Mrs C Tupper v St John’s International School: 1401701/2024

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Case No 1401701/2024

Venue Exeter

Hearing 29 and 30 September 2025 And 1, 2 and 3 October 2025

Between

Mrs C TupperClaimant

St John’s International SchoolRespondent

Before

Employment Judge N J Roper

In person for claimant

Mr C Howells (instructed by Counsel) for respondent

Date 3 October 2025

JUDGMENT

[1]The claimant’s claim that the respondent has failed to make reasonable adjustments is not well-founded and it is hereby dismissed; and

[2]The claimant’s claim for discrimination arising from her disability is not well-founded and it is hereby dismissed; and

[3]The claimant’s claim for victimisation is well-founded, and the Respondent is ordered to pay the claimant compensation for injury to feelings in the sum of £10,830.01 (which is inclusive of interest of £830.01); and 3. The claimant’s claim for discrimination on the grounds of her part-time status is not well-founded and it is hereby dismissed; and

[5]The claimant’s claim for unlawful deduction from wages is not well- founded and it is hereby dismissed; and

[6]The claimant’s claim for breach of contract in respect of her wrongful dismissal is well-founded, and the respondent is ordered to pay the claimant the gross sum of £8,377.06.

REASONS

[1]In this case the claimant Mrs Chloe Tupper, who was dismissed by reason of capability, claims that she has been discriminated against because of a protected characteristic, namely her disability. The claim is for discrimination arising from disability, because of an alleged failure by the respondent to make reasonable adjustments, and for victimisation. The claimant also brings a claim for discrimination because of her parttime status, and for breach of contract or otherwise for unlawful deduction from her wages. The respondent concedes that the claimant is disabled, but it contends that the reason for the dismissal was capability, that there was no discrimination, and it denies the monetary claims.

[2]This hearing was determined by an Employment Judge sitting without lay members. The composition of the panel hearing the case has been taken with the agreement of the parties and the Employment Judge, having considered the overriding objective and having applied the Senior President of Tribunals Practice Direction and the Presidential Guidance of 29 October 2024.

[3]I have heard from the claimant. For the respondent I have heard from Mr Bryan Kane and Miss Kirstin Larby. I have also considered two statements from Miss Emma Thorpe and a statement from Mr Anthony Streak on behalf of the respondent, but I can only attach limited weight to this because they were not present at this hearing and could not be questioned on this evidence.

[4]The claimant did not request any specific adjustments to be put in place for this hearing other than a request to explain the structure of the hearing process, and for breaks when requested to consider and assess information, and these requests were accommodated.

[5]There was a degree of conflict on the evidence. I found the following facts proven on the balance of probabilities after considering the whole of the evidence, both oral and documentary, and after listening to the factual and legal submissions made by and on behalf of the respective parties.

[7]The respondent is a Co-Educational Day and Boarding School for ages 2 to 16 in Sidmouth Devon (“the School”). It is part of a wider international school organisation known as IES/SEK. As is often the case with independent schools, there were constraints on its budget which had to be managed, and its budgets and timetables were always under review.

[8]The claimant is Mrs Chloe Tupper. She was employed by the respondent as a parttime teacher of mathematics. She commenced employment on 4 September 2023 and was dismissed summarily on 7 May 2024, and was given one month’s pay in lieu of notice. The respondent asserts that the claimant failed to survive her probationary period.

[9]The claimant was diagnosed as autistic in June 2017. Her unchallenged evidence was to the effect that this mental impairment has a substantial adverse effect on her ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities, particularly in the workplace. This includes adverse effects on communication (struggling with ambiguous or inconsistent communication); routine and predictability (in that she relies on structure and advance notice, with sudden changes causing anxiety); fairness and systems (in that she has a strong internal sense of fairness and desire to follow rules and processes, and when policies are not apply consistently this causes distress and anxiety); and masking (like many autistic women she often masks distress in professional settings).

[10]The claimant was provided with a written contract of the terms and conditions of her employment. Clause 4 provided: “Probationary Period: the first six months from the start of the employment are considered probationary. During this probationary period either the Employee or the School may terminate the employment relationship by giving not less than one month’s prior written notice.” Clause 5 provided: “Notice Period: Following the successful completion of the probationary period and subject to earlier termination, either party may terminate the employment on giving one term’s prior written notice.” Clause 17 provided: “Working Hours: 0.4 FTE - working hours as agreed with the Head of School.”

[11]The claimant also wished to educate her two children at the school. The School offered teaching staff a discounted rate against school fees, sometimes known as fee remission, which for a full-time employee was 71%. The claimant was working 0.4 FTE so the normal position was that this fee remission would reduce to 29% (0.4 of 71%). In addition, the normal position for teaching staff was that they would be provided with allocated time for planning, preparation and assessment which is commonly known as PPA. This was normally 10% of teaching time.

[12]The arrangements were different for the claimant. The Headteacher is Mr Bryan Kane, from whom I have heard. He emailed the claimant before her employment on 19 June 2023 stating: “It’s possible we may have a part-time role available. It is a 0.4 role (FTE £35k which we can’t really go above owing to budget). But we could maybe work something regarding fee remission. Essentially three mornings a week.” The parties subsequently agreed the terms of the claimant’s employment which were that she would teach three mornings a week (with each morning consisting of four hours teaching) which was the 0.4 the equivalent of 30 hours teaching per week. There was no additional time for PPA on offer, but equally there was no requirement on the claimant to carry out her pro rata equivalent of other non-classroom teaching duties. These included supervision at break times, lunchtimes, after school clubs, weekend boarding supervision, and covering for other teachers such as for sickness absence. The claimant did occasionally cover break times, and one weekend, and up to two cover lessons, but she was not required to undertake what would have been a normal pro rata equivalent of the non-classroom duties.

[13]In addition, the claimant enjoyed a more generous level of fee remission for her children. Mr Kane emailed her on 28 June 2023 to this effect: “I confirm by email (as it will not appear in your full job offer) that the fee remission for your two children (subject to the admissions process) will be set at 57% “…

[14]The contractual arrangements agreed by the parties were therefore that the claimant would teach three mornings a week for four hours each, with no additional PPA time, with no pro-rata requirement for non-classroom duties, and with a more generous fee remission. These were the agreed terms under which the claimant worked from the commencement of her employment in September 2023 until the events of April 2024 which are set out below.

[15]Before joining the School, the claimant had notified the HR Department of IES/SEK that she had autism. The respondent’s organisation was therefore on notice of the claimant’s disability. Nonetheless we accept Mr Kane’s evidence that as Headteacher he personally had no actual knowledge of the claimant’s disability, and he had no knowledge that the claimant was put to any disadvantage by reason of autism. The same applies to Miss Kirsten Larby, from whom I have heard. She is the Senior School Lead and Pastoral Care for the School.

[16]Miss Larby had responsibility for timetabling the teaching staff which included the claimant. Two matters arose about timetabling in December 2023. One of these concerns related to the teaching of mixed ability pupils. This is sometimes referred to as “differentiation” and the parties disagree as to its exact meaning. The claimant suggests that differentiation is limited to being able to teach different levels of ability to different pupils in the same lesson within the same syllabus. The respondent suggests that the definition is wider, and that it includes teaching more than one syllabus to different pupils in the same lesson, and that this is a normal requirement for experienced teachers, particularly in order to address budgetary constraints.

[17]In December 2023 the claimant spoke with Ms Larby and raised concerns about her teaching hours, which focused on the possibility of reducing the claimant’s timetable and her ability to differentiate between mixed ability curriculums. The claimant did not suggest that she was at any disadvantage because of her disability. Miss Larby’s view was that the claimant remained in a position to undertake her agreed contractual teaching hours and that she did not have the same commitment to undertake nonteaching duties as other staff.

[18]The other issue related to the possible “collapsing” of the Year 10 timetable into one class. This proposal was discussed and clarified at a staff meeting in December 2023, a few days before the end of term. The minutes of this staff meeting were then circulated to the relevant staff. Although this proposal might have freed up some time for PPA, the claimant preferred to continue to teach Year 10 separately. Just before the end of term carol service the claimant tried to speak to Miss Larby about this, but Miss Larby did not consider it an appropriate time. In any event that proposal did not go ahead. On returning to school some three weeks later in January 2024 Miss Larby confirmed to the claimant that no changes had been made. The claimant did not state that she was disabled, nor did she suggest that she might have been at any disadvantage.

