Miss EC Thompson v Vale of Glamorgan Council: 1600397/2016
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Case No 1600397/2016
Between
Miss EC ThompsonClaimantVale of Glamorgan CouncilRespondent
Before
Employment Judge WilliamsDate 13 October 2023
JUDGMENT
The claimant’s application dated 4th February 2019 for reconsideration of the judgment herein dated 30th January 2019 is refused.
REASONS
[1]The claimant’s application for reconsideration of the judgment herein dated and sent to the parties on 30th January 2019 has been considered by Employment Judge Williams pursuant to rule 72 of the Employment Tribunals Rules of Procedure.[2]The application for reconsideration is contained in: i. The claimant’s letter of 4th February 2019; ii. Further correspondence from the claimant dated 12th February 201915th February 201922nd February 20194th March 20195th March 2019; iii. Further documentation submitted by the claimant dated 12th March 201914th March 201918th March 2019;[3]The employment judge has also seen the claimant’s letter dated 19th March 2019 addressed to the Employment Appeal Tribunal and copied to the Employment Tribunal.[4]The employment judge has also considered the respondent’s observations on the claimant’s application contained in its letter dated 13th March 2019.[5]The claimant’s extensive submissions contain repeated allegations of bias, prejudice, perversity and errors of law by the tribunal. The claimant also repeatedly submits that Employment Judge Williams should not properly consider this application.[6]Rule 72 provides (3) where practicable, the consideration under paragraph (1) shall be by the employment judge who… chaired the full tribunal which made [the original decision] …[7]The Regional Employment Judge determined that it was practicable for Employment Judge Williams to consider this application.[8]In the opinion of Employment Judge Williams, the claimant’s submissions raise points of appeal which will foreseeably be pursued by the claimant before the Employment Appeal Tribunal, rather than matters which can properly be considered by a tribunal reconsidering its own judgment.[9]Accordingly, the employment judge considers that there is no reasonable prospect of the original decision being varied or revoked. This application is therefore refused. TRIBIWNLYSOEDD CYFLOGAETH Hawlydd: Emma Thompson Atebydd: Cyngor Bro Morgannwg Gwrandawyd Caerdydd Ar: 26, 27, 29, 30 Tachwedd; 3, yn: 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13, Rhagfyr 2018; yn y siambrau ar 14 Rhagfyr 2018 Gerbron: Y Barnwr Cyflogaeth S J Williams Aelodau: Mr W Davies Ms T Lovell Cynrychiolaeth: Hawlydd: Mrs Thompson Atebydd: Ms Criddle, bargyfreithiwr DYFARNIAD Dyfarniad unfrydol y tribiwnlys yw: 1. Ni chafodd yr hawlydd ei diswyddo'n annheg; 2. Ni wnaeth yr atebydd wahaniaethu yn erbyn yr hawlydd oherwydd ei hanabledd; 3. Ni wnaeth yr atebydd fethu yn ei ddyletswydd i wneud addasiadau; 4. Ni wnaeth yr atebydd aflonyddu ar yr hawlydd. RHESYMAU Rhagarweiniad[1]Yn ôl ei hawliad i’r tribiwnlys, mae'r hawlydd yn honni ei bod wedi cael ei diswyddo'n annheg gan yr atebydd, bod yr atebydd wedi gwahaniaethu yn ei herbyn oherwydd ei hanabledd, wedi methu yn ei ddyletswydd i wneud addasiadau ac wedi aflonyddu arni trwy ei ymddygiad yng nghyswllt ei hanabledd.[2]Ar ran yr hawlydd, bu i Mrs Thompson, cynrychiolydd proffesiynol yr hawlydd a mam yr hawlydd, ddangos tystiolaeth yr hawlydd a Mrs Val Burbidge. Ar ran yr atebydd, bu i Ms Criddle ddangos tystiolaeth gan Jenny Ford, Gerard McNamara, Sue Alderman, Christopher Elmore AS, Robert Green, Andrew Thompson, Geraint Hilbourne, Rhys Jones, Dr Ian Johnson, Dr Mathew Griffiths a Lyn Cosgrove. Bu i’r holl dystion roi eu prif dystiolaeth ar ffurf datganiadau ysgrifenedig a gafodd eu darllen gan y tribiwnlys ymlaen llaw. Roedd y ddau ddatganiad tyst ar gyfer yr hawlydd yn 170 o dudalennau wedi’u teipio i gyd.[3]Yn y gwrandawiadau rhagarweiniol a gynhaliwyd ar 6 Rhagfyr 2017 a 25 Hydref 2018, gwnaethpwyd gorchmynion rheoli achos i baratoi ar gyfer y gwrandawiad terfynol, gan ddelio â nifer o faterion, yn cynnwys yr addasiadau angenrheidiol ar gyfer y gwrandawiad, y bwndel dogfennau a'r materion yr oedd angen gwneud penderfyniadau yn eu cylch. Yn benodol, ar 6 Rhagfyr 2017, rhoddwyd cyfarwyddiadau i'r partïon ddarparu rhestr derfynol o faterion; ar 25 Hydref 2018, cadarnhawyd bod yr hawlydd wedi cytuno i’r rhestr o faterion a baratowyd gan yr atebydd. Mae’r tribiwnlys wedi defnyddio’r rhestr honno fel fframwaith ar gyfer y dyfarniad hwn.[4]Cafodd y tribiwnlys fwndel o ddogfennau a oedd yn cynnwys tudalennau 1 - 1806, a bu iddo gyfeirio'n helaeth ato. Er gwaethaf y cyfarwyddyd y dylid cyfeirio at un bwndel a gytunwyd arno, daeth Mrs Thompson â bwndel ar wahân i'r gwrandawiad, a oedd gyda thabiau ynddo ond heb rifau tudalennau; fodd bynnag, roedd yr holl ddogfennau yr oedd hi'n cyfeirio atynt hefyd wedi’u cynnwys yn y bwndel a baratowyd gan yr atebydd. Gyda chymorth gan Ms Criddle, roedd modd inni groesgyfeirio’r ddau fwndel yn foddhaol. Mae cyfeiriadau mewn cromfachau isod yn cyfeirio at dudalennau yn y bwndel a baratowyd gan yr atebydd. Bu i'r ddau gynrychiolydd baratoi eu hargymhellion cloi yn ysgrifenedig, a bu iddynt ddarparu rhagor o fanylder arnynt ar lafar. Cafodd y cynrychiolwyr eu gwahodd gan y Tribiwnlys i gyflwyno eu hargymhellion cloi gan gyfeirio at y materion yr oedd angen i'r tribiwnlys wneud penderfyniadau yn eu cylch. Materion rhagarweiniol[5]Paratowyd datganiadau tyst yr hawlydd yn Saesneg, ond dewisodd yr hawlydd i gael ei groesholi gan Ms Criddle yn Gymraeg. Oherwydd ei bod yn cael trafferth gwefusddarllen wrth i Mr McNamara siarad, roedd hefyd eisiau gwasanaeth cyfieithu ar y pryd i'r Gymraeg. At y dibenion hyn, darparwyd gwasanaeth cyfieithu ar y pryd, a oedd yn gweithio’n dda iawn, ac nid oedd y gwrandawiad yn hirach o’i herwydd.[6]Gofynnodd Mrs Thompson am addasiadau penodol ymlaen llaw ac yn ystod y gwrandawiad. Bu i’r atebydd gynorthwyo gyda pharatoi’r bwndeli ar gyfer y tabl tystion ar bapur glas a chynigiodd Ms Criddle newid lle gyda Mrs Thompson pan oedd yn ymddangos bod y golau yn yr ystafell tribiwnlys yn peri anhawster iddi, er na dderbyniwyd y cynnig ar y pryd. Gofynnodd Mrs Thompson am fath benodol o gadair hefyd. Yn y canlyniad, dywedodd ei bod yn fodlon â'r ffordd roedd staff y tribiwnlys wedi sicrhau eu bod hi a'r hawlydd yn gyfforddus, gyda beth alwodd hi'n 'gwasanaeth cwsmer hen fasiwn o safon'.[7]Am sawl rheswm, roedd yr amser a ddyrannwyd i’r gwrandawiad yn hirach nac efallai y byddai'r materion eu hunain wedi gallu cyfiawnhau. Roedd y dogfennau yn swmpus iawn a rhagwelwyd, oherwydd ei dyslecsia, efallai y byddai'r hawlydd angen rhagor o amser i ddarllen a mwy o gyfnodau seibiant yn ystod yr achos na'r arfer. Roedd Mrs Thompson hefyd yn cael anawsterau oherwydd diffyg medrusrwydd corfforol, ac roedd angen rhagor o amser i ddod o hyd i'r dogfennau perthnasol. Yn y canlyniad, diolchodd y tribiwnlys i’r ddau gynrychiolydd am lynu’n agos at yr amserlen arfaethedig ar gyfer croesholi'r tystion, ac felly'n galluogi’r gwrandawiad i gael ei gwblhau o fewn yn amser a neilltuwyd iddo.[8]Ar 5 Rhagfyr, diwrnod 7 o'r gwrandawiad, cyflwynodd Mrs Thompson gais ysgrifenedig dyddiedig 4 Tachwedd (yn ôl pob tebyg, 4 Rhagfyr oedd y dyddiad a fwriadwyd), gan ymhelaethu arno ar lafar, i ddiwygio hawliad yr hawlydd i gynnwys honiadau bod Mr McNamara yn dethol aelodau o staff i ddilyn y drefn gallu oherwydd eu bod yn aelodau undeb llafur ac i wneud esiampl ohonynt, ac felly roedd yr atebydd wedi gwahaniaethu yn erbyn yr hawlydd oherwydd ei haelodaeth undeb llafur. Roedd Mrs Thompson hefyd yn ceisio dadlau bod yr atebydd wedi methu â darparu 'addasiadau rhesymol, gan fanteisio ar ffioedd tribiwnlys i atal gwneud cais oherwydd methiannau statudol.' Mi wnaeth y tribiwnlys ymneilltuo i ystyried yr honiadau.[9]Roedd elfen gyntaf y cais yn seiliedig ar ddeunydd yn natganiad tyst Mr McNamara, lle mae’n datgan, ym mharagraff 56, bod pedwar o athrawon a oedd wedi cael eu hadnabod gan Estyn fel rhai oedd yn darparu gwersi anfoddhaol i gyd yn aelodau o undeb llafur, ac felly bu iddo drafod y mater gyda chynrychiolwyr o'r undeb llafur leol cyn rhoi'r athrawon ar raglen gymorth anffurfiol (gweler isod ym mharagraffau 23-24). Roedd datganiad Mr McNamara wedi bod ym meddiant yr hawlydd ers 25 Hydref fan bellaf, ac, yn ôl barn y tribiwnlys, nid oedd yn darparu unrhyw dystiolaeth fel sail i'r cais presennol. Nid oedd unrhyw awgrym, yn y datganiad hwn neu'n unrhyw le arall, bod y pedwar athro/pedair athrawes wedi cael eu dethol i gael cymorth anffurfiol oherwydd eu haelodaeth mewn undeb llafur. At hynny, ni roddodd yr hawlydd unrhyw dystiolaeth i gefnogi'r honiad bod yna gamwahaniaethu oherwydd aelodaeth mewn undeb llafur, ac nid oedd y cynrychiolwyr o’i hundeb llafur wedi mynegi unrhyw gynnen o’r fath. Yn ôl barn y tribiwnlys, nid oed yn bosib dadlau yn seiliedig ar yr honiad bod yr atebydd wedi manteisio ar y ffaith bod ffioedd tribiwnlys wedi cael eu cyflwyno. Felly, cafodd yr honiadau eu gwrthod.[10]Yn y gwrandawiadau rhagarweiniol y cyfeirir atynt uchod, cafodd y cwestiwn o adnabod atebydd/atebwyr cywir yr hawliad hwn ei ystyried a’i ddatrys. Roedd yr atebydd cyntaf gwreiddiol, sef Corff Llywodraethu Ysgol Gyfun Y Barri, a ddaeth i ben pan gaeodd yr ysgol ei drysau ym mis Gorffennaf 2018. Yna, mi wnaeth yr ail atebydd dderbyn y byddai'n gyfrifol am unrhyw ddyfarniad o blaid yr hawlydd. Felly, cafodd yr atebydd cyntaf gwreiddiol ei ddileu o’r achos, ac aeth yr achos yn ei flaen yn erbyn yr unig atebydd a enwir uchod.[11]Bu i’r tribiwnlys egluro o’r cychwyn cyntaf y byddai’r gwrandawiad presennol ond yn mynd i'r afael â chwestiynau yng nghyswllt atebolrwydd, yn cynnwys ymddygiad cyfrannol, Polkey, ac unrhyw ddadlau yng nghyswllt casgliadau oherwydd methiant i ddilyn cod ymarfer ACAS. Y ffeithiau a ganfuwyd gan y tribiwnlys[12]Rhoddwyd llawer o dystiolaeth ger ein bron, ac roedd llawer o’r dystiolaeth hon ar ei gorau ond yn berthnasol yn ymylol. Rydym yn fwriadol wedi cyfyngu ein canfyddiadau ffeithiol yn yr achos hwn i’r materion hynny sy’n berthnasol i’n penderfyniad.[13]Cytunwyd bod yr hawlydd yn, a bob amser wedi bod, yn unigolyn sydd ag anabledd. Mae ei hanabledd o ganlyniad i(1) dyslecsia a(2) nam ar y clyw. Mae dyslecsia a nam ar y clyw yr hawlydd yn gyflyrau gydol oes. Mi gafodd ddiagnosis pan oedd yn mynychu'r brifysgol, neu hyd yn oed cyn hynny. Mewn adolygiad cyn gwrandawiad mewn tribiwnlys cyflogaeth arall, bu i'r hawlydd gyflwyno hawliad yn erbyn Pwyllgor Rheoli YMCA Y Barri ac eraill, lle'r oedd hefyd wedi'i chyflogi ganddynt. Cafodd yr hawlydd ei dyfarnu’n unigolyn sydd ag anabledd yn ystyr Deddf Cydraddoldeb 2010, yn rhinwedd ei dyslecsia a'i namau clyw. Yn ei ddyfarniad yn dilyn gwrandawiad ar 4 Mehefin 2013, nododd y barnwr cyflogaeth bod effeithiau'r anafiadau roedd yr hawlydd wedi dioddef yn dilyn damwain ffordd (gweler isod) “yn amherthnasol ar ben ei hunain, ond roeddynt yn berthnasol o ran eu bod wedi gwaethygu anawsterau clyw [yr hawlydd]”. Yng ngoleuni'r honiadau dilynol a wnaed gan yr hawlydd, mae'n werth nodi bod y barnwr cyflogaeth wedi nodi bod “y prifathro yn ystyriol iawn ac er bod gwaith yn cael ei ddychwelyd iddi'n aml, mae'r [prifathro] yn gallu cywiro rhywfaint o'r gwaith ei hun" (gweler Dyfarniad, paragraff 21).[14]Nid oed canfyddiad, a ni awgrymwyd inni, bod yr anafiadau corfforol roedd yr hawlydd wedi’u dioddef yn y damwain ffordd wedi arwain, yn eu hunain, at nam o’r fath y cyfeirir ato yn adran 6 Deddf Cydraddoldeb 2010.[15]Roedd yr hawlydd wedi hyfforddi fel athrawes Cymraeg ail iaith. Wedi iddi gymhwyso yn 1999, cafodd ei chyflogi fel athrawes Cymraeg ail iaith yn Ysgol Gyfun Y Barri (BCS), lle bu iddi weithio hyd nes cafodd ei diswyddo, a ddaeth i rym ar 31 Awst 2016. Roedd yr ysgol yn ysgol cyfrwng Saesneg yn nhref Y Barri ym Mro Morgannwg, sy’n ardal o Gymru lle mae’r mwyafrif o’r boblogaeth yn siarad Saesneg. Nid oedd Cymraeg yn bwnc poblogaidd yn yr ysgol. Pan ymunodd yr hawlydd â'r ysgol, David Swallow oedd y pennaeth hyd at ei ymddeoliad ar 31 Rhagfyr 2011. Cafodd Gerard McNamara ei benodi'n bennaeth ym mis Medi 2012, ac yn y cyfnod interim, roedd y dirprwy bennaeth, Jennifer Ford, yn gweithredu fel pennaeth dros dro. Hyd at mis Awst 2011, pennaeth yr adran Gymraeg oedd Gareth James; wedyn roedd Anwen Jones yn bennaeth yr adran Gymraeg hyd at 2014, ac yna cafodd ei holynu gan Geraint Hilbourne.[16]Roedd yr hawlydd yn gwbl ymwybodol o'i dyslecsia a'i nam ar y clyw trwy gydol ei chyfnod yn yr ysgol. At hynny, nid oedd wedi bod yn gyfrinachol am y materion hynny ac roedd yr ysgol hefyd yn gwbl ymwybodol ohonynt bob amser. Ni ofynnodd yr hawlydd am unrhyw addasiad i’w hamgylchedd gwaith yn ystod cyfnod cynnar ei chyflogaeth.[17]Ym mis Mawrth 2012, roedd yr hawlydd yn rhan o ddamwain ffordd a chafodd anafiadau, a arweiniodd at hawliad sifil am iawndal ar gyfer anafiadau personol, a gafodd ei gyfaddawdu. Bu i’r Tribiwnlys ddarllen nodiadau cydamserol yn cofnodi 'mân anaf i'r pen', ynghyd ag adroddiadau orthopedig a seiciatrig yn ddiweddarach a oedd yn rhoi’r argraff gyffredinol o, ar yr un llaw, anafiadau meinwe feddal, anafiadau cyhyrysgerbydol, ac anaf i'r pen, lle disgwyliwyd i’r hawlydd wella o fewn misoedd, ac, o bosib, PTSD a oedd wedi para am 6 mis; ac, ar y llaw arall, cwynion am symptomau parhaus gan 'hanesydd gwael ac anghyson' (Adroddiad Professor Maden, 20 Mehefin 2018, t. 1606 a t. 1631) nad oedd yn gyson â'r hanes cychwynnol ac sy’n cynnwys elfen ffug. Roedd Dr Attwood (adroddiad 2 Mai 2018, t. 1602) yn ystyried bod yr hawlydd yn dioddef ‘anhwylder gorbryder â ffobia’. Roedd Mrs Thompson yn cyfeirio at y damwain tro ar ôl thro fel digwyddiad lle ‘bron iddi dorri ei phen (near decapitation)' a bod y damwain wedi peryglu bywyd yr hawlydd. Roedd y tribiwnlys o'r farn bod hyn yn gor-ddweud yr holl beth a daeth i'r casgliad bod gan yr hawlydd dueddiad cryf, yn fwriadol neu fel arall, i orliwio effeithiau ei hanafiadau.[18]Yn dilyn ei damwain ffordd ar 12 Mawrth 2012, roedd yr hawlydd yn absennol o'r gwaith o 14 - 31 Mawrth i gychwyn, yna dychwelodd i'r gwaith o 23-27 Ebrill, ac yna'n absennol o’r gwaith eto hyd at 22 Hydref 2012, pan ddychwelodd yn raddol.[19]Cyfeiriwyd at dystiolaeth a ddarparwyd gan David Swallow (t.1298ff.) at ddibenion hawliad anaf personol yr hawlydd. Roedd Mr Swallow yn cydnabod bod ‘neilltuo amser cwricwlwm yn broblem barhaus ar gyfer Cymraeg. Gan nad oedd llawer o ddiddordeb yn y pwnc, ynghyd â chanlyniadau siomedig, roedd yn anodd cyfiawnhau neilltuo llawer o amser cwricwlwm i'r pwnc.' Er bod amserlenni yn amrywio gydag amser ac yn amrywio ar draws y blynyddoedd gwahanol, fel arfer roedd yna 2-3 gwers Cymraeg ym mhob pythefnos.[20]Roedd Mr Swallow hefyd wedi gwneud sylwadau perthnasol am allu'r hawlydd fel athrawes, gan ddatgan ei farn bod 'perthynas Emma gyda'r disgyblion yn gallu dirywio pan oedd anghytundeb... Roedd Emma yn cael trafferth rheoli dosbarthiadau a disgyblion nad oedd â diddordeb yn y pwnc. Roedd yn cael trafferth trefnu ei hun a'r dosbarth er mwyn dysgu'r disgyblion hynny'n effeithiol. O'r hyn rwy'n ei gofio o’i hystafell ddosbarth, roedd wastad yn edrych yn anhrefnus...’ ac 'Roedd gwendidau Emma o ran dysgu wastad yn peri problem fawr iddi o ran bod yn effeithiol yn ei rôl' a 'Byddai, rwy'n credu, wedi parhau i gael trafferthion yn yr ysgol ac rwy’n meddwl y byddai'n bosibl y byddai wedi gadael yr ysgol maes o law.' Mae'n werth nodi bod y sylwadau hyn yn dod gan bennaeth yr oedd yr hawlydd yn dweud bod ganddi berthynas dda ag ef, ac mae'n berthynas a gychwynnodd cyn ei damwain ffordd. Maent yn mynd yn groes i’r achos a gyflwynwyd i ni ar ran yr hawlydd, sef(a) cyn i Jennifer Ford, ac yna Gerard McNamara, gymryd y rôl pennaeth ymlaen, nid oedd unrhyw un wedi canfod diffygion gyda’i dysgu, a(b) dim ond ar ôl ei damwain bu iddi gael unrhyw anhawster yn y gwaith, a(c) ei bod yn athrawes dda a gafodd ei thanseilio gan ymdrechion Christopher Elmore, Gerard McNamara, ac eraill. Byddwn yn dychwelyd i’r cynhennau hynny isod.[21]Dywedodd Jennifer Ford (datganiad tyst para. 19) bod ganddi bryderon am allu'r hawlydd i ddysgu a'i gallu i reoli dosbarth cyn ei damwain, a bod y gwendidau hyn wedi dod i'r amlwg ar ôl i Anwen Jones ddod yn bennaeth yr adran yn ystod cyfnod absenoldeb yr hawlydd ym mis Mawrth 2012. Roedd y safbwynt hyn yn cael ei ategu gan asesiad David Swallow (gweler y paragraff blaenorol). Yn seiliedig ar dystiolaeth David Swallow a Jennifer Ford rydym yn dod i’r casgliad bod gwendidau dysgu'r hawlydd wedi'u hadnabod ymhell cyn i Jennifer Ford ddod yn bennaeth dros dro, a chyn damwain yr hawlydd. Roedd rhai agweddau o'r gwendidau hynny yn hynod debyg i'r rhai a arweiniodd yn y pen draw at ei diswyddo.[22]Ar 4 Mai 2012 (t. 180), bu i’r hawlydd gael cyfarfod gyda Jennifer Ford i drafod dychwelyd i'r gwaith yn raddol yn dilyn ei damwain. Yn y cyfarfod hwnnw, rhoddodd Ms Ford copi o drefn gallu'r atebydd i'r hawlydd.[23]Yn ystod absenoldeb yr hawlydd, roedd Mr McNamara wedi cael ei benodi i’r swydd pennaeth a dechreuodd yn ei swydd ym mis Medi 2012. Cyflwynodd Mr McNamara yr hyn y cyfeiriwyd ato fel trefn anffurfiol, a elwir yn Rhaglen Gefnogi i Unigolion. Y bwriad oedd iddo ragflaenu a, gan obeithio, osgoi’r angen am drefn gallu ffurfiol. Oherwydd y pryderon oedd wedi codi, rhoddwyd yr hawlydd ar y rhaglen gefnogi hon, yn cychwyn ar 25 Ebrill 2013, gyda thri targed gwella penodol: cynllunio gwersi, rheoli dosbarth ac ansawdd marcio gwerslyfrau (t. 218).[24]Ym mis Mawrth 2013, roedd yr ysgol yn destun adolygiad ffurfiol gan Estyn, yr arolygiaeth dros addysg yng Nghymru, a gyhoeddodd ei adroddiad ym mis Mai 2013. Roedd yr adroddiad yn gritigol o sawl agwedd ar berfformiad yr ysgol, yn cynnwys, ac sy'n berthnasol i'n penderfyniad, safonau'r ysgol o ran Cymraeg fel ail iaith yng nghyfnod allweddol 3 (t.200). Hefyd, cyfeiriwyd yn benodol at bedwar o athrawon, a'r hawlydd oedd un ohonynt. Roedd y pedwar ohonynt i gyd yn destun y rhaglen gefnogi anffurfiol.[25]Roedd Mr McNamara wedi arsylwi'r hawlydd yn y dosbarth ar 16 Ionawr 2013, ac yn ystod y drefn anffurfiol cafodd gwersi’r hawlydd eu harsylwi ddwywaith eto ar 7 Mehefin 2013 gan Mr McNamara ac ar 22 Tachwedd gan Mr McNamara ar y cyd ag Anwen Jones. Yn yr holl arsylwadau, aseswyd bod y gwersi yn anfoddhaol. Penderfynodd Mr McNamara bod cynnydd yr hawlydd dan y drefn anffurfiol yn anfoddhaol, ac felly dylid ei rhoi dan drefn gallu ffurfiol yr atebydd. Cyflwynodd y rhybudd ffurfiol cyntaf i’r hawlydd ar 17 Ionawr 2014 a dechreuodd cam 1 o’r drefn ffurfiol. Nodwyd y materion penodol a oedd yn destun pryder yng nghyswllt yr hawlydd fel: cynllunio gwersi; rheoli ystafell ddosbarth; marcio. Yn dilyn apêl gan yr hawlydd, penderfynodd panel o lywodraethwyr i barhau gyda’r asesiad gallu ffurfiol.[26]Yn ystod cam 1 cafodd gwersi’r hawlydd eu harsylwi ar 31 Mawrth 2014 gan Jennifer Ford a Llinos Evans, pennaeth y gyfadran, ac ar 2 Ebrill 2014 gan Ms Ford. Mewn cyfarfod adolygu ar 28 Ebrill 2014, nodwyd fod y ddau sesiwn arsylwi wedi'u dyfarnu'n anfoddhaol. Unwaith eto, roedd yr hawlydd yn absennol o’r ysgol rhwng mis Mehefin 2014 a mis Mawrth 2015 oherwydd gorbryder a straen. Ar 1 Mai 2015, bu i Mr McNamara gyflwyno ail rybudd ysgrifenedig ffurfiol ar yr hawlydd a dechreuodd cam 2 o'r drefn ffurfiol.[27]Cafodd yr hawlydd ei harsylwi yn y dosbarth ar 4 Mehefin 2014 gan Anwen Jones, ac yn ystod cam 2 o'r drefn ffurfiol, cafodd gwersi'r hawlydd eu harsylwi ar 4 Mehefin 2015 gan Andrew Thompson, dirprwy bennaeth yr ysgol, ar y cyd â Geraint Hilbourne, ac eto ar 15 Mehefin 2015, gan Mr McNamara ar y cyd â Mr Hilbourne. Mewn cyfarfod adolygu ar 18 Mehefin 2015, nodwyd bod y ddau sesiwn arsylwi wedi'u dyfarnu'n anfoddhaol a phenderfynodd Mr McNamara symud yr hawlydd ymlaen i gam 3 o'r drefn ffurfiol, a fwriadwyd i bara am gyfnod o bedair wythnos. Ar 22 Mehefin cyflwynodd rybudd ysgrifenedig terfynol iddi.[28]Ar 15 Gorffennaf 2015, cafodd apêl yr hawlydd yn erbyn y penderfyniad i symud ymlaen i gam 3 o'r drefn ei gwrthod gan banel o lywodraethwyr. Nid oedd cynrychiolydd undeb llafur yr hawlydd, Geraint Davies, wedi dadlau bod yr hawlydd wedi bodloni gofynion cam 2, ond dadleuodd nad oedd y fframwaith cefnogi wedi'i roi ar waith yn llawn, ac felly, dylid ailadrodd cam 2. Roedd y panel o lywodraethwyr yn anghytuno.[29]Ym mis Gorffennaf 2015, cyflwynodd Estyn adroddiad dilynol, a oedd, ymysg pethau eraill, yn nodi bod safonau Cymraeg fel ail iaith yn parhau i fod yn destun pryder.[30]Yn ystod cam 3 o’r drefn ffurfiol, cafodd gwersi’r hawlydd eu harsylwi ar 23 Mehefin 2015 gan Andrew Thompson ar y cyd â Rhys Jones, ar 7 Gorffennaf gan Rhys Jones ac ar 13 Gorffennaf gan Andrew Thompson ar y cyd â Rhys Jones. Rhys Jones oedd pennaeth Ysgol Gyfun Treorci, ysgol fraenaru a oedd yn gweithio gydag Ysgol Gyfun Y Barri i rannu arferion da. Mae Mr Jones yn siaradwr Cymraeg iaith gyntaf, ac er nad yw'n athro Cymraeg arbenigol, mae ganddo lawer o brofiad yn arsylwi ac asesu gwersi gan athrawon eraill.[31]Mewn cyfarfod adolygu ar 2 Medi, a gafodd ei ohirio ar ddiwedd y tymor ysgol blaenorol, nodwyd fod y tair gwers arsylwi wedi'u hystyried yn anfoddhaol o ran cynnydd disgyblion a'r dysgu. Cyfeiriodd Geraint Davies, cynrychiolydd undeb llafur yr hawlydd, at ganllawiau Llywodraeth Cymru ar y cysylltiad posibl rhwng perfformiad gwael ac anabledd (t.421) a gofynnodd am apwyntiad iechyd galwedigaethol ar gyfer yr hawlydd i geisio barn feddygol. Roedd Mr McNamara yn cytuno â hyn, ond gofynnodd pam nad oedd y mater o anabledd yr hawlydd wedi cael ei godi mewn apwyntiadau iechyd galwedigaethol blaenorol. Dywedodd yr hawlydd ei bod wedi cael diagnosis ar gyfer ei dyslecsia a'i nam ar y clyw yn y 1990au cynnar, roedd apwyntiadau iechyd galwedigaethol blaenorol wedi ymwneud â'i hanafiadau yng nghyswllt ei damwain, ac nad oedd unrhyw broblem wedi codi cyn ei damwain ac nid oedd wedi codi unrhyw beth am ei hanabledd yng nghyswllt y drefn gallu. Ar ôl i Ann Jones brocio rhywfaint, dywedodd yr hawlydd bod ei habsenoldeb o Mehefin 2014 i Mawrth 2015 oherwydd straen a achoswyd gan y drefn gallu.[32]Bu i’r hawlydd herio priodoldeb cael ei hasesu gan Rhys Jones, er roedd wedi cytuno iddo asesu ei gwersi yn flaenorol, gan nad oedd yn athro Cymraeg arbenigol. Bu iddi awgrymu hefyd ei bod wedi cael adborth llafar gan Geraint Hilbourne a oedd yn llawer mwy cadarnhaol na’i adroddiad ysgrifenedig. Cafodd y cyfarfod ar 2 Medi ei ohirio.[33]Cafwyd pedwar adroddiad: adroddiad golwg optometrig gan Eurfron Nyhan, dyddiedig 15 Medi (prin cyfeiriwyd ato ger ein bron yn flaenorol), adroddiad iechyd galwedigaethol gan Dr Joanna Lever, dyddiedig 25 Medi; adroddiad atodol byr gan Dr Martin Andrew, dyddiedig 13 Hydref ac adroddiad gan Ann Rees o’r Ganolfan Ddysgu Dyslexia Action yng Nghaerdydd, dyddiedig 22 Hydref (t. 1548-1561).[34]Nododd Dr Lever bod dyslecsia yr hawlydd wedi'i ddiffinio fel anabledd (er na chyfeiriodd at nam clyw yr hawlydd) a bod y pyliau diweddaraf o salwch wedi ymwneud â phroblemau yng nghyswllt y damwain ffordd a straen yn y gweithle. Roedd y ddau beth olaf wedi arwain at symptomau gorbryder sylweddol, a oedd wedi'u gwaethygu gan straen y drefn gallu. Ym marn Dr Lever, roedd cyflyrau’r hawlydd (sef y problemau eilradd bu iddi adnabod) yn cael effaith andwyol ar ei gallu i gyflawni ei rôl, a byddai'r drefn gallu yn cynyddu lefelau pryder yr hawlydd ymhellach a allai, yn ei dro, gael effaith ar ansawdd ei dysgu. Cynghorodd Dr Lever: dylai'r hawlydd gael amser ychwanegol i baratoi gwersi a marcio, ei bod yn cael gwaith papur ar gyfer unrhyw gyfarfodydd gallu ymlaen llaw, o bosib mewn ffont mwy, a'i bod yn cael amser ychwanegol i ymateb; ac y gallai meddalwedd sy’n ymateb i lais fod yn fuddiol os oedd angen i'r hawlydd ysgrifennu adroddiadau ar ei gliniadur, ac efallai y byddai’n well iddi ddefnyddio cyfrifiadur a thaflunydd yn hytrach na bwrdd du neu fwrdd gwyn.[35]Nid oedd Dr Andrew, ar ôl trafod achos yr hawlydd gyda chydweithwyr uwch, yn meddwl bod yr hawlydd yn bodloni’r meini prawf ar gyfer PTSD.[36]Nododd Ms Rees nad oedd yr hawlydd yn teimlo bod ei dyslecsia yn cael effaith ar ei dysgu er roedd yn teimlo bod ei chyflwr yn gwneud rhai tasgau gweinyddol yn anoddach, fel ysgrifennu cynlluniau gwersi ac ysgrifennu adroddiadau yn Saesneg, ac mi’r oedd yn teimlo bod y straen roedd yn ei brofi pan roedd ei gwersi yn cael eu harsylwi yn golygu nad oedd yn perfformio i’r safon arferol o ddysgu. Pwysleisiodd Mr McNamara, a oedd hefyd wedi cyfarfod â Ms Rees, nad oedd ganddo unrhyw broblemau gyda’i sillafu neu'r ffordd roedd yr hawlydd yn ysgrifennu adroddiadau; y prif bryder oedd cynnydd y plant yn ei dosbarthiadau. Rhestrodd Ms Rees pymtheg o addasiadau a oedd eisoes wedi'u rhoi ar waith i gefnogi'r hawlydd, yn cynnwys lwfans ar gyfer cynllunio a pharatoi gwersi (PPA) a oedd yn 12% yn y flwyddyn flaenorol ac yn 20% yn y flwyddyn gyfredol o'i gymharu â 10% ar gyfer athrawon eraill (t.1559). Nododd Ms Rees, wrth grynhoi, 'nid oedd y pennaeth yn ystyried anawsterau a all fod oherwydd dyslecsia Emma, er enghraifft cywirdeb sillafu ac ysgrifennu adroddiadau'n gywir, yn faterion pwysig. Nid yw Emma yn ystyried bod ei dyslecsia yn effeithio ar ei dysgu, ond mae’n adnabod ystod o broblemau a all gael eu gwaethygu gan ei dyslecsia yng nghyswllt y broses gallu, e.e. arsylwi gwersi a chyfarfodydd. Fodd bynnag, mae hi'n derbyn bod arsylwadau o wersi yn hanfodol ar gyfer yr holl athrawon ac felly ni all gael ei heithrio rhag cael ei harsylwi.’[37]Cyflwynodd Ann Rees nifer o argymhellion, yn cynnwys meddalwedd testun i leferydd; dogfennau mewn fformat electronig; arbrofi gyda maint papur, lliw papur a ffont, darparu agendâu ymlaen llaw; recordiadau sain o gyfarfodydd neu gofnodion electronig (t. 1560).[38]Yn ei llythyr ar 6 Hydref 2015 i Ann Jones, swyddog personél yr atebydd, mae'r hawlydd yn mynegi rhan o'i dadl, gyda llawer o’i chynnwys wedi'i chyflwyno ger ein bron. Ysgrifennodd: ‘Tro ar ôl thro rwyf, yn fwriadol, wedi cael fy rhoi mewn sefyllfa lle byddaf yn siŵr o fethu, i fy niswyddo heb unrhyw fwriad o ddilyn unrhyw gamau gweithredu i fy nghynorthwyo, gyda’ch gilydd rydych wedi erydu fy hunanhyder a fy hunangred. Rwyf bellach wedi ystyried y sefyllfa ac rwy'n credu fy mod i'n athrawes ardderchog sydd wedi cael ei thanseilio yn fwriadol ac yn ddideimlad...’[39]Yn dilyn nifer o ohiriadau, cafodd y cyfarfod ar 2 Medi i adolygu cam 3 o’r drefn ffurfiol ei gynnal ar 5 Tachwedd 2015. Cyfeiriodd Mr McNamara achos yr hawlydd at banel disgyblu a diswyddo y corff llywodraethu a dywedodd y byddai'n argymell diswyddo. Cynhaliwyd cyfarfod o'r panel ar 9 Rhagfyr, a daethpwyd i'r casgliad nad oedd y panel am wneud penderfyniad terfynol, gan gytuno i gyfarfod i drafod eto ar 14 Rhagfyr a chyhoeddi ei benderfyniad i’r partïon ar 17 Rhagfyr.[40]Ar 17 Rhagfyr, cyhoeddodd y panel ei benderfyniad bod polisi a gweithdrefnau'r atebydd wedi'u dilyn yn gywir, ond roedd y panel eisiau cael gafael ar ragor o wybodaeth cyn gwneud penderfyniad terfynol (t. 560). Bu iddynt gyfarwyddo y dylid ymestyn cam 3 o’r broses am gyfnod o bedair wythnos, yn cychwyn ar 4 Ionawr 2016; byddai’r cyfnod hwnnw yn cynnwys: dwy wers arall yn cael eu harsylwi gan athro/athrawes Cymraeg arbenigol; dau ymweliad i'r ysgol fraenaru (Ysgol Gyfun Treorci) yn yr wythnos gyntaf o'r cyfnod o bedair wythnos, yn cynnwys sesiwn yn arsylwi dwy wers Gymraeg fel ail iaith; unigolyn cyswllt newydd i’w adnabod gan yr hawlydd; o leiaf dau gyfarfod rheolaidd gyda phennaeth yr adran wedi’u trefnu yn yr amserlen, gan gymryd cofnodion a gytunwyd arnynt; cefnogaeth briodol gan athro/athrawes Cymraeg i’w darparu. Ystyriodd y panel yr adroddiadau iechyd galwedigaethol, yr adroddiad dyslecsia a'r adroddiad optometrig, ac ystyriodd bod darparu rhagor o amser i baratoi a chynllunio gwersi (PPA) yn addasiad rhesymol a oedd yn berthnasol i gynllunio gwersi a'r asesiad gallu. Bu i’r panel bennu dyddiad dros dro o 11 Chwefror 2016 ar gyfer ailgychwyn y cyfarfod, lle byddai cynnydd yr hawlydd ar ôl yr estyniad amser o bedair wythnos yn cael ei ystyried.[41]Ar 18 Rhagfyr am 12.57, bu i’r hawlydd anfon neges e-bost at Mr McNamara yn cwyno ei fod wedi methu â’i hysbysu am fanylion y ddau ymweliad i Ysgol Gyfun Treorci. Atebodd Mr McNamara am 13.12 fod Treorci wedi gofyn i'r ymweliadau gael eu cynnal ar y dydd Iau a'r dydd Gwener o'r wythnos gyntaf o'r tymor, a rhag ofn nad oedd yr hawlydd yn edrych ar ei chyfrif e-bost dros gyfnod y gwyliau, byddai'n ysgrifennu ati gyda'r manylion, ond, beth bynnag, byddai ganddi ddigon o amser i baratoi pan ddychwelodd i'r gwaith ar 4 Ionawr. Yn ddiweddarach ar 18 Rhagfyr, am 17.47 bu i Mr McNamara anfon neges e-bost at yr hawlydd i wneud cofnod o'r ffaith ei fod wedi dod â'i lythyr yn bersonol i'w chartref ar ei ffordd adref am 14.36. Yn y dystiolaeth, gwnaeth yr hawlydd lawer o’r ffaith bod Mr McNamara wedi gwneud iddi gynhyrfu’n lân pan ddaeth i ymweld â’i chartref. Bu iddi gwyno, yn y lle cyntaf, nad oedd Mr McNamara wedi gwneud y trefniadau angenrheidiol ar gyfer ei hymweliadau i Threorci o fewn hanner diwrnod, ac yna cwynodd ei fod wedi dod a’i lythyr iddi yn bersonol i'w chartref i sicrhau ei bod yn cael y llythyr yn brydlon (roedd yr hawlydd wedi dweud yn flaenorol nad oedd wastad yn edrych ar ei negeseuon e-bost). Nid oeddem yn gallu derbyn tystiolaeth yr hawlydd bod agor y drws i Mr McNamara wedi peri iddi ddioddef chwalfa nerfol (datganiad tyst, Chwefror 2018, paragraff 1238). Daeth y tribiwnlys i'r casgliad bod yr hawlydd yn bod yn hynod o afresymol ar y pwynt hwn.[42]Ar ddydd Sadwrn, 19 Rhagfyr, pan oedd Ysgol Gyfun Y Barri ar gau am gyfnod y gwyliau Nadolig, anfonodd Mrs Thompson lythyr a oedd dros 30 o dudalennau wedi'u teipio at Ann Jones, gan fynnu mewn geiriau cryf iawn ei bod yn cael ymateb ddim hwyrach na hanner dydd ar 24 Rhagfyr (t. 567ff.) Er bod y llythyr hwn yn achos eithafol, mae'n enghraifft berffaith o batrwm a oedd yn codi tro ar ôl thro, sef gohebiaeth gan Mrs Thompson a gyfeiriwyd at swyddogion yr atebydd, a oedd yn hirfaith, yn ormesol ac yn llethol, gyda geirfa cymhleth, heb fod angen. Roedd yr ohebiaeth weithiau dan enw Mrs Thompson ei hun neu dan enw'r hawlydd, (t. 599-603; 605-10). Yn y llythyr diwethaf mae Mrs Thompson yn ysgrifennu ar 29 Rhagfyr 2015, mae’n nodi bod yr hawlydd yn ‘dal i wella yn dilyn PTSD'; nid oedd unrhyw gefnogaeth feddygol ar gyfer yr honiad hwn.[43]Ar 4 neu 5 Ionawr 2016, bu i’r hawlydd, gyda'i mam, fynychu apwyntiad gyda Nicola Johns, ymgynghorydd iechyd galwedigaethol. Roedd yr hawlydd a/neu ei mam yn anghytuno â barn Ms Johns a ni roddwyd awdurdodaeth i ddatgelu’r adroddiad dilynol yn ei gyfanrwydd i'r atebydd.[44]Ar 6 Ionawr 2016, bu i Mrs Thompson ffonio Nicola Johns yn datgan bod yr hawlydd ofn mynychu apwyntiad gyda'i meddyg teulu rhag ofn iddi gael ei diswyddo am gymryd amser i ffwrdd o’r gwaith, a bod 'bywyd Emma mewn perygl'. Yn hwyr y noson honno, anfonodd Mr McNamara neges e-bost at yr hawlydd yn cyfeirio at y trefniadau ar gyfer wythnos gyntaf y tymor. Roedd yr hawlydd wedi mynegi ei dymuniad i ymweld ag Ysgol Bryn Hafren yn hytrach na Ysgol Gyfun Treorci oherwydd roedd y pellter i deithio yn llai; roedd asesiad risg straen am gael ei gynnal ar 7 Ionawr; a trefnwyd athro/athrawes llanw er mwyn iddi allu mynychu apwyntiad gyda’i meddyg teulu ar 8 Ionawr. Hefyd, gofynnodd Mr McNamara i’r hawlydd drefnu apwyntiad gydag ef i gadarnhau bod yr holl agweddau ar y gefnogaeth i’w darparu ar gyfer yr hawlydd mewn lle. Ar ôl cael copi o’r neges e-bost hon, ysgrifennodd cynrychiolydd undeb llafur yr hawlydd, Geraint Davies, “Pam fod yna gymaint o stŵr wedi bod?" Pan gafodd cyfarfod gyda Mr McNamara ei drefnu ar gyfer 12 Ionawr am 12.30, ysgrifennodd yr hawlydd am 11.18 i ddweud nad oedd wedi cael 5 diwrnod o rybudd. Erbyn hyn roedd yn dod yn anodd iawn i'r atebydd yn gyffredinol, ac i Mr McNamara yn enwedig, reoli disgwyliadau'r hawlydd a bodloni ei cheisiadau.[45]Ar 21 Ionawr, bu i Mr McNamara wahardd yr hawlydd ar seiliau meddygol oherwydd ei fod wedi cael ei gynghori 'o ystyried yr wybodaeth a ddarparwyd gennych chi a'ch mam, ynghyd â’r diffyg gwybodaeth sydd ar gael gan yr adran Iechyd Galwedigaethol a'ch Meddyg Teulu... ystyrir yw nad yw'n briodol i chi barhau i fod yn y gweithle...' (t. 784-86).[46]Mynychodd yr hawlydd a’i mam apwyntiad arall gyda Nicola Johns ar 27 Ionawr a datgelwyd adroddiad cyfyngedig yn cadarnhau nad oedd yr hawlydd yn ffit i weithio. Cafodd dystysgrif gan ei meddyg teulu yn nodi ei nad oedd yn ffit i weithio am y cyfnod 20 Ionawr - 11 Chwefror.[47]Ar 1 Chwefror, trwy lythyr, bu i’r corff llywodraethu atgoffa’r hawlydd y byddai'r panel a oedd yn ystyried ei hachos yn cyfarfod eto ar 11 Chwefror i ystyried ei chynnydd. Ysgrifennodd Mrs Thompson ar 3 Chwefror nad oedd yr hawlydd yn ffit i fynychu, ac felly, yn unol â hynny, penderfynodd y panel drefnu cyfarfod ar gyfer 29 Chwefror. Ysgrifennodd Dr Ian Johnson, cadeirydd y panel, '...byddwch yn gweld bod Mr McNamara wedi rhoi gwybod inni fod yna wahaniaeth yn y cyngor a gafwyd gan yr Adran Iechyd Galwedigaethol a gan eich meddyg, ac rwy'n deall eich bod wedi cael eich cynghori i ganiatáu i'r Adran Iechyd Galwedigaethol gysylltu â’ch meddyg ond eich bod wedi gwrthod y cais hwn. Rwyf hefyd yn deall eich bod wedi gwrthod datgelu dau adroddiad iechyd galwedigaethol yn dilyn cyfeiriadau iechyd blaenorol. Dalier sylw bydd y pwyllgor yn gwneud penderfyniad ar sail yr wybodaeth a fydd ar gael iddynt yn y cyfarfod ar 29 Chwefror 2016’.[48]Mynychodd yr hawlydd a’i mam apwyntiad arall gyda Nicola Johns ar 24 Chwefror. Cafodd yr hawlydd dystysgrif arall yn datgan nid oedd yn ffit i fod yn y gwaith, a ni ddychwelodd i'r gwaith cyn iddi gael ei diswyddo.[49]Cynhaliwyd cyfarfod panel disgyblu a diswyddo'r corff llywodraethu ar 29 Chwefror. Ni fynychodd yr hawlydd. Gwrthodwyd cais gan Geraint Davies, cynrychiolydd undeb llafur a oedd yn cynrycholi’r hawlydd, am ohiriad fel bod yr hawlydd yn gallu gwella'n llawn, dychwelyd i'r gwaith a chwblhau'r cyfnod o bedair wythnos i ymestyn cam 3 o’r drefn, oherwydd nid oedd y cyfarwyddyd iechyd galwedigaethol wedi'i ryddhau ac nid oedd unrhyw arwydd o ran pryd byddai’r hawlydd yn ffit i ddychwelyd i'r gwaith. Yna gadawodd Mr Davies y cyfarfod. Clywodd y panel gan Andrew Thompson a Geraint Hilbourne, gyda'r ddau yn cadarnhau cywirdeb yr adroddiadau a baratowyd ganddynt yn dilyn arsylwi gwersi'r hawlydd. Penderfyniad y panel oedd dod â chyflogaeth yr hawlydd i ben ar y seiliau canlynol:a. Dyfarniadau anfoddhaol cyson ar ei gallu i ddysgu;b. Diffyg gwybodaeth feddygol i bennu dyddiad ar gyfer dychwelyd i’r gwaith;c. Diffyg ymgysylltu ers y cyfarfod ar 16 Rhagfyr;d. Gofynion yr ysgol a'r adran Gymraeg yn enwedig wedi’u pwysleisio mewn adroddiad Estyn fel bod angen cefnogaeth ychwanegol;e. Cytunwyd ar yr estyniad amser am gyfnod o bedair wythnos i allu darparu cefnogaeth ychwanegol. Fodd bynnag, roedd yna ddiffyg ymgysylltu, gwrthodiad i ddarparu gwybodaeth iechyd galwedigaethol manwl ac roedd yr hawlydd i ffwrdd o'r gwaith oherwydd salwch ar hyn o bryd ac nid oedd unrhyw ddyddiad dychwelyd hysbys.[50]Cadarnhawyd y penderfyniad gyda'r hawlydd mewn llythyr ar 8 Mawrth a oedd yn rhoi rhybudd iddi y byddai ei chyflogaeth gydag Ysgol Gyfun Y Barri yn dod i ben ar 31 Awst 2016. Roedd y llythyr hefyd yn hysbysu’r hawlydd bod ganddi’r hawl i apelio trwy nodi ei rhesymau o fewn pum diwrnod gwaith o'r dyddiad cafodd y llythyr.[51]Ysgrifennodd Mrs Thompson at gadeirydd y llywodraethwyr ar 9 Mawrth 2016 yn cyfeirio at ‘y cydweithio “twyllodrus/anonest” ar a chyn 18 Hydref 2013 am 07:39, lle mae yna dystiolaeth bendant bod Emma Thompson wedi'i rhoi mewn sefyllfa lle byddai'n siŵr o fethu, yn fwriadol ac ar y cyd, gan Mr McNamara, Sue Alderman...ac Ann Jones" Byddwn yn dychwelyd isod i'r mater y mae'r llythyr hwn yn cyfeirio ato. Ysgrifennodd Mrs Thompson lythyr arall at gadeirydd y llywodraethwyr ar yr un dyddiad, yn cwyno am ymosod seiciatrig, erledigaeth ac aflonyddwch.[52]Ar 10 Mawrth, cyflwynodd Mrs Thompson apêl ysgrifenedig ar ran yr hawlydd, ynghyd â llythyr eglurhaol a oedd yn cynnwys 37 o dudalennau (t. 912 ff). Roedd y cwynion a wnaed yn eithafol. Cyfeiriodd at “hanes gwaith perffaith” yr hawlydd “cyn fendeta Chris Elmore” a “cynllwynio i ddiswyddo Emma Thompson”, a "proses dwyllodrus" a “twyllo gan Chris Elmore i setlo hen gownt” a phroses “hynod esgeulus a maleisus” hyd at dweud “nad oedd tystiolaeth bod y cyfarfod [ar 29 Chwefror] wedi mynd yn ei flaen”. Honnodd y byddai “unrhyw athro arall wedi pasio'r sesiwn arsylwi ond oherwydd dylanwad cryf Chris Elmore i setlo fendeta yn ei herbyn, ROEDD YN DWYLLODRUS ac ni adawodd iddi basio yn fwriadol" a gwnaeth nifer o honiadau difrifol iawn yn erbyn Chris Elmore yng nghyswllt ei fendeta honedig.[53]Yn ogystal â’r honiadau a wnaed yn erbyn yr atebydd a Mr Elmore, honnodd Mrs Thompson bod cynrychiolydd undeb llafur yr hawlydd, Geraint Davies yn “cysgu yn yr un gwely â’r cyflogwr cythruddol”.[54]Trwy lythyr, ar 6 Ebrill, rhoddodd y corff llywodraethu wybod i'r hawlydd y byddai cyfarfod o'r pwyllgor apeliadau disgyblu a diswyddo ar 22 Ebrill yn ystyried ei hapêl. Trwy ei llythyr ar 12 Ebrill, cyfeiriodd Mrs Thompson at baragraff 7.4 trefn gallu'r atebydd a honnodd oherwydd dyddiad y gwrandawiad arfaethedig, roedd y llywodraethwyr wedi’u ‘gwahardd rhag gwrando'r apêl oherwydd y terfyn amser.” Mae Paragraff 7.4 o’r drefn yn datgan: Gall y cyflogai apelio yn erbyn y penderfyniad hwn yn ysgrifenedig o fewn 5 diwrnod gwaith o gael y penderfyniad ysgrifenedig. Rhaid i’r apêl gael ei gwrando o fewn 10 diwrnod gwaith o gael y llythyr apêl.[55]Yn ei lythyr dyddiedig 13 Ebrill, bu i Mr Quigley, Ysgrifennydd Cyffredinol Cynorthwyol (Datblygiad a Chefnogaeth Ranbarthol) NASUWT, brotestio yn erbyn yr hawlydd am 'fygwth, gwneud honiadau eithafol tro ar ôl thro, a defnyddio iaith sarhaus heb fod angen' a methiant yr hawlydd i ddarparu cefnogaeth ar gyfer 'yr honiadau difrifol iawn rydych wedi'u gwneud ynghylch Cynghorydd Elmore [fel yr oedd ar y pryd].' Gyda phob tegwch i’r hawlydd, barn y tribiwnlys yw ei fod yn debygol iawn mai'r iaith yr oedd yn cwyno amdani oedd iaith a ddefnyddiwyd gan Mrs Thompson yn hytrach na'r hawlydd.[56]Ar 14 Ebrill ysgrifennodd Mrs Thompson lythyr, un hirfaith unwaith eto, yn dweud ei bod “...yn cymryd drosodd gan yr undebau yn swyddogol fel cynrychiolydd cyfreithiol Ms Thompson wedi 12 Ebrill 2016 3:15pm...” Mae geiriad penodol iawn y llythyr hwnnw yn bwrw amheuaeth ynghylch honiad Mrs Thompson ei bod wedi rhoi gwybod i'r atebydd yn ystod gwyliau'r ysgol dros y Nadolig ei bod yn gweithredu ar ran yr hawlydd yn lle'r undeb llafur. Daethpwyd i’r casgliad mai’r llythyr hwn oedd yr arwydd cyntaf gafodd yr atebydd ynghylch y newid yng nghynrychiolaeth yr hawlydd. Er gwaethaf y termau a nodir yn llythyr Mrs Thompson, roedd yn ymddangos bod NASUWT dan yr argraff fod angen iddynt barhau i gynrychioli'r hawlydd yn ei hapêl, a gofynnodd i ohirio'r gwrandawiad o'r 22 Ebrill fel bod eu swyddog yn gallu mynychu. Yn yr amgylchiadau hynny, nid oeddem yn gallu beirniadu’r atebydd am gytuno i hynny er gwaethaf honiad Mrs Thompson bod yr atebydd yn gwybod nad oedd yr undeb yn gweithredu yn yr achos mwyach.[57]Cafodd dyddiad y gwrandawiad apêl ei ohirio o 22 Ebrill i 29 Ebrill, ac mewn ymateb i honiadau Mrs Thompson eu bod wedi’u gwahardd rhag gwrando'r apêl oherwydd y terfyn amser, eglurodd Antonia Forte, y rhesymau yn ei llythyr dyddiedig 15 Ebrill fel a ganlyn: “Rwy'n cydnabod bod yr apêl wedi'i threfnu y tu allan i'r terfyn amser o 10 diwrnod gwaith (fel y nodir yn adran 7.4). Mae yna amrywiaeth o resymau dros hyn, yn cynnwys cyfnod gwyliau’r Pasg, a phryd mae’r llywodraethwyr a chynrychiolydd undeb llafur Emma ar gael." Cyfeiriodd Antonia Forte hefyd at gymhlethdod yr achos, yr anhawster wrth geisio sicrhau panel o lywodraethwyr nad oedd wedi bod yn rhan o achos yr hawlydd yn flaenorol a'r ohebiaeth hirfaith a gafwyd gan Mrs Thompson ar ôl iddi gyflwyno'r apêl. Daeth i’r casgliad, 'Yng ngoleuni'r uchod, nid wyf yn teimlo bod oedi afresymol wedi bod wrth drefnu'r gwrandawiad apêl, ac rwy’n cadarnhau’r bwriad i barhau gyda’r trefniadau ar gyfer y gwrandawiad apêl ar 29 Ebrill 2016' er, cydnabuwyd ei fod tu allan i'r cyfnod o 10 diwrnod gwaith a ddarperir ar gyfer y drefn hon.[58]Ar 20 Ebrill, cadarnhaodd Nicola Johns bod y pedwar apwyntiad iechyd galwedigaethol roedd yr hawlydd wedi’u mynychu ers mis Ionawr wedi cynhyrchu pedwar adroddiad, a chytunodd yr hawlydd i ddatgelu'r ddau adroddiad olaf yn unig i'r atebydd.[59]Yn y gwrandawiad apêl a gynhaliwyd ar 29 Ebrill, nid oedd yr hawlydd yn bresennol ac nid oedd ganddi gynrychiolaeth ychwaith. Roedd hyn oherwydd bod Mrs Thompson o'r farn bod yr apêl dan derfyn amser ac felly roedd yr hawlydd wedi ennill yr apêl trwy ddiffyg. Adolygodd y panel y cam anffurfiol a’r tri cham ffurfiol o’r drefn. Mi wnaethant ystyried y chwe aelod o staff Ysgol Gyfun Y Barri a Rhys Jones, pennaeth Ysgol Gyfun Treorci, a oedd wedi arsylwi gwersi’r hawlydd. Bu iddynt ystyried yr addasiadau a geisiwyd gan yr hawlydd oherwydd ei hanabledd a’i hanafiadau, a chawsant wybod nid oedd yr hawlydd wedi cysylltu y problemau gyda'i gallu i ddysgu gyda'i hanableddau tan cam 3 o'r drefn. Ystyriwyd hefyd cwynion yr hawlydd yn erbyn staff yr atebydd, y llygredigaeth honedig rhwng staff yr atebydd, y pennaeth ac undeb llafur yr hawlydd a'r honiad o fendeta.[60]Clywodd y pwyllgor apêl dystiolaeth gan Mr McNamara, Geraint Hilbourne, Andrew Thompson a Rhys Jones. Roedd y pedwar ohonynt oll wedi arsylwi gwersi'r hawlydd. Dywedodd Mr McNamara nid oedd yr hawlydd erioed wedi gofyn am unrhyw gymhorthion neu addasiadau i gyflawni ei rôl cyn mis Medi 2015. Dywedodd mai’r nifer helaeth o’r gwaith darllen yr oedd rhaid i'r hawlydd ei wneud oedd darllen a marcio llyfrau disgyblion, ac na fyddai meddalwedd sy'n ymateb i lais wedi helpu’r hawlydd i wella ei dysgu. Cadarnhaodd Messrs Hilbourne, Thompson a Jones mai eu hasesiadau o ddysgu’r hawlydd oedd ei bod yn anfoddhaol.[61]Nododd y pwyllgor apêl roedd yr hawlydd yn un o bedwar o athrawon a gafodd eu hadnabod fel angen cymorth ychwanegol, ac mai hi oedd yr unig un o'r pedwar a fethodd i wella'n gyson a methu â chyrraedd y safonau gofynnol. Bu i'r pwyllgor wrthod y ddadl ei bod wedi'i rhoi mewn sefyllfa lle byddai'n siŵr o fethu. Bu iddo hefyd wrthod y dadleuon bod yna lygredigaeth neu fendeta wedi bod a ni welodd y pwyllgor gysylltiad rhwng gwaith i wella adeiladau a oedd yn mynd ymlaen yn yr ysgol a safon dysgu'r hawlydd. Er eu bod yn difaru nad oeddynt wedi cael cyfle i glywed gan yr hawlydd neu gynrychiolydd ar ran yr hawlydd, penderfynodd y pwyllgor i beidio â chefnogi apêl yr hawlydd.[62]Ysgrifennodd cadeirydd y pwyllgor apêl, Lyn Cosgrove, at yr hawlydd ar 6 Mai 2016 yn cadarnhau bod penderfyniad y pwyllgor disgyblu a diswyddo wedi’i gefnogi ac roedd y pwyllgor apêl wedi cyfarwyddo’r atebydd i derfynu ei chontract, yn dod i rym ar 31 Awst 2016.[63]Ar 16 Mai, ysgrifennodd Jennifer Hill, Cyfarwyddwr - Dysgu a Sgiliau, Cyngor Bro Morgannwg, yn cadarnhau terfyn cyflogaeth yr hawlydd a'i hysbysu, ‘Yn unol â'r ddyletswydd statudol sydd wedi’i chynnwys yn Rheoliadau Addysg (Cyflwyno Gwybodaeth) (Cymru) 2009, byddwn nawr yn adrodd am y mater hwn i Gyngor y Gweithlu Addysg.’[64]Bu i ni glywed tystiolaeth bod yna waith adeiladu yn mynd ymlaen mewn ardaloedd wrth ymyl ei hystafell ddosbarth tra roedd gallu'r hawlydd yn cael ei asesu. Penderfynodd y tribiwnlys bod y pwyllgor apêl wedi dod i'r casgliad rhesymol nid oedd hyn yn ffactor a gyfrannodd at yr hawlydd yn methu â darparu gwersi effeithiol. Nid oedd unrhyw dystiolaeth o gwbl i gefnogi honiadau eithafol Mrs Thompson bod yr atebydd wedi esgeuluso ei ddyletswydd gofal i staff a disgyblion, un ai trwy anwybyddu'r posibilrwydd bod yna asbestos peryglus yn yr ardal berthnasol neu fel arall.[65]Er gwaethaf rhywfaint o newidiadau o ran geiriad y safonau proffesiynol a ddefnyddiwyd i asesu’r hawlydd, nid oes unrhyw amheuaeth ym meddwl y tribiwnlys bod yr hawlydd wastad yn gwybod yn dda iawn yr hyn yr oedd yn ofynnol iddi gyflawni a chafodd adborth helaeth, ar lafar ac yn ysgrifenedig, gan y rhai oedd wedi'i harsylwi, yn rhoi gwybod iddi ym mha ffyrdd yr oedd hi’n methu â chyflawni'r gofynion hynny.[66]O 1999 hyd at ddiwedd 2015, ni ofynnodd yr hawlydd am unrhyw addasiadau o gwbl yng nghyswllt ei hanableddau, sef dyslecsia a cholli ei chlyw. Fel y dywedodd wrth Ann Rees, nid oedd yn ystyried bod ei dyslecsia yn effeithio ar ei dysgu. Cefnogwyd y safbwynt hwn gan Rhys Jones, a ddywedodd wrth y pwyllgor apêl bod ganddo brofiad o athrawon gyda dyslecsia, ac nid oedd wedi'u hatal rhag darparu gwersi effeithiol. Roedd yr hawlydd wedi datblygu strategaethau ymdopi ei hun, fel gwefusddarllen.[67]Yn dilyn damwain ffordd yr hawlydd yn 2012, mi gafodd cadair wahanol, stôl ar gyfer gorffwys ei thraed a theclyn i’w helpu i deipio ac ysgrifennu'n fwy cyfforddus ('writing slope'). Pennwyd rhestr o addasiadau ar gyfer yr hawlydd gan Ann Rees (t. 1559), a'r addasiad mwyaf arwyddocaol oedd cynyddu'r amser PPA o 10% i 20%. Awgrymodd Dr Lever ac Ann Rees i’r hawlydd ddefnyddio meddalwedd arbenigol: un ai meddalwedd oedd yn ymateb i lais (Dr Lever) os oedd rhaid i’r hawlydd ysgrifennu adroddiadau, neu feddalwedd testun i leferydd (Ann Rees) i helpu gyda rhuglder darllen a dwyn pethau i gof. Roedd bleindiau wedi’u gosod yn ystafell ddosbarth yr hawlydd, yr un fath â'r rhai oedd wedi'u gosod yn holl ystafelloedd yr ysgol. Ni wnaeth yr hawlydd gwyno am y bleindiau hyn tan 2015. Roedd y tribiwnlys yn fodlon nid oedd unrhyw ddiffygion gyda’r bleindiau wedi cael effaith sylweddol ar berfformiad yr hawlydd yn y dosbarth. Roedd cwyn yr hawlydd ynghylch lleoliad penodol ei bwrdd o fewn yr ystafell ddosbarth yn mater dibwys, a chyda cymorth os oedd angen, byddai'r hawlydd wedi gallu symud y bwrdd yn hawdd os oedd yn dymuno gwneud hynny. Yr unig amod gan Mr McNamara oedd ni ddylai bwrdd yr athro/athrawes gael ei leoli mewn man a fyddai’n atal y disgyblion rhag gweld y bwrdd gwyn yn glir.[68]Nodwyd uchod bod yr hawlydd wedi gwneud honiadau difrifol iawn, yn bennaf yn erbyn Christopher Elmore AS. Datganodd yr hawlydd, ‘Rwy’n credu mai [Christopher Elmore] sydd wrth wraidd fy mhroblemau cyflogaeth yn yr YMCA ac yn yr ysgol, lle roedd yn lywodraethwr yn y ddau sefydliad. Rwy’n credu roedd hyn yn fendeta a gafodd ei ddal yn fy erbyn oherwydd materion yr oedd Mr Elmore yn rhan ohonynt...' (datganiad tyst, Chwefror 2018, paragraff 24). Y ffaith yw, roedd Mr Elmore yn aelod o fwrdd rheoli HWB YMCA Y Barri ar yr adeg yr oedd proses gyfreitha flaenorol yr hawlydd yn erbyn y corff hwnnw yn mynd ymlaen, ac roedd yn llywodraethwr yn Ysgol Gyfun y Barri rhwng mis Medi 2012 a mis Gorffennaf 2016. Ni gafodd y dystiolaeth sylw pellach heblaw am ym mis Ebrill 2016, pan gafodd Mr Elmore ei hysbysu gan yr atebydd am yr honiadau a wnaed yn ei erbyn gan yr hawlydd. Fodd bynnag, nid oedd yn rhan o unrhyw fater yn ymwneud â'r drefn gallu ar gyfer yr hawlydd, ei diswyddiad nac ei hapêl.[69]Er mwyn parhau gyda’r ddadl hon, roedd rhaid i’r hawlydd fwrw ymlaen gan gyfeirio at y rhai hynny oedd wedi chwarae rhan, sef yr athrawon niferus a oedd wedi arsylwi ei gwersi, swyddogion o awdurdod yr atebydd a ddeliodd â'i hachos, a thrwy oblygiad, llywodraethwyr yr ysgol. Nid oedd yn ofn gwneud hynny, gan honni eu bod oll wedi cymryd rhan mewn llygredigaeth a chynllwynio i'w diswyddo.[70]Roedd yr honiad o lygredigaeth hyd yn oed wedi’i gyfeirio at gynrychiolydd undeb llafur yr hawlydd, Geraint Davies, ar y sail bod Mr McNamara wedi ysgrifennu at Sue Alderman ar 18 Hydref 2013, gan ddweud, 'Mae Emma Thompson wedi bod ar gynllun gefnogi. Cytunwyd ar y pecyn cymorth yn gyffredinol gyda'r undebau... mae Geraint Davies yn ddyn iawn. Gallaf gyfarfod gydag ef ar ben fy hun gan mai cymorth anffurfiol yw hyn. Os ydych yn meddwl y byddai’n well ichi fod yn bresennol mae croeso mawr ichi.’ Mewn gwirionedd, yr oll oedd Mr McNamara yn gwneud oedd holi a oedd Ms Alderman yn meddwl y dylai adran Adnoddau Dynol yr atebydd fod yn bresennol mewn cyfarfod rhyngddo ef a swyddog undeb llafur.[71]Er tegwch y rhai a gafodd eu hymosod arnynt yn gyhoeddus gan yr hawlydd, dylai'r tribiwnlys ddatgan mewn ffordd hollol glir ni chafwyd yr un darn o dystiolaeth gredadwy i gefnogi honiadau’r hawlydd am fendeta, llygredigaeth na chynllwynio. Y gyfraith[72]Mae Deddf Hawliau Cyflogaeth 1996 yn darparu: 98 Cyffredinol(1) Wrth benderfynu, at ddibenion y Rhan hon p’un, a oedd diswyddo cyflogai yn deg ynteu’n annheg, mae gofyn i’r cyflogwr ddangos – (a) y rheswm (neu, os oes mwy nag un, y prif reswm) dros ddiswyddo, ac (b) ei fod yn... rheswm sy’n syrthio o fewn isadran(2) ... (2) Mae rheswm yn syrthio o dan yr isadran hon os yw'n - (a) ymwneud â gallu’r ... cyflogai i berfformio gwaith o'r fath y cafodd ei gyflogi gan y cyflogwr i'w wneud... (4) Lle bo’r cyflogwr wedi bodloni gofynion isadran (1), mae ateb y cwestiwn a oedd y diswyddo yn deg ynteu'n annheg (gan ystyried a roddwyd gan y cyflogwr) – (a) yn dibynnu, dan yr amgylchiadau (yn cynnwys graddau’r adnoddau gweinyddol a ddefnyddiwyd gan y cyflogwr) p'un a wnaeth y cyflogwr ymddwyn yn rhesymol ynteu'n afresymol wrth ei drin fel rheswm digonol i ddiswyddo'r cyflogai, a (b) bydd yn cael ei benderfynu yn unol ag ecwiti a theilyngdod sylweddol yr achos.[73]Mae’r Ddeddf Cydraddoldeb yn darparu: 13 Gwahaniaethu uniongyrchol(1) Mae unigolyn (A) yn gwahaniaethu yn erbyn unigolyn arall (B) os, oherwydd nodwedd warchodedig, mae A yn trin B yn llai ffafriol nac y mae A yn trin, neu byddai’n trin, pobl eraill. 20 Dyletswydd i wneud addasiadau(2) Mae’r ddyletswydd yn cynnwys y tri gofyniad canlynol:(3) Mae’r gofyniad cyntaf yn ofyniad, lle bo darpariaeth, maen prawf neu ymarfer gan A yn rhoi unigolyn anabl dan anfantais sylweddol yng nghyswllt mater perthnasol o'i gymharu ag unigolion nad ydynt yn anabl, i gymryd camau gweithredu rhesymol i osgoi'r anfantais.(4) Mae’r ail ofyniad yn ofyniad, lle bo nodwedd ffisegol yn rhoi unigolyn anabl dan anfantais sylweddol yng nghyswllt mater perthnasol o'i gymharu ag unigolion nad ydynt yn anabl, i gymryd camau gweithredu rhesymol i osgoi'r anfantais.(5) Mae’r trydydd gofyniad yn ofyniad, lle oni bai am ddarparu cymorth cynorthwyol, byddai unigolyn anabl dan anfantais sylweddol yng nghyswllt mater perthnasol o’i gymharu ag unigolion nad ydynt yn anabl, i gymryd camau gweithredu rhesymol i osgoi'r anfantais. 26 Aflonyddu (1) Mae unigolyn (A) yn aflonyddu ar unigolyn (B) os – (a) Bydd A yn ymddwyn mewn ffordd annymunol yng nghyswllt nodwedd warchodedig perthnasol, ac (b) Pwrpas neu effaith yr ymddygiad yw - (i) amharchu urddas B, neu (ii) creu amgylchedd bygythiol, annymunol, difreiniol, difrïol neu sarhaus ar gyfer B. Cyflwyniadau[74]Cyflwynodd Ms Criddle mai’r rheswm dros diswyddo'r hawlydd oedd ei gallu, ac nid oedd unrhyw wahaniaethu, aflonyddu neu fethiant ar ran yr atebydd yn ei ddyletswydd i wneud addasiadau. Cafodd y drefn gallu, trwy’r cam anffurfiol, y tri cham ffurfiol a’r estyniad o’r trydydd cam ffurfiol, ei gynnal mewn ffordd deg ac onest. Trwy gydol y broses, methodd yr hawlydd i ddangos y safon ofynnol o ran ei gallu a'r rheswm hwnnw yn unig oedd y rheswm dros ei diswyddo. Bu iddi ddadlau hefyd y gwnaed nifer o honiadau'r hawlydd o wahaniaethu ar ôl y terfyn amser.[75]Datganodd Mrs Thompson bod diswyddiad yr hawlydd o ganlyniad i fendeta a ddechreuwyd a sbardunwyd gan Christopher Elmore, oherwydd ei wrthdeimlad tuag at yr hawlydd yn dilyn ei chyfreitha yn erbyn YMCA, a bod nifer o dystion yr atebydd wedi cymryd rhan yn y fendeta hon. Ymhlyg â hynny roedd nifer o gynhennau eraill, sef(i) bod yr hawlydd yn athrawes gymwys a oedd wedi perfformio'n fedrus yn ystod y drefn gallu,(ii) roedd y tystion proffesiynol a oedd wedi arsylwi'r hawlydd yn anonest yn eu hasesiadau o wersi'r hawlydd a’r dystiolaeth a roddwyd ganddynt i'r tribiwnlys hwn,(iii) roedd y broses o arsylwi gwersi'r hawlydd wedi'i 'pheiriannu' yn fwriadol fel bod yr hawlydd yn methu, trwy, er enghraifft, dewis y dosbarthiadau a oedd yn ymddwyn yn heriol iawn a dewis unigolion nad oedd yn arbenigo yn y Gymraeg i’w harsylwi, a(iv) bod Mr Elmore ei hun wedi bod yn gelwyddog pan ddywedodd nad oedd wedi chwarae rhan yng nghyflogaeth yr hawlydd yn Ysgol Gyfun Y Barri.[76]Cyflwynodd Mrs Thompson bod yr hawlydd wastad wedi bod yn athrawes dda, nid oedd yr atebydd eisiau cydnabod y ffaith hon, a byddai’r atebydd ond dan ddyletswydd i adrodd am diswyddiad yr hawlydd i Gyngor y Gweithlu Addysg os oedd y diswyddiad yn ‘bendant’.[77]Cyflwynodd Mrs Thompson ymhellach bod y tribiwnlys wedi’i hatal rhag ymchwilio i gefndir gwrthdeimlad honedig Mr Elmore yn erbyn yr hawlydd. Trafodaeth a chasgliadau ar y materion gerbron y tribiwnlys[78]O ran dadleuon yr atebydd bod rhai cwynion penodol 'ar ôl y terfyn amser', allan o barch i'r dadleuon cyflawn iawn a roddwyd ger ein bron, yn gyntaf rydym wedi ystyried teilyngdod y honiadau. Pe baem wedi ystyried bod unrhyw un ohonynt yn deilwng, byddwn wedi gorfod mynd ymlaen i ystyried a chawsant eu cyflwyno'n amserol. Nid yw hyn wedi codi yn yr achos hwn.[79]Rydym eisoes wedi nodi’n glir ein canfyddiad nad oedd fendeta, llygredigaeth na chynllwynio wrth wraidd diswyddiad yr hawlydd. Oni bai am Mr Elmore ei hun, nid oes unrhyw awgrym bod yna gymhelliad dirgel ar ran y nifer fawr o bobl a oedd yn rhan o achos yr hawlydd - athrawon yn Ysgol Gyfun Y Barri, Rhys Jones a swyddogion yr atebydd - a fyddai'n esbonio eu dymuniad honedig i'w diswyddo; ac, fel yr ydym wedi canfod, ni chwaraeodd Mr Elmore unrhyw ran yn y broses o ddiswyddo'r hawlydd.[80]O ran honiad Mrs Thompson ei bod wedi’i hatal rhag ymchwilio i gwrthdeimlad honedig Mr Elmore yn y croesholi, penderfynodd y tribiwnlys bod angen i Mrs Thompson gadarnhau cysylltiad pendant rhwng Mr Elmore a'r penderfyniad a wnaed gan Ysgol Gyfun Y Barri neu'r atebydd, a gafodd effaith andwyol ar yr hawlydd. Os gellir gwneud hynny, efallai byddai modd dadlau roedd ganddo'r cyfle i ddylanwadu ar y penderfyniad, a pharhau â’r gwrthdeimlad yn ei herbyn. Efallai byddai cefndir y gwrthdeimlad honedig yn yr amgylchiadau hynny wedi dod yn berthnasol. Ond os nad oedd modd canfod cysylltiad rhwng Mr Elmore ac unrhyw benderfyniad a gafodd effaith andwyol ar yr hawlydd, yna roedd y cefndir yn parhau i fod yn amherthnasol. Gan nad oedd Mr Elmore wedi chwarae rhan yn unrhyw benderfyniad yng nghyswllt cyflogaeth yr hawlydd yn Ysgol Gyfun Y Barri, roedd unrhyw ddig yr oedd yn ei ddal yn ei herbyn yn amherthnasol i'n penderfyniad.[81]Daethom i’r casgliad roedd gan y panel diswyddo a’r pwyllgor apêl yr hawl rhesymol i ddod i’r casgliad bod yr athrawon a oedd wedi arsylwi'r hawlydd wedi cynnal eu hunain mewn ffordd broffesiynol ac onest, eu bod yn athrawon profiadol a oedd yn gymwys iawn i asesu perfformiad yr hawlydd a'u bod wedi cyflwyno barn onest a oedd yn haeddu parch. Roedd gan y panel diswyddo a’r pwyllgor apêl hawl resymol i ddod i’r casgliad bod y dystiolaeth yn ddigon cadarn.[82]Roedd gan y panel disgyblu a'r pwyllgor apêl yr hawl rhesymol i wrthod honiadau'r hawlydd bod y rhai oedd wedi'i harsylwi ac wedi gweld diffyg ynddi yn anghymwys i ddyfarnu ei dysgu gan nad oeddynt yn siaradwyr Cymraeg, yn athrawon Cymraeg nac yn arolygwyr o Estyn. Ger ein bron, strategaeth yr hawlydd oedd i feio pobl eraill yn hytrach na chydnabod unrhyw ddiffygion ar ei rhan hi.[83]Nid oeddwn yn gallu osgoi ystyried ein amheuon cryf ynghylch dibynadwyedd yr hawlydd fel tyst. Cyflwynodd honiadau eithafol heb unrhyw dystiolaeth y tu ôl iddynt, gan ddarparu disgrifiadau anghyson a gorliwio'r ddamwain ffordd (t. 1634), gan ddisgrifio yn y dystiolaeth ei bod ‘bron wedi colli ei phen' (near decapitation) o'i gymharu â'r 'man anaf i'r pen' a nodwyd ar y pryd (t. 1335); ystyriwyd mai ‘cyflwr ffug’ oedd yr esboniad tebygol ar gyfer rhai o'i chwynion (t. 1630-31); a mynnodd ei bod yn parhau i ddioddef PTSD ymhell tu hwnt i fis Medi 2012, sef yr adeg olaf pan oedd unrhyw ddiagnosis meddygol i gefnogi hyn.[84]Trwy gydol y drefn gallu, cafodd yr hawlydd ei chynrychioli gan ei hundeb llafur, gan eithrio'r apêl pan oedd wedi gwrthod eu gwasanaethau.[85]Nid oedd y dystiolaeth yn yr achos hwn wedi dechrau sefydlu unrhyw achos o wahaniaethu neu aflonyddu ar sail anabledd. Nid oedd unrhyw elfen o’r ffordd gafodd yr hawlydd ei thrin yn ymwneud â'i hanabledd. Nid oedd ymddygiad yr atebydd yn cynnwys unrhyw un o'r pwrpasau a nodir yn adran 26(1) Deddf Cydraddoldeb 2010, ac nid oedd yn rhesymol dan yr amgylchiadau, yn cynnwys canfyddiad yr hawlydd, fod unrhyw ymddygiad ar ran yr atebydd wedi achosi unrhyw un o'r effeithiau hynny.[86]Cydnabuwyd gan yr atebydd fod gan Ysgol Gyfun Y Barri drefn gallu ac roedd yn ei wneud yn ofynnol i athrawon gyflawni safon dda o ddysgu. Roedd y rheiny yn ddarpariaethau, yn meini prawf neu’n ymarferion (PCPs) at ddibenion adran 20 Deddf Cydraddoldeb 2010. Ein dyfarniad yw nid yw'n bosibl 'gwrthod i wneud addasiadau rhesymol' gyfrif fel darpariaeth, maen prawf neu ymarfer o'r fath. Ni all methu â chydymffurfio â dyletswydd arwain at y ddyletswydd honno.[87]Er ein bod yn derbyn yn llawn yr oedd y drefn gallu siŵr o fod wedi bod yn brofiad a berodd straen i’r hawlydd – fel y byddai ar gyfer unrhyw athro/athrawes – nid oeddem yn gallu derbyn cynnen yr hawlydd bod y PCPs wedi’i rhoi mewn perygl o ddioddef chwalfa nerfol. Hyd yn oed os oedd wedi’i gadarnhau ei bod wedi dioddef chwalfa o'r fath (ac nid oedd hyn wedi digwydd) dywedodd yr hawlydd yn ei thystiolaeth (gweler paragraff 41 uchod) mai agor y drws i Mr McNamara oedd wedi achosi’r chwalfa nerfol. Yn yr un modd, ni ellir ei ystyried yn anfantais y byddai unigolyn anabl yn ei brofi o'i gymharu ag unigolion nad ydynt yn anabl.[88]Nid ydym yn meddwl yr oedd y drafftio o'r materion ar y pwynt hwn yn adlewyrchu un elfen o achos yr hawlydd ger ein bron. Un o’r dadleuon rhoddodd yr hawlydd ger ein bron oedd bod y PCPs, heb unrhyw addasiad, yn golygu y byddai hi’n debygol o fethu'r drefn ac felly byddai rhywfaint o addasu wedi bod yn rhesymol. Mae yna wrthddweud amlwg rhwng yr elfen hon o'r ddadl a'r datganiad bod yr hawlydd yn athrawes dda a llwyddiannus trwy gydol ei chyfnod yn yr ysgol a oedd yn ddioddefwr fendeta, a byddai wedi pasio'r drefn oni bai am hynny. Yn yr ail achos ni fyddai wedi bod angen unrhyw addasiad i'r drefn. Rydym wedi ystyried pob un o'r addasiadau unigol a ofynnwyd amdanynt (gweler y rhestr o faterion, paragraff 12 (a-j)) ac wedi edrych ar y ddwy elfen o’i dadl a nodir uchod.[89]Nid oedd unrhyw dystiolaeth foddhaol bod y PCPs yn rhoi’r hawlydd dan anfantais oherwydd ei dyslecsia neu’r nam ar ei chlyw. Dywedodd yr hawlydd wrth y Ganolfan Ddysgu Dyslexia Action yng Nghaerdydd nid oedd ei dyslecsia yn effeithio ei dysgu (t. 1556ff.), ond bod ysgrifennu cynlluniau gwersi ac adroddiadau yn Saesneg yn peri anhawster iddi. Mae hyn yn ymddangos yn wir oherwydd roedd yr hawlydd wedi bod yn dysgu, gyda dyslecsia (a'i nam ar y clyw) ers 1999 ac ni ofynnodd am unrhyw addasiadau tan hanner ffordd drwy 2015. Nid oedd unrhyw ofyniad yn y drefn gallu yn gofyn am rywbeth yn ychwanegol i lwyth dysgu arferol yr hawlydd.[90]Pan ofynnwyd am addasiadau, bu i'r atebydd eu hystyried a rhoddodd rhai ohonynt ar waith. Yn bwysig iawn, cafodd yr hawlydd dwywaith yr amser PPA arferol ar gyfer athro/athrawes; ac yn 2015, pan ofynnwyd am ddogfennau wedi'u hargraffu ar bapur glas, cafodd hyn ei wneud. Er nid ydym yn fodlon yr oedd yn ofyniad rhesymol i’r atebydd gymryd unrhyw gamau gweithredu yn yr achos hwn, roedd yr amser ychwanegol a roddwyd yn hael iawn. O ystyried natur gwaith yr hawlydd, nid ydym yn meddwl yr oedd yn ofyniad rhesymol i'r atebydd ddarparu meddalwedd arbenigol, p'un a oedd yn feddalwedd a oedd yn ymateb i lais neu'n feddalwedd testun i leferydd. Roedden ni’n fodlon nad oedd yn ofyniad rhesymol i’r atebydd wneud unrhyw un o’r addasiadau eraill a ofynnwyd amdanynt.[91]Nawr byddwn yn ystyried y gŵyn ynghylch diswyddo annheg (gweler y rhestr o faterion, paragraffau 15-17). Roedd un rheswm yn unig ar gyfer diswyddo’r hawlydd, sef, yn dilyn trefn gallu drwyadl a oedd yn hynod onest a theg, daethpwyd i'r casgliad nad oedd dysgu'r hawlydd wedi cyrraedd y safon sy'n ofynnol gan athrawes ddosbarth. Cafodd yr hawlydd ddigonedd o gyfleoedd i wella ei pherfformiad a chafodd ei rhybuddio y gallai methu â gwneud hynny arwain at iddi’n cael ei diswyddo. Roedd y rheswm felly yn ymwneud â gallu’r hawlydd. Ni phenododd Ysgol Gyfun Y Barri olynydd parhaol ar gyfer yr hawlydd tan fis Medi 2016, ac felly nid oedd y penderfyniad i'w diswyddo a gwrthod ei hapêl o reidrwydd yn anochel.[92]Rydym yn ddigon bodlon dan yr holl amgylchiadau bod y panel disgyblu a diswyddo a'r pwyllgor apêl wedi gweithredu'n rhesymol wrth drin diffyg gallu’r hawlydd fel rheswm digonol dros ei diswyddo. Nid oedd y rheswm wedi’i ddylanwadu’n negyddol gan unrhyw gymhelliad amhriodol.[93]Roedd rhaid i’r atebydd gyfeirio manylion achos yr hawlydd at Gyngor y Gweithlu Addysg yn dilyn ei diswyddiad oherwydd diffyg gallu, oherwydd gofyniad statudol a roddwyd ar yr atebydd.[94]Yr unig agwedd ar drefn yr atebydd sydd angen ei drafod ymhellach yw amseriad y gwrandawiad apêl. Rhaid i ni gadw mewn cof mai'r prawf yw p'un a oedd yr atebydd wedi gweithredu'n rhesymol. Daeth y llythyr dyddiedig 10 Fawrth i law ar 14 Mawrth. Yn unol â pharagraff 7.4 o'r drefn dylai fod yr apêl wedi'i gwrando o fewn 10 diwrnod; hynny yw (gan eithrio gwyliau’r pasg) ddim hwyrach na 12 Ebrill, sef ail ddiwrnod tymor yr haf. Cafodd yr apêl ei gwrando ar 29 Ebrill, 13 diwrnod gwaith yn hwyr. Os nad oedd yr apêl wedi’i gwrando, fel dadleuodd Mrs Thompson, yna mae'n ymddangos inni y sefyllfa fyddai bod y penderfyniad i'w diswyddo wedi sefyll, ac ni fyddai’r hawlydd wedi cael cyfle i apelio. Nid ydym yn meddwl bod dadl Mrs Thompson y byddai'r apêl wedi'i 'hennill' drwy ddiffyg a byddai'r diswyddiad wedi'i wrthdroi yn gywir. Gan gadw mewn cof cymhlethdod y materion a'r honiadau a godwyd, yr ohebiaeth hynod hirfaith a gyflwynwyd gan Mrs Thompson (cyn ac ar ôl i’r apêl gael ei chyflwyno), y gwyliau Pasg yng nghanol y broses, yr angen i recriwtio llywodraethwyr i wirfoddoli a'r cais gan undeb llafur yr hawliad i ohirio’r apêl am gyfnod o wythnos, nid ydym o'r farn y gellir beirniadu'r atebydd am fod yn afresymol drwy drefnu'r apêl ar y dyddiad hwyrach. Dewis yr hawlydd oedd peidio â mynychu a pheidio â chael cynrychiolaeth yn yr apêl. Nid oedd y ffaith bod yr apêl wedi’r gwrando’n hwyr yn golygu bod diswyddo’r hawlydd yn annheg.[95]Yn ein dyfarniad, rydym o’r farn nid oes sail i'r tri deg chwech o resymau (gweler y rhestr o faterion, paragraff 16) pam y mae'r hawlydd yn honni bod ei diswyddiad wedi bod yn annheg. Maent yn ymddangos fel cynigion heb gyfiawnhad i feirniadu eraill yn hytrach na chydnabod a mynd i'r afael â'r beirniadaeth a gyfeiriwyd at yr hawlydd ei hun. Casgliad[96]Gwrthodir cwynion yr hawlydd. Barnwr Cyflogaeth S J Williams Dyddiedig: 30 Ionawr 2019 RHESYMAU WEDI’U HANFON AT Y PARTION AR ………30 Ionawr 2019…………. ………………………………………………. AR RAN YSGRIFENNYDD Y TRIBIWNLYSOEDD CYFLOGAETH Rhif yr Achos: 1600397/2016 TRIBIWNLYSOEDD CYFLOGAETH Hawlydd: Miss EC Thompson Atebydd: Cyngor Bro Morgannwg DYFARNIAD Gwrthodir cais yr hawlydd, dyddiedig 4 Chwefror 2019, i ailystyried y dyfarniad dyddiedig 30 Ionawr 2019. RHESYMAU 1. Mae cais yr hawlydd i ailystyried y penderfyniad dyddiedig 30 Ionawr 2019, a anfonwyd at y partïon ar y dyddiad hwnnw, wedi cael ei ystyried gan y Barnwr Cyflogaeth Williams yn unol â Rheol 72 Rheolau Trefniadaeth y Tribiwnlysoedd Cyflogaeth. 2. Mae’r cais i ailystyried yn cael ei gynnwys yn: i. Llythyr yr hawlydd, dyddiedig 4 Chwefror 2019 ii. Gohebiaeth bellach gan yr hawlydd, dyddiedig 12 Chwefror 2019 15 Chwefror 2019 22 Chwefror 2019 4 Mawrth 2019 5 Mawrth 2019; iii. Dogfennaeth bellach a gyflwynwyd gan yr hawlydd, dyddiedig 12 Mawrth 2019 14 Mawrth 2019 18 Mawrth 2019; 3. Mae’r barnwr cyflogaeth hefyd wedi darllen llythyr yr hawlydd, dyddiedig 19 Mawrth 2019, sydd wedi’i gyfeirio at y Tribiwnlys Apeliadau Cyflogaeth ac wedi cael ei gopïo i’r Tribiwnlys Cyflogaeth. 4. Mae’r barnwr cyflogaeth hefyd wedi ystyried sylwadau’r atebydd ar gais yr hawlydd, a oedd wedi’u cynnwys yn ei lythyr, dyddiedig 13 Mawrth 2019. 5. Mae cyflwyniadau helaeth yr hawlydd yn cynnwys honiadau niferus o dueddiadau a rhagfarnau, rheithfarn a gwallau cyfreithiol ar ran y Tribiwnlys. Mae’r hawlydd hefyd yn datgan tro ar ôl tro ni ddylai’r Barnwr Cyflogaeth Williams ystyried y cais hwn. 6. Mae Rheol 72 yn darparu (3) lle bo’n ymarferol, bydd yr ystyriaeth dan baragraff (1) yn cael ei wneud gan y barnwr cyflogaeth a… gadeiriodd y tribiwnlys llawn a wnaeth [y penderfyniad gwreiddiol] ... 7. Penderfynodd y Barnwr Cyflogaeth Rhanbarthol ei fod yn ymarferol i’r Barnwr Rhanbarth Williams ystyried y cais hwn. 8. Yn ôl barn y Barnwr Cyflogaeth Williams, roedd cyflwyniadau’r hawlydd yn codi pwyntiau apelio a fydd mwy na thebyg yn cael eu dilyn gan yr hawlydd gerbron y Tribiwnlys Apeliadau Cyflogaeth, yn hytrach na materion a all gael eu hystyried yn briodol gan dribiwnlys sy’n ailystyried dyfarniad ei hun. 9. Yn unol â hynny, mae’r barnwr cyflogaeth yn ystyried nid oes rhagolwg tebygol y bydd y penderfyniad gwreiddiol yn cael ei amrywio neu ei ddiddymu. Felly, mae’r cais hwn yn cael ei wrthod. Barnwr Cyflogaeth Williams Dyddiedig: 23 Ebrill 2019 DYFARNIAD WEDI’I ANFON AT Y PARTÏON AR ………26 Ebrill 2019………………. AR RAN YSGRIFENNYDD Y TRIBIWNLYSOEDD CYFLOGAETH S7.1 2
The law
[98]General(1) In determining for the purposes of this Part whether the dismissal of an employee is fair or unfair, it is for the employer to show – (a) the reason (or, if more than one, the principal reason) for the dismissal, and (b) that it is ..... a reason falling within subsection (2) .....(2) A reason falls within this subsection if it – (a) relates to the capability ..... of the employee for performing work of the kind which he was employed by the employer to do ..... (4) Where the employer has fulfilled the requirements of subsection (1), the determination of the question whether the dismissal is fair or unfair (having regard to the reason shown by the employer) – (a) depends on whether in the circumstances (including the size and administrative resources of the employer's undertaking) the employer acted reasonably or unreasonably in treating it as a sufficient reason for dismissing the employee, and (b) shall be determined in accordance with equity and the substantial merits of the case. 73 The Equality Act 2010 provides: 13 Direct discrimination (1) A person (A) discriminates against another (B) if, because of a protected characteristic, A treats B less favourably than A treats or would treat others. 20 Duty to make adjustments (2) The duty comprises the following three requirements.(3) The first requirement is a requirement, where a provision, criterion or practice of A's puts a disabled person at a substantial disadvantage in relation to a relevant matter in comparison with persons who are not disabled, to take such steps as it is reasonable to have to take to avoid the disadvantage.(4) The second requirement is a requirement, where a physical feature puts a disabled person at a substantial disadvantage in relation to a relevant matter in comparison with persons who are not disabled, to take such steps as it is reasonable to have to take to avoid the disadvantage.(5) The third requirement is a requirement, where a disabled person would but for the provision of an auxiliary aid, be put at a substantial disadvantage in relation to a relevant matter in comparison with persons who are not disabled, to take such steps as it is reasonable to have to take to provide the auxiliary aid. 26 Harassment (1) A person (A) harasses another (B) if – (a) A engages in unwanted conduct related to a relevant protected characteristic, and (b) The conduct has the purpose or effect of – (i) violating B's dignity, or (ii) creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for B. Submissions 74 Ms Criddle submitted that the reason for the claimant’s dismissal related to her capability and that there was no discrimination, harassment or failure by the respondent in its duty to make adjustments. The capability procedure, through its informal stage, three formal stages and an extension of the third formal stage, was fairly and honestly conducted, the claimant failed throughout to demonstrate the required standard of capability and that that alone was the reason for her dismissal. She also contended that a number of the claimant’s allegations of discrimination were out of time. 75 Mrs Thompson submitted that the claimant’s dismissal resulted from a vendetta initiated and driven by Christopher Elmore, because of his antipathy to the claimant following her litigation against the YMCA, in which vendetta numerous of the respondent's witnesses conspired. Implicit in that were several further contentions, namely that (i) the claimant was a competent teacher who performed capably during the capability procedure, (ii) the professional witnesses who observed the claimant were dishonest in their assessments of her and in the evidence they gave to this tribunal, (iii) the observations of the claimant's lessons were deliberately 'engineered' so that the claimant would fail by, for example, selecting classes with the most challenging behaviour and deliberately selecting non-Welsh specialists to observe her, and (iv) that Mr Elmore himself was untruthful when he said that he had no involvement in the claimant's employment at BCS. 76 Mrs Thompson submitted that the claimant was always a good teacher, that the respondent did not wish to acknowledge that fact, and that the respondent would be under a duty to report the claimant’s dismissal to the EWC only if the dismissal were ‘safe’. 77 Mrs Thompson further submitted that the tribunal prevented her from exploring the background to Mr Elmore’s alleged grudge against the claimant. Discussion and conclusions on the issues before the tribunal 78 Concerning the respondent’s arguments that certain of the complaints were ‘out of time’, in deference to the very full arguments put before us we have considered firstly the merits of the claims. If we had found merit in any of them we would necessarily have had to go on to consider whether they were brought in time. That has not arisen in this case. 79 We have already made clear our finding as a fact that there was no vendetta, conspiracy or corruption underlying the claimant’s dismissal. Save in the case of Mr Elmore himself, there was no suggestion of any ulterior motive on the part of the large number of people involved in the claimant's case - teachers at BCS, Rhys Jones and officers of the respondent – which would explain their supposed desire to dismiss her; and, as we have found, Mr Elmore had no part whatsoever in the claimant’s dismissal. 80 Concerning Mrs Thompson's submission that she was prevented from exploring Mr Elmore's alleged grudge in cross-examination, the tribunal ruled that it was first necessary for Mrs Thompson to establish some connection between Mr Elmore and the taking by BCS or the respondent of a decision adverse to the claimant. If that could be done, then it might be arguable that he had the opportunity to influence the decision, and to further any grudge which he might hold. The background to the alleged grudge might in those circumstances become relevant. But if no connection could be established between Mr Elmore and any decision adverse to the claimant then the background remained irrelevant. Since Mr Elmore had no involvement whatsoever in any decision relating to the claimant's employment at BCS, any grudge which he might have held against her was irrelevant to our decision. 81 We found that the dismissal panel and appeal committee were reasonably entitled to conclude that the teachers who observed the claimant conducted themselves with professional integrity, that they were experienced teachers who were well qualified to judge the claimant’s performance and that they gave honest judgments which were entitled to respect. The dismissal panel and appeal committee were reasonably entitled to find the weight of their evidence compelling. 82 The disciplinary panel and appeal committee were reasonably entitled to reject the claimant’s assertions that those who observed her and found her wanting were in some way unqualified to judge because they were not Welsh speakers, or were not Welsh teachers, or were not Estyn inspectors. Before us the claimant’s approach was routinely to blame others rather than to acknowledge any deficiencies on her own part. 83 We could not avoid entertaining serious doubts about the claimant's reliability as a witness. She made extravagant and unsupported allegations, gave inconsistent and exaggerated accounts of the road traffic accident (p. 1634) describing in evidence a ‘near decapitation' compared with the ‘mild head injury’ noted at the time (p. 1335); it was considered that 'factitious disorder' was the likely explanation of some of her complaints (p. 1630-31); and she insisted she continued to suffer PTSD well beyond Sept 2012, the latest time for which there was any supporting medical diagnosis. 84 Throughout the capability procedure the claimant was represented by her trade union save at the appeal when she dispensed with their services. 85 The evidence in this case did not begin to establish any case of direct disability discrimination or of harassment. No treatment of the claimant by the respondent was because of her disability. No conduct of the respondent had any of the purposes proscribed by section 26 (1) of the Equality Act 2010, nor was it reasonable in the circumstances, including the perception of the claimant, for any conduct of the respondent to have any of those effects. 86 It is conceded by the respondent that BCS had a capability procedure and that it required teachers to achieve a good standard of teaching. Those were provisions, criteria or practices (PCPs) for the purposes of section 20 of the Equality Act 2010. It is in our judgment not possible for ‘refusing to make reasonable adjustments’ to constitute such a provision, criterion or practice. The failure to comply with a duty cannot itself give rise that duty. 87 Whilst we accept without reservation that the capability procedure must have been a stressful experience for the claimant – as it would for any teacher – we could not accept the claimant’s contention that the PCPs put her at the substantial disadvantage of suffering a nervous breakdown. Even if it had been established that she did suffer such a breakdown (which it was not), the claimant in evidence stated (see paragraph 41 above) that it was opening the door to Mr McNamara which caused it. Nor could it be a disadvantage to which a disabled person is put in comparison with persons who are not disabled. 88 We do not think the drafting of the issues at this point properly reflected one strand of the claimant’s case before us. One of the arguments put forward by the claimant was that the PCPs, without any adjustment, made it likely that she would fail the procedure and that therefore some adjustment would have been reasonable. There is obvious tension between this strand of argument and the further proposition that the claimant was throughout a good and successful teacher who was the victim of a vendetta, in the absence of which she would have passed the procedure. In that latter case she would have needed no adjustment to the procedure. We have considered each of the adjustments contended for (see list of issues, paragraph 12 (a-j)), and have looked at both strands of her argument set out above. 89 There was no satisfactory evidence that the PCPs placed the claimant at any disadvantage by reason of her dyslexia or her hearing impairment. The claimant told Dyslexia Action Cardiff Learning Centre that dyslexia did not affect her teaching (p. 1556ff.), but that writing lesson plans in English and writing reports caused some difficulty. This rings true because the claimant had been teaching, with dyslexia (and her hearing impairment) since 1999 and did not ask for any adjustments till mid-2015. There was nothing required by the capability procedure which was not part and parcel of the claimant’s ordinary teaching load. 90 When adjustments were requested the respondent considered them and made some of them. Importantly, the claimant was allowed twice as much PPA as usual for a teacher; and when, in 2015, documents printed on blue paper were requested, this was done. Whilst we are not satisfied that the respondent was reasonably required to take any steps in this case, that additional time provision was generous. Given the nature of the claimant’s work we do not think that it was reasonably necessary for the respondent to provide specialist computer software, whether voice-activated or text-to-speech. We were satisfied that it was not reasonably necessary for the respondent to make any other of the adjustments argued for. 91 We turn to consider the complaint of unfair dismissal (see list of issues, paragraphs 15-17). There was one reason only for the claimant’s dismissal, namely that after an exhaustive capability procedure which was scrupulously honest and fair, the claimant’s teaching was found not to be to the standard required of a classroom teacher. The claimant was given ample opportunity to improve her performance and was warned that failure to do so might result in her dismissal. The reason thus related to the claimant’s capability. BCS did not appoint a permanent replacement for the claimant until September 2016 and the decision to dismiss her, and dismiss her appeal, were not for that reason foregone conclusions. 92 We are quite satisfied that in all the circumstances the disciplinary and dismissal panel and the appeal committee acted reasonably in treating the claimant's lack of capability as a sufficient reason to dismiss the her. That reason was not tainted by any improper motive. 93 The referral by the respondent of the details of the claimant's case to the Education Workforce Council following her dismissal for lack of capability followed as a matter of statutory obligation placed on the respondent. 94 The only aspect of the respondent’s procedure which calls for further comment is the timing of the appeal hearing. We remind ourselves that the test to be applied is whether the respondent acted reasonably. The appeal letter dated 10 March was received on 14 March. According to paragraph 7.4 of the procedure it should have been heard within 10 working days; that is (excluding the Easter holiday) not later than 12 April, the second day of the summer term. It was actually heard on 29 April, thirteen working days late. If the appeal had not been heard, as Mrs Thompson argued, then it seems to us that the position would have been that the dismissal would have stood and the claimant would have been deprived of the opportunity of an appeal. We do not think Mrs Thompson’s argument that the appeal would have been ‘won’ by default and the dismissal overturned is correct. Bearing in mind the complexity of the issues and allegations raised, the extremely voluminous correspondence submitted by Mrs Thomson (before and after the appeal was presented), the intervening Easter holiday, the need to enlist the services of volunteer governors and the request by the claimant’s trade union for a postponement of a week, we do not think that the respondent can be criticised as acting unreasonably for convening the appeal when it did. The fact that the claimant did not attend and was not represented was her choice. Lateness in the hearing the appeal did not render the claimant's dismissal unfair. 95 The thirty-six respects (see list of issues, paragraph 16) in which the claimant alleges that her dismissal was unfair have no substance in our judgment. They amount to unjustified attempts to criticise others rather than to acknowledge and confront the criticism directed at the claimant herself. Conclusion 96 The claimant’s complaints are dismissed.
Background
[99]However, Ms Rees in her report (page 1559 original bundle) recorded that the Claimant admitted that she did not read or respond to emails and did not regularly check her pigeon-hole. This had led to Mr McNamara having to personally deliver documents by hand to her to ensure receipt.[100]In addition, the Williams Tribunal found that the Claimant knew what was required of her and there is no evidence that the Tribunal could rely upon that the Claimant truly did not understand the capability process. The Tribunal saw evidence that the Claimant did receive documents in advance (for example she received an agenda on 7 October 2015).[101]The Claimant has not shown any substantial disadvantage suffered by her due to the PCP’s arising from her disabilities to be addressed by such an adjustment. Conducting lesson observations with someone with experience in the Welsh language.[102]The Claimant has not explained how this would address a substantial disadvantage she faced due to her disabilities caused by the PCP’s. This issue was plainly about whether those who observed her lessons were qualified to do so (the Claimant said that they were not). This was something the Disciplinary and Dismissal panel asked to be done during the four-week extension period given to the Claimant to avoid dismissal, but there was no evidence that this instruction was due to her disabilities. The Tribunal does not find that this adjustment would have been reasonable. Unfair dismissal[103]As the Tribunal has not found a failure to make reasonable adjustments, the Tribunal considered that there was no basis on which it could find the dismissal was unfair (given the surviving findings of the Williams tribunal).
Conclusions
[104]The Claimant’s claims of failure to make reasonable adjustments are not well-founded and are dismissed. The finding of the Williams tribunal that the Claimant was not unfairly dismissed remain in light of this Tribunal’s conclusion. The Tribunal will deal with the issue of costs orders and preparation time orders separately.
Conclusions
[1]The Claimant’s application for the panel to be recused is refused;[2]The Respondent’s application for a Costs Order is successful as the Claimant’s claims had no reasonable prospect of success and the conduct of the litigation by her/her representative was unreasonable;[3]The Tribunal will exercise its discretion to order that the Claimant pays costs incurred by the Respondent;[4]The costs to be paid by the Claimant will be assessed by detailed assessment undertaken by an Employment Judge assessing costs as if the proceedings were in the County Court.
Conclusions
[1]At the outset of the hearing, Mrs Thompson on behalf of the Claimant renewed the repeated written applications she had made for all three members of the panel to recuse themselves from continuing to deal with these proceedings. In essence, it was an application asserting apparent bias. The Tribunal applied the test of whether a fair-minded informed observer would consider there to be a real possibility of bias. It also, in light of the serious allegations made against them, considered whether in any event they had actual bias and should recuse themselves.[2]Oral reasons for the Tribunal’s refusal to recuse themselves were given. Mrs Thompson alleged that 3456 documents had been lost by the Cardiff Employment Tribunal (“the Cardiff ET”) (including before the empanelment of this tribunal); the Tribunal explained that its members were not responsible for this and noted that the documents required for the liability hearing had been before it. Mrs Thompson alleged that the Judge had stolen and hidden evidence, aided and abetted by the non-legal members; the evidence relied upon was her understanding that packages of bundles were delivered to the Judge’s personal office to be unwrapped and therefore it must be the Judge who stole documents. The Judge explained that this was not the practice in this Tribunal; Mrs Thompson persisted in alleging that the Judge had stolen documents. An informed observer would know that it was extremely unlikely that panel members were responsible for the carriage of documents or looking after evidence. There are proper processes for HMCTS staff to follow in this regard. The same goes for the panel members enabling the Judge to steal documents.[3]Mrs Thompson asserted that there was a special rule in Cardiff ET that people cannot complain about failures to make reasonable adjustments in hearings. The Tribunal noted that the provisions of the Equality Act 2010 did not strictly apply to judicial proceedings, but there was a right to a fair hearing (Article 6 ECHR). The facts of this case were that all of the reasonable adjustments directed by Regional Employment Judge Davies had been made. Judge Davies set out the reasonable adjustments and those had been complied with.[4]Mrs Thompson argued that the events at the end of the remitted liability hearing, the conduct of the panel and her belief that the Judge was a liar meant that the panel should be recused. The facts known to an informed observer were that when the Claimant sought some form of amplification to listen to the liability judgment (without any prior warning), the Judge asked the staff if the hearing loop was available and was told that it was not; passing that information on was not a lie by a Judge. The idea that the clerk, Judge and other staff should walk into other courts dealing with their own proceedings to take their equipment as asserted by Mrs Thompson was not an appropriate course of action. The appropriate action is to make the request to HMCTS, which was done.[5]In light of the unavailability of the loop (as it had not been pre-booked), the panel had a discussion with the parties when about to hand down the remitted liability judgment. Mrs Thompson agreed to the written judgment being handed down in writing (with the agreed adjustments in terms of font and colour of paper) to be considered; she asked for 30 minutes to read it but the Tribunal gave longer than that. It also explained that as the Judgment would not be discussed further that day, the Claimant and her representative did not need to closely analyse it over the adjournment; the only matter to be discussed that day were the arrangements for today. The Tribunal did not consider any of this would cause the fair-minded observer to consider that there was a real possibility of bias.[6]There was an allegation that the Tribunal stared at the Claimant whilst she cried on the last day of the remitted liability hearing. This is incorrect. The Claimant was given breaks and treated with respect and courtesy. Mrs Thompson argued that the headsets used by a different interpreter (Mr William) were removed deliberately from the hearing room on the last day on the direction of the panel as retribution for alleged protected disclosures made by Mrs Thompson to the Lord Chief Justice and others about the Cardiff ET. Firstly, the Tribunal was wholly unaware of any such disclosures. Secondly, the equipment was that brought by Mr William, who was not booked for the last day of the remitted hearing (the Tribunal had previously explained the difficulties in finding interpreters due to a conference elsewhere and had another interpreter present that day). It was not removed at the direction of the Tribunal. The Tribunal did not consider any of this would cause the fair-minded observer to consider that there was a real possibility of bias.[7]The criticisms about Cardiff ET made by Mrs Thompson were generic and not specific to any panel member. Similarly, Mrs Thompson’s comments about those who are hearing impaired being able to have a fair trial in the Cardiff ET did not relate specifically to any member of this panel. The directions made by Regional Employment Judge S Davies regarding reasonable adjustments had been complied with, and by the point of handing down Judgment, which was when the Claimant sought further adjustments, the decision had already been made. From the unsuccessful attempts to use the loop today, it would have made no difference at all as the Claimant could not use the loop as she did not wear a hearing aid, and the decision was concluded by the time the parties attended for the handing down of the Judgment.[8]The allegation that this Tribunal would automatically prefer the submissions of a Kings Counsel was not accepted; there was no basis for such an allegation. Mrs Thompson argued that the Claimant now had no trust and confidence in the Tribunal as a result of her previous experience with it. If the Claimant was not happy with the liability Judgment, that was understandable in the view of the Tribunal, but it did not justify the recusal of the panel. The Tribunal concluded that a fair-minded reasonable informed observer would not conclude that there was a real possibility of bias.[9]Mrs Thompson made very serious allegations; potentially with a view to force the panel to recusal itself by causing actual bias to arise. Being accused of a crime without the most cogent evidence to support it could cause panel members to form a view about the Claimant or her representative. However, parties cannot pick their panel members; once empaneled, unless the members suffer from a bias or other good reason to recuse themselves, they are duty bound to be robust and continue to deal with proceedings. The panel discussed this point, and all confirmed that they each remained open-minded and able to decide the costs application on the basis of the evidence before them and the submissions made by the parties. Postponement[10]Mrs Thompson also renewed the application previously made for a postponement. There was no change of material circumstance to justify such an application, but the Tribunal heard the application anyway and refused it. Again, oral reasons were given but in essence the Claimant’s application was largely based on irrelevant factors. The fact that her representative alleged that the Cardiff ET lost documents, that the Claimant objected to the remitted liability judgment, or that appeals were underway did not mean that the costs hearing should be postponed.[11]The Tribunal did not accept that there had been preferential treatment of the Respondent’s representative when it came to the issue of reading from documents. Mrs Thompson had shown that she found it difficult to keep to the topic in question and to only address the Tribunal on relevant points that were accurate, despite reminders. It is appropriate to stop a representative using limited time and resources to read from an irrelevant document. The Respondent’s representative in contrast read a small excerpt from a relevant document. That did not amount to preferential treatment.[12]The Respondent has been waiting for four years for the determination of this application. The Tribunal did not consider it in the interests of justice to further delay, particularly as the Claimant’s arguments had been addressed more than once on the issue of the desired postponement.[13]At the outset of the second day, Mrs Thompson again sought to prevent the progression of the costs hearing. The Tribunal identified that the issue she sought to raise (about the Regional Employment Judge) was wholly irrelevant and refused to allow the application to be made. There was only the window of the morning session available with Mr William and his equipment, and the Tribunal wished to ensure that the Claimant’s evidence was heard then while equipment acceptable to her was available. The costs application[14]For a summary of the background to this judgment, the previous liability judgments should be read, particularly the most recent. These proceedings have been underway for approximately 7 years, and included a partially successful appeal to the Employment Appeal Tribunal, leading to the remittal of the failure to make reasonable adjustments claim (which if successful, would have led to a review of the previously unsuccessful unfair dismissal claim).[15]Following the promulgation of the two liability judgments on 30 January 2019 & 22 June 2023 dismissing the Claimant’s claims, the Tribunal in today’s proceedings considered the Respondent’s application for costs made on 22 February 2019. It was not updated since the second liability judgment was promulgated.[16]The basis of that application was on two grounds:a. that the Claimant’s claims of unfair dismissal, direct disability discrimination, disability related harassment and failure to make reasonable adjustments had no reasonable prospect of success;b. that the Claimant or her representative had acted unreasonably in the bringing of the proceedings and/or the way that the proceedings had been conducted.[17]The Respondent submitted that the conduct of proceedings were plainly unreasonable and was supported by a finding in the first liability judgment by the Williams Tribunal (paragraph 42) that the Claimant’s representative’s correspondence was “unduly lengthy, oppressive, onerous and extravagantly worded”. The Respondent said that the same description could be applied to the correspondence sent within the litigation itself, which at the time of the application totaled 17 volumes. The Respondent said that the Claimant had failed to pursue the litigation in a proportionate way, making multiple unmeritorious applications (often making serious and unsubstantiated allegations of wrongdoing).[18]The Respondent set out 15 aspects of the alleged unreasonable conduct by the Claimant and/or her representative for the purposes of the costs application:a. 80-page claim, which was repetitive, and failed to identify the claims clearly but made serious irrelevant allegations;b. Originally bringing a claim against 5 Respondents, which was unnecessary;c. Attempts to join others as respondents, including a union and external regulatory bodies, which were not pursued;d. Failure to respond to the Respondent’s attempts to clarify the claims in September 2016, forcing the Respondent to incur costs to produce a list of issues to clarify the claims;e. The making of wholly unmeritorious applications in October 2016 asserting “vicarious liability” and unprofessional conduct against one former Respondent and asserting personal injury, as well as attempts to strike out the Respondent on the basis of no reasonable prospect of success;f. Correspondence in November 2016 alleging that external third parties were seeking to undermine the claim and suggesting that they should be witnesses;g. The Claimant’s production of 4 lever-arch bundles for the first preliminary hearing in December 2017, which were not in date order, contained incomplete documents and were annotated with the Claimant’s comments. The bundles were allegedly of no value and not referred to in the course of the hearing;h. At the first preliminary hearing, the Claimant withdrew applications to amend, add new Respondents and obtain witness orders, and accepted the claim should only be against the current Respondent, but had previously written extensively to the contrary;i. The “further particulars” produced by the Claimant were extremely difficult to understand and lengthy, yet failed to answer the questions posed, requiring more work to gain proper particulars and to amend the Response;j. The Claimant did not provide a signed consent form for her medical records until February 2018, and did not co-operate when it was highlighted that the records from the personal injury solicitors were incomplete (allegedly blaming the Respondent). The Respondent said this caused it to incur the costs of a specific disclosure application;k. The Claimant was found by the first Tribunal (paragraph 17) to have exaggerated her medical condition and her case contradicted itself between whether she was fit for work or struggling due to a personal injury, causing additional costs;l. The Claimant allegedly failed to disclose any documents relating to the claims, and failed to co-operate in the production of a hearing bundle, other than asking for the inclusion of one particular document. The Claimant’s representative then sent a “barrage of correspondence” to the Respondent claiming that documents had been omitted; the documents were then included but the Claimant refused to use the bundle and produced her own at the liability hearing. The Respondent said that the Claimant’s bundle duplicated documents within the official hearing bundle. It said that this was entirely unreasonable conduct and caused additional costs;m. The Claimant made 8 applications before the second preliminary hearing in October 2018, making serious allegations of professional misconduct, which required a substantial amount of work to rebut. The Claimant failed to pursue any of the applications, other than to ask again for the Response to be struck out on the basis of no reasonable prospect of success. This was refused;n. The Claimant produced two witness statements, the first of which was lengthy, not in chronological order, and exceptionally difficult to follow;o. The sheer scope of the Claimant’s claims meant that the Respondent called more witnesses than would be reasonable or proportionate to the claims. The Respondent pointed out that the first Tribunal thought that more time had been allocated to the final hearing than could be justified (paragraph 7), and said that this incurred unnecessary costs that would not have been incurred if the Claimant had conducted litigation proportionately.[19]Turning to the second ground relied upon by the Respondent, it submitted that the claims pursued by the Claimant were “doomed to fail” as she had advanced no case as to the connection between her disability and the treatment of her when she complained (it relied upon paragraph 85 of the first liability judgment). The Respondent noted that the Claimant had not been put to any substantial disadvantage by any provision, criterion or practice (“PCP”), and that the Claimant’s case was inconsistent with such an argument as she argued that she was a good teacher who was the victim of a vendetta. The Respondent highlighted that the Claimant during the relevant time had told Dyslexia Action Cymru her dyslexia did not affect her teaching, and that the first liability judgment had held that there was no shred of credible evidence of any vendetta, corruption or conspiracy. It went on to point out that in paragraph 91 of the first liability judgment, the Tribunal had held that the procedure used to dismiss the Claimant was scrupulously honest and fair, and that the Claimant had unjustifiably criticised others (paragraph 95 first liability judgment).[20]The Respondent said that it had sent a costs warning letter to the Claimant on 21 November 2018 making the above points regarding merit, which had been ignored. It said as a result £183,742.42 of public money had been wasted dealing with “wholly unmeritorious claims”. The Respondent provided a Schedule of costs with its costs application of February 2019. It sought £86,631 for the in-house solicitors costs (no VAT mentioned) and £94,486.36 (exclusive of VAT) for Counsel’s fees. This totaled £181,117.36 as far as this Tribunal’s mathematics indicated.[21]In the written submissions provided to the second Tribunal in June 2023, the Respondent said that the fact that there was a remittal did not have any relevance to the costs application. This was because the EAT ordered the remittal as the first Tribunal had provided insufficient reasons dealing with the failure to make reasonable adjustments claims and had not shown that they had been considered properly. The Respondent did mention that the EAT had observed that it was not confident that the Claimant would ultimately succeed. Further written submissions were provided for today’s proceedings, but they largely echoed earlier submissions and were updated in light of recent evidence. The Claimant’s response[22]The response of the Claimant’s representative, Mrs Thompson, before the oral hearing was not constructive. She sent voluminous correspondence focused on making allegations against the Judge, tribunal members, HMCTS staff and others, and making complaints about matters not relevant to this application. This correspondence appeared in the judgment of this Tribunal to be an attempt to stop the costs hearing from proceeding. These matters were ignored by the Tribunal in reaching its decision today.[23]However, the Claimant’s representative did provide limited information about the means of the Claimant, but without a witness statement to support it. The Tribunal directed that this evidence would be considered and the Claimant would be expected to attend to give oral evidence. During the course of submissions regarding recusal and postponement, it became apparent that the Claimant may have written a witness statement, but it had not reached either the Tribunal or the Respondent. Directions were made to ensure that the Claimant brought additional copies of the statement and any other evidence she said was missing from the costs bundle to the costs hearing. At the start of the second day, the Claimant provided a witness statement dated 12 October 2023 (so could not have been in any bundle sent to the Tribunal and Respondent as alleged) and additional evidence. The Tribunal considered the evidence as so far as it was relevant. Much of it was not.[24]Oral submissions were made. Ms Criddle orally highlighted elements of her argument and submitted that the oral evidence heard from the Claimant regarding her means showed that the picture painted in the witness statement and the Schedule which the Claimant swore was true to the best of her knowledge and belief was not accurate. Ms Criddle argued that in reality the Claimant had substantial means and was financially comfortable, and able to satisfy the legal costs claimed and be able to rent a home if necessary. Regrettably, the oral submissions of Mrs Thompson did not assist the Tribunal greatly. She did not, despite reminders, deal with the key points for most of her address, instead choosing to assert that the Claimant should have won the liability hearing and had been discriminated against, and the Employment Appeal Tribunal did think she had a good case (amongst other irrelevant or inaccurate statements).
The hearing
[25]The same adjustments made at the second liability hearing in June 2023 were made for the costs hearing (see paragraph 6 second liability judgment), with the addition of a direction that either the Welsh interpreter must provide headphones to amplify the hearing for the Claimant or a loop must be provided by HMCTS. It was listed to two days to ensure sufficient time and to ensure that regular breaks were provided for the benefit of the Claimant’s representative.[26]On the first day, 12 October 2023, the additional equipment ordered in the above paragraph was not satisfactory to the Claimant. The loop was also available (having been booked just in case), but was of no assistance as the Claimant did not wear a hearing aid. HMCTS staff worked hard to understand the difficulty, as they had observed the Claimant testing the equipment prior to the hearing and confirming that she could hear. The interpreter who attended that day confirmed that she had brought the standard equipment, and knew the equipment used by Mr William was similar. It appeared that standard interpreter headsets do not provide a formal amplification function. It was not until the hearing commenced that the Claimant announced that she could not hear sufficiently. HMCTS tried to use other equipment available, such as a roving personal amplifier and tested TOURTALK TT 200-T. None of this equipment appeared to be suitable.[27]While the Tribunal and the parties discussed potential solutions, the Tribunal bore in mind that the history of these proceedings showed that the Claimant had taken a full part in proceedings throughout without amplification or use of headphones at all times. It was not until 22 June 2023 that there was an issue, and no new medical evidence was provided in support. The Claimant had shown throughout, and while under the observation of the Tribunal on 12 October 2023, that she was able to follow proceedings without amplification. She was observed reacting appropriately to what the Judge and others said, giving her mother instructions and able to ask for clarification of a particular word in English. She did not on 12 October 2023 ask the Welsh interpreter to interpret the proceedings for her, despite being able to hear them through the headset provided.[28]Ultimately, it was confirmed that Mr William’s services had been obtained for the morning of the second day. By this point, the Claimant had confirmed that she would be content with the assistance of Mr William and his equipment so there was no reason why her oral evidence could not be given then. While the Tribunal acknowledged that the situation was not ideal, the representatives were able to deal with recusal and postponement on the first day. As the Tribunal pointed out, the Claimant should have been well aware of what issues were to be raised to give instructions to her representative, and its duty was to make reasonable adjustments. Given the reasonable adjustments provided and the evidence that the Claimant did not want the hearing to proceed, the Tribunal was satisfied that it was fair to deal with the recusal and postponement applications without Mr William. The Tribunal though ensured that it observed the Claimant in case there were signs that she was struggling to follow the proceedings. There were none.[29]On the second day, the Claimant was fully assisted by Mr William and his equipment. This was when she gave oral evidence and the costs application was heard. The Tribunal also wishes to record that while Mrs Thompson became unwell at the end of the hearing, this was after her submissions on behalf of the Claimant. Mrs Thompson was expressly asked if she was happy to continue before she made her submissions as the break had been extended to allow her more time; she confirmed that she was happy to proceed to make her submissions.[30]At the hearing, the Tribunal had the benefit of a bundle provided at its direction by the Respondent totaling 988 pages, including the evidence provided as to the Claimant’s means, and heard from the Claimant orally on this issue. It also bore in mind its own judgment from June 2023 and received late evidence from the Claimant on the second day.[31]The Tribunal more than once reminded the parties of the three-stage approach that should be adopted for costs applications (see law section below). It also reminded the parties that it would not conduct a detailed assessment if a costs order was made, but it would decide whether to order such an assessment if it reached that point (and if so, what directions would be given to the judge sitting alone conducting the detailed assessment as if they were in the County Court). It was also explained that summary assessment was an option, limited to £20,000, though neither party sought such an order.
