment was sent to him. His involvement was limited. We have also accepted Professor Fegan’s evidence as to why he made the decision. We have found Professor Fegan had a clear understanding of the remit of his role and the relevance of the Judgment and we find that the reason why Professor Fegan amended the Terms of Reference was because the judgment findings gave rise to a genuine conclusion that there were conduct issues arising that were potentially relevant breaches of the GMP, not because of the fact the Claimant brought the claim nor because she gave evidence in that claim. The real reason why Professor Fegan amended the Terms of Reference is the words used in the Judgment, not the fact that the Judgment existed at all.[49]We find that Mr Coulthard carried out a careful review of Professor Fegan’s drafted Terms of Reference. He was an entirely independent figure, having had no involvement in the first claim at all. It is correct that he initially maintained Professor Fegan’s drafted allegations, and then chose to amend them. That does not indicate, as the Claimant suggests, a lack of careful consideration of the allegations in the first place. We accept Mr Coulthard’s evidence that he had considered for himself whether the Terms of Reference as drafted met the threshold for investigation under the USPW and checked for himself that the draft Terms of Reference cross referenced the GMP correctly. In the process, he corrected a few typos but was otherwise satisfied that they were appropriate. It was only on the receipt of legal advice that Mr Coulthard removed some suballegations of Allegation 10. That is not recognition that Allegation 10 as drafted was an act of victimisation, but the action of a prudent Case Manager acting on the advice of professionals. His decision to maintain the remainder of Allegation 10 and 11 as drafted was, we find, because he felt the Tribunal’s findings raised relevant questions of honesty and integrity and the conduct of court proceedings by a medical professional.[50]We do not make findings of fact based on a witness’ demeanour alone, however it is relevant – this claim being entirely reliant on the thought process of these two witnesses – that they both gave their evidence in a direct and measured manner, repeatedly stating that they simply thought the findings met the threshold for investigation and giving no indication that they had formed a view either way as to what findings may or may be reached in an investigation.[51]Finally, we reach these findings not only because we accept the evidence of Professor Fegan and Mr Coulthard as to the reason why they acted as they did, but because the decisions they reached are objectively reasonable, and a decision they were entitled to reach under the UPSW.[52]The Claimant’s case morphed, during the hearing before us, to focus on the decision to reframe the Tribunal’s findings within the context of the GMP standards. It is not entirely clear why this should be relevant to the reason ‘why’ Professor Fegan and Mr Coulthard acted as they did. The Claimant is not relying on this reframing as a detriment.[53]We are satisfied that the Tribunal’s judgment could have been considered by these two decision-makers – as is expressly set out in the UPSW – and that any findings could be assessed against the GMP standards, even where the precise wording of the GMP is not used in the Judgment. Medical professionals are held to the highest of standards by society and their regulators, and as such it is clearly potentially relevant to their honesty and integrity, or their ability to collaborate with colleagues, that a Tribunal has made the type of findings made in the first claim. The decisions under question here went no further than to make that connection. They were therefore reasonable decisions entirely open to the two witnesses. There is no evidence before us on which we can find that the reason for the decisions was anything different to the terms of the Judgment itself, rather than the act of bringing a claim or giving evidence in that claim. The Law - Victimisation[54]Section 27 Equality Act 2010 provides that a person(a) (A) victimises another person(b) (B) if A subjects B to a detriment because – (a) B does a protected act, or (b) A believes that B has done, or may do, a protected act[55]A protected act includes, insofar as relevant to these proceedings, bringing proceedings under the Equality Act, and giving evidence in those proceedings.[56]A ‘detriment’ in the context of victimisation claims is not defined by the Act but should be given the same broad interpretation as in other areas of discrimination law. The EHRC Employment Code gives a helpful summary: “Generally, a detriment is anything which the individual concerned might reasonably consider changed their position for the worse or put them at a disadvantage… there is no need to demonstrate physical or economic consequences. However, an unjustified sense of grievance alone would not be enough to establish detriment”[57]There is no dispute, in this case, that the decision on 21 February 2024 to update the Terms of Reference in an internal investigation to include Allegations 10 and 11 (i.e. Professor Fegin’s decision), and the decision to continue to pursue some of Allegation 10 and all of Allegation 11 (Mr Coulthard’s decision) amount to a detriment.