[19]By email dated 2 February 2024 Ms Thorpe, an HR officer for the respondent, emailed the claimant to this effect: “It is coming up to your six-month probation scheme. We have recently set up a new system where this is now acknowledged with every new member of staff and is a good chance for you to review how you feel about your role. If you could complete the attached and then organise a catch up with Bryan through the front desk that would be great …” There was an End of Probation Form attached to that email which specifically referred to a meeting to review progress and to “determine whether probation should be signed off at this stage”. The claimant suggests that subsequently Mr Kane told her that she need not complete the form, although Mr Kane disputes this and the relevant contemporaneous documents suggest that he was indeed waiting for the claimant to complete it. In any event the respondent did not pursue the matter and neither it did arrange for any probationary review meeting as such.

[20]The claimant had further discussions with Miss Larby about potential changes to the timetable in March and April 2024. The claimant expressed the wish to have more hours, but Miss Larby explained that this was not possible under the current budget unless other members of staff reduced their hours. The claimant requested Miss Larby to ask a colleague to reduce her hours, but Miss Larby did not wish to do so. She reassured the claimant that the arrangement would remain under which she did not have to undertake any non-teaching commitment to pupils in the same way that other staff were required to do.

[21]This followed an email which the claimant had sent to Mr Kane on 12 March 2024. It was a clear and detailed email with an attached schedule of the GCSE mathematics subjects which had to be taught to various pupils. In short, the concerns were about timetabling, insufficient teaching hours for the GCSE content, and the requirement to teach multiple syllabi in one lesson. The claimant concluded her email by stating that “it does not seem satisfactory to just continue with the status quo if it is not in the best interests of our students.” The claimant did not refer to her disability at any stage during this detailed email, nor that she personally might have been put to any disadvantage as a result of the respondent’s requirements for her to teach in this way. She was effectively raising concerns that (in her opinion) the current requirements were not in the best interests of the students. The respondent’s position was that these requirements effectively best matched their obligations given the budgetary constraints.

[22]The claimant had also sent a detailed email to the same effect to Miss Larby on 12 March 2024, but again the claimant did not refer to her disability at any stage during this detailed email, nor that she personally might have been put to any disadvantage as a result of the respondent’s requirements for her to teach in this way.

[23]The claimant then had an email exchange on 8 April 2024 with Miss Thorpe of HR. She stated “I want to chat about my contract and the number of hours I work. Specifically, that I am on a 0.4 contract and teach 12 hours but am not paid for any PPA time. I have also discovered that the person I share a full-time position with (so has a 0.6 contract) teaches 11 hours a week. My 12 hours equates to 0.4 of a 30 hour week but I should have had an hour of PPA in that – so 11 teaching and one PPA.” She also stated that she had reached out to the leadership team for support and guidance but felt that she had been ignored and was feeling overwhelmed. There was no suggestion that this was in any way related to her disability.

[24]Another email from the claimant during that exchange stated: “I have not raised the specific issue (my contracted hours) with senior management. I have raised my concerns regarding timetabling for year 10 and 11 with them repeatedly but been dismissed as there is no one available to teach more hours etc or I have just been ignored. I have said that I am worried and nervous about September but again not heard anything. Whilst this isn’t directly related to my hours or anyone else’s it all plays into my concerns about our year 10 and 11’s and my ability to teach them.”

[25]Mr Kane then met with the claimant on 9 April 2024, and a colleague who taught science and mathematics in year 9, namely Karen Inman, attended with the claimant. The claimant suggested that she should take on some teaching GCSE from Year 9. Mr Kane was embarrassed by this suggestion because it would require a commensurate reduction in Karen Inman’s hours, and she was present at the meeting. He declined to make any such change because of the effect it would have. The claimant asserts that Mr Kane adopted an aggressive tone at this meeting, which he strongly denies. The claimant also reported to Mrs Whitby, the respondent’s Director of Administration and Finance, that she had “interpreted Mr Kane as being aggressive”. The claimant’s evidence varied from asserting that it was a symptom of her disability which made her consider Mr Kane to have been aggressive (even if he were not), to a different suggestion that he actually was aggressive. There is no reference to this in any contemporaneous documents, and on balance I therefore prefer Mr Kane’s evidence that he was not aggressive at this meeting, and I so find.

[26]Mr Kane was concerned about the claimant’s continuing request for PPA time and on 12 April 2020 he wrote to the claimant: “I fully recognise that we need to keep things fair. So, in this spirit, moving forward, we will remunerate you for an extra hour per week for PPA time. However, in converse fairness, I am reducing your additional fee remission to the correct amount of 29% discount (0.4 of 71%). You have, up until now, benefited from a 57% reduction (0.8 of 71%) in recognition of your 12 hours without PPA. But, as you have pointed out, we must revert to a position which is fair for all. I hope you find this arrangement a better fit and a good deal clearer. On another note, to do specifically with year 11, I am deeply concerned about your admission that you would find it difficult to differentiate for the groups in Year 11. I need to be clear … If this is something you feel you cannot facilitate then we will need to have a conversation about how we move forward … If you need to discuss any of the above please make an appointment to come and see me”.

[27]On 16 April 2024 there was then a meeting between Mr Kane, Miss Larby, and the claimant to address the ongoing concerns with regard to differentiation between foundation and higher-level teaching. They also discussed budget constraints. It was agreed that the claimant would continue to deliver the course. The claimant did not raise any concern about her disability nor that she was at any disadvantage because of her disability. She emailed Mr Kane and Miss Larby after the meeting to thank them for their time and confirming that she felt reassured by their support. Mr Kane also requested the claimant to submit her outstanding probation review form.

[28]There was then an email exchange between the claimant and Mr Kane on 17 April 2024. The claimant stated: “I am glad we have worked out a plan together and feel reassured by your support.” In his response Mr Kane warned the claimant: “You must be very careful not to discuss others’ contracts/hours/conditions outside of the confines of HR as these are personal, private and confidential. For example, if other staff were aware that you benefited from such a favourable staff discount, then you can understand the problem. Similarly discussing any working conditions or any other staff has the potential to cause discontent or unhappiness and I would have to treat that very seriously indeed.” Mr Kane also confirmed that with effect from September 2024 the claimant’s fee remission would revert to the normal 0.4 of 71%

[29]Notwithstanding this exchange, and following discussion with the senior management, the decision was then taken by Mr Kane about 19 April 2024 to terminate the claimant’s employment on the basis that she had not survived her probationary period. The HR Department then requested the claimant to attend a meeting on 23 April 2024, the purpose of which was described as being “to discuss the future arrangements for maths”. The claimant submitted a sickness certificate the day before that meeting and was certified as being unfit to work until 5 May 2024 by reason of stress.

[30]Mr Kane then met with the claimant on her return on 7 May 2024. Although the respondent had described this as a “probationary review meeting” it was clear that the decision had already been taken to dismiss the claimant. For example, this had been confirmed in an earlier email on 24 April 2024 from Mrs Whitby to the HR Department with a copy to Mr Kane. This email stated: “We had decided on Friday last week that we definitely wanted to end Chloe’s employment due to a number of serious concerns about her conduct. She was in full health, and her sickness is not one of the concerns we have about her.”

[31]The claimant was not informed in terms that the meeting was likely to result in her dismissal, nor the reasons for that decision. She was allowed to be accompanied by a colleague, but she was not informed of her right to be accompanied by a union representative. The decision to dismiss her had already been taken before that meeting took place on 7 May 2024. The claimant was told that her employment was to be terminated and that she could either work out her contractual period of one month’s notice, or be paid in lieu of notice. The claimant decided to leave immediately and to accept one month’s pay in lieu of notice.

[32]As confirmed in the minutes of the meeting the respondent’s position was as follows: “We have over the past months been reviewing your performance against the standards expected by the school and a number of concerns have been raised. These are … Lack of experience of differentiating for years 10 and 11; expressing your concern about how this would work, leading to a lack of confidence from the senior team in your ability to differentiate effectively; the recent flow of information coming back to the senior team about your sowing seeds of discontent among staff, questioning contracts that are confidential to staff, spreading untruths about the Head of school (saying that he was aggressive). Further to this, making other staff feel uncomfortable and the need to have GCSE teaching in year 9, despite a teacher already being in that role … Overall this very deep concern from the senior team about your contribution to a level of toxicity which goes against the staff code of conduct … Your recent behaviour and interactions with others have given us great cause for concern. Despite confirming and repeating the arrangements for years 9, 10 and 11 owing to the size of the school and budgeting implications, you continue to revisit this. All of these concerns are such that we have come to the conclusion that despite the environment we have provided for your working, we do not believe that you will meet the standards expected and therefore we wish to give notice to end your contract with us at this time.” Mr Kane confirmed in his evidence that these were the reasons he decided to terminate the claimant’s employment and that this was supported by the respondent’s senior management.

[33]There were two main examples of the claimant “questioning confidential contracts”. The first was when the claimant had written to HR in April 2024 to complain about the hours allocated to Lisa Kabza, the colleague with 0.6 FTE with whom she shared the full-time position. She complained about the fact that she had “discovered” that Lisa had just 11 teaching hours per week the claimant also raised this with Mr Kane. She also suggested that some of Lisa’s hours could be reallocated to her. She also raised the matter of Karen Inman’s contract hours during her meeting with Mr Kane on 9 April 2024.

[34]The claimant subsequently decided to pursue this claim, and she commenced the Early Conciliation process with ACAS on 28 May 2024 (Day A). ACAS issued the Early Conciliation certificate on 9 July 2024 (Day B). The claimant presented these proceedings on 23 July 2024. It is not clear when these proceedings were served on the respondent, but the respondent entered its response and grounds of resistance on 14 October 2024.

[35]With effect from September 2024, Karen Inman was promoted to Key Stage 3 coordinator. Previously on 9 April 2025 Mr Kane had refused the claimant’s request for more teaching hours so that she could start teaching year 9 students the syllabus for year 10 which was to follow. Mr Kane refused the request because it would have meant reducing Karen Inman’s contracted hours. Miss Larby also confirmed to the claimant that Karen Inman had a full timetable at that stage and that she needed to retain her teaching hours for year 9 to have the correct number of hours. These circumstances no longer applied after September 2024 when Karen Inman was no longer able to teach year 9 maths because of her new position. The respondent was then able to offer teaching hours for year 9 to the claimant’s replacement.

[36]Following the termination of her employment the claimant applied for alternative employment, and she was required to submit a reference. The respondent was asked to complete this reference. Mr Kane did so on a computerised form and sent it to the prospective new employer in June 2024. The respondent did not retain a copy of this reference. In any event the claimant was informed that her application would not proceed because the reference was incomplete and/or unsatisfactory. Mr Kane’s evidence was that he definitely completed a reference and so the conclusion must be that for some reason the prospective new employer considered Mr Kane’s reference to be unsatisfactory in some way. We do not know why.

[37]The parties were then in dispute about the level of school fees which were required to be paid for the claimant’s son who was due to remain at the School for the autumn term from September 2024. By letter dated 28 August 2024 Mr Kane and Mrs Whitby had written to all parents on behalf of the respondent to confirm that new Government legislation would impose VAT on all school fees with effect from January 2025. That letter concluded: “parents not paying their fees monthly (over 10 months) may wish to consider this is a potentially helpful option …”

[38]By email dated 15 August 2024 Mrs Whitby emailed the claimant with an invoice for school fees for the autumn term 2024, which was expressed to be due for payment on or before 5 September 2024. She concluded by saying: “If you would like to pay by monthly instalments then please let me know.”

[39]The claimant replied by email dated 19 August 204 to say that she was proceeding with an employment tribunal claim and that she was entitled to a full term’s notice, and accordingly the 57% fee remission discount which she had previously enjoyed should continue until the end of that notice period. She calculated what she thought was due, applying this discount. By email dated 5 September 2024 Mrs Whitby replied to the effect: “as you are no longer an employee of the School the full fees are due for payment by the end of today. I emailed you back in June to make sure you are aware of this. We cannot adjust the invoice based on what a possible tribunal may decide.”

[40]Later that day the claimant replied to say that there remained an ongoing dispute about the legality of her dismissal and that she would only be paying the sum which she felt to be due if the School had given the appropriate notice period, after applying the preexisting fee remission. She explained that she needed to split this over the remaining four months of her son’s time with the School and therefore expressed her intention to pay the discounted fees by four monthly instalments.

[41]Mrs Whitby replied on 6 September 2020 to confirm: “the fee invoice still stands for the full amount” and that “the full amount of the term ahead must be paid by 5 pm on Wednesday 11 September. Failure to pay may result in [your son’s] suspension from School.” By email 9 September 2024 the claimant replied and asked: “We have always paid by monthly instalments under section 4.9 - please can we ask why this has changed now? We have not broken any of the terms and conditions under section 4 and therefore do not understand what grounds you can threaten to exclude …”

[42]Mrs Whitby replied on 9 September 2024, referring to the previous fee remission concession and stated: “As you are no longer employed by the School this prior arrangement has naturally come to an end. Since no new agreement has been concluded to allow for continued payment in instalments or to apply any discount, we must now follow the School’s standard payment policy. Accordingly, the outstanding fees will need to be paid in termly instalments, as is required of all parents and guardians …”

[43]In my judgment two separate matters have been conflated here. In the first instance, I agree that the School was entitled to issue a fee invoice for the full amount without any discount or fee remission. As a matter of fact, the claimant was no longer employed as a teacher at the School, and even though she had a potential claim for wrongful dismissal in connection with her notice period, the discounted fees only applied to existing members of staff. The other issue is that of whether the school fees, whatever level they were set out, could be paid by instalments. The letter from Mr Kane and Mrs Whitby on 28 August 2024 confirmed that the option of paying fees in 10 monthly instalments was available to all parents. Mrs Whitby had actually offered this in her email to the claimant of 15 August 2024. For some unexplained reason, the respondent changed its stance. It offered payment by instalments in writing on at least two occasions, then insisted on full payment, and then insisted on termly instalments The respondent did not call Mrs Whitby to give evidence, and I have heard no evidence as to why the respondent refused to allow the claimant to pay that term’s fee invoice in monthly instalments, rather than the whole term as a termly instalment (which had the effect of requiring the term’s fees to be paid in full because there was only one term remaining). The respondent has not provided any explanation for its changing position in this respect.

[44]In addition, the claimant was able to obtain a record of legal advice from IES/SEK to the School, to the effect that(i) the claimant was no longer an employee of the School and therefore no longer entitled to any fee remission, such that school fees were now payable in full; and

(ii) providing that fees were paid without remission, this could be by instalments. Nonetheless that offer was not confirmed.

[45]The claimant then decided to remove her son from the School. This then triggered a standard process whereby a form is sent to the Local Authority. For some unknown reason one of the respondent’s clerks completed the form to the effect that the claimant was removing her son for the purposes of home education. This incorrect information had the effect of “de-registering” the claimant’s son, or put another way the effect of persuading the Local Authority, temporarily at least, that they were not required to find a place in state education for the claimant’s son. On the face of it this appears to have been an administrative error, and there is no evidence that the clerk in question was aware of the presentation of these proceedings. Equally the respondent has not called any evidence to seek to explain what happened and why

[46]Having established the above facts, I now apply the law to the various claims.

[47]The Claims to be Determined

[48]The claimant’s claims to be determined by this Tribunal were agreed at two case management preliminary hearings and finally set out in a list of issues in the Case Management Order of Employment Judge Bax dated 15 August 2025. This is referred to in this judgment as the Agreed List of Issues. The claimant’s claims are for disability discrimination, (being discrimination arising from disability, and an alleged failure to make adjustments), victimisation, for discrimination on the grounds of part-time status, and for monetary claims presented as breach of contract or alternatively unlawful deduction from wages. I deal with each of these claims in turn.

[49]The Claimant’s Disability:

[50]As noted above the claimant had been diagnosed as autistic, and at all material claimant she had a mental impairment which had a substantial adverse effect on her ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities, particularly in the workplace. This included adverse effects on communication (struggling with ambiguous or inconsistent communication); routine and predictability (in that she relies on structure and advance notice, with sudden changes causing anxiety); fairness and systems (in that she has a strong internal sense of fairness and desire to follow rules and processes, and when policies are not apply consistently this causes distress and anxiety); and masking (like many autistic women she often masks distress in professional settings).

[51]I find that at all material times the claimant suffered from a mental impairment which had a substantial and long-term adverse effect on her ability to carry out normal day to day activities. There was a substantial adverse effect because it was more than minor or trivial, and there was a long-term effect because it lasted for at least 12 months. The respondent has conceded that the claimant was a disabled person by reason of the impairment relied upon at all material times. I agree with that concession, and I so find.

[52]Reasonable Adjustments

[53]The provisions relating to the duty to make reasonable adjustments are to be found in sections 20 and 21 of the EqA. The duty comprises of three requirements, of which the first is relevant in this case, namely that where a provision criterion or practice of A’s puts a disabled person at a substantial disadvantage in relation to a relevant matter in comparison with persons who are not disabled, there is a requirement to take such steps as it is reasonable to have to take to avoid that disadvantage. A failure to comply with this requirement is a failure to comply with a duty to make reasonable adjustments. A discriminates against a disabled person if A fails to comply with that duty in relation to that person. However, under paragraph 20(1)(b) of Schedule 8 of the EqA A is not subject to a duty to make reasonable adjustments if A does not know, and could not reasonably be expected to know –(a) … ;

(b) … that an interested disabled person has a disability and is likely to be placed at the disadvantage referred to in the first, second or third requirement.

[54]The constituent elements of claims in respect of an alleged failure to make reasonable adjustments are set out in Environment Agency v Rowan. Before considering whether any proposed adjustment is reasonable, the Tribunal must identify:(i) the provision, criterion or practice applied by or on behalf of the employer;

(ii) the identity of the nondisabled comparators (where appropriate); and

(iii) the nature and extent of the substantial disadvantage suffered by the claimant.

[55]Environment Agency v Rowan has been specifically approved by the Court of Appeal in Newham Sixth Form College v Sanders - the authorities make it clear that to find a breach of the duty to make reasonable adjustments, an employment tribunal had first to be satisfied that there was a PCP which placed the disabled person at a substantial disadvantage in comparison with persons who were not disabled. The tribunal had then to consider the nature and extent of the disadvantage which the PCP created by comparison with those who were not disabled, the employer's knowledge of the disadvantage, and the reasonableness of proposed adjustments.

[56]It is the essence of the duty to make reasonable adjustments that it requires the disabled person to be treated more favourably (as a result of their disability) than the non-disabled. They may need special assistance to compete on equal terms – per Lady Hale at para 47 of Archibald v Fife Council.

[57]As per HHJ Richardson at para 37 of General Dynamics Information Technology Ltd v Carranza

UKEAT/0107/14

KN: “The general approach to the duty to make adjustments under section 20(3) is now very well-known. The Employment Tribunal should identify(1) the employer's PCP at issue;

(2) the identity of the persons who are not disabled with whom comparison is made; and

(3) the nature and extent of the substantial disadvantage suffered by the employee. Without these findings the Employment Tribunal is in no position to find what, if any, step it is reasonable for the employer to have to take to avoid the disadvantage. It is then important to identify the "step". Without identifying the step it is impossible to assess whether it is one which it is reasonable for the employer to have to take”.

[58]There is no requirement to show that the disability caused the substantial disadvantage, merely that the PCP caused a substantial disadvantage to the disabled person as compared to those who are not disabled. This comparative aspect of the reasonable adjustments provision was described by Simler J in Sheikholeslami at para 48: “It is well established that the duty to make reasonable adjustments arises where a PCP puts a disabled person at a substantial disadvantage compared with people who are not disabled. The purpose of the comparison exercise with people who are not disabled is to test whether the PCP has the effect of producing the relevant disadvantage as between those who are and those who are not disabled, and whether what causes the disadvantage is the PCP … There is no requirement to identify a comparator or comparator group whose circumstances are the same or nearly the same as the disabled person’s circumstances”

[59]In Lamb v The Business Academy Bexley, the EAT observed that: “the phrase “PCP” is not defined in the legislation, but it is to be construed broadly, having regard to the statute’s purpose of eliminating discrimination against those who suffer disadvantage from a disability. It includes formal and informal practices, policies and arrangements, and may in certain cases include one- off decisions.” However, it is clear from Ishola v Transport for London, that although a PCP will not be narrowly construed, nonetheless the concept does not apply to every act of unfair treatment of a particular employee. It must be capable of being applied to others, and it suggests a state of affairs which indicates how similar cases are generally treated or how a similar case will be treated if it occurred again. This is consistent with Nottinghamshire City Transport Ltd v Harvey which states “practice connotes something which occurs more than on a one-off occasion and which has an element of repetition about it”.

[60]It is incumbent on a claimant to show the duty to make reasonable adjustments has arisen and there are facts from which it could be reasonably inferred, absent adequate explanation, that it has been breached. That requires(i) the showing of both substantial disadvantage (to show that the duty has arisen), and

(ii) evidence of some apparently reasonable adjustment that could have been made (the issue of breach) see Project Management Institute v Latif.

[61]I have considered the cases of Environment Agency v Rowan

[2008] IRLR 20

EAT; Newham Sixth Form College v Sanders EWCA Civ 7 May 2014; Archibald v Fife Council

[2004] IRLR 651

HL General Dynamics Information Technology Ltd v Carranza

[2015] ICR 169

EAT; Sheikholeslami v University of Edinburgh

[2018] IRLR 1090

; Ishola v Transport for London

[2020] ICR 1024

CA; Nottinghamshire City Transport Ltd v Harvey [2013] EqLR 4 EAT; and Project Management Institute v Latif

[2007] IRLR 579

EAT.

[62]The claimant relies on seven PCPs which are set out in the list of issues. My findings in respect of each of these are as follows:

[63]PCP1: Changing the timetable.

[64]The respondent concedes that this PCP was in place in that its practice was to make changes to the timetable, which was usually on a term-by-term basis

[65]PCP2: Requiring staff to teach two different syllabi (high-level and low-level) to the same group with reduced teaching time (four hours) compared to teaching one syllabus to each group (eight hours).

[66]The respondent concedes that this PCP was in place to the extent that it was the respondent’s practice to merge the year 10 maths groups in this way because of fluctuating pupil numbers on a termly basis.

[67]PCP3: Communicating changes to the teaching timetable by way of meeting minutes which were not sent to staff and were unclear.

[68]This PCP is denied by the respondent, and I find that there was no such PCP in place. The respondent’s practice was to discuss and to communicate timetable changes at the relevant staff meetings, which were then confirmed in the minutes of those meetings. There is no evidence that the minutes of any meeting were unclear. Any claim relying on this PCP is not well-founded and it is dismissed.

[69]PCP4: Failing to provide additional time or assistance to adapt to new class structures.

[70]The respondent denies that there was any such PCP in place, in that time and assistance were provided where appropriate. This complaint effectively identifies the claimant’s concern on 6 December 2023 when she discovered the potential merger of the two year 10 groups at the start of the January 2024 term. The claimant was given approximately one month’s notice of this proposed change, and in the event it did not occur. There was no suggestion from the claimant at the time that she was personally put to any disadvantage by the proposal, because her concerns were focused on how the changes would potentially disadvantage the pupils. In my judgment there was no such PCP in place. In addition, that specific allegation cannot be said to have caused the claimant any substantial disadvantage, and in any event the respondent had no knowledge of any potential disadvantage. This aspect of the claim is not well-founded and it is dismissed.

[71]PCP5: Not carrying out the scheduled appraisals in the spring term of 2024;

[72]There is no evidence in this claim as to whether there were any scheduled appraisals, and if so why they were not carried out. It is true that there was to be a probation review meeting towards the end of the probationary period once the claimant had returned the relevant form. She failed to do so, and the respondent failed to arrange a performance review meeting. These were the one-off circumstances of the claimant’s final weeks of employment. There is no evidence to suggest that the respondent has a practice of not scheduling or carrying out appraisal meetings. I find that this PCP was not in place, and any claim relying on this PCP is not well-founded and it is dismissed.

[73]PCP6: Not informing staff in advance of the nature of dismissal meetings.

[74]Similarly, there is no evidence that the respondent has in place a PCP whereby it fails to inform its staff in advance of the nature of dismissal meetings. In the particular circumstances of the claimant’s case, the decision had already been taken, and the meeting on 7 May 2024 was arranged to communicate the reason for dismissal. It was not a disciplinary or capability hearing where the claimant might be expected to state her case in response to allegations of capability or conduct which had been put to her. The claimant accepted in evidence that being given notice of this meeting would not have made any difference to the outcome. There is no evidence to suggest that the respondent has a practice of not informing staff in advance of the nature of dismissal meetings. I find that this PCP was not in place, and any claim relying on this PCP is not well-founded and it is dismissed.

[75]PCP7: Not informing staff of their right to be accompanied to the dismissal meetings.

[76]The same point applies to this PCP. It is true that in the particular circumstances of the claimant’s case she was not informed that she could have requested a representative to attend the meeting with her. She did have a colleague to accompany her. But that is not the point. There is no evidence to suggest that the respondent has a practice of not informing staff of their right to be accompanied to dismissal meetings. I find that this PCP was not in place, and any claim relying on this PCP is not well-founded and it is dismissed.

[77]The only surviving PCPs are therefore PCP1, and PCP2. These two PCPs are said to have put the claimant at a substantial disadvantage for the following reasons.

[78]PCPs 1 (changing the timetable): changes to routine or structure are distressing to the claimant and are difficult to manage; the claimant takes longer to process information and prepare for changes because of cognitive processing difficulties and executive functioning challenges.

[79]PCP 2: (requiring staff to teach two syllabi): moving between two syllabi was difficult for the claimant because making transitions is more difficult for the claimant; and the claimant takes longer to process information and prepare for changes because of cognitive processing difficulties and executive functioning challenges.

[80]To the extent that substantial means more than minor or trivial, I find that these two PCPs did cause this substantial disadvantage to the claimant when compared with non-disabled employees. However, although the School’s organisation had been notified at the outset of the claimant’s employment that she suffered from autism, Mr Kane and the senior management team had no actual knowledge of the claimant’s disability, and more particularly had no knowledge that either of these two PCPs caused or were likely to cause the disadvantage relied upon by the claimant. In short, the claimant’s complaints were all centred on her legitimate concerns as to whether the timetabling and the teaching of two syllabi were in the best interests of the students. She never raised the matter of her disability at the relevant times, nor that she might be put to any substantial disadvantage. Mr Kane and the other managers were simply unaware of that possibility.

[81]For these reasons I find the statutory duty to make such adjustments as might be reasonable was simply not engaged. I find that the claimant’s claim is not well-founded and it is dismissed.

[82]Discrimination Arising from Disability s15 EqA:

[83]Under section 15 (1) of the EqA a person (A) discriminates against a disabled person (B) if A treats B unfavourably because of something arising in consequence of B’s disability, and A cannot show that the treatment is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. Under section 15(2), this does not apply if A shows that A did not know, and could not reasonably have been expected to know, that B had the disability.

[84]The proper approach to section 15 claims was considered by Simler P in the case of Pnaiser v NHS England at paragraph 31:(a) Having identified the unfavourable treatment by A, the ET must determine what caused it, i.e. what the “something” was. The focus is on the reason in the mind of A; it involves an examination of the conscious or unconscious thought processes of A. It does not have to be the sole or main cause of the unfavourable treatment but it must have a significant influence on it.

(b) The ET must then consider whether it was something "arising in consequence of B’s disability”. The question is one of objective fact to be robustly assessed by the ET in each case. Furthermore:

(c) It does not matter in precisely what order the two questions are addressed but, it is clear, each of the two questions must be addressed,

(d) the expression "arising in consequence of" could describe a range of causal links … the causal link between the something that causes unfavourable treatment and the disability may include more than one link, and

(e) the more links in the chain there are between the disability and the reason for the impugned treatment, the harder it is likely to be to establish the requisite connection as a matter of fact.

[85]In City of York v Grosset, the Court of Appeal made it clear that s15(1)(a) EqA requires investigation of two distinct causative issues:(i) did A treat B unfavourably because of an (identified) “something”? and

(ii) did the “something” arise in consequence of B’s disability?

[86]As confirmed by Simler P in Sheikholeslami v University of Edinburgh: “The approach to s 15 Equality Act 2010 is now well established and not in dispute on this appeal. In short, this provision requires an investigation of two distinct causative issues:(i) did A treat B unfavourably because of an (identified) something? and

(ii) did that something arising in consequence of B’s disability? The first issue involves an examination of the putative discriminator’s state of mind to determine what consciously or unconsciously was the reason for any unfavourable treatment found. If the “something” was a more than trivial part of the reason for unfavourable treatment, then stage (i) is satisfied. The second issue is a question of objective fact for an employment tribunal to decide in the light of the evidence (see City of York v Grosset).

[87]In Robinson v Department for Work and Pensions the Court of Appeal emphasised the importance in a section 15 EqA claim of considering the thought processes of the putative discriminator, and also that “but for” causation does not suffice. The question of what amounts to “unfavourable” treatment was considered by the Supreme Court in Williams v Trustees of Swansea University Pension and Assurance Scheme. Lord Carnwath suggested that a relatively low threshold of disadvantage suffices to trigger the need for justification under section 15 EqA [at para 27].

[88]In Basildon & Thurrock NHS Foundation Trust v Weerasinghe the EAT held that the fact that unfavourable treatment might be loosely related to a person’s disability, or the context in which the disability was manifested, is not the same as showing that the treatment was the result of something arising out of the person’s disability.

[89]I have considered the cases of Pnaiser v NHS England

[2016] IRLR 170

EAT; Basildon & Thurrock NHS Foundation Trust v Weerasinghe

UKEAT/0397/14

; City of York Council v Grosset

[2018] IRLR 746

CA; Sheikholeslami v University of Edinburgh

[2018] IRLR 1090

; Robinson v Department for Work and Pensions

[2020] IRLR 884

; Williams v Trustees of Swansea University Pension and Assurance Scheme

[2019] IRLR 306

SC.

[90]The claimant’s claim under section 15 EqA is set out in the Agreed List of Issues. There are three specific claims of unfavourable treatment, which are as follows:(1) dismissing the claimant;

(2) reducing the claimant’s fee discount; and

(3) refusing to give the claimant additional hours, whereas the same hours were offered to the new hire.

[91]The claimant claims that the following arose in consequence of her disability of autism:(1) the claimant interpreted the Headteacher’s tone as aggressive in the meeting of 7 April 2024;

(2) the Headteacher interpreted the claimant’s communication style as inappropriate or otherwise misinterpreted her in the meetings of 7 April 2024 and on 9 or 10 April 2024; and

(3) the claimant followed an instruction to request extra hours from the Headteacher. This arises from the claimant’s inability to assess nuances and social cues.

[92]With regard to analysing what is the “something” which is said to arise in consequence of the claimant’s disability or autism, I find as follows. In the first place the claimant suggests that her “interpretation” that Mr King was aggressive arose in consequence of autism. However, the claimant’s evidence varied between saying that she had (incorrectly) identified his tone as aggressive (when it was not) because of autism, as against an accusation that Mr King was actually aggressive. For the reasons explained in the findings of fact above I find that the claimant accused Mr King of actually being aggressive, when he was not. I do not accept that she wrongly interpreted his tone as aggressive or that to do so arose in consequence of her autism.

[93]Secondly the claimant suggests that Mr Kane interpreted her communication style as inappropriate or otherwise misinterpreted her in the April 2024 meetings referred to. However, there is no evidence that Mr Kane misinterpreted the claimant in this way. On the contrary, the claimant’s arguments with regard to the timetabling and the syllabi were clear and cogent. Mr Kane understood them, but the trouble was that he did not agree with her because of the budgetary constraints, and he became concerned that she would not deliver the curriculum as instructed.

[94]The third suggestion is that the claimant only requested extra hours from the head teacher because she followed an instruction to do so. Whereas I accept that the claimant may sometimes be unable to assess nuances and social clues, and that this arises in consequence of her autism, I do not accept the implication that the claimant only requested extra hours because she could not appropriately assess nuances and social clues. The claimant repeatedly asked for extra hours because she wanted them, by asking both the senior management team and Mr Kane. Asking for extra hours was not something that arose in consequence of her disability. It arose because of concerns relating to the timetable, and her desire for more paid hours, whether within the curriculum, or for PPA.

[95]Applying this to the less favourable treatment relied upon, the first allegation is that of dismissal. I find that Mr Kane’s reasons for dismissal were clearly explained at the meeting on 7 May 2024, and Mr Kane’s evidence to this tribunal was consistent with this. In the first place the senior management team had a lack of confidence in the claimant’s ability to differentiate in the new proposed timetable for years 10 and 11; the claimant had discussed and questioned contracts which were perceived to be confidential; the claimant had wrongly asserted that Mr Kane had been aggressive; and the claimant had appeared to pressurise another member of staff to withdraw from year 9 teaching. Dismissal is clearly unfavourable treatment, but in my judgment the reasons for the dismissal are clear, and it cannot be said that dismissal occurred because of any of the matters alleged to have risen in consequence of the claimant’s disability. There is simply no causal link between the two.

[96]The second allegation of unfavourable treatment is reducing the claimant’s fee discount. I accept that reducing the level of school fee remission is unfavourable treatment. However, the reasons for this were clear. The claimant had sought to vary the originally agreed contractual terms whereby she taught 12 hours without any PPA, but with fee remission at a more generous rate than would otherwise have been the case. When she complained about her lack of PPA hours Mr Kane decided to regularise the position by allowing her request for 10% of her hours for PPA, but as a consequence reducing the more generous fee remission to that which normally applied. The reduction in the claimant’s fee remission level was not put in place because of any matter which arose in consequence of the claimant’s disability. Again, there is simply no causal link between the two.

[97]The third allegation is refusing to give the claimant additional hours although the same were offered to the new hire. Again, I accept that this could in principle amount to unfavourable treatment. However, in this case the respondent needed to appoint a key stage 3 coordinator from September 2024, and Karen Inman successfully applied for this role. She was then no longer able to teach year 9 maths. This meant that Mr Kane was then able to allocate the year 9 hours which had earlier been discussed and requested by the claimant. The failure historically to offer the claimant the additional hours in question was because there was no opportunity within budgetary constraints to do so. The only reason it was subsequently offered to the new hire was because of later events and Karen Inman’s promotion, which freed up the possibility of someone else teaching her year 9 hours. The claimant cannot be said to have suffered this unfavourable treatment because of something arising in consequence of her disability. Again, there is simply no causal link between the two.

[98]For these reasons I find that the claimant’s claim under section 15 EqA for discrimination arising from disability is not well-founded and it is hereby dismissed.

[99]Part-time Worker Discrimination

[100]Regulation 5 of the Part-time Workers (Prevention of Less Favourable Treatment) Regulations 2000 provides that: 5(1) A part-time worker has the right not to be treated less favourably than the employer treats a comparable full-time worker-(a) as regards the terms of his contract; or

(b) by being subjected to any other detriment by any act, or deliberate failure to act, of his employment. Under Regulation 5(2), the rights conferred by paragraph (1) apply only if the treatment is on the ground that the worker is a part-time worker, and the treatment is not justified on objective grounds. Under Regulation 5(3) in determining whether a part-time worker has been treated less favourably than a comparable full-time worker, the pro-rata principle shall be applied unless it is inappropriate.

[101]The claimant relies on two allegations of less favourable treatment in the Agreed List of Issues, as follows:(1) The claimant was required to teach for all of her contracted hours and also expected to do other duties such as boarding duties. Full-time members were not required to teach for their full contracted hours; and

(2) the claimant was not paid the PPA whereas full-time staff were.

[102]The claimant relies on four full-time comparators namely Karen Inman, Chris Logan, Juliet Parker and Jon Goss.

[103]In my judgment the difficulty that the claimant faces with her claim is the lack of an appropriate and suitable full-time comparator. This arises from the specific and different arrangements which were put in place for the claimant, and which were not in place for other full-time teachers, either generally, or for any of her four named comparators. In the first place the respondent identified a requirement for a part-time teacher to teach three morning classes of four hours each. The claimant agreed to this arrangement, and the respondent did not have scope within its budget to offer any additional hours. This arrangement did not include any time for PPA, but as a form of recompense the arrangement did include an enhanced discount against school fees which (pro rata) exceeded the discount offered to full-time teachers. In addition, the claimant was not required to perform the same duties which full-time teachers were, particularly with regard to covering other teachers’ absences, and with regard to break duties, after-school clubs, and other supervision of boarders. This did happen very occasionally in the claimant’s case, but it was not an equivalent part of her duties (even on a pro rata basis) to the extent that it was for full-time teachers.

[104]It is true that the claimant was treated differently than full-time teachers because of the different nature of the relationship between the respondent and the claimant, which suited both, and which was different in nature from relationship with full-time teachers. That is not to say however that the claimant necessarily suffered any less favourable treatment given that, in the round, the arrangements included a more generous discounted rate for her son’s school fees. In any event, the claimant has not been able to identify a true comparator enjoying the same relationship as the claimant, but on a full-time basis. Put simply, there is no basis for the claimant to suggest that there was any full-time comparator engaged on the same basis of the claimant was, nor that she was treated differently on the grounds of her part-time status.

[105]In my judgment this claim is not well-founded, and it is hereby dismissed.

[106]Victimisation s27 EqA:

[107]The definition of victimisation is found in section 27 of the EqA. A person(a) (A) victimises another person

(b) (B) if A subjects B to a detriment because B does a protected act or A believes that B has done, or may do, a protected act. The following are all examples of a protected act, namely bringing proceedings under the EqA; giving evidence or information in connection with proceedings under the EqA; doing any other thing for the purposes of or in connection with the EqA; and making an allegation (whether or not express) that A or another person has contravened the EqA. Giving false evidence or information, or making a false allegation, is not a protected act if the evidence or information is given, or the allegation is made, in bad faith.

[108]The provisions relating to the burden of proof are to be found in section 136 of the EqA, which provides in section 136(2) that if there are facts from which the court could decide, in the absence of any other explanation, that a person (A) contravened the provision concerned, the court must hold that the contravention occurred. However by virtue of section 136(3) this does not apply if A shows that A did not contravene the provision. A reference to the court includes a reference to an employment tribunal.

[109]Thus the burden of proof will shift if the worker proves that the employer has done a protected act, and that the worker has been subject to a detriment.

[110]The remedies available to the tribunal are to be found in section 124 of the EqA. The tribunal may make a declaration as to the rights of the complainant and the respondent in relation to the matters to which the proceedings relate; may order the respondent to pay compensation to the complainant (on a tortious measure, including injury to feelings); and make an appropriate recommendation. In addition the tribunal may also award interest on any award pursuant to section 139 of the EqA.

[111]The interest payable on discrimination awards is to be calculated in accordance with the Employment Tribunals (Interest on Awards in Discrimination Cases) Regulations 1996 ("the Interest Regulations"). Under regulation 2 the tribunal shall consider whether to award interest, and if it chooses to do so then under regulation 3 the interest is to be calculated as simple interest accruing from day to day. Under regulation 6 the interest on an award for injury to feelings is to be from the period beginning on the date of the act of discrimination complained of and ending on the day of calculation. All other sums are to be calculated for a period beginning with a midpoint date between the act of discrimination and ending on the day of calculation.

[112]I have considered the cases of Warburton v Chief Constable of Northamptonshire Police

[2022] ICR 925

EAT, applying Chief Constable of West Yorkshire v Khan

[2001] 1 WLR 1947

HL; Nagarajan v London Regional Transport

[2000] 1 AC 501

; Chief Constable of Greater Manchester v Bailey

[2017] EWCA Civ 425

; Shakil v Samsons Ltd

[2024] EAT 192

] Vento v West Yorkshire Police

[2003] IRLR 102

CA; Da’Bell v NSPCC

[2010] IRLR 19

EAT; Simmons v Castle

[2012] EWCA Civ 1039

; De Souza v Vinci Construction (UK) Ltd

[2017] EWCA Civ 879

; and the Eighth Addendum dated 27 March 2025 to the Presidential Guidance on awards for injury to feelings and psychiatric injury dated 5 September 2017.

