Mr G Sutton and Others v Health Transportation Group Ltd and Others: 1401924/2024 and Others
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Case No 1401924/2024
Between
Mr G Sutton Mr T Croucher Mr J Scott Mr K Jones Mr A HouseClaimant(1) Health Transportation Group Limited (2) NHS Dorset (3) EMED Group LimitedRespondentDate 27 March 2026
JUDGMENT
[1]The claimants’ application dated 4 February 2026 for reconsideration of the judgment sent to the parties on 22 January 2026 is refused.
REASONS
[2]On 4 February 2026 the claimants applied for reconsideration of the Judgment dated 5 January 2026 which was sent to the parties on 22 January 2026 (“the Judgment”). The grounds of the application are contained in a document of the same date.[3]The relevant aspects of the Judgment which attract the claimants’ application are the decision to dismiss the claimants’ applications to amend the claim to add claims of indirect age discrimination and regulations 13, 14 and 15 of the TUPE Regulations 2006. 1 of 13[4]Schedule 1 of The Employment Tribunals (Constitution and Rules of Procedure) Regulations 2024 contains the Employment Tribunal Rules of Procedure 2024 (“the Rules”). Under Rule 68 an application for reconsideration under Rule 70 must be made within 14 days of the date on which the decision (or, if later, the written reasons) were sent to the parties. The application was therefore received within the relevant time.[5]I have undertaken preliminary consideration of the claimants’ application. References in square brackets (e.g. [25]) are references to paragraph numbers from the reasons promulgated with the judgment.
The Law
[6]Rules 68 to 71 of The Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024 (the “Rules”) provide: “Reconsideration of judgments Principles 68.—(1) The Tribunal may, either on its own initiative (which may reflect a request from the Employment Appeal Tribunal) or on the application of a party, reconsider any judgment where it is necessary in the interests of justice to do so. (2) A judgment under reconsideration may be confirmed, varied or revoked. (3) If the judgment under reconsideration is revoked the Tribunal may take the decision again. In doing so, the Tribunal is not required to come to the same conclusion. Application for reconsideration 69. Except where it is made in the course of a hearing, an application for reconsideration must be made in writing setting out why reconsideration is necessary and must be sent to the Tribunal within 14 days of the later of—(a) the date on which the written record of the judgment sought to be reconsidered was sent to the parties, or(b) the date that the written reasons were sent, if these were sent separately. Process for reconsideration 70.—(1) The Tribunal must consider any application made under rule 69 (application for reconsideration). 2 of 13 (2) If the Tribunal considers that there is no reasonable prospect of the judgment being varied or revoked (including, unless there are special reasons, where substantially the same application has already been made and refused), the application must be refused and the Tribunal must inform the parties of the refusal. (3) If the application has not been refused under paragraph (2), the Tribunal must send a notice to the parties specifying the period by which any written representations in respect of the application must be received by the Tribunal, and seeking the views of the parties on whether the application can be determined without a hearing. The notice may also set out the Tribunal’s provisional views on the application. (4) If the application has not been refused under paragraph (2), the judgment must be reconsidered at a hearing unless the Tribunal considers, having regard to any written representations provided under paragraph (3), that a hearing is not necessary in the interests of justice. (5) If the Tribunal determines the application without a hearing the parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to make further written representations in respect of the application. Reconsideration by the Tribunal on its own initiative 71. Where the Tribunal proposes to reconsider a judgment on its own initiative, it must inform the parties of the reasons why the decision is being reconsidered and the judgment must be reconsidered (as if an application had been made and not refused) in accordance with rule 70(3) to (5) (process for reconsideration).[7]An application for reconsideration is an exception to the general principle that (subject to appeal on a point of law) a decision of an Employment Tribunal is final. The test is whether it is necessary in the interests of justice to reconsider the judgment (Rule 68).[8]Rule 70(2) empowers me to refuse the application based on preliminary consideration if there is no reasonable prospect of the original decision being varied or revoked.[9]The test of whether it was necessary and in the interests of justice to vary or revoke a Judgment or Order where application is made under Rule 70 was considered in Scrannage v Rochdale Metropolitan Borough Council [2018] UKEAT/0032/17 by Her Honour Judge Eady QC. I quote as follows from paragraphs 22 to 23 of Scranage: “22. The test for reconsideration under the ET Rules is thus straightforwardly whether such reconsideration is in the interests of justice (see Outasight VB Ltd v Brown UKEAT/0253/14 (21 November 2014, unreported). The “interests of 3 of 13 justice” allow for a broad discretion, albeit one that must be exercised judicially, which means having regard not only to the interests of the party seeking the review or reconsideration, but also to the interests of the other party to the litigation and to the public interest requirement that there should, so far as possible, be finality of litigation. 23. Where the application for reconsideration is made on the basis of “new evidence”, the test the ET will apply remains that laid down by the Court of Appeal in Ladd v Marshall [1954] 3 All ER 745 (Outasight paragraph 49), which provides that three conditions must be met as follows 1) that the evidence could not have been obtained without reasonable diligence for use at the original hearing; 2) that it is relevant and would probably have had an important influence on the hearing; and 3) that it is apparently credible.”[10]In Trimble v Supertravel Ltd [1982] ICR 440 the Employment Appeal Tribunal (“EAT”) held that if a matter has been ventilated and argued then any error of law falls to be corrected on appeal and not by review. In addition, in Fforde v Black EAT 68/60 the EAT decided that the interests of justice ground of review does not mean “that in every case where a litigant is unsuccessful, he is automatically entitled to have the tribunal review it. Every unsuccessful litigant thinks that the interests of justice require a review. This ground of review only applies in the even more exceptional case where something has gone radically wrong with the procedure involving a denial of natural justice or something of that order”.[11]The importance of finality was confirmed by the Court of Appeal in Ministry of Justice v Burton and anor [2016] EWCA Civ 714 where Elias LJ said that: “the discretion to act in the interests of justice is not open-ended; it should be exercised in a principled way, and the earlier case law cannot be ignored. In particular, the courts have emphasised the importance of finality (Flint v Eastern Electricity Board [1975] ICR 395) which militates against the discretion being exercised too readily; and in Lindsay v Ironsides Ray and Vials [1994] ICR 384 Mummery J held that the failure of a party's representative to draw attention to a particular argument will not generally justify granting a review.”[12]Similarly in Liddington v 2Gether NHS Foundation Trust EAT/0002/16 the EAT chaired by Simler P said in paragraph 34 that: “a request for reconsideration is not an opportunity for a party to seek to re-litigate matters that have already been litigated, or to reargue matters in a different way or by adopting points previously omitted. There is an underlying public policy 4 of 13 principle in all judicial proceedings that there should be finality in litigation, and reconsideration applications are a limited exception to that rule. They are not a means by which to have a second bite at the cherry, nor are they intended to provide parties with the opportunity of a rehearing at which the same evidence and the same arguments can be rehearsed but with different emphasis or additional evidence that was previously available being tendered.”[13]In Employment Rights Advice Ltd v Craig Vernon & Volkmaster Ltd UKEAT/0082/18/LA Mrs Justice Stacey reviewed the decision in Scranage relating to new evidence, noting at paragraph 27: “27. It is not an absolute test. There might be cases where the interests of justice would permit fresh evidence to be adduced notwithstanding that the principles laid down in Ladd v Marshall are not strictly met. Examples of when this might arise include where a party has been genuinely ambushed, or if there was some additional factor or mitigating circumstances. It cannot be a closed category because the nature of the interests of justice test is, self-evidently, that the interests of justice are paramount. It is impossible to anticipate all the number of different circumstances which may arise that might occur require re-visitation of a particular issue because it is in the interests of justice to do so.[14]In common with all powers under the Rules, preliminary consideration under Rule 70 (2) must be conducted in accordance with the overriding objective which appears in Rule 3, namely to deal with cases fairly and justly. This includes dealing with cases in ways which are proportionate to the complexity and importance of the issues, and avoiding delay. Achieving finality in litigation is part of a fair and just adjudication. The law: Adequacy of reasons[15]The reasons do not have to be of uniform length or substance but must be proportionate to the significance of the issue and, for decisions other than judgments, they may be very short (see rule 60(6)). In any event, as pointed out by the Court of Appeal in Anya v University of Oxford [2001] IRLR 377 at 381, the duty on courts and tribunals to give 'adequate and intelligible' (or, as it was put in Clark v Clark Construction Initiatives Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 1446, [2009] IRLR 718, 'candid, intelligible, transparent and coherent') reasons for their decisions exists independently by virtue of the body of case law on art 6 of the Human Rights Convention (as applied by ss 2 and 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998).[16]Where reasons are given for a judgment, there are specific matters that they must cover (rule 60(7)). They must(a) identify the issues which the tribunal has determined,(b) state the findings of fact made in relation to those issues,(c) concisely identify the relevant law and state how that law has been applied to those findings in order to decide the issues.[17]Those requirements are a ‘guide and not a straight jacket’ (see Balfour Beatty Power Networks Ltd v Wilcox [2006] EWCA Civ 1240, [2007] IRLR 63 at [25]) if 5 of 13 the judgment shows that there has been 'substantial compliance' with the requirements of it, which 'can only be achieved by sufficient detail in respect of each of its components as to enable a party to understand the conclusions reached' (see Greenwood v NWF Retail Ltd [2011] ICR 896 63).[18]As the Court of Appeal noted in English v Emery Reimbold & Strick Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 605, [2003] IRLR 710 at [19-21] “This does not mean that every factor which weighed with the judge in his appraisal of the evidence has to be identified and explained. But the issues the resolution of which were vital to the judge's conclusion should be identified and the manner in which he resolved them explained. It is not possible to provide a template for this process. It need not involve a lengthy judgment. It does require the judge to identify and record those matters which were critical to his decision. If the critical issue was one of fact, it may be enough to say that one witness was preferred to another because the one manifestly had a clearer recollection of the material facts or the other gave answers which demonstrated that his recollection could not be relied upon. …' When giving reasons a judge will often need to refer to a piece of evidence or to a submission which he has accepted or rejected. Provided that the reference is clear, it may be unnecessary to detail, or even summarise, the evidence or submission in question. The essential requirement is that the terms of the judgment should enable the parties and any appellate tribunal readily to analyse the reasoning that was essential to the judge's decision.''[19]In High Table Ltd v Horst [1997] IRLR 513 at 518, CA, Peter Gibson LJ pointed out that 'whilst [the tribunal] must consider all that is relevant it need only deal with the points which were seen to be in controversy relating to those issues, and then only with the principal important controversial points'. The Grounds of the Application[20]The permissible grounds for reconsideration are only those set out in Rule 70, namely that it is in the interests of justice to vary or revoke the Judgment.[21]The claimants’ grounds for reconsideration are as follows:21.1 The Written Reasons do not adequately explain why the decision to dismiss the amendment application was made21.2 The Written Reasons do not sufficiently engage with the claimants’ arguments in their written submissions relating to their amendment application.21.3 The claimants were not permitted to expand their submissions orally and the Judge did not draw to their attention the ‘consequence’ of not expanding on the applications orally. 6 of 13[22]The claimants’ complaint in relation the second ground is detailed in paragraph 3.5 of the application, namely they alleged that the Reasons do not:22.1 “summarise, paraphrase or analyse the submissions of the Claimants;22.2 explain why the Claimants’ arguments were rejected; or22.3 distinguish or address the legal authorities relied upon by the Claimants”[23]Examples in support of that allegation are detailed in paragraph 4 of the application, specifically referring to the claimant’s explanations for the delay (they were litigants in person, did not understand that the events gave rise to a claim of indirect age discrimination when they realised, at a later stage, that the protected characteristic of age was engaged, and then acted promptly) and the alleged failure to address or distinguish the case of “Knott v Dover Harbour Board [2019] EWCA Civ 1638.” The claimant’s argument is that that case was analogous on its facts to their case and the outcome should therefore have been the same.[24]Since the claimants argue that they do not understand the basis on which the Judgment was reached, in order to prevent an avoidable and meritless appeal which would only add further delay to the proceedings, these reasons address each ground below, providing references to the elements of the Judgment and Case Management Order where the reasoning and the explanation is contained.[25]That course, however, is not a tacit acceptance that a Judge must set out each of the claimants’ arguments and provide reasons as to why each was rejected for their reasons to be Meek compliant. As the authorities detailed above make clear, a Judge’s obligation is to provide reasons which adequately explain why the decision was made, not why all the claimant’s arguments were rejected. The two are connected but are distinct matters. Ground 1: Inadequate explanation of the decision to dismiss the amendment applications[26]The Reasons expressly identify and address the factors which a Tribunal must consider when determining an amendment application, namely: the nature of the amendment, the timing and manner of the application, and the balance of prejudice caused by permitting or refusing the amendments, having regard to the applicability of the time limits. In particular:[27]Nature of the amendment application: The Reasons detail the conclusion at [18] that the claim of indirect age discrimination was a new claim and was not the relabelling of existing facts.[28]To assist the claimants, in Selkent the court drew a distinction between amendments which seek to add detail to an existing claim and those where there “is a substantial alteration pleading a new cause of action.” This was clearly a new cause of action given that the claimants argued that that they did not 7 of 13 appreciate that such a claim was viable when presenting the claim form but came to appreciate that later (this was referenced at [26]). It is impossible in consequence to argue that the claim form contained a claim which the claimants did not understand could be pursued until later; it is presumed that is the basis on which they made the concession recorded at [18].[29]The argument on amendment had therefore moved beyond the initial basis of the claimants’ position in their application where they sought to argue that the claim relied upon “entirely the same factual background already pleaded”. For the avoidance of doubt, I had in any event concluded that that argument was misconceived. That was because whilst the broad factual background to the claims would be the same, there were no facts pleaded which established or could establish a claim for indirect discrimination - the ET1s made no reference at all to age or to a PCP relating to age. The only ET1 which articulated a policy or practice was that filed on 19 November 2024, where a PCP was broadly identified in the Grounds of Claim filed with it, and that was in reality an application to amend but not an application to amend to add such a claim.[30]During the hearing, I expressed my view that the amendment application to add an indirect age discrimination claim sought to add a new claim, pleading a new cause of action which was not in the original claims, and was not a relabelling of existing facts; and the claimants accepted that.[31]The Judgment further detailed my conclusion at [14] that the claims under the TUPE Regs were new claims. Again, the claimant’s conceded that point during the hearing. Some facts relevant to the claim were first referenced in the claim form presented on 19 November 2024 which was itself an application to amend the claim to add new respondents.[32]The claim form containing the only relevant facts for both claims the claimants seek to add by amendment was presented over 6 months after the claimants were dismissed and was therefore over 3 months out of time. It did not articulate the claims under the TUPE Regs that the claimants applied to add by amendment but appeared to raise a claim that the claimant’s dismissal was automatically unfair because of the operation of Regulations 4 and 7 of TUPE. It did not detail or reference claims under Regulations 13 to 15.[33]Timing and manner of the applications: the relevant factors are addressed at [20 – 26]. The timing of the amendment application was addressed at [23-24]. The application to add the age discrimination and TUPE claims was made on 14 July 2025. That application was made 14 months after the claimants’ dismissal and was 11 months out of time.[34]The manner of the applications was addressed at [20 – 22]. The Reasons reflected my finding that the TUPE claims were not particularised in the amendment application; it did not address the claimants’ asserted basis for their status to bring claims under Regulations 13 to 15, nor did it set out the factual basis for those claims. 8 of 13[35]In their reconsideration application the claimants argue that the TUPE claims were fully pleaded in the November claim form. That is a misdescription – as stated, the “Grounds” attached to the claim for sought to add respondents, the claim form itself did not identify that it was making another type of claim, such as a claim under TUPE, in box 8.1.[36]The claimants’ argument is, however, demonstrative of their occasional scatter gun approach to this litigation, the pleadings and amendments, and of their fundamental misunderstanding of the nature and importance of pleadings. It is not the role or responsibility of the Tribunal or the Respondent to identify claims from a narrative submitted by a claimant, or to seek to distil the claims for multitudinous, disparate accounts or documents (see Moustache v Chelsea and Westminster Hospital NHS Foundation Trust [2025] EWCA Civ185 endorsing the words of Elisabeth Laing J (as she then was) in Adebowale v ISBAN UK Ltd UKEAT/0068/15 at [16]: “The ET1, whether it is drafted by a legal representative, or by a lay person, must be readily understood, at its first reading, by the other party to the proceedings (who may or may not be legally represented) and by the Employment Judge. The Employment Judge is, of course, an expert but ... should not be burdened by, or expected by the parties to engage in, a disproportionately complex exercise of interpretation ...”[37]Here my conclusion, and that of the respondents, was that the claim which was readily understood to have been made in the claim form presented in November 2024 was of unfair dismissal, not a claim under TUPE. That facts relevant to the TUPE claim were first identified in the amendment application dated 24 July 2025, which contained a bare reference to the failure to consult but even that was detailed under the heading “Grounds for Unfair Dismissal.”[38]The only claim under TUPE which was identified in the amendment application was of automatically unfair dismissal under Regulation 7. The claimant’s conceded that matter during the hearing. It is nothing to their credit, therefore, that they now avail from that concession and knowingly and misleadingly suggest in their application for reconsideration at 4.7 that “TUPE consultation breaches had been pleaded since November 2024.”[39]Further it is at best disingenuous and at worst misleading to suggest that the Tribunal ‘failed to engage’ with the claimant’s submissions that the claims under TUPE ‘were fully particularised’ when the claimants had accepted during the hearing that they were not particularised in either the claim form submitted in November 2024 or in the amendment application submitted in July 2025.[40]Given that concession, there was no need for the Reasons to engage with an argument which had been abandoned. If one is being generous to the claimants, they have confused the content of their written submissions on amendment with the amendment application itself when preparing the application for reconsideration, seeing the references to the regulations in the submissions and 9 of 13 forgetting the concession they made in relation to the claim form and amendment application.[41]Balance of prejudice: The Judgment considers the balance of prejudice and the connected applicability of time limits at [27 – 31]. Additional, relevant points are made at:41.1 [20] in relation to the TUPE claims – the claimants were a world away from demonstrating that they actually had standing to present a claim as individual employees41.2 [21-22] in relation to the Indirect Age Discrimination claims.41.3 [25] in relation to whether, if the claimants were permitted to amend their claims, they had any realistic prospect of demonstrating at the final hearing that the claims were within time.[42]Lastly, the claimants again misstate matters in relation to the failure to address the decision of Knott v Dover Harbour Board. The claimants referred the Judge to the Tribunal decision in Knott (see paragraph 10 of the Claimant’s written submissions dated 13 November 2025). That was a first instance decision and was not therefore binding on the Tribunal in relation to this application. They did not refer the Judge to any decision of the Court of Appeal in Knott, as is now referenced in the application for reconsideration. That may be because the case never reached the Court of Appeal; the decision has only ever been a first instance decision of the Tribunal. The two citations provided for the decision in the Court of Appeal are fabricated; neither exists – they do not connect a decision of the Court of Appeal at all, let alone one for Knott.[43]That the claimants have included such a demonstrably false premise as part of their application for reconsideration is a very serious matter indeed. The claimants will be required to provide a witness statement, signed with a statement of truth, explaining precisely who prepared the reconsideration application and who included the reference to Knott in the Court of Appeal and the citations provided in respect of it, and how and why they included them. That will be the subject of a separate order.[44]In any event the decision to grant or refuse an amendment is a discretionary one and therefore is made by the Judge on the facts specific to each case. How other judges determined other applications is of very limited relevance at all. Given the case was a first instance decision and not binding, there was no need to distinguish it or explain why it was not followed. Ground 2: The claimants the claimants were prevented from providing their submissions orally. 10 of 13[45]There is nothing in this ground of the application; it is without merit. Once again the asserted factual basis at paragraph 6.1 is simply wrong. The claimants were permitted to expand on their application.[46]The claimants submitted a 27-page written argument addressing amendment, strike out, and deposit. 8 pages of that addressed the amendment application. The amendment application itself consisted of a single page letter and an 11 page document. The claimants’ arguments were therefore exhaustively articulated in 20 pages of writing.[47]Nevertheless, because the application related to many documents, and was spread over more than one, I explored the basis of the application with the claimants during the hearing, discussing aspects of the application and the claims the claimants sought to add with Mr Sutton.[48]Having concluded my enquiries, I asked the claimants whether there was anything more they wished to add to their arguments relating to the claims of TUPE and indirect age discrimination. Mr Sutton stated that there was not.[49]I did not require lengthy verbal submissions from the Respondents for the same reasons – their arguments were also contained in detailed skeleton arguments; I asked them whether they were content to rely on their arguments. That is appropriate case management; nothing is to be gained by repeating written arguments verbally. It is certainly not a requirement of a fair hearing.
Discussion and Conclusions
[50]Despite the claimants’ assertion at paragraph 8.1 that “This application is not an attempt to re-argue the merits,” the arguments at paragraphs 4.1, 4.2, 4.5 and 4.6, 4.7 and 4.13 are precisely that. They are no more than attempts to relitigate points and arguments which were considered when the decision on amendment was made.[51]The arguments at paragraphs 4.3 and 4.4 are of a similar nature; albeit with the added but entirely false suggestion that Knott was a Court of Appeal authority. The argument at 4.8 is false and misleading for the reasons detailed above.[52]The assertion that the Reasons do not permit the reader to understand why the amendment application was refused is entirely inaccurate. The argument that they do not explain why the claimants’ arguments were rejected is misconceived; it is only necessary to address material arguments in the Reasons, this was done. There was, therefore, no need to set out explicitly that the claimants would be prejudiced if the application was refused, that is a point self-evident in any amendment application; rejecting an amendment application causes prejudice to any claimant because they are unable to pursue the claims which are the subject of the application. Conversely, if an amendment were allowed, a respondent would always experience prejudice in the form of having to respond to new allegations. 11 of 13[53]The issue for the tribunal is whether the balance of prejudice favours granting or refusing the application. That balancing act is addressed at [27 – 31]. The Reasons specifically took into account, as detailed at [31], that the true focus of the claimants’ claims as they were described to the Judge was about the process which resulted in the determination that their roles were redundant, and the lack of consultation with the claimants about the roles which were necessary for the delivery of the contract. Arguments as to the process were, as was explained to the claimants during the hearing, very much at the heart of their unfair dismissal claim which was properly presented and which had been accepted. The prejudice to them was therefore limited because that claim addressed the heart of their grievances about their dismissal and would permit them to recover compensation in the form of loss of earnings if it succeeded.[54]I do not understand what the claimants are referring to in paragraph 4.6 of the application – they did not identify any ‘less intrusive’ case management options. A Judge is certainly not required to consider arguments which were not raised before them. Furthermore, this was not a strike out application where less draconian case management orders are required to be considered before making a strike out order: it was an amendment application, which necessitates a binary decision: whether to grant or dismiss the application.[55]The arguments at paragraphs 4.11 – 4.14 are simply wrong – the reasons engage with the indirect race discrimination claim in relation to merits at [21-22] and in terms of the prejudice caused if it were permitted at [29]. Paragraph [22] could have been better articulated; the point the Reasons sought to convey was that the claimants would be required to show first that those of a particular age group were be placed at a disadvantage by the asserted PCP, and secondly that the claimants themselves were placed at that disadvantage. The reality was that any paramedic would be placed the disadvantage of losing their jobs by the decision not to employ paramedics to deliver the service but the disadvantage was caused because of their job roles, not because of their age. If they were 19 and a paramedic, they would have suffered the same disadvantage. This was explained to the claimants during the hearing, and the claimants suggested that they believed they had been targeted because of their age; i.e. that the decision to remove the role of paramedic was a means of removing those over 50. That is why the Reasons refer to a claim of direct age discrimination.[56]The arguments in the reconsideration application at paragraphs 4.9 – 4.10 are utterly misconceived – the respondents withdrew their strike out and deposit order applications as detailed in Judgment because the claimants accepted that they were never employed by the Second Respondent, and any claim against the Third Respondent transferred to the First Respondent as a consequence of the service provision change.[57]It is therefore difficult to understand what the claimants are referring to in paragraph 4.10 – the Reasons do not set out the authorities or legal tests relating to strike out or deposit because I was not determining those applications as they had been withdrawn. 12 of 13
Conclusion
[58]Having considered all the points made by the claimants I am satisfied that there is no reasonable prospect of their demonstrating that it is in the interests of justice for the Judgment on amendment to be varied or revoked.[59]There was no denial of natural justice in this case; rather I considered the evidence and the claimants’ arguments that were put before me and determined that the amendment application should be dismissed. The points of significance were considered and addressed at the hearing in my extempore Judgment and again in the written reasons.[60]Accordingly, I dismiss the application for reconsideration pursuant to Rule 72(1) because it is without merit. Approved by