[58]The critical question is one of causation. Why did the employer subject the employee to the detriment? Was it because they had done (or might do) the protected act? Or was it wholly for other reasons? The Tribunal must identify “the real reason, the core reason, the causa causans…” for the treatment. Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police v Khan [2001] ICR 1065.[59]It is not enough for the protected act to be causative of the treatment in the ‘but for’ sense. It must be a real reason.[60]The ‘reason why’ test is essentially the same as in direct discrimination cases. The Claimant need not show that the detriment was solely because of the protected act. If protected acts have a significant influence on the employer’s decision, causation will be made out. Nagarajan v London Regional Transport 1999 ICR 877 HL. A ‘significant influence’ should be ‘an influence which is more than trivial’ Igen Ltd (formerly Leeds Careers Guidance) and ors v Wong and other cases 2005 ICR 931 CA[61]The ‘reason why’ test can be satisfied whether or not the discriminator consciously or subconsciously permitted the protected act to determine or influence his or her treatment of the Claimant. Analysis and Conclusions[62]Having reached the findings of fact above, we must apply them to the law to reach a conclusion with reference to the Agreed List of Issues. Did C do a protected act by:a. Pursuing a claim for whistleblowing detriment and victimisation against R, on 31 May 2021, under 1600708/2021 and 1600710/2021?b. Between 3 and 19 October 2022 giving evidence or information in connection with proceedings under the EqA[63]Section 27(1) is clear. We find that each of these acts by the Claimant were a protected act. There was some suggestion in Mr Islam-Choudhry’s closing argument that we need not engage with the issue if the Claimant’s claim fails on causation, but we find we must consider each of the requisite elements of a victimisation claim in order to reach a conclusion.[64]The Respondent has never put a positive case that these acts by the Claimant should not be considered ‘protected’ because they were done in bad faith within the meaning of section 27(3). Mr Islam-Choudhury accepted as such. To the contrary, despite the ET3 going no further than to say (a) in particular is ‘capable of amounting to’ a protected act, in each Case Management Hearing during these proceedings the Employment Judge has recorded that the fact of a protected act is not in dispute. The Respondent has never sought to correct that position. The Agreed List of Issues accepts that bringing the claim was a protected act, as does the Respondent’s opening note which states that ‘there is no real dispute that the First Claim and C giving evidence about alleged victimisation in the first claim) were protected acts.[65]For these reasons, we are satisfied that the Claimant did a protected act in bringing the first claim, and giving evidence during those proceedings. Did R do the following:a. On 21 February 2024, update the Terms of Reference in an internal investigation to include Allegations 10 and 11? R accepts that it did.b. On 31 May 2024, refuse to remove (all of) (sub) allegations? R says that it removed six of the 10 sub-allegations within Allegation 10 specifically points (d)-(f) and (h)-(j) Did those actions entail C being subject to a detriment? R accepts that they did[66]There is no dispute that these decisions were taken by Professor Fegan and Mr Coulthard respectively and that the acts amounted to a detriment. Were the detriments done because of (one or both of) the protected act(s)?[67]We refer to our findings of fact. The detriments were done because, taking each in turn:a. Professor Fegan updated the Terms of Reference because, having considered the Tribunal’s judgment in the first claim in detail, he considered there were findings there which warranted further investigation because they may give rise to breaches of the GMP 2013. He was not, in reaching that decision, biased either subconsciously or consciously by the fact that the Claimant had brought the claim in the first place nor by his own limited role in the first claim for the reasons we have already explained.b. Mr Coulthard’s decision to maintain Allegations 10 and 11 were based on his own review of the Terms of Reference together with the Judgment and the GMP guidance. He was an entirely independent figure and he reached the decision, having taken appropriate legal advice, because he was satisfied that some of the findings were potentially relevant to the GMP standards.c. The Claimant primarily relies on nothing more than a ‘but for’ causative link between the two events, but that is not sufficient for her claim to succeed. The real reason why is the reason put forward by the Respondent, and is the terms of the judgment itself, not the fact the claim was brought or evidence was given.[68]The claim is therefore dismissed. Approved by: