Ms A Akhtaru v The Winchester Diocesan Board of Finance: 1406290/2023 and 1406291/2023

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Case No 1406290/2023, 1406291/2023

Between

Ms A AkhtaruClaimant

The Winchester Diocesan Board of FinanceRespondent

Before

Employment Judge Gray

Members

Mr P English and Mr L Wakeman

In person for claimant

Mr Doughty (instructed by Counsel) for respondent

Date 29 December 2025

JUDGMENT

The unanimous judgment of the tribunal is that the Claimant’s complaints of detriment and dismissal for the making of a protected disclosure are dismissed on withdrawal, and the complaint of victimisation fails and is dismissed. JUDGMENT having been delivered on the 27 November 2025 (and sent to the parties on the 5 December 2025), and written reasons having been requested by correspondence from the Claimant dated 7 December 2025, in accordance with Rule 60(3) of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024, the following reasons are provided:

REASONS

[1]This is a claim brought by Ms Akhtaru against the Winchester Diocesan Board of Finance, complaining of detriment and dismissal for the making of a protected disclosure, and of victimisation.

[2]At the start of the hearing when confirming the list of issues, the Clamant withdrew the protected disclosure complaints. These are therefore dismissed on withdrawal.

[3]This matter had been listed for a 9-day final hearing to determine matters of liability.

[4]The Tribunal were provided with:a. A documents bundle (1,163 pages with separate index). We were also provided with some additional higher quality copies of certain pages.

b. Witness statement bundle consisting of statements on behalf of the Claimant and her supporting witness Christopher Amedu and eight statements in support of the Respondent consisting of: i. Susan Beckett (SB) ii. Philip Garrard (PG) iii. Paul Gelman (PGe) iv. Elspeth Gurney (EG) v. Jane Hammond (JH) vi. Colin Harbidge (CH) vii. Laura Ryder (LR) viii. Mark Teahan (MT)

c. Chronology, Cast List and List of Key Documents with red text indicating disagreements.

d. An updated list of issues.

[5]The timetable for this final hearing was agreed with the parties at the start of the hearing and met, with evidence and submissions concluding in the morning of day 7 and with Judgment being delivered in the afternoon of day 9.

[6]The List of issues had been agreed at previous case management hearings (a copy of that agreed list is set out in Annex A below). The agreed list of issues was then updated by agreement to focus upon the complaint of victimisation and include express reference to a detriment of dismissal.

[7]THE FACTS

[8]The Tribunal found the following facts proven on the balance of probabilities after considering the whole of the evidence, both oral and documentary, and after considering the factual and legal submissions made by and on behalf of the respective parties.

[9]The Claimant commenced her employment with the Respondent on the 8 December 2021 (pages 243 to 244). A copy of the Claimant's particulars of employment was provided to this Tribunal at pages 245 to 249. The Claimant’s job role was Assistant to the Finance Director. Her place of work was Wolvesey (page 245). The hours were a minimum of 35 hours a week, 9am to 5pm Monday to Friday.

[10]The particulars state (page 245) … “The Staff Handbook is on the computerised HR system and available upon request from the HR Department. It is a condition of your employment that you make yourself aware of our policies and procedures and ensure you conform to notification procedures, particularly in relation to the Absence Policy. Most of our policies are on our computerised HR system.”

[11]Within the handbook (pages 174 to 212) under the heading Associated Work (pages 198 and 199) it states … “Full-time staff should not engage in any commercial or professional activity, including writing material for commercial publication, on their own account or undertake any continuing work for another employer without the permission of the Chief Executive.”.

[12]The Claimant confirmed in cross examination that she didn’t read the handbook.

[13]We were referred to an email dated 17 June 2022 (page 680) in which the Claimant provided information about her lifestyle businesses (involving sauces and English language teaching) to MT’s personal email address. MT addresses this at paragraphs 6 to 11, 13 and 14 of his witness statement. This is not formal approval of these roles in line with the handbook.

[14]By a message on 12 October 2022 the Claimant writes to Mr Gelman seeking permission to undertake a catering job at weekends … “… I just wanted to let you know that as I am feeling the financial pinch, I am doing a weekend catering job in a kitchen to earn some extra cash. I don't feel that there is any conflict of interest, but wanted to run that past you. Please let me know if there would be any issues.” (page 682).

[15]On the 20 October 2022 the Claimant is given approval for “the secondary employment” (page 682) although the Claimant confirmed to us in her oral evidence that this was not secondary employment and she was actually referring to her sauce business. This misunderstanding/inaccuracy was not corrected by the Claimant at the time. The English teaching is not addressed in the approval.

[16]On the 14 November 2022 the Claimant returns from a secondment. The background for the secondment arises from the Claimant being involved in a grievance against the then Financial Director, who left their employment with the Respondent before that grievance process concluded.

[17]Messages are exchanged with the Claimant and MT (pages 276 to 277) on the 15 November 2022 about the Claimant’s return to the Finance Team. The Claimant refers to being able to change the hours of her English language students and that she had been working 8am to 4pm at Wolvesey… “I have been working from 8am to 4pm on Tuesdays, as I do some volunteering at 4.30pm. in Southampton. However, I will speak to my students today and change the time/day. At Wolvesey, I have been doing 8am - 4pm.” Reference is made to volunteering rather than any form of business or secondary employment.

[18]The Claimant says in reply to MTs message asking if it is okay for her to come into the office Tuesdays and Wednesdays from next week, “Yes that’s fine”.

[19]MT confirmed that he met with the Claimant on the 16 November 2022 and at that meeting was told by the Claimant that two days in the office would be a problem for her. He accepted that at that time as the best he could get from the Claimant to balance both her needs and that of the team believing if he had gone in heavy handed it would be detrimental as he was trying to facilitate a smooth return from her secondment into his Finance Team.

[20]The Claimant says it was at this meeting that she agreed with MT that she could use “Finance Support Officer” as her email signature, having whilst on secondment referred to herself as a “Project Support Officer”. This is denied by MT. At paragraph 28 of his statement ... “Amina did suggest that her job title on her email signature could be Finance Support Officer, but I did not agree to this as I did not have the authority to make changes to anyone’s role or job title.”.

[21]There is no documented express confirmation of agreement, nor of any formal change in job role. The Claimant says it is proven by her using the job role in her email signature and it not being challenged for around 2 to 3 months.

[22]However, Paul Gelman, tells us it was not noticed until raised with him by another employee in the Finance Team on the 31 January 2023, thinking it was a new role she had missed out on applying for. When he checks emails from the Claimant to him at that time there is no signature block, so he takes no further action. However, on the 16 February 2023 he does notice it on an email from the Claimant. PGe checks with MT who informs he had not given permission. PGe then emails the Claimant asking her to revert to the “Assistant to the Finance Director” title in her emails as the other role does not exist in the organisation (page 352).

[23]We accept what PGe tells us. The role did not exist in the organisation. When identified by him as happening he then corrects that. Not noticing a change to an email footer does not constitute acceptance or approval of that change that was not officially approved.

[24]The Claimant is informed on the 22 November 2022 that MT will become her Interim Line Manager (page 1096).

[25]During her cross examination of MT, the Claimant challenged his actions from when he became her line manager and before her asserted protected acts. For example, asserting the email MT sends on the 9 December 2022 (page 282) is complaining about her.

[26]MT in his evidence notes on the 30 November 2022 that the Claimant is complaining about other staff in the Finance Team (page 593 and paragraphs 31 to 39 of his statement), suggesting the difficulties may be because of her actions leading to the resignation of the Finance Director.

[27]At that time concerns about MT were not expressed by the Claimant. In a message to Paul Gelman on the 12 December 2022 (page 283) the Claimant writes … “… I am happy working with Mark T and don't have the feeling of being on edge coming to work. Nevertheless, I have been on the receiving end of the aftermath of a grievance, as one member of the team was on the periphery of the grievance (as stated in my addendum) and it has created a hostile environment for me. In addition, as there has been a void of high-level leadership, there has been, in my opinion, a power struggle amongst coworkers, which has given rise to micromanaging of my work and individual projects that I own, by a colleague, which only adds to my stress.”.

[28]The Claimant is asserting at this point that the grievance against the Finance Director has caused a hostile environment.

[29]It is then from a meeting with PGe on the 10 January 2023 that he records the Claimant saying that the finance team are not behaving like Christians (page 623).

[30]It is around the 18 January 2023 that MT emails a task list to the Claimant (pages 306 to 307). They then meet to discuss them on the 18 January 2023.

[31]On the morning of the 18 January 2023 the Claimant meets with PGe before her meeting with MT and raises issues with him as to the task list (paragraph 23 and pages 308, 309 and 310). The notes record that the Claimant tells him she cannot attend the office two days a week as she has English lesson classes on a Wednesday as she has taken on a new student and she is also not a dogsbody and should not be being asked to do the banking which is another employee’s job. The notes also record the Claimant asserting that MT has lost his soft skills.

[32]It is in this context that the Claimant’s first protected act is said to arise. On 18 January 2023, the Claimant says she verbally disclosed to Mr Teahan that she considered that her colleagues were hostile towards her because of her race.

[33]The Claimant says in her witness statement at paragraphs 13 and 14 … “13. I told Mr Teahan that after much deliberation, and after my efforts to engage with Ms Hoyland and Ms Bucknall, not improved their behaviour to me, I had come to the conclusion that their hostile behaviours could be attributed to my race i.e., that their actions were racially motivated. In response, Mr Teahan insinuated it was a ridiculous assumption and very strongly articulated that, as an Irishman, he had never experienced nor witnessed anything untoward in the context of racism, within the Finance department. I replied that he did not have my lived experience, i.e., that as a white male he would not be able to resonate with my experience of racism. In response, Mr Teahan became visibly outraged and literally put pen to paper and said he was going to report me to Human Resources. At that moment, I became worried - not only was my line manager visibly angry with me about the concerns I raised but he was going to report me to HR. 14. Mr Teahan´s reaction shocked and confused me. Instead of taking my concerns seriously, his attitude was one of categorical denial and outrage. I felt compelled to reiterate to him that I believed it was because I was an Asian that my colleagues had behaved in the hostile manner towards me. My perception was that they felt I did not quite know my place.”

[34]MT in his witness statement (at paragraph 40) refers us to his notes of the meeting which at page 592 confirm … “AA stated that she felt she was being treated differently as a Muslim woman and a person of colour. MT responded that he had seen no evidence of any such bias. AA said that MT would not be able to empathise or understand this because "you're a white man and you're not ethnic".

[35]The notes also record the Claimant informing MT that her outside work (possibly teaching English language) means she can only attend Wolvesey on one day per week i.e., on Tuesdays (page 591).

[36]There is a consistency in what we are told, and we accept that the Claimant did raise concern as to treatment towards her because of race.

[37]We also note that the Claimant was concerned about MTs reaction to her “white male” comment confirming she recalled him saying he would go to HR about the “white male” comment. The Claimant accepted in cross examination that this was her racially stereotyping her manager. The Claimant confirmed to us that this was then her focus, when considering the letter that followed from SB dated 27 January 2023, and that she was going to be disciplined for the white male comment. The Claimant also confirmed in her oral evidence that after the 18 January 2023 she increased her work in her own businesses and started to look for other jobs as she knew she was on the way out.

[38]There does also appear to have been discussions at this time with the Claimant about making a flexible working request. As a message from PGe to MT dated 19 January 2023 records … “Hi Mark, That sounds a good plan, would Monday morning be good for you, I have emailed Amina this week to suggest changing the time of our meeting to Tuesday morning, I haven't had a response yet, possibly because I sent her a copy of my notes that I shared with you and Susan and I don't think she will like some of my comments, I've also asked her to resolve her issues with other staff herself and ask you to consider a formal flexi approach to working 3/4 days on a Wednesday for three months. I'm not suggesting you should agree to that but I've recommended she makes these requests in the appropriate process.” (page 312).

[39]MT speaks with PGe about what the Claimant has raised with him on the 23 January 2023 (page 315). The notes record it being noted that the Claimant would not work in the office on Wednesdays and would not do the bank run. It refers to “unchristian”, and also that she felt she was being treated differently as a Muslim and a person of colour. It notes the Claimant saying to MT that he would not be able to empathise with that because “you’re a white man and you’re not ethnic”.

[40]There is then the letter from SB to the Claimant dated 27 January 2023 (pages 601 to 603) which is chronologically the first allegation of detriment (3.1.1 By a letter dated 27 January 2023, the Claimant was invited to a formal meeting by Ms Beckett [1]).

[41]The key paragraphs read: “Mark's notes indicate that you feel that you have been treated differently as a Muslim woman and a person of colour. He wrote that you said he would not be able to empathise or understand because he is a white man. This is a serious claim, one that we must discuss. I need to understand what it is we have done or not done that leads you to feel such a way.”. “I will ask Emma to contact you early next week to set a meeting date for us. I wish to meet with you in person and will do what I can to arrange a meeting with you on a Tuesday, if this is not possible it may be necessary for you to make a special journey in to meet me.”

[42]The letter does not invite the Claimant to a formal meeting. The Claimant says she thought it was formal because the letter was on headed note paper. The Claimant also focused on the white man reference. However, when the relevant paragraph is read in full it also refers to the Claimant saying she felt she had been treated differently as a Muslim woman and a person of colour, and they need to understand what makes her feel such a way. The Claimant’s concerns about repercussions due to her “white male” comment have meant she has not considered the content of the letter as a whole.

[43]It is next alleged that on the 10 February, the Claimant was informed that a consultant, Ms Ryder, was going to examine the resourcing of the Finance Team [1] (3.1.2).

[44]The Claimant is informed of this, and it is communicated to the Finance Team by email (page 337).

[45]We are told by the Respondent that the reason for the communication at this time is to do with the chronology of LR’s appointment. We accept what the Respondent submits. The scope of the works was proposed in November 2022 (pages 301 to 304). LR expressed an interest in the work in December 2022 (page 296 to 300). The issue of terminating the shared resources agreement was raised in December 2022 (page 293). Colin Harbidge confirms in his statement at paragraph 19 that LR could not start before she did due to personal circumstances which LR confirmed in her oral evidence referring to being in South Africa. We accept what the Respondent says which is supported by contemporaneous documents and correspondence.

[46]It is then alleged that on or around 10 February 2023, the Claimant was asked to re-identify herself as ‘Assistant to Finance Director’, a change from ‘Finance Support Officer’ [1] (3.1.3). The communication about this was on the 16 February 2023, so does fall after the second alleged protected act. However, as already stated, we accept what PGe tells us about this. The role did not exist in the organisation. When identified by him as happening he then corrects that.

[47]The second protected act is asserted in the list of issues as the Claimant’s written informal grievance sent to Ms Beckett in or about end of January 2023 about Mr Teahan’s handling of allegations of racism [1].

[48]It was confirmed in evidence that this was actually the Claimant’s correspondence dated 14 February 2023 (pages 343 to 348). The Claimant refers to this in paragraph 23 of her witness statement … “On 14 February 2023, I sent a letter to Ms Beckett, responding to her letter dated 27 January 2023. I conveyed in my letter my feelings of being victimised as a consequence of raising concerns about race discrimination at my meeting on 18 January 2023 (pages 343 - 348).”.

[49]Considering the letter as a whole and in particular pages 347 and 348, the Claimant does refer to being ignored by colleagues … “possibly being attributed to the fact that I had not fulfilled their expectations of the docile, subservient South Asian woman”. It also says that … “It is Mark who decided to introduce the word discrimination into the narrative, in addition to the words Muslim and colour.”. Further …. “By raising my concerns about unconscious bias, white gaze, covert racism in the context of potential race discrimination, I feel that I have been victimised for raising those concerns. The implication of Susan Beckett's email and the underlying message in paragraphs 6 - 11 suggest that I have done something wrong.”. This is asserting a contravention of the Equality Act in our view. It also reinforces that the Claimant is focused on her “white male” comments to MT that he may have been upset by, rather than her allegations of potential racism against other staff.

[50]The Claimant requests for HR to follow the matter up informally. She also states what she is seeking as an outcome: “As an outcome I would like the following to happen:• Catrin Bucknall continues to bank cash and cheques.

• I return to Wolvesey twice a week after Easter or indeed before.

• Mark treats me with respect.

• We have catch-ups every two weeks.

• He receives further support on how to lead a multi-cultural team and training in the area of Equality, Diversity and Inclusion.”

[51]What the Claimant seeks is consistent with what the Respondent’s notes at the time have recorded as being her not wanting to do the banking or work in the office on Wednesdays. The outcomes also focus on MT, rather than the Claimant’s allegations of potential racism against other colleagues in the Finance Team.

[52]It is alleged that during the Claimant’s meeting with Mr Teahan on 14 February 2023, she asked to be identified on the website as a member of the Winchester Finance Team. The request was not actioned [1] (3.1.4).

[53]MT tells us that (paragraphs 75 and 76): “75.I checked the live website following the meeting and could see that Amina was clearly listed on the Finance page with her contact details. 76.I made enquiries of the Communications team to find out when exactly her details had been added to the site. From the information I extracted from the WordPress files, it can be evidenced that Amina was added to the Finance section of the website on 17 January 2022, which is the same date that that I was added.”

[54]This is consistent with page 629 showing screen shots of the website as at the 5 July 2023. However, the Claimant is not included on the Parish Resources section of the website. The Claimant was not included in this section because she did not deal with the Parishes and only those team members involved in supporting their end of year finances were listed here. We accept what MT tells us which is consistent with the documents presented.

[55]It is then alleged that Mr Teahan failed to supply the Claimant with her Progress Report (‘PACT’) after 14 February, despite her repeated requests [1] (3.1.5).

[56]The Claimant in her written closing submissions acknowledges with the deletion of the words “despite her repeated requests” from this issue, that she did not make repeated requests. The one request we were taken to was her email dated 26 April 2023 (page 451) which says … “If you could, at some stage, please send me my P.A.C.T. Report, further to our meeting on 14th February 2023.”.

[57]MT tells us at paragraph 70 of his witness statement that … “Paul Gelman asked me via Teams message on 20 February 2023 if I could “hold fire on the PACT for the moment” in relation to the PACT for Amina due to the fact that she had made a number of allegations regarding my management approach.”.

[58]Also, MT confirms that he did not complete the PACTs for any of his support staff’s in 2023 (paragraphs 71 to 72 of his witness statement) … “due to the workload and time pressures, particularly since the resignation of the Finance Director.”.

[59]It is then alleged that the Claimant’s grievance was rejected on or around the 13 March 2023 because of her protected acts (3.1.6).

[60]The outcome of the Claimant’s grievance is at pages 383 to 391 of the bundle. We have considered this document in full. It is a full and well-reasoned response to the matters the Claimant has raised. We note in particular the reasoning given in the outcome at page 386. The Claimant … “did not offer any further evidence or explanation at the [Grievance] Hearing to explain why she had considered the possibility that YH and CB's interactions with her might be motivated by discrimination”. Further, it reflects that alternative reasons for the potential difficult relations have been mooted by the Claimant and without more concludes that … “it is more likely that the challenging relationships and interactions are due to personality clashes rather than racism or discrimination.”. We accept this as a reasonable conclusion based on the evidence presented at the time and to this Tribunal. The reason the grievance is rejected is because it has not been found proven. The Claimant does not appeal the outcome at that time to challenge this.

[61]The grievance outcome also includes a recommendation (page 390) that … “AA to write to the Chief Operating Officer to seek retrospective formal permission for her additional paid employment, and the resulting need for a flexible working request. I strongly encourage that submitting this request (including full details of time commitment, constraints etc.) be a priority for AA. This will allow me to reach a quick decision on whether to approve it or not, thereby remove further uncertainty around AAs attendance at the office etc.”. In our view this is a perfectly reasonable request in view of what the Claimant has been articulating to the Respondent about her availability for work and attending the office and what the handbook states.

[62]The Claimant provides the information requested in reply to an email on 15 March 2023 at pages 683 to 684. It is not a full disclosure of all the roles. The Claimant confirmed in her oral evidence that at this time she was undertaking her sauce business (which included hiring a kitchen at the weekend every 6 to 8 weeks to do batch cooking), working for her family in a restaurant kitchen on an ad hoc basis for no pay, and undertaking English Language teaching having taken on a new student on Wednesday afternoons from the beginning of January. The Claimant thought the deficiencies in the information that she had provided in March 2023 would be clarified when CH spoke to MT as referred in the email (page 684). That discussion did not happen though as CH assumed the Claimant had provided all the necessary information in response to a request for details of all her additional roles. The permission is then confirmed on the 27 March 2023 confirming: “The information you have given is:• Working in the restaurant: Ad hoc weekend work undertaken only if you have the time. Approximately one Saturday every 6-8 weeks.

• Working as a tutor teaching English as a foreign language: 2 to 3 hours in total per week, worked usually on a Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, sometimes on a Thursday. Usually 4:30pm, sometimes later. I can confirm that your request is approved.”

[63]This permission does not reflect what the Claimant is doing, but it does reflect what she told the Respondent in her reply to the request for information email and the previous approval. The Claimant did not seek to correct this misunderstanding.

[64]It is within this context that it is then alleged that on the 14 April 2023, the Claimant was accused by Ms Beckett of breaching procedure and dishonesty (the letter was also re-sent on 21 April) [1] (3.1.7).

[65]The letter is at page 659. The Claimant in her written closing submissions acknowledges the letter does not accuse her of dishonesty by her deleting that word from the issue. It is not in dispute that the letter does infer the Claimant may have breached procedure. However, such an assertion is founded on the facts of the situation. The Claimant has not provided full disclosure, trusting that the gaps would be filled in by a discussion between CH and MT, but they have not been when the permission is confirmed, and the Claimant does not seek to clarify any misunderstanding at that time.

[66]It is then alleged that on the 23 April 2023, Mr Harbige wrote a combative and threatening letter to the Claimant [1] (3.1.8).

[67]The letter is actually dated the 24 April 2023 and is at pages 442 to 443.

[68]The Claimant addresses this letter in paragraphs 61 to 63 of her witness statement saying that she perceived this communication to be combative and almost threatening; stating that her failure to carry out management instructions (a reference to her wish not to meet with HR) could lead to disciplinary action taken against her (pages 442). The Claimant is not asserting that the letter is threatening in her evidence, referring to it being almost threatening.

[69]What CH writes is in response to the letter the Claimant sends him in response to the grievance outcome (pages 413 to 422). The Claimant’s response is stated as not being an appeal but challenges the findings made. In relation to the request to provide information about secondary employment the Claimant states … “I do not know why I was requested to seek permission in writing from you, when permission had already been granted from HR, yourself and my line manager.”. This does appear that the Claimant is challenging the request. It is against this background and context that CH highlights that failure to follow a reasonable management instruction may lead to disciplinary action. The letter from CH also informs the Claimant again of her right of appeal and extends the time in which to do so. We do not find that such a response in this context is combative and threatening as alleged.

[70]The Claimant alleges that on the 25 April, the Claimant was invited to attend a Formal Stage 1 meeting in relation to absence [1] (3.1.9).

[71]It is not in dispute that the Claimant was invited to such a meeting and that the Claimant met the criteria for doing so whether under the old absence policy (page 187) or the new (page 227). We also note the following from the meeting notes from this meeting (page 469): “Paul: This meeting is to discuss your unsatisfactory attendance in the previous 12 months which amounts to 6 instances and equates to 24 days, starting on 28 July to 12 August for 10 days, 3 Oct to 4 Oct for 2 days, 1 Dec to 2 Dec for 2 days, 22 Feb to 24 Feb for 3 days, 22 March 2023 to 29 March for 6 days, and 19 April to 20 April for 1 day. That is 24 days and that is the period that we are looking at. As I mentioned when I emailed you, we want to look at how we can focus on getting you back into the workplace and reduce your sickness record. This is a supportive meeting, and the aim is to get you back into work. I know you sent me an email staying you weren't happy about having this meeting and it is down to the way HR’s interaction with you. Is that something you would like to unpack for us? Amina: No, not at the moment. How did you want to go through this? Each of the sicknesses and what actually triggered them?”

[72]It is the Claimant's sickness absence levels that triggers the meeting in line with the policy.

[73]It is alleged by the Claimant that in April 2023, Ms Ryder recommended the Claimant’s dismissal [1] (3.1.10).

[74]It was not established as matter of fact that Ms Ryder recommended the Claimants dismissal, and this is acknowledged by the Claimant in her written closing submissions … “Although she did not recommend my exit, she did illustrate a justifiable pathway for my exit, should the Diocese split, which was to remove the admin (me).”. The Claimant asserts that LR illustrated a justifiable pathway for her exit should the Diocese split, and admin was removed. This though is not what the report shows (in particular page 1133) which costs out the Diocese staying together or splitting, and if split the cost would increase by £78,622 without factoring in the cost of admin. It was therefore not a recommendation made.

[75]The Claimant also refers to LR saying that the admin was causing capacity issues. The relevant part of the report reads (page 457): “d) Team Capacity (including resilience to navigate change, known changes, as well as immediate resource needs). The projects listed in Appendix A cannot be met by the current time, skill, and expertise available from within the team. A project accountant has been contracted to carry out a review and reconciliation of some restricted funds, and this work is currently taking longer than first planned. There is an immediate need for a senior management accountant to support the preparation and analysis of finance reports for WDBF and remove some of the current responsibilities Financial Controller, Mark Teahan, is carrying. This is not such a concerning issue in Portsmouth as there is capacity and skill available from the PDBF focussed Finance Officer, but due to the long running vacancy for payroll support, the issue is felt by both Financial Controllers. The outsourcing of payroll will release some of the capacity back, but not enough resource to meet the full need, in addition, the financial requirements of the recently formed Board of Education CIO, which is still being set up, are still currently unknown. Lastly, there is also an ongoing HR matter with an admin role which is being addressed but is also contributing to stress and creating a resourcing issue for tasks to be carried out. All of these matters are creating a stretch in team capacity and expertise, in particular in the area of financial management and report preparation.”

[76]The part in issue for the Claimant is … “Lastly, there is also an ongoing HR matter with an admin role which is being addressed but is also contributing to stress and creating a resourcing issue for tasks to be carried out.”. This in our view is highlighting the factual reality of the matter. There is a dispute over who should do the bank runs and there is friction in the team. It does not recommend the Claimant’s dismissal.

[77]It is then alleged that on the 4 May, the Claimant was not invited to Xledger accounts training, despite having asked Mr Teahan to have been provided with such training [1] (3.1.11).

[78]MT addresses this issue in paragraphs 78 to 88 of his witness statement. MT confirms that Claimant’s role as Assistant to the Finance Director was primarily an administrative role and she did not require any access to Xledger in order to carry out her duties. This was not challenged by the Claimant.

[79]MT refers to how the Xledger training offered at that time (4 May 2023) was a webinar update of new features on Xledger that is rolled out twice a year, which could be easily accessed by any user and is not specific training (page 1107). We accept what MT tells us which is consistent with the contemporaneous documents presented.

[80]The third protected act, namely the Claimant’s formal written grievance, on or around the start of May 2023, which was sent to Ms Beckett and the Bishop of Southampton [1], is not in dispute, the Respondent accepting it amounts to such. Having considered the document at pages 580 to 583 dated 9 May 2023 we agree with this.

[81]It is then alleged that on 30 May 2023 the Claimant was invited by Ms Beckett to a disciplinary hearing [1], without having explored informal resolution options [2] (3.1.12).

[82]It is not in dispute that the Claimant was invited to such a hearing.

[83]The reasons are set out by SB in paragraphs 80 and 81 of her witness statement: “80. On 30 May 2023 I wrote 2 letters to Amina to inform her about the planned investigations into her grievance and a potential misconduct. [490-491] [661- 662]. 81.The allegations of misconduct were serious and if proved potentially amounted to gross misconduct. It was not appropriate in those circumstances to deal with it informally until the matter had been investigated [662].”

[84]The allegations against the Claimant are (page 661): “1. It is alleged that you undertook or sought to undertake secondary employment with The English Chat Cafe Online Academy and Zaman Condiments without seeking the appropriate authorisation; 2. It is alleged that you undertook or sought to undertake secondary employment through Zaman Condiments and Sauces, The English Chat Cafe Online Academy and UK Tutors during your normal working hours; 3. It is alleged that whilst being signed unfit to attend work you attended a secondary employment Zaman Condiments and Sauces business event and social function on 24th March 2023;”

[85]Having considered the evidence presented in this case we agree with the Respondent’s submissions that as of March 2023 the Claimant had not given full and frank disclosure of her activities outside of work. The Claimant herself submitted about this matter in closing submissions that with reference to page 403, it says that Colin needs to speak to the line manager, so the Claimant says she thought, “oh well Mark is my line manager, and he might explain things to Colin.”. This submission recognises the information given by the Claimant at the time is deficient. There is also concern on the part of the Respondent that the Claimant had attended a business event while self-certified absent from work. It is not in dispute the Claimant attended the event. The context of doing so is clearly a relevant matter for investigation.

[86]The Claimant has been invited to a disciplinary investigation in this context.

[87]The Claimant then alleges that she was ignored by Mr Teahan at the mid-June Finance Team meeting [1] (3.1.13).

[88]This is a meeting that took place on the 28 June 2023.

[89]The Claimant is the only attendee attending remotely via TEAMs while all other attendees were in the office.

[90]The Claimant says at paragraph 85 of her statement: “85. On 28 June 2023, a hybrid Finance meeting was held at the Respondent’s offices. I attended virtually via Teams. All the Finance Team attended in person at the office. They all greeted me when I joined the meeting. Mr Teahan, however, ignored me and kept his head down looking at his notebook. It was not until I greeted him that he gave me a muffled peripheral greeting.”

[91]MT says at paragraph 96 of his statement: “96.I refute the allegation that Amina was ignored by me or by anyone else during the course of the meeting. I specifically recall Amina being asked if she could hear us clearly and if she had any questions. She responded along the lines that she could hear everything clearly and that she had no questions. If Amina did feel ignored during this meeting, then this was definitely not intentional.”.

[92]Attending such meetings as the only remote attendee does have an impact on interaction. We also note that the allegation is the Claimant being ignored but her own evidence confirms MT did respond when she greeted him, rather than ignored her.

[93]The Claimant then asserts that it was to her detriment being given a management accountancy-based task on 27 June by Mr Harbige and Mr Teahan without warning and without the necessary skills or experience to have been able to complete it [1] (3.1.14).

[94]The task is communicated in an email dated 27 June 2023 from CH’s PA (page 533).

[95]MT confirmed in his evidence that he did not allocate this task to the Claimant.

[96]The Respondent does not accept this was a management accountancy-based task. CH tells us that the task required no accounting or even basic bookkeeping knowledge whatsoever. It was a job that should have taken around 8 hours. He oﬀered the Claimant over a week to complete the task to ensure that it did not cause her any stress (paragraph 60 of his witness statement). This was not challenged by the Claimant.

[97]CH confirmed in his oral evidence that the Claimant did get a fair way through the task, sending a couple of draft outlines, and she didn’t raise she was struggling, just raising questions with his PA.

[98]The Claimant alleges that Mr Garrard’s approach at the grievance hearing on 29 June was biased and he pursued his own agenda. The Claimant no longer pursues the remaining part of this allegation that Mr Garrard sought to persuade her to drop her grievance in return for the discontinuance of the disciplinary process [1] (3.1.15).

[99]PG denies any such bias. We have a copy of PG’s notes of the meeting on the 29 June 2023 (pages 584 to 587) that are dated the 30 June 2023.

[100]PG was not challenged about those notes by the Claimant. No specific examples of bias were put to PG about this meeting.

[101]PG was referred to page 741 and what he writes … “both barrels spring to mind” but that is written in an email dated 21 August 2023, when PG believed he was being asked to present the management case and confirmed that it meant he intended to be comprehensive and assertive in his presentation. To be forthright and to the point. He maintained though he was still impartial.

[102]The Claimant has not proven that PGs approach to the grievance hearing on the 29 June was biased and he pursued his own agenda, the rest of that issue having been withdrawn by the Claimant during the course of the evidence.

[103]PG produces a grievance investigation report on the 27 July 2023 (pages 570 to 578) with separate appendixes. It is a detailed report and concludes: “Although AA may have interpreted and perceived a whole series of events, incidents and actions as being acts of discrimination, victimisation and harassment there is, in my opinion, insufficient evidence to support such claims. Furthermore, throughout her whole service, and particularly from 18th January 2023 (date of protected disclosure), the employer has acted entirely reasonably by making every effort and attempt to investigate and resolve her concerns through both informal and informal channels. However, it is my view, that every such endeavour has been interpreted, whether mischievously or not, as an unfavourable act with a blatant refusal to attend meetings to discuss the same, when, in fact, the aim has always been the exact opposite - to reconcile and resolve differences for the benefit of both parties.”

[104]PG produces a disciplinary investigation report on the 1 August 2023 (pages 650 to 658) with separate appendixes. It is a detailed report and concludes: “It is my view that there are grounds for inviting AA to a formal disciplinary hearing. As far as I am concerned there is overwhelming evidence to support that AA did not receive the appropriate authority for her outside work. Furthermore, it is reasonable to believe, in all probability, that she has been working on her businesses, especially bearing in mind the extent of the activities she undertakes for Zaman, during normal working (Diocese) hours. Lastly, it is not in dispute that she attended a conference while she was signed unfit for work. However, she breached the Diocese rules by failing to notify her employer of her whereabouts. Whether this was down to deceit, negligence or just plain unauthorised absence, is a question to be explored. On all three counts, I believe AA has breached the rules of the Diocese - see Appendix 20 which includes the Disciplinary Policy, pages 2 and 3, paragraphs 1.8.1 and 1.8.2.”

[105]There is then a grievance hearing on the 29 August 2023 for which we have a transcript at pages 787 to 838. Elspeth Mackeggie Gurney acts as the Chair.

[106]There are then disciplinary hearings on the 31 August 2023 (transcript at pages 839 to 879) and 7 September 2023 (transcript at pages 907 to 963) again chaired by Elspeth Mackeggie Gurney.

[107]The outcome of the grievance is dated 25 September 2023 (pages 983 to 993) and does not uphold the Claimant’s grievance.

[108]The outcome of the disciplinary is dated 25 September 2023 (pages 975 to 982) and concludes: “On the balance of probabilities, I have concluded that you intentionally misled WDBF in respect of your secondary employments by not disclosing full details of these when requested very specifically to do so. I have also concluded that due to the nature of your secondary employments, particularly Zaman Condiments and Sauces, and the lack of clarity in your responses when questioned, that it is more likely than not that you have undertaken secondary employment in working hours. In addition, I consider that you were dishonest when you disclosed the reasons for your sickness absence and subsequently attended the secondary employment business event on 24th March 2023. The requirement for honesty goes to the heart of the employment relationship and is essential for trust and confidence to be maintained. As the Assistant to the Finance Director of a charity, you have access to highly confidential financial and management information, as well as being trusted with cheques and banking involving charitable funds. The level of trust placed in you is therefore exceptionally high and this trust has now broken down. I therefore find that your dishonesty has fundamentally breached the implied duty of trust and confidence and as such you have committed gross misconduct. In reaching my decision, I have carefully weighed up all of the evidence presented to me in respect of these allegations including areas where I felt your explanations lacked openness and credibility. I have also noted your assertion that the independent investigation report was biased in many respects. I therefore consider it is important for me to make very clear that my decision would have been reached in any event without consideration of those aspects of PG's report that caused you concern. Any bias by the investigator, as alleged by you, was therefore irrelevant to the outcome I have determined. WDBF's disciplinary policy states at paragraph 1.8.4 that in the case of gross misconduct employees will be summarily dismissed. This is my recommendation to the Diocesan Secretary who is now responsible for notifying you of the outcome of the hearing and your right of appeal.”

[109]These outcomes are then confirmed to the Claimant by letters dated 27 September 2023 from Colin Harbidge (pages 1,001, and 998 to 1,000). CH confirmed that it was his decision to summarily dismiss the Claimant for gross misconduct which is based on the conclusions of Elspeth Mackeggie Gurney.

[110]Both outcomes set out the Claimant’s right of appeal. The Clamant did not exercise that right of appeal.

[111]The Claimant challenges her dismissal and the process as being a detriment due to her protected acts. Her first specific challenge is the Respondent failed to appoint an independent investigator (3.1.16.1).

[112]PG confirms in his witness statement (paragraphs 10 to 12) that he complies with the CIPD’s Code of Standards and Ethics.

[113]At paragraph 13 PG confirms … “My remit with the Diocese was and is to provide services in the field’, that is, to support the various Parochial Church Councils (PCCs) and Parishes within the boundaries of the Diocese [518]. Consequently, I have been supporting Vicars and Wardens [520] rather than HQ staff (of which the Claimant was one) who were and are based at Alresford and Wolvesey.”

[114]We accept what PG tells us. The Claimant has not proven that PG was not an independent investigator. The Claimant does not submit an appeal to challenge this.

[115]The Claimant next alleges that the Respondent failed to heed and/or act upon her complaints about his lack of independence (specifically to the Bishops of Basingstoke and/or Southampton) (3.1.16.2).

[116]The Claimant addresses this allegation in paragraphs 94 and 95 of her witness statement: “94. On 30th June 2023, after the grievance meeting and feeling distressed about Mr Garrard´s lack of neutrality, I informed Bishop Deborah Sellin, the Bishop of Southampton that the investigator leading the investigations (pages 536) was not impartial. 95. Despite my concerns, they and I, were not acknowledged by the Bishops. I felt completely ignored by them.”

[117]The Claimant’s email to the Bishops is acknowledged and the Claimant informed in reply on the 7 July 2023 (page 541) … “I have read your email and I note that the current processes have not yet been completed. I would encourage you to continue to participate in these processes. If, in due course, you are dissatisfied with the investigation or outcome of either of the processes, there will be an opportunity to appeal.”

[118]Despite this direction and that the Claimant’s challenges could have been the subject of an appeal, the Claimant did not raise an appeal. There is nothing to suggest that this response on behalf of the Bishops is materially influenced by the Claimant’s protected acts.

[119]The Claimant asserts that the Respondent failed to provide an independently minded chairman for the disciplinary hearing who asked invasive and unfair questions, was guided by the management case and failed to follow up on issues raised by the Claimant (3.1.16.3).

[120]This allegation is not proven by the Claimant based on the evidence we have been presented and considering the context of the allegations raised against the Claimant.

[121]We do not find that EG was not an independently minded chair. The Claimant was deficient in the information she provided to the Respondent at the time, relying upon a potential discussion with her line manager to fill in the gaps. It is therefore reasonable for EG to probe the Claimant about what she was or was not doing outside of work. As EG notes in her disciplinary outcome … “The responses to questions put to you at the disciplinary meeting with regard to The English Chat Cafe Online Academy did not clarify exactly how the teaching of English as a foreign language operates or how it impacts your normal working hours. The responses to questions about Zaman Condiments & Sauces explained clearly how the social media presence is created but the detail of how an award winning and expanding retail food manufacturing business operates only in the evenings and weekends was not made clear by you. Your lack of transparency by failing to properly disclose to SB when requested all the hours that you work on secondary employments, which would also include lunch hours and evenings, has affected the credibility of your explanation.”. We note that the Claimant revealed new details about what she was doing outside of work at this Tribunal hearing.

[122]The Claimant claims that the Respondent allowed Mr Garrard to attend the hearing without warning and to ask the Claimant questions (3.1.16.4);

[123]The without warning element of this allegation is not proven by the Claimant as there is an email the Claimant was sent by SB dated 8 August 2023 about the disciplinary and grievance process that includes … “I can confirm that Phil Garrard will be in attendance at the meetings to present his reports. It is not intended that any other witnesses will be in attendance at the meetings however should it prove necessary for any witnesses to attend then arrangements can be made to facilitate this.” (page 723).

[124]The question process at the disciplinary hearing is discussed and clarified (see page 910 for example) and the questions PG asks of the Claimant are seeking clarification of what is asked of him (page 918) or to make a point (page 924). We accept what the Respondent submits about this in their written closing submissions at paragraph 128.

[125]It is also alleged that Ms Gurney attempted to allow Mr Harbige and Ms Beckett to attend the hearing without warning (3.1.16.5).

[126]As already noted, the Claimant has been given notice that other witnesses could be called (page 723). When it became necessary the process for doing so was then agreed by the Claimant as set out in blue text in the email dated 4 September 2023 from the Claimant (page 891).

[127]The Claimant alleges that Ms Gurney failed to give any or any sufficient regard to the Claimant’s evidence in relation to the allegations of misconduct and reached an irrational conclusion on the evidence (see paragraphs 32 to 64 of [2]) (3.1.16.6).

[128]This allegation is not proven by the Claimant based on the evidence we have been presented and considering the context of the allegations raised against the Claimant. We have already addressed relevant matters about this when considering if EG was independently minded or not. Further, the reasoning of EG in respect of the allegation that the Claimant attended a business event while signed off sick, is reasonable and sustainable in our view (pages 979 and 980). We note from the findings: “There is no dispute that you attended a business event and social function in connection with Zaman Condiments & Sauces on March 24th 2023. You had informed your line manager, MT, on March 22nd 2023 that you did not feel well enough to work and that you had "cold like symptoms and feeling stressed and anxious". Your self-certification which you submitted on your return to work on 29th March 2023 refers to a cold exacerbated by work related stress. … My view is that cold-like symptoms which prevented you from working from home for WDBF would also prevent you from attending a business event, attended by a number of other people. It must therefore be the case that either you were dishonest in your statement to your line manager that you had cold like symptoms (see Allegation 4), or you did have cold like symptoms but attended the business event when you should have stayed at home either on sickness absence or working. Either way, your attendance at the business event whilst on sickness absence, in my view, breached the implied duty of trust and confidence inherent in all employment relationships.”

[129]The Claimant alleges that the Respondent failed to keep a good and accurate note of the disciplinary meeting (3.1.16.7).

[130]This allegation is struck through in the Claimant’s written closing submissions so is not pursued by the Claimant. We can understand why this is so, because the Claimant has presented no evidence to support this allegation, despite having access to recordings of the hearing if she wanted and having made her own notes which she has not presented copies of to this Tribunal. The Claimant has not proven the matters as alleged.

[131]The Claimant challenges the grievance process and outcome as being detrimental due to her protected acts. Her first specific challenge is the Respondent failed to permit the Claimant to ask questions of Ms Beckett and/or Mr Garrard at the hearing (3.1.17.1).

[132]The Claimant has not presented evidence of a request being made to ask questions of Ms Beckett and/or Mr Garrard at the hearing and it being refused. Her closing written submissions assert she was unsure of the process and did not know how it worked. This though is not the allegation, as the Respondent submits in its closing written submissions, concluding that the detriment is not made out. We accept this submission. The Claimant has not proven this matter as alleged.

[133]It is next alleged that the Respondent failed to keep an accurate and complete record of the hearing (3.1.17.2).

[134]This allegation has been struck through by the Claimant in her written closing submissions (as 3.1.16.7). We understand why, as the Claimant has presented no evidence to support this allegation, despite having access to recordings of the hearing if she wanted and having made her own notes which she has not presented copies of to this Tribunal. The Claimant has not proven the matters as alleged.

[135]It is also alleged that Ms Gurney failed to account for the Claimant’s evidence adequately and/or at all and rejected her grievance (3.1.17.3).

[136]Having considered the reasons given by EG for the findings she made (pages 983 to 993) we agree as submitted by the Respondent in its written closing submissions that they are clear, balanced and supported by the evidence in front of her. The Claimant has not discharged the necessary burden of proof in respect of this allegation.

[137]The Claimant alleges that Ms Hammond refused to assist the Claimant in the recovery of her IT equipment and ‘unfriended’ her on social media [1, added by amendment] (3.1.18).

[138]Ms Hammond did do these things but was very clear in her evidence as to why. She denied she was instructed to do so and confirmed it was because she didn’t like the Claimant, felt used by her, and it was difficult to end contact while they were working together at a small organisation. We accept Ms Hammond’s evidence about this matter. The Claimant has not proven that Ms Hammond was instructed to do these things.

[139]We accept based on the facts found that the Respondent dismissed the Claimant for gross misconduct for the reasons found by EG. These are matters that occurred irrespective of the Claimant’s protected acts.

[140]Certain allegations in this claim are potentially out of time. Claim one was submitted on the 9 August 2023 relying upon an ACAS certificate dated 15 June 2023 to 27 July 2023. Claim two was submitted on the 21 November 2023 relying upon an ACAS certificate dated 8 November 2023 to 10 November 2023.

[141]Things complained about before the 16 March 2023 for claim one are potentially out of time and before the 9 August 2023 for claim two are potentially out of time.

[142]The Claimant has presented no evidence as to why she could not have submitted her claim before she did, asserting that the matters are all connected to the asserted protected act on 18 January 2023. The Claimant explained that she believed she would be dismissed after what happened on the 18 January 2023 so began to increase her work in her own businesses and look for alternative employment.

[143]THE LAW

[144]Discrimination

[145]The Claimant is alleging victimisation under the provisions of the Equality Act 2010 (“the EqA”). The Claimant complains that the Respondent has contravened a provision of part 5 (work) of the EqA.

[146]In respect of the burden of proof, there is a two-stage process for analysing the complaint. At the first stage, the Claimant must prove facts from which the Tribunal could conclude, in the absence of an adequate explanation, that the Respondent had committed an unlawful act of discrimination against the Claimant. At the second stage, if the Claimant is able to raise a prima facie case of discrimination following an assessment of all the evidence, the burden shifts to the Respondent to show the reasons for the alleged discriminatory treatment and to satisfy the tribunal that the protected characteristic played no part in those reasons (Igen -v- Wong

[2005] EWCA Civ 142

as affirmed in Ayodele -v- CityLink Ltd

[2018] ICR 748

[147]We also note the recent decision of Efobi v Royal Mail Group Ltd

(2021) ICR 1263

which confirmed that the reverse burden of proof remains good law under the EqA.

[148]Also, considering Madarassy v Nomura International Plc

[2007] ICR 867

, Mummery LJ stated: “The Court in Igen v Wong expressly rejected the argument that it was sufficient for the claimant simply to prove facts from which the tribunal could conclude that the respondent “could have” committed an unlawful act of discrimination. The bare facts of a difference in status and a difference in treatment only indicate a possibility of discrimination. They are not, without more, sufficient material from which a tribunal “could conclude” that, on the balance of probabilities, the respondent had committed an act of discrimination”.

[149]The burden of proof does not shift to the Respondent simply on the Claimant establishing a difference in status and a difference in treatment. Those bare facts only indicate a possibility of discrimination. They are not, without more, sufficient material from which a tribunal “could conclude” that the Respondent had committed an unlawful act of discrimination (Madarassy). “Could conclude” must mean that “a reasonable Tribunal could properly conclude” from all the evidence before it. This would include evidence adduced by the Claimant in support of the allegations of discrimination. It would also include evidence adduced by the Respondent contesting the complaint.

[150]In Igen the Court of Appeal cautioned tribunals ‘against too readily inferring unlawful discrimination on a prohibited ground merely from unreasonable conduct where there is no evidence of other discriminatory behaviour on such ground’ but made it clear that a finding of ‘unexplained unreasonable conduct’ is a primary fact from which an inference can properly be drawn to shift the burden.

[151]Victimisation – section 27 Equality Act 2010

[152]Victimisation occurs where one person subjects another to a detriment because that person has done a protected act or the former believes that that person has done, or may do, a protected act: s.27(1) EqA.

[153]The following are protected acts under EqA:(1) bringing proceedings under EqA;

(2) giving evidence or information in connection with proceedings under EqA, regardless of who brought these proceedings;

(3) doing any other thing for the purposes of or in connection with EqA; and

(4) alleging, whether expressly or otherwise, that the respondent or another person has contravened EqA: s.27(2) EqA.

[154]We were referred to the following authorities by Respondent’s Counsel in his closing written submissions:

[155]As to what is a protected act, Kokomane v Boots Management Services Ltd

[2025] EAT 38

where HHJ Beard states as follows at paragraph 23: “There is always a need in these cases to return to the statutory formulation. In order for a complaint to be a protected act it must meet the statutory form required by the Equality Act, in other words a complaint about something which, if proven, would be a contravention of the Act. That means a complaint in this case must be about race discrimination: which could be direct race discrimination or race harassment in the circumstances and, in meeting that definition, the protected act must be considered in the factual context in which it was made. Considering the context, it appears to me that what is set out, for instance, by Waite LJ in Waters, is that the allegation relied on need not state explicitly that an act of discrimination has occurred. All that is required are that facts should be asserted which are capable in law of amounting to an act of discrimination. Whilst that is a decision which related to earlier legislation it seems to me that the decision in Durrani where Langstaff J indicates that in context the circumstances may make it plain the way in which a protected characteristic is being relied upon, supports the earlier approach. Although it will usually be the case that that the Equality Act element is made explicit it is not necessary that it should. An ET would be entitled to reach a decision based on context that the word “race” is unnecessary where it is held that the factual matters that are relied upon meet the definition. In the Fullah case, it seems to me that it is important to recognise that the reference made by the EAT was to the specific form of words that were used. That was rejected in that case as amounting to a protected act in circumstances where the context made it clear that they were not protected acts.”

[156]As to whether the protected act is the cause of an alleged detriment the test is whether the alleged detriment was to a material degree influenced by the protected act. Importantly this is not a ‘but for’ test as explained by Lord Nicholls in Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police v Khan

[2001] ICR 1065

at paragraph 29: “Contrary to views sometimes stated, the third ingredient (“by reason that”) does not raise a question of causation as that expression is usually understood. Causation is a slippery word, but normally it is used to describe a legal exercise. From the many events leading up to the crucial happening, the court selects one or more of them which the law regards as causative of the happening. Sometimes the court may look for the “operative” cause, or the “effective” cause. Sometimes it may apply a “but for” approach. For the reasons I sought to explain in Nagarajan v London Regional Transport

[1999] ICR 877

, 884–885, a causation exercise of this type is not required either by section 1(1)(a) or section 2. The phrases “on racial grounds” and “by reason that” denote a different exercise: why did the alleged discriminator act as he did? What, consciously or unconsciously, was his reason? Unlike causation, this is a subjective test. Causation is a legal conclusion. The reason why a person acted as he did is a question of fact.”

[157]We were also referred to the recent decision of HHJ James Taylor in Miss Carozzi v 1) University of Hertfordshire 2) Ms Lucas

[2024] EAT 169

at paragraph 36.

[158]The job of the Tribunal is to establish the reason why an act or omission has occurred and from that decide whether it was influenced to a material degree by the protected act.

[159]The position in relation to what amounts to a detriment was summarised by the Court of Appeal in Jesudason v Alder Hey Children’s NHS Foundation Trust

[2020] IRLR 374

Sir Patrick Elias at para 27: “There is a detriment if a reasonable employee might consider the relevant treatment to constitute a detriment.”

[160]He went on to set out Lord Neuberger’s well-known summary in Derbyshire v St Helens MBC

[2007] IRLR 540

, paragraph 67: “… In that connection, Brightman LJ said in Ministry of Defence v Jeremiah

[1980] ICR 13

at 31A that “a detriment exists if a reasonable worker would or might take the view that the [treatment] was in all the circumstances to his detriment”. That observation was cited with apparent approval by Lord Hoffmann in Khan

[2001] ICR 1065

, para 53. More recently it has been cited with approved in your Lordships’ House in Shamoon v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary

[2003] ICR 337

. At para 35, my noble and learned friend, Lord Hope of Craighead, after referring to the observation and describing the test as being one of “materiality”, also said that an “unjustified sense of grievance cannot amount to ‘detriment’”. In the same case, at para 105, Lord Scott of Foscote, after quoting Brightman LJ’s observation, added: “If the victim’s opinion that the treatment was to his or her detriment is a reasonable one to hold, that ought, in my opinion, to suffice”.”

[161]At paragraph 68 he stated as follows: “An alleged victim cannot establish ‘detriment’ merely by showing that she had suffered mental distress: before she could succeed, it would have to be objectively reasonable in all the circumstances.”

[162]Time Limits

[163]Section 120 of the EqA confers jurisdiction on claims to employment tribunals, and section 123(1) of the EqA provides that the proceedings on a complaint within section 120 may not be brought after the end of –(a) the period of three months starting with the date of the act to which the complaint relates, or

(b) such other period as the employment tribunal thinks just and equitable.

[164]Under section 123(3)(a) of the EqA conduct extending over a period is to be treated as done at the end of that period.

[165]Section 123(3)(b) of the EqA, failure to do something, is to be treated as occurring when the person in question decided upon it. Where there is no evidence to the contrary, s.123(4) of the EqA 2010 provides a default means by which the date of the ‘decision’ can be identified, either when there is an inconsistent act or alternatively the expiry of the period in which the employer might reasonably have been expected to do it.

[166]An ongoing situation or continuing state of affairs amounting to discrimination was considered in Hendricks v Metropolitan Police Commissioner

[2003] IRLR 96

. It is not sufficient to rely on an alleged overarching or floating discriminatory state of affairs without that state of affairs being anchored by discrete acts of discrimination.

[167]We note the principals from the cases of British Coal v Keeble

[1997] IRLR 336

EAT; Robertson v Bexley Community Service

[2003] IRLR 434

CA; and London Borough of Southwark v Afolabi

[2003] IRLR 220

CA;

[168]We note the factors from section 33 of the Limitation Act 1980 which are referred to in the Keeble decision:

[169]The length of and the reasons for the delay.

[170]The extent to which the cogency of the evidence is likely to be affected by the delay.

[171]The extent to which the parties co-operated with any request for information.

[172]The promptness with which the claimant acted once he knew the facts giving rise to the cause of action.

[173]The steps taken by the claimant to obtain appropriate professional advice.

[174]We note that the Court of Appeal in the Afolabi decision confirmed that, while the checklist in section 33 of the Limitation Act provides a useful guide for tribunals, it need not be adhered to slavishly. The checklist in section 33 should not be elevated into a legal requirement but should be used as a guide. The Court suggested that there are two factors which are almost always relevant when considering the exercise of any discretion whether to extend time and they are: the length of, and reasons for, the delay; and whether the delay has prejudiced the respondent (for example, by preventing or inhibiting it from investigating the claim while matters were fresh).

[175]It is also clear from the comments of Auld LJ in Robertson that there is no presumption that a tribunal should exercise its discretion to extend time, and the onus is on the claimant in this regard … "It is also important to note that time limits are exercised strictly in employment and industrial cases. When tribunals consider their discretion to consider a claim out of time on just and equitable grounds there is no presumption that they should do so unless they can justify failure to exercise the discretion. Quite the reverse, a tribunal cannot hear a complaint unless the applicant convinces it that it is just and equitable to extend time, so the exercise of discretion is the exception rather than the rule".

[176]THE DECISION

[177]The Claimant asserts that she did three protected acts:

[178]The first is that on 18 January 2023, she verbally disclosed to Mr Teahan that she considered that her colleagues were hostile towards her because of her race. There is a consistency in what we are told by the Claimant and MT and what MT records in his notes (page 592), and we find that the Claimant did raise concern as to treatment towards her because of race and this amounts to a protected act within the meaning of section 27(2)(d) of the Equality Act.

[179]The second is the Claimant’s written informal grievance sent to Ms Beckett on the 14 February 2023. We find that what is written is asserting a contravention of the Equality Act and does amount to a protected act within the meaning of section 27(2)(d) of the Equality Act.

[180]The third is the Claimant’s formal written grievance, dated 9 May 2023 which was sent to Ms Beckett and the Bishop of Southampton. The Respondent accepts this was a protected act and we do also within the meaning of section 27(2)(d) of the Equality Act.

[181]In respect of each of the detriments we find as follows: 182.3.1.1 By a letter dated 27 January 2023, the Claimant was invited to a formal meeting by Ms Beckett [1]. The Claimant was not invited to a formal meeting, so this matter has not been proven as alleged. 183.

3.1.2 On 10 February, the Claimant was informed that a consultant, Ms Ryder, was going to examine the resourcing of the Finance Team [1]. This did happen. The reason the Clamant is informed of this at this time is that is when LR is available to start, the Respondent having gone through a scoping and EOI process in November/December 2022. 184.

3.1.3 On or around 10 February 2023, the Claimant was asked to reidentify herself as ‘Assistant to Finance Director’, a change from ‘Finance Support Officer’ [1]. This happened on the 16 February 2023, and the reason is the role does not exist. 185.

3.1.4 During the Claimant’s meeting with Mr Teahan on 14 February 2023, she asked to be identified on the website as a member of the Winchester Finance Team. The request was not actioned [1]. The Claimant has not proven this matter as alleged. 186.

3.1.5 Mr Teahan failed to supply the Claimant with her Progress Report (‘PACT’) after 14 February, despite her repeated requests [1]. The Claimant has not proven this matter as alleged. 187.

3.1.6 The rejection of her grievance on or around 13 March 2023 [1]. The grievance is rejected but the reason for that is because it has not been found proven. 188.

3.1.7 On 14 April 2023, being accused by Ms Beckett of breaching procedure and dishonesty (the letter was also re-sent on 21 April) [1]. The letter infers a beach of procedure, but such an assertion is founded on the facts of the situation. The Claimant has not provided full disclosure, trusting that the gaps would be filled in by a potential discussion between CH and MT, but they have not been when the permission is confirmed, and the Claimant does not seek to clarify any misunderstanding at that time. 189.

3.1.8 On the 23 April 2023, Mr Harbige wrote a combative and threatening letter to the Claimant [1]. This was actually a letter dated 24 April 2023, and we do not find that the content of such a response in the context it is sent is combative and threatening as alleged. 190.

3.1.9 On 25 April, the Claimant was invited to attend a Formal Stage 1 meeting in relation to absence [1]. The Claimant was invited to attend such a meeting, but it is her sickness absence levels that triggers the meeting in line with the policy. 191.

3.1.10 In April 2023, Ms Ryder recommended the Claimant’s dismissal [1]. The Claimant has not proven this matter as alleged. 192.

3.1.11 On 4 May, the Claimant was not invited to Xledger accounts training, despite having asked Mr Teahan to have been provided with such training [1]. We accept the account of MT on this matter, there was not a relevant training invite that the Claimant was not invited to. 193.

3.1.12 On 30 May, the Claimant was invited by Ms Beckett to a disciplinary hearing [1], without having explored informal resolution options [2]. The Claimant is invited to a disciplinary investigation, but this is because there are reasonable grounds to investigate the matter. 194.

3.1.13 Being ignored by Mr Teahan at the mid-June Finance Team meeting [1]. The Claimant has not proven this matter as alleged. 195.

3.1.14 Being given a management accountancy-based task on 27 June by Mr Harbige and Mr Teahan without warning and without the necessary skills or experience to have been able to complete it [1]. The Claimant has not proven this matter as alleged. 196.

3.1.15 Mr Garrard’s approach at the grievance hearing on 29 June was biased and he pursued his own agenda [1]. The Claimant has not proven that PG’s approach to the grievance hearing on the 29 June was biased and he pursued his own agenda, with the rest of that issue having been withdrawn by the Claimant during the course of the evidence. 197.

3.1.16 In relation to her dismissal [2]; 198.3.1.16.1 Failed to appoint an independent investigator. We accept what PG tells us. The Claimant has not proven that PG was not an independent investigator. 199.

3.1.16.2 Failed to heed and/or act upon her complaints about his lack of independence (specifically to the Bishops of Basingstoke and/or Southampton). Despite the direction sent on behalf of the Bishops and that the Claimant’s challenges could have been the subject of an appeal, the Claimant did not raise an appeal. There is nothing to suggest that this response on behalf of the Bishops is materially influenced by the Claimant’s protected acts. 200.

3.1.16.3 Failed to provide an independently minded chairman for the disciplinary hearing who asked invasive and unfair questions, was guided by the management case and failed to follow up on issues raised by the Claimant. This allegation has not been proven as alleged. 201.

3.1.16.4 Allowed Mr Garrard to attend the hearing without warning and to ask the Claimant questions. This allegation has not been proven as alleged. 202.

3.1.16.5 Ms Gurney attempted to allow Mr Harbige and Ms Beckett to attend the hearing without warning. This allegation has not been proven as alleged. 203.

3.1.16.6 Failed to give any or any sufficient regard to the Claimant’s evidence in relation to the allegations of misconduct and reached an irrational conclusion on the evidence (see paragraphs 32 to 64 of [2]). This allegation has not been proven as alleged. 204.

3.1.16.7 Failed to keep a good and accurate note of the disciplinary meeting. The Claimant has not proven the matters as alleged. 205.

3.1.17 In relation to her grievance [1; added by amendment]; 206.3.1.17.1 Failed to permit the Claimant to ask questions of Ms Beckett and/or Mr Garrard at the hearing. The Claimant has not proven this matter as alleged. 207.

3.1.17.2 Failed to keep it accurate and complete record of the hearing. The Claimant has not proven the matters as alleged. 208.

3.1.17.3 Ms Gurney failed to account for the Claimant’s evidence adequately and/or at all and rejected her grievance. The Claimant has not proven the matters as alleged 209.

3.1.18 Ms Hammond refused to assist the Claimant in the recovery of her IT equipment and ‘unfriended’ her on social media [1, added by amendment]. We accept Ms Hammond’s evidence about this matter. The Claimant has not proven that Ms Hammond was instructed to do these things

[210]We accept the Claimant was dismissed for gross misconduct for the reasons found by EG.

[211]The Claimant has not proven all matters as alleged and where the thing complained about did happen, for example the dismissal, we do not find that it was done (or materially influenced) because the Claimant had done the protected acts. The Claimant’s complaints of victimisation therefore fail and are dismissed and with these findings we do not need to consider the time limit jurisdictional matters.

[212]The unanimous judgment of the tribunal is that the Claimant’s complaints of detriment and dismissal for the making of a protected disclosure are dismissed on withdrawal, and the complaint of victimisation fails and is dismissed. Approved by: Employment Judge Gray Dated 29 December 2025 Judgment sent to Parties on 14 January 2026 ANNEX A – THE ISSUES

[1]Time limits1.1 Were the victimisation complaints made within the time limit in section 123 of the Equality Act 2010? The Tribunal will decide:1.1.1 Was the claim made to the Tribunal within three months (plus early conciliation extension) of the act or omission to which the complaint relates?