[113]What constitutes a detriment under the victimisation provisions was recently set out by the ET in Warburton v the Chief Constable of Northamptonshire Police. The key test is encapsulated in the question “is the treatment of such a kind that a reasonable worker would or might take the view that in all the circumstances it was to his detriment?” That precludes an unjustified sense of grievance from amounting to a detriment. The test is not a wholly objective one given the alternatives that the reasonable worker would or might take the prescribed view. It is not necessary to establish any physical or economic consequence. Although the test is framed by reference to a reasonable worker, it is not a wholly objective test. It is enough that a reasonable worker might take such a view. This means that the answer to the question cannot be found only in the view taken by the ET itself. The ET might be of one view, and be perfectly reasonable in that view, but if a reasonable worker (although not all reasonable workers) might take the view that, in all the circumstances, it was to his detriment, the test is satisfied. It should not, therefore, be particularly difficult to establish a detriment for these purposes.

[114]The test of causation is similar to that for direct discrimination. Whether a detriment is because of a protected act should be addressed by asking why A acted as they did, and not by applying a “but for” approach. The protected act must be a real reason for the treatment – see Chief Constable of Greater Manchester v Bailey. Put another way, the correct legal test to the causation or “reason why” question is whether the protected act had a significant influence on the outcome - see Warburton, applying Chief Constable of West Yorkshire v Khan; Nagarajan v London Regional Transport and Chief Constable of Greater Manchester v Bailey.

[115]As recorded in the Agreed List of Issues, the claimant relies on one protected act, namely the presentation of this claim (which was presented on 23 July 2024). The claimant relies of four detriments said to have been caused by this protected act:(1) submitting unfavourable and or incomplete references to a prospective employer of the claimant in June 2024;

(2) introducing a requirement for the claimant to pay her son’s fees in full while other parents were allowed to pay in instalments in September 2024;

(3) informing the claimant that her son would be suspended if she was not able to pay the fees in full in September 2024; and

(4) deregistering the claimant’s son without her permission in September 2024.

[116]There is clearly a difficulty with the first allegation of detriment, namely the reference. This is because the protected act relied upon in the Agreed List of Issues is the presentation of this claim which took place on 23 July 2024. This was after the provision of the reference relied upon in June 2024. It cannot be said therefore that there is any causal link between the presentation of these proceedings, and the nature of the reference which had already been provided.

[117]During these proceedings the claimant suggested that the presentation of the claim necessarily includes the commencement of the process under which the claim can be submitted, namely the commencement of the Early Conciliation process with ACAS. This was notified on 28 May 2024 (Day A under the process), and this does predate the reference. However, there has been no evidence before this tribunal as to what, if any, information was passed to the respondent during the Early Conciliation process, or when. The claimant has not established that there was any protected act before the presentation of this claim (on 23 July 2024) in the sense that the respondent was aware before the disputed reference of any potential claim, and more importantly that it met the requirements of section 27(2) to the effect that any potential claim related to the EqA.

[118]In my judgment the protected act relied upon, as confirmed in the Agreed List of Issues, is the actual presentation of this claim. This post-dated the provision of the disputed reference, and it cannot be said therefore that this was a detriment suffered by the claimant because of the protected act relied upon. This first aspect of the victimisation claim is not well-founded, and it is therefore dismissed.

[119]To deal with the third allegation next (albeit slightly out of order) this is informing the claimant that her son would be suspended if she was not able to pay the relevant school fees. I accept Mr Kane’s evidence that it was standard practice for the School to suspend pupils if the relevant fees were not being paid. Although this is clearly detrimental treatment, this was standard practice, and there is no evidence that this treatment was only applied to the claimant because she had presented these proceedings. Again, there is simply no causal link between the two. This allegation of victimisation is not well-founded, and it is dismissed.

[120]This leaves the second and fourth allegations of detrimental treatment, namely requiring the claimant in September 2024 to pay the school fees in full while others were allowed to pay in instalments; and incorrectly reporting the claimant’s son as about be home educated, thus de-registering him from the local authority education system. I find that in each case this was detrimental treatment. The final question to be determined is whether the respondent subjected the claimant to these detriments because the claimant had done the protected act relied upon, namely having presented these proceedings, in the sense that the presentation of these proceedings was the real reason for this detrimental treatment, or that it had a significant influence on the outcome.

[121]In my judgment, in respect of these second and fourth allegations of detrimental treatment, there is a clear protected act, the claimant has suffered detriment, and the respondent has been unable to offer a cogent explanation as to why this happened. In these circumstances the burden of proof under section 136 EqA shifts to the respondent to prove, on the balance of probabilities, why the claimant suffered this detrimental treatment, and more particularly that it was not because she had made the protected act relied upon. In this case the respondent has been unable to do this, and I therefore conclude that the claimant’s claim for victimisation is well-founded in respect of the second fourth allegations of detrimental treatment.

[122]The claimant seeks an award for injury to feelings. I accept her evidence that she found the refusal to pay fees by instalments upsetting and annoying, but more importantly, she has given evidence as to the distress caused by the deregistration of her son from the local authority roll of pupils eligible for education. She was very upset at the impact which this had on her son, and she was very upset at the steps which she had to take to educate her son in the interim period and to seek to resolve the matter. The claimant does not rely on any medical evidence in support, but the respondent does not challenge the claimant’s evidence the effect that she felt upset in this way.

[123]It is always difficult to make an assessment for injury to feelings in these circumstances. In my judgment an appropriate award lies towards the top end of the lower Vento band, and accordingly I make an award in the sum of £10,000 as compensation for injury to the claimant’s feelings.

[124]The claimant is entitled to interest at 8% under the relevant Regulations from the date of the victimisation complained of. If we take this as, say, 20 September 2024 then that is one year and two weeks to the date of calculation today (3 October 2024). This is 379 days at 8%. That is a daily rate of £2.19, which is total interest of £830.01.

[125]The respondent is therefore ordered to pay compensation to the claimant in the sum of £10,830.01

[126]PPA Payments - Breach of Contract/Unlawful Deductions

[127]The claimant asserts that she was entitled to a 10% payment for planning, preparation and assessment time (PPA). There is a dispute as to whether the claimant was entitled to this, whether it was paid to the claimant, and whether the respondent was entitled to reduce the payment because of an additional discount on tuition fees. This claim is presented as a claim for breach of contract or alternatively for unlawful adoption from wages.

[128]Any claim for breach of contract is permitted by article 3 of the Employment Tribunals Extension of Jurisdiction (England and Wales) Order 1994 (“the Order”) and the claim was outstanding on the termination of employment.

[129]Normal contractual principles apply to claims under the Order, which includes the right of set-off, even in circumstances where the employer has not entered an employer’s counterclaim under paragraph 4 of the Order, see for instance Ridge v HM Land Registry

[2014] UKEAT 0485/12

[130]The alternative claim is based on the principle that an employee has the right not to suffer unauthorised deductions from wages. Section 13 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (“the Act”) provides: “13(1) an employer shall not make a deduction from wages of a worker employed by him unless –(a) the deduction is required or authorised to be made by virtue of a statutory provision or a relevant provision of the worker’s contract, or

(b) the worker has previously signified in writing his agreement or consent to the making of the deduction.”

[131]For the reasons explained in the findings of fact above, the claimant’s entitlement to increased pay for PPA was only due to commence at the start of the new school term in September 2024. In short this is because of the clear link between the level of fee remission, and the agreement to introduce payment for PPA. Mr Kane agreed in his letter of 12 April 2024 “moving forward, we will remunerate you an extra hour per week for PPA time”. It was clear that this was linked to a reduction of the additional fee remission from a discount of 57% to a lower discount of 29% to start in the next School year from September 2024. The respondent did not apply the lower level of discounted fees at that time (during the summer term of 2024). The PPA payments were only due to commence at the start of the new term in September 2024 at which stage the lower level of discounted fees would apply. In addition, Mr Kane did not give instructions to amend the respondent’s payroll which in all probability would have occurred if his understanding was that the PPA payments were to apply immediately.