Law
[32]The Tribunal must deal with costs applications in three stages: a) Has the threshold for the making of a costs order been met? This is likely to require findings of fact about the paying party’s conduct. b) If so, should the Tribunal exercise its discretion to award costs? c) If it chooses to make a costs order, how much and in what form?[33]Today’s hearing can only address Stages 1 & 2 due to size of the costs award sought. Detailed assessment is carried out by a designated judge sitting alone applying the principles that apply in the County Court. However, it is agreed that this Tribunal is the forum to decide the mode of assessment and the principles to be adopted at that assessment by the costs judge to address Stage 3.[34]Rule 76 of the Employment Tribunal Rules of Procedure state: “(1) A Tribunal may make a costs order or a preparation time order, and shall consider whether to do so, where it considers that—(a) a party (or that party's representative) has acted vexatiously, abusively, disruptively or otherwise unreasonably in either the bringing of the proceedings (or part) or the way that the proceedings (or part) have been conducted;(b) any claim or response had no reasonable prospect of success;…”[35]The common meaning of the word “unreasonable” apply to this application; the test is not whether the impact of the conduct on the Respondent was unreasonable. However, the Tribunal should take into account the “nature, gravity and effect” of a party’s unreasonable conduct (McPherson -v- BNP Paribas 2004 ICR 1398, CA). If the Tribunal finds unreasonable behaviour during the conduct of the proceedings by the Claimant (or by bringing the proceedings), it does not mean that the Tribunal must make a costs order against her.[36]Davidson -v- John Calder (Publishers) Ltd and another [1985] IRLR 9 reminded the Tribunal that when considering conduct, it is the conduct in the course of the proceedings alone which has to be considered, not conduct in relation to the dismissal itself or pre-dating the proceedings.[37]The Tribunal when considering whether to make an order under Rule 76(1)(b) (no reasonable prospect of success) bore in mind the guidance offered in Radia -v- Jefferies International Ltd (2020) IRLR 431 - where there is an overlap between unreasonable bringing of or conducting the claim under Rule 76(1)(a) and no reasonable prospect of success under Rule 76 (1)(b), the key issues for consideration by the tribunal are in either case likely to be the same: did the complaints in fact have no reasonable prospect of success, did the complainant in fact know or appreciate that, and finally, ought they, reasonably, to have known or appreciated that? Radia notes that tribunals should focus on what the parties knew about their cases at the time, not what the tribunal knows after hearing the evidence.[38]Turning to the issue regarding whether the claims (in whole or in part) had “no reasonable prospect of success”, merely losing a claim or a central allegation does not necessarily mean costs should be awarded (HCA International Ltd - v- May-Bheemul UKEAT/0477/10/ZT). When considering if a party should have realised that the claim had no reasonable prospect of success, the Tribunal can consider what that party knew or ought to have known if they had “gone about the matter sensibly” (Cartiers Superfoods Ltd -v- Laws [1978] IRLR 315) (though this authority is based on an older different version of the Tribunal rules, it simply further confirms that the Tribunal should consider what a party knew or ought to have known as set out in Radia). However, caution in making such an assessment is wise as what is obvious with hindsight may not be so clear during the “dust of battle” (Marler -v- Robertson [1974] ICR 72).[39]The Tribunal has a discretion and should consider all relevant factors. Costs orders in the Employment Tribunal are the exception, rather than the rule (Yerrakalva -v- Barnsley Metropolitan Borough Council 2012 ICR 420, CA). Rule 76 uses the word “may” when talking about circumstances which may lead to the making of such an order. It is a relevant factor to consider whether any application for strike out or a deposit order was made by the receiving party (AQ Ltd -v- Holden [2012] IRLR 648).[40]The purpose of costs orders is to compensate the receiving party; punishment of the paying party is not a relevant factor (Lodwick -v- Southwark London Borough Council 2004 ICR 884 CA). This means consideration of the loss caused to the receiving party as a result of the identified basis of any costs order is required. The case of Yerrakalva demonstrates that costs should be limited to those “reasonably and necessarily incurred”.[41]The ability to pay of the paying party can be a relevant factor in deciding how to exercise the Tribunal’s discretion (and also when considering how much should be paid). However, this is a factor to be balanced against the need to compensate the receiving party if they have been unreasonably put to expense (Howman -v- Queen Elizabeth Hospital Kings Lynn EAT 0509/12). The Tribunal is not required to consider ability to pay, but it may choose to do so. Any assessment of the Claimant’s ability to pay must be based on evidence before the Tribunal. Vaughan -v- London Borough of Lewisham and others 2013 IRLR 713 EAT saw the appeal tribunal make the point that a costs order can be made on the basis that there is a realistic prospect that the Claimant might be able to afford to pay costs in the future.[42]Another potentially relevant factor can be whether the paying party was legally advised (AQ Ltd). While Mrs Thompson does not appear to be legally qualified, she has made the point more than once that she has previously appeared in employment tribunals as a professional representative. Findings Stage 1 - Did the Claimant bring claims with no reasonable prospect of success? Did the Claimant act unreasonably in the bringing or continuing of proceedings?
Findings
[43]As Radia confirms, the key issues for consideration by this Tribunal when dealing with Stage 1 overlap between the two limbs relied on by the Respondent. Whether the Claimant was unreasonable in bringing or continuing the claims is closely connected to the issue as to whether the claims had no reasonable prospect of success and whether the Claimant knew or ought to have known that. The limbs in this case cannot be sensibly separated in the Tribunal’s view, and so were considered together.[44]The Claimant can only be taken to have known what she knew, or ought to have known, and cannot be expected to have predicted the findings of the Tribunal. The Tribunal must also consider the nature, gravity and effect of conduct when deciding if it was unreasonable.[45]No further evidence was before the Tribunal for the costs application about what the Claimant did or did not know. The submissions from the Claimant did not assist on this point.[46]Stepping back, the Tribunal concluded that for many allegations, the Claimant ought to have known that she had no evidence to support her case very early on, if not from the outset. Not only did the Williams Tribunal note in paragraph 85 of its judgment that the Claimant had advanced no case as to the connection between her disability and the treatment of her when she complained (“The evidence in this case did not even begin to establish any case of direct disability discrimination or harassment. No treatment of the Claimant by the Respondent was because of her disability”), the same point arose in this Tribunal as set out in paragraphs 47-60 of its liability judgment of June 2023. The Claimant argued that there was corruption or a conspiracy against her, something that the Williams Tribunal decisively rejected in paragraph 71 of its Judgment and for which it said there was no evidence.[47]As the shifting burden of proof required the Claimant to show facts in support of her discrimination claims, the Claimant ought to have been aware she needed to adduce evidence that could show a breach of the Equality Act 2010 had occurred; she failed to advance such a case before either the Williams tribunal or this one. Indeed, as Ms Criddle submitted the Claimant ran a contradictory factual case that she was not underperforming, but was instead the victim of a conspiracy but also that for the discrimination claims she was underperforming for reasons linked to her disability. In reality, the Claimant never accepted that she was underperforming from the evidence before the Tribunal, which meant that she struggled to argue the opposite for the reasonable adjustment claims.[48]The Tribunal concluded that the Claimant had no reasonable prospect of success for any of the discrimination claims. The unfair dismissal claim was also without merit due to the Claimant’s wholly unsubstantiated argument that there was a conspiracy against her. The Williams Tribunal was unequivocal that the procedure used was fair and honest, and the evidence relied upon for that conclusion was known to the Claimant at the time of events. This claim also had no reasonable prospect of success in the view of the Tribunal, given the Claimant’s arguments and lack of evidence, and this ought to have been known by the Claimant and her professional representative.[49]The Tribunal turned to the second limb relied upon by the Respondent. Having reviewed the evidence put before it by the Respondent, the Tribunal was satisfied that the Claimant or her representative had conducted litigation in a wholly disproportionate and unreasonable manner. It accepted as accurate the allegations set out above in paragraph 5 upon a review of the evidence supplied within the costs bundle; indeed, the Claimant nor her representative never engaged with the detail of the 15 points set out.[50]The Claimant’s representative in her correspondence was attempting to conduct litigation through the writing of lengthy, unfocussed and aggressive letters. This was not in accordance with the over-riding objective. It was the Respondent who clarified the claims. Mrs Thompson blamed the Respondent for the need for litigation and the way in which she chose to conduct it; those allegations in the view of the Tribunal were baseless; the correspondence between the parties speaks for itself and it is hardly surprising if professional representatives repeated accused of misconduct would refuse to talk to Mrs Thompson on the telephone. Examples of how Mrs Thompson chose to conduct the litigation are given below.[51]The Claimant’s representative did repeatedly seek a strike out of the defence, arguing as early as September 2016 that there was no defence when the Respondent had provided a substantial Response. This application was repeated many times (and withdrawn on occasions), and included inappropriate threats against third parties, such as the Education Workforce Council, or attempts to involve others wholly unconnected to the events in question (for example, the chief executive of Estyn). As Mrs Thompson told this tribunal that she was an experienced employment tribunal representative, she or the Claimant ought to have known that allegations and applications require cogent reasoning and evidence; these were largely absent from the correspondence before the Tribunal.[52]The Claimant’s representative had a pattern of behaviour of making extraordinary allegations against a wide variety of people (including in the Williams Tribunal against the Claimant’s own trade union representative), for which there appeared to be little or no evidence in support. This included the allegations against professional representatives in 2018 of serious misconduct when there was no basis for such allegations, which was the case here (more is set out below on this issue). In addition, it was evident that the Claimant’s representative persistently refused to comply with case management directions (disclosure, use of joint bundles) and caused additional costs as a result.[53]The Tribunal noted that the Claimant’s representative’s correspondence often included disrespectful and inappropriate language, such as referring to the then Respondents as a “disgrace” (page 167 costs bundle) and involved in “a cruel and sadistic 4-year plot” (page 199 costs bundle), and suggested that one witness was a “psychopath” (page 210 costs bundle). Ms Criddle pointed out in her submissions that matters reached such a level that the then Regional Employment Judge (Judge Clarke) wrote to the parties on 25 October 2016 and asked Mrs Thompson to reflect on the terms used in her correspondence. He highlighted the over-riding objective and noted several terms within her letters were not of assistance (page 231 costs bundle). Judge Clarke set out in the clearest possible terms what conduct was expected of the Claimant’s representative: “Finally, I invite Ms Thompson to moderate the terms of her correspondence. It does not assist the over-riding objective for the actions of individuals to be described regularly as ‘sadistic’ or ‘barbaric’ or for a capability procedure to be described as a ‘weapon of mass destruction’. I also invite her to resist the temptation to write to the tribunal with further submissions about why the claimant has been poorly treated. It is only necessary for a party to write to the tribunal if they are responding to a request from the tribunal, applying for an order or judicial direction or replying to such an application made by an opponent.”[54]Regrettably, Mrs Thompson ignored this invitation (and later ones making similar points about not sending lengthy letters about the case) and persisted in writing lengthy, diffuse, and inappropriate correspondence to the Respondent and Tribunal, substantially increasing the costs of the Respondent. Instead, Mrs Thompson raised allegations against the Respondent’s professional representatives on 12 February 2018 (page 317 costs bundle), claiming that they misled the Tribunal. There was no evidence supporting such allegations (or any of the later ones of equal seriousness), and the Claimant’s representative did not pursue such matters before the Tribunal. The inevitable conclusion is that this was because the Claimant or her representative knew, or ought to have known, that there was no basis for such allegations.[55]Mrs Thompson also continued to refer to the Respondent and witnesses in inappropriate terms (for example, describing one as “vexatious, malicious and perverse” page 365 costs bundle; stating that a witness was engaged in “collective thuggery” page 376 costs bundle; describing the instruction of Counsel by the Respondent as “crudely offensive” and complaining it was perverting the course of justice - page 410 costs bundle). In stark contrast, the correspondence from the Respondent’s representatives was professional, constructive and wholly in compliance with the over-riding objective. This includes the correspondence about disclosure and the hearing bundles (for example, page 469-470 costs bundle).[56]The Tribunal considered the nature, gravity and effect of such unreasonable conduct, which was from the outset of the proceedings with the lengthy and confusing statement of case containing emotional declarations of wrongdoing through to the lengthy, unfocussed and aggressive correspondence and applications not pursued, through to the hearing before the Williams Tribunal which plainly from the judgment itself was extended due to the conduct of the litigation by Mrs Thompson. It concluded that it was not only in breach of the over-riding objective, causing substantial costs to be incurred for no good purpose, but was wholly disproportionate and unprofessional. The Respondent was put to enormous expense for no good reason. The Tribunal concluded that the conduct of the litigation from the start was unreasonable. Stage 2 - How should the Tribunal exercise its discretion?[57]The Tribunal was asked to consider a number of factors when exercising its discretion, but many raised by the Claimant were irrelevant. The Tribunal observed that Mrs Thompson simply could not focus on what would assist the Tribunal, and persisted in making statements such as the Claimant had been denied reasonable adjustments (not found by this Tribunal), that the Appeal Tribunal should have simply decided the whole case in the Claimant’s favour, or that the Equality Act 2010 should not allow disabled claimants to be subjected to a costs order (ignoring the Rules of Procedure of the Employment Tribunal). The Tribunal considered carefully whether this was a factor to be weighed in the balance, albeit Mrs Thompson herself was plainly unable to identify that she could be part of the problem and why the Claimant found herself in this position. The Tribunal considered that it should not be put in the balance as neither party raised it, and the Claimant had been present during the liability hearings and in the recent hearings, had presumably seen the letter from Judge Clarke of 25 October 2016 and the attempts by the various tribunals to keep Mrs Thompson on track – if the Claimant did not agree with the way that Mrs Thompson had chosen to behave, it was open to her to dispense with her services. The Claimant did not.[58]Mrs Thompson argued that parties had a right to be represented by fearless, independent advocates; the Tribunal agreed. However, this right is not unfettered. Advocates are required to assist the Tribunal with succinct, logical, and clear arguments that are relevant and based on the law; they are required to deal with the other side with courtesy, respect and to only seek what is relevant and proportionate. Advocates should not advance serious allegations against professionals without a cogent evidential basis, or repeatedly make applications that they then do not pursue after causing the other party to incur costs in dealing with them. In short, fearless and independent advocates are required to behave professionally. The Tribunal did not consider this argument helped the Claimant. Indeed, the conclusion it had drawn was that Mrs Thompson’s conduct was unreasonable, which was why it now had the discretion to make the costs order.[59]The Respondent’s position was straightforward. If the Claimant was found to have brought claims with no reasonable prospect of success or acting unreasonably in the conduct of the litigation, and given her financial position, why should the public purse bear the very significant costs? Ms Criddle further pointed out that the Respondent’s representatives sent a costs warning letter on 21 November 2018 (page 648 case bundle).[60]The Claimant’s means was the relevant factor on which the Claimant sought to rely which the parties spent most time and effort addressing. The Tribunal reviewed the means of the Claimant. The original alleged witness statement was in reality 11 pages signed by the Claimant’s representative, complaining about the liability judgment and the decision to proceed with the costs hearing. It also alleged that the Respondent’s bundle contained documents unlawfully stolen from the Claimant’s home; a point rebutted by the Respondent’s representative to the satisfaction of the Tribunal in later correspondence. The only relevant part within this document was an allegation that the Claimant does not have the means to pay such costs as sought by the Respondent.[61]The attachments to the document were of more assistance. The Claimant produced a spreadsheet of her income and expenses and limited evidence in support (and swore that it was true in her oral evidence). Some figures were wholly absent, such as the amount in a NatWest bank account (the Claimant confirmed orally was worth about £4,000), and it appeared that the Claimant was part owner of a property for which she was paying a mortgage, but little information or explanation was provided. The value of the property was unknown, though there was a reference in one document to a valuation in 2005 of £185,000 (page 944 costs bundle).[62]It appeared from the spreadsheet that the Claimant’s gross income was £2250 per month (net £1780.36), that there was a property interest and some savings in the region of £2524, and a low value car (which the Claimant accepted she had valued herself, but the Tribunal thought a £1000 valuation for a car of that age was likely to be reasonable). The Claimant’s account of her spending was confusing, using a mixture of dollars and sterling and annual/quarterly/monthly figures. It broadly appeared that she spent a significant proportion of her monthly wages if the evidence she relied upon was correct. The spreadsheet and supporting evidence provided by the Claimant, unsupported by a witness statement supported by a statement of truth was unsatisfactory in that it did not adequately set out the position and was not a full declaration of the Claimant’s financial position. It was a partial account.[63]The Tribunal was provided with a witness statement on 13 October 2023 by the Claimant. Of most assistance was the oral cross-examination, conducted in Welsh. Under cross examination, it became clear that the Claimant’s spreadsheet and witness statement was not accurate. The Tribunal would have been misled had it relied solely on what the Claimant said within those documents. The Claimant under cross-examination admitted that contrary to the picture she sought to draw, she was not solely responsible for the costs of running the property of which she owned 50% and for some items she did not pay half the cost; in addition, her brother lived in the property and contributed financially (being in full time work). She confirmed that there was a mortgage of at most £256.86 (and page 944 of the costs bundle showed that the Claimant could draw at will on a facility under the mortgage the sum of approximately £89,000). The Claimant did not provide any valuation of the property, other than the reference to the mortgage paperwork to £185,000, which the Claimant said dated from 2005. As Ms Criddle submitted, the Tribunal concluded that the Claimant is financially comfortable and able to draw on substantial sums of money to pay the Respondent’s costs.[64]The Claimant was also forced to accept under cross-examination that she was still registered as a teacher and able to return to the profession, though the Tribunal considered there to be great force in the Claimant’s point that having been dismissed for capability and been out of teaching for many years, it was likely to be very difficult for her to secure a role; however, it was not an impossibility.[65]The Tribunal did not accept the suggestion by the Claimant that the property was worth less than the 2005 valuation. It was open to the Claimant to provide a proper valuation and she did not; the Tribunal considered that it was much more likely that the property was worth considerably more than £185,000 given the passage of 18 years and the mortgage could easily be cleared with the Claimant’s available savings elsewhere. The Tribunal did not accept the Claimant’s figures in her spreadsheet as wholly accurate, and concluded that she was more likely than not to be spending less of her monthly income than asserted. However, the property alone was likely to be sufficient to pay much of the amount sought by the Respondent, and the cash assets in excess of £6,500 and the Claimant’s income were more likely than not to be able to assist with any shortfall. The Tribunal considered that it was also open to the Claimant to increase her income using her teaching qualification, but this might take time to achieve.[66]The Tribunal stepped back and considered whether the Claimant’s means were a reason why the costs order should not be made; it concluded that the evidence showed that there was a realistic prospect of payment in full. The Tribunal further concluded that, given the findings above under Stage 1, it would exercise its discretion and considered it appropriate to grant the costs order sought for 100% of the costs incurred by the Respondent from the start of the proceedings up to the date of the application in 2019 (and the costs of any detailed assessment). The argument that disabled claimants should not face costs orders was unsustainable; costs orders are rare and only made in limited circumstances. However, the gravity of what has happened in this case and the resources expended by the Respondent in trying to deal with meritless claims brought in an unreasonable manner could be overlooked. The Claimant was given a warning on 21 November 2018 and chose to take the risk of persisting. The nature of the assessment to be undertaken and on what basis[67]The method of assessment will be detailed assessment. The Tribunal considered that to limit recovery to summary assessment would not be just. It is evident that the Respondent’s costs far exceed £20,000, and this would have been reasonably foreseeable to the Claimant (or her representative) from the outset. The Respondent is entitled to be properly compensated for the costs incurred as a result of the Claimant’s unreasonable conduct of proceedings/bringing claims with no reasonable prospect of success; summary assessment would not achieve that goal. There is no good reason why the public purse should bear the majority of the Respondent’s costs, as opposed to the Claimant.[68]The detailed assessment will be conducted on the basis of standard assessment of costs. No application for indemnity costs has been made. Following promulgation of this Judgment, the proceedings will be assigned to an Employment Judge sitting alone who will make further directions to enable a detailed assessment to be undertaken in line with the judgment of this Tribunal. The parties are encouraged to co-operate and consider whether they are able to agree the amount to be paid by the Claimant to the Respondent, and avoid the costs of a detailed assessment.