1.1.2 If not, was there conduct extending over a period?

1.1.3 If so, was the claim made to the Tribunal within three months (plus early conciliation extension) of the end of that period?

1.1.4 If not, were the claims made within a further period that the Tribunal thinks is just and equitable? The Tribunal will decide:1.1.4.1 Why were the complaints not made to the Tribunal in time?

1.1.4.2 In any event, is it just and equitable in all the circumstances to extend time?

1.2 Was the detriment complaints made within the time limit in section 48 of the Employment Rights Act 1996? The Tribunal will decide:1.2.1 Was the claim made to the Tribunal within three months (plus early conciliation extension) of the acts complained of?

1.2.2 If not, was there a series of similar acts or failures and was the claim made to the Tribunal within three months (plus early conciliation extension) of the last one?

1.2.3 If not, was it reasonably practicable for the claim to be made to the Tribunal within the time limit?

1.2.4 If it was not reasonably practicable for the claim to be made to the Tribunal within the time limit, was it made within a reasonable period?

[2]Protected disclosure (‘whistle blowing’)2.1 Did the Claimant make one or more qualifying disclosures as defined in section 43B of the Employment Rights Act 1996? The Tribunal will decide:2.1.1 What did the Claimant say or write? When? To whom? The Claimant says she made disclosures on these occasions:2.1.1.1 On 18 January 2023, she verbally disclosed to Mr Teahan that she considered that her colleagues were hostile towards her because of her race [1]

2.1.1.2 The Claimant’s written informal grievance sent to Ms Beckett in or about end of January 2023 about Mr Teahan’s handling of allegations racism [1];

2.1.1.3 The Claimant’s formal written grievance, on or around to start of May 2023, which was sent to Ms Beckett and the Bishop of Southampton [1].

2.1.2 Were the discloses of ‘information’?

2.1.3 Did she believe the disclosure of information was made in the public interest?

2.1.4 Was that belief reasonable?

2.1.5 Did she believe it tended to show that: 2.1.5.1 a person had failed, was failing or was likely to fail to comply with any legal obligation, namely their compliance with the Equality Act.

2.1.6 Was that belief reasonable?

2.2 If the Claimant made a qualifying disclosure, was a protected disclosure because it was made to her employer? The Respondent accepts that disclosures made to Mr Teahan and/or Ms Beckett would have been made to the ‘employer’ within the meaning of s. 43C.

[3]Detriment (Employment Rights Act 1996 section 47B)3.1 Did the Respondent do the following things:3.1.1 By a letter dated 27 January 2023, the Claimant was invited to a formal meeting by Ms Beckett [1];

3.1.2 On 10 February, the Claimant was informed that a consultant, Ms Ryder, was going to examine the resourcing of the Finance Team [1];

3.1.3 On or around 10 February 2023, the Claimant was asked to re-identify herself as ‘Assistant to Finance Director’, a change from ‘Finance Support Officer’ [1];

3.1.4 During the Claimant’s meeting with Mr Teahan on 14 February 2023, she asked to be identified on the website as a member of the Winchester Finance Team. The request was not actioned [1];

3.1.5 Mr Teahan failed to supply the Claimant with her Progress Report (‘PACT’) after 14 February, despite her repeated requests [1];

3.1.6 The rejection of her grievance on or around 13 March 2023 [1];

3.1.7 On 14 April 2023, being accused by Ms Beckett of breaching procedure and dishonesty (the letter was also re-sent on 21 April) [1];

3.1.8 On the 23 April 2023, Mr Harbige wrote a combative and threatening letter to the Claimant [1];

3.1.9 On 25 April, the Claimant was invited to attend a Formal Stage 1 meeting in relation to absence [1];

3.1.10 In April 2023, Ms Ryder recommended the Claimant’s dismissal [1];

3.1.11 On 4 May, the Claimant was not invited to Xledger accounts training, despite having asked Mr Teahan to have been provided with such training [1];

3.1.12 On 30 May, the Claimant was invited by Ms Beckett to a disciplinary hearing [1], without having explored informal resolution options [2];

3.1.13 Being ignored by Mr Teahan at the mid-June Finance Team meeting [1];

3.1.14 Being given a management accountancy-based task on 27 June by Mr Harbige and Mr Teahan without warning and without the necessary skills or experience to have been able to complete it [1];

3.1.15 Mr Garrard’s approach at the grievance hearing on 29 June was biased and he pursued his own agenda; to persuade the Claimant to drop her grievance in return for the discontinuance of the disciplinary process [1];

3.1.16 In relation to her dismissal [2];3.1.16.1 Failed to appoint an independent investigator;

3.1.16.2 Failed to heed and/or act upon her complaints about his lack of independence (specifically to the Bishops of Basingstoke and/or Southampton);

3.1.16.4 Allowed Mr Garrard to attend the hearing without warning and to ask the Claimant questions;

3.1.16.5 Ms Gurney attempted to allow Mr Harbige and Ms Beckett to attend the hearing without warning;

3.1.16.7 Failed to keep a good and accurate note of the disciplinary meeting;

3.1.17 In relation to her grievance [1; added by amendment];3.1.17.1 Failed to permit the Claimant to asked questions of Ms Beckett and/or Mr Garrard at the hearing;

3.1.17.2 Failed to keep it accurate and complete record of the hearing;

3.1.17.3 Ms Gurney failed to account for the Claimant’s evidence adequately and/or at all and rejected her grievance;

3.1.18 Ms Hammond refused to assist the Claimant in the recovery of her IT equipment and ‘unfriended’ her on social media [1, added by amendment].

3.2 By doing so, did it subject the Claimant to detriment?

3.3 If so, was it done on the ground that she had made the protected disclosure set out above?

[4]Dismissal (Employment Rights Act s. 103A)4.1 Was the making of any proven protected disclosure the principal reason for the Claimant’s dismissal?

4.2 The Claimant did not have at least two years’ continuous employment, and the burden is therefore on her to show jurisdiction and therefore to prove that the reason or, if more than one, the principal reason for the dismissal was the protected disclosure.

[5]Victimisation (Equality Act 2010 s. 27)5.1 Did the Claimant do protected acts as set out in paragraph 2.1 above?

5.2 Did the Respondent do the things set out in 3.1 paragraph above?

5.3 By doing so, did the Respondent subject the Claimant to detriment?

5.4 If so, was it because the Claimant had done the protected acts?

[6]Remedy Unfair dismissal6.1 The Claimant does not wish to be reinstated and/or re-engaged?

6.2 What basic award is payable to the Claimant, if any?

6.3 Would it be just and equitable to reduce the basic award because of any conduct of the Claimant before the dismissal? If so, to what extent?

6.4 If there is a compensatory award, how much should it be? The Tribunal will decide:6.4.1 What financial losses has the dismissal caused the Claimant?

6.4.2 Has the Claimant taken reasonable steps to replace their lost earnings, for example by looking for another job?

6.4.3 If not, for what period of loss should the Claimant be compensated?

6.4.4 Is there a chance that the Claimant would have been fairly dismissed anyway if a fair procedure had been followed, or for some other reason?

6.4.5 If so, should the Claimant’s compensation be reduced? By how much?

6.4.6 If the Claimant was unfairly dismissed, did she cause or contribute to dismissal by blameworthy conduct? If so, would it be just and equitable to reduce her compensatory award? By what proportion?

6.4.7 Does the statutory cap of fifty-two weeks’ pay or £105,707 apply? Detriment (s. 47B)

6.5 What financial losses has the detrimental treatment caused the Claimant?

6.6 Has the Claimant taken reasonable steps to replace their lost earnings, for example by looking for another job?

6.7 If not, for what period of loss should the Claimant be compensated?

6.8 What injury to feelings has the detrimental treatment caused the Claimant and how much compensation should be awarded for that?

6.9 Has the detrimental treatment caused the Claimant personal injury and how much compensation should be awarded for that?

6.10 Is it just and equitable to award the Claimant other compensation?

6.11 Did the Claimant cause or contribute to the detrimental treatment by their own actions and if so would it be just and equitable to reduce the claimant’s compensation? By what proportion?

6.12 Was the protected disclosure made in good faith? If not, is it just and equitable to reduce the claimant’s compensation? By what proportion, up to 25%? Victimisation

6.13 Should the Tribunal make a recommendation that the Respondent take steps to reduce any adverse effect on the Claimant? What should it recommend?

6.14 What financial losses has the discrimination caused the Claimant?

6.15 Has the Claimant taken reasonable steps to replace lost earnings, for example by looking for another job?

6.16 If not, for what period of loss should the Claimant be compensated for?

6.17 What injury to feelings has the discrimination caused the Claimant and how much compensation should be awarded for that?

6.18 Has the discrimination caused the Claimant personal injury and how much compensation should be awarded for that?

6.19 Is there a chance that the Claimant’s employment would have ended in any event? Should their compensation be reduced as a result?

6.20 Should interest be awarded? How much?