[132]Given the claimant’s employment terminated before the commencement of this new arrangement which was due to take effect from September 2024, the claimant’s claim that she suffered a breach of contract or alternatively unlawful deduction from wages in respect of the non-payment of PPA during her employment is not wellfounded and it is dismissed. However, it does have an impact on the wrongful dismissal claim, for the following reasons.

[133]Wrongful Dismissal

[134]There is a dispute between the parties as to the correct period of notice due to the claimant on her dismissal. The claimant asserts that she should have been paid one full term’s notice. The respondent’s position is that the claimant was still in her probationary period and was entitled to one month’s notice only, which has already been paid to the claimant in lieu of that notice period. There is no suggestion from the respondent that the claimant was guilty of gross misconduct such that the respondent was entitled to dismiss without notice.

[135]This is effectively a claim for breach of contract which is permitted by article 3 of the Employment Tribunals Extension of Jurisdiction (England and Wales) Order 1994 (“the Order”) because this potential claim was outstanding on the termination of employment.

[136]There is no dispute between the parties that the correct level of notice due to the claimant on the termination of her employment is either one month (if the claimant were to be dismissed during her probationary period), or a full term’s notice to expire at the end of the term, in the event that the claimant had completed her probationary period. This was clear from clause 5 of the contract, and it is consistent with general teachers’ terms and conditions. Similarly there is no dispute between the parties that the claimant was dismissed on 7 May 2024

[137]The respondent’s position is that the claimant had failed to complete her probationary period. However, clause 4 of the claimant’s contract states that “the first six months from the start of the employment are considered probationary”. The claimant commenced employment on 4 September 2023, and this period of six months therefore expired on 4 March 2024. The respondent has argued that the claimant’s failure to return its required form means that the probationary period is necessarily extended. I do not agree. The claimant makes the good point that there was a requirement not only for the form to be returned, but for there to be a probationary review meeting as well, and the respondent failed to arrange this within the six month period. There was never any indication or agreement that the probationary period of six months was to be extended, to accommodate this meeting, or for any other reason.

[138]In my judgment the probationary period was not extended, and it had expired after six months and approximately two months before the claimant was dismissed. For this reason, the claimant was entitled to a full term’s notice, to expire on 31 December 2024. She was only paid in lieu of notice for one month’s notice for the period between 7 May and 7 June 2024. She is entitled to damages for her losses during the balance of that lost notice period. For the reasons explained above this includes PPA payments, but only with effect from the commencement of the following school term from September 2024.

[139]The respondent does not dispute the claimant’s calculation that her gross weekly pay was £269.28, and that the additional PPA payment was at the level of £22.44 per week. The correct notice of payment should therefore have been for 34 weeks at £269.28 (from 7 May until 31 December 2024), which is £9,155.52, together with 17 weeks and two days (say 17.3) at £22.44 (£388.21) which is a sub-total of £9,543.73. The notice pay actually received (namely one month at £1,166.67) falls to be deducted from this sum which leaves £8,377.06.

[140]The claimant’s claim for wrongful dismissal is therefore well-founded and the respondent is ordered to pay the claimant the gross sum of £8,377.06.

[1]The claimant has applied for a reconsideration of the judgment dated 3 October 2025 which was sent to the parties on 24 October 2025 (“the Judgment”). The grounds are set out in her email dated 5 November 2025, which was received at the tribunal office on that same day.

[2]The Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024 contain the Employment Tribunal Rules of Procedure (“the Rules”). Under Rule 69 an application for reconsideration under Rule 68 must be made within 14 days of the date on which the decision (or, if later, the written reasons) were sent to the parties. The application was therefore received within the relevant time limit.

[3]The grounds for reconsideration are only those set out in Rule 68, namely that it is necessary in the interests of justice to do so.

[4]The grounds relied upon by the claimant are these:(a) there were procedural irregularities in the disclosure process (namely that the respondent failed to comply with its duty of full disclosure throughout these proceedings);

(b) there was a failure to draw adverse inferences against the respondent because of the repeated failures to comply with the disclosure process; and

(c) there was an unsafe or perverse finding relating to knowledge of the claimant’s disability (in short the finding that the respondent’s main HR Department knew of the claimant’s disability but the relevant managers for the respondent had no actual knowledge of the same). The application for reconsideration is limited to two of the claimant’s claims, namely the alleged failure by the respondent to make reasonable adjustments, and the claim for discrimination arising from disability.

[5]These matters raised by the claimant have already been considered in the light of all of the evidence presented to the tribunal before it reached its decision. With regard to the first two issues relating to disclosure and inferences, all of the claimant’s arguments as to the respondent’s perceived failures in complying with the disclosure process were raised repeatedly by the claimant during the hearing, and the allegations were put to the respondent’s witnesses. The Tribunal was fully aware of these allegations during the hearing, and before the Judgment was made.

[6]With regard to the third matter now raised, namely the respondent’s knowledge of the claimant’s disability, the matter of the respondent’s actual or constructive knowledge was raised and discussed during the hearing and before the Judgment was made. In any event, it is to be noted from the Judgment that the claim relating to an alleged failure to make reasonable adjustments was decided to be not well-founded because only the first and second PCPs relied upon were in place, and as a matter of fact the respondent had no actual knowledge of any alleged substantial disadvantage said to have been suffered by the claimant as result of either these two remaining PCPs. With regard to the claim under section 15 EqA that there was discrimination arising from the claimant’s disability, this claim was rejected because there was no causal link between the three allegations of unfavourable treatment relied upon, and the matters which were said to have arisen in consequence of the claimant’s disability. In other words neither claim failed because the respondent’s relevant managers at the School did not know the fact that the claimant was disabled, whereas the HR department did know.

[7]This is not a matter in which new evidence can be said to have come to light after the hearing, as recently discussed in Mayanja v City of Bradford Metropolitan Borough Council

[2025] EAT 160

[8]Judicial discretion as to reconsideration should be exercised having regard to the interests of both parties and the public interest in finality in litigation (Outasight VB Ltd v Brown

UKEAT/0253/14/LA

[9]The earlier case law suggests that the interests of justice ground should be construed restrictively. The Employment Appeal Tribunal (“the EAT”) in Trimble v Supertravel Ltd

[1982] ICR 440

decided that if a matter has been ventilated and argued then any error of law falls to be corrected on appeal and not by review. In addition, in Fforde v Black EAT 68/80 (where the applicant was seeking a review in the interests of justice under the former Rules which is analogous to a reconsideration under the current Rules) the EAT decided that the interests of justice ground of review does not mean “that in every case where a litigant is unsuccessful he is automatically entitled to have the tribunal review it. Every unsuccessful litigant thinks that the interests of justice require a review. This ground of review only applies in the even more exceptional case where something has gone radically wrong with the procedure involving a denial of natural justice or something of that order”.

[10]More recent case law suggests that the "interests of justice" ground should not be construed as restrictively as it was prior to the introduction of the "overriding objective" (which is now set out in Rule 3). This requires the tribunal to give effect to the overriding objective to deal with cases fairly and justly. As confirmed in Williams v Ferrosan Ltd

[2004] IRLR 607

EAT, it is no longer the case that the "interests of justice" ground was only appropriate in exceptional circumstances. However, in Newcastle Upon Tyne City Council v Marsden

[2010] IRLR 743

, the EAT confirmed that it is incorrect to assert that the interests of justice ground need not necessarily be construed so restrictively, since the overriding objective to deal with cases justly required the application of recognised principles. These include that there should be finality in litigation, which is in the interest of both parties.

[11]In Ebury Partners UK Ltd v Davis EAT [2023] the EAT held that while it may be appropriate to reconsider a decision where there has been some procedural mishap, the jurisdiction should not be invoked to correct a supposed error made by the tribunal after the parties have had a fair opportunity to present their case on the relevant issue. This is particularly the case where the error alleges one of law, which is more appropriately corrected by the EAT.

[12]Accordingly, I refuse the application for reconsideration pursuant to Rule 70(2) because there is no reasonable prospect of the Judgment being varied or revoked.