Mrs S Vickerage v Dorset County Hospital NHS Foundation Trust: 1401661/2024

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Case No 1401661/2024

Between

Mrs S VickerageClaimant

Dorset County Hospital NHS Foundation TrustRespondent

Before

Employment Judge Murdoch

Mr Hallstrom (instructed by counsel) for claimant

Mr Loftus (instructed by solicitor) for respondent

Date 15 October 2025

JUDGMENT

The complaint of discrimination arising from disability contrary to section 15 of the Equality Act (EA 2010) and harassment related to disability contrary to section 26 of the EA 2010 were brought out of time, time is not extended, and the claims are dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Approved by:

REASONS

[1]This was a preliminary hearing to determine whether the claims were brought in time and, if not, whether the Claimant was entitled to the benefit of an extension under the just and equitable test.

The claims

[2]By a claim form presented on 17 July 2024 the Claimant brought the complaint of discrimination on the grounds of disability. The Claimant makes three claims of unlawful discrimination arising from disability contrary to section 15 of the Equality Act (EA 2010) and three claims of unlawful harassment related to disability contrary to section 26 of the EA 2010.

[3]These claims relate to the sending of an email by an employee of the Respondent to one or more other employees of the Respondent on three separate occasions: 19 June 2023, 12 July 2023 and 15 November 2023. The Claimant was not copied to any of these emails, and was unaware of them until she received them on 8 April 2024 pursuant to a data subject access request. She says that comments made in those e-mails were harassment or unfavourable treatment. Case No: 1401661/2024 2

The hearing

[4]I heard the claim on 15 October 2025. The hearing was heard remotely. Both parties were represented. The Claimant provided a witness statement, which became her evidence in chief, and she answered questions from the Respondent’s representative under oath. Both parties provided written submissions and authorities and gave oral closing statements. I adjourned to deliberate and gave my judgment orally. Issues for the Tribunal to decide

[5]On the 7 October 2025, the Respondent conceded that the Claimant was disabled by reason of Chronic Fatigue Syndrome at the relevant time of her discrimination allegations dated June 2023 to November 2023.

[6]The remaining issues to be decided were as follows:(1) Whether the Claimant’s claims were presented in time;

(2) If not, whether an extension of time should be granted such that the claims can proceed; and

(3) Alternatively, whether any of the claims should be struck out or made subject to a Deposit Order because of time limits. The law in relation to time limits: the just and equitable test

[7]When considering whether it is just and equitable to extend time, it is worth keeping in mind the following:(1) The discretion to extend time is a wide one.

(2) Time limits are to be observed strictly in employment tribunals. There is no presumption that time will be extended unless it cannot be justified. The reverse is true: the exercise of discretion is the exception rather than the rule.

(3) The burden of persuading the Tribunal that it is just and equitable to extend time rests on the Claimant.

(4) If a tribunal directs itself correctly in law, the EAT can only interfere if the decision is, in the technical sense, ‘perverse’, i.e. no reasonable tribunal properly directing itself in law could have reached it, or the tribunal failed to take into account relevant factors, or took into account irrelevant factors, or made a decision which was not based on the evidence.

(5) What factors are relevant to the exercise of the discretion, and how they should be balanced, are a matter for the tribunal. Two factors that are almost always relevant when considering the exercise of any discretion whether to extend time: the length of, and reasons for, the delay; and whether the delay has prejudiced the Respondent (for example, by preventing or inhibiting it from investigating the claim while matters were fresh). Findings of fact and conclusions

[8]The Claimant was employed by the Respondent from March 2015 to 6 March 2024 as a Therapies Assistant/Administrator. The claim form details Case No: 1401661/2024 3 that the Claimant’s employment was terminated on 6 March 2024 on grounds of sickness capability.

[9]A few days later, on 10 March 2024, the Claimant made a subject access request to the Respondent. The Claimant received the response to this request on 8 April 2024, which included 129 documents.

[10]The Claimant notified ACAS of the dispute on 27 March 2024 and the certificate was issued on 8 May 2024. This was the first mandatory certificate (EC Reference Number R150670/24/15). The Claimant referred to this early conciliation certificate number within section 2.3 of her Claim Form.

[11]There is a second non-mandatory certificate. The notification occurred on 28 May 2024 and the certificate was issued on 20 June 2024.

[12]On 8 May 2024, the claimant’s dismissal appeal hearing took place. On 10 May 2024, the appeal outcome letter was sent to the claimant.

[13]The Claimant submitted her claim form on 17 July 2024. Out of time

[14]The parties agreed that the claim for discrimination arising from disability under section 15 is out of time. There is therefore no need to consider this further.

[15]The claimant’s contention is that her harassment claim under section 26 did not crystalise until she received the emails on 8 April 2024 and is therefore not out of time.

[16]The Claimant’s representative pointed me to the case of Greasley-Adams v Royal Mail Group

[2023] ICR 1031

EAT to support his contention that the harassment claim was not out of time. This case finds there can be no perception of harassment unless the Claimant is aware of the conduct, but it does not concern the date at which the time limit starts to run in harassment cases.

[17]I do not accept that time starts to run from 8 April 2024. The claimant’s claim rests on three emails dated: 19 June 2023, 12 July 2023 and 15 November 2023. Accordingly, applying the normal limitation period of three months less one day (subject to ACAS early conciliation), the deadlines for presentation of a claim in relation to each allegation would be 18 September 2023, 11 October 2023 and 14 February 2024 respectively.

[18]I find that these emails amount to conduct extending over a period, as there is clearly a unifying feature to the three internal emails which relate to broadly the same subject matter. The end of the period is therefore the last email, which is dated 15 November 2023, and which makes the deadline for claim form submission to be the 14 February 2024.

[19]The Claimant submitted her claim form on 17 July 2024, which is over five months out of time. Case No: 1401661/2024 4

[20]I find that the fact the Claimant did not receive these emails until 8 April 2024 is relevant, but I will consider that relevance at the second stage of the analysis, namely, whether it is just and equitable to extend time, rather than the first stage, which concerns the purely factual question of whether the claim was presented out of time. Just and equitable to extend tine

[21]I accept that the Claimant did not know about the three emails until a few days after 8 April 2024, as it took her a few days to process the documents. I accept that she did not know until, say, 11 April 2024. As I note above, I consider this to be a relevant factor. Indeed, I consider it to be a highly relevant factor, which I have taken into account in this case.

[22]The Claimant first notified ACAS on 27 March 2024. Importantly, she made this contact before she received the relevant emails. This is likely because she had been advised as such, or she or her husband had done a simple google search to find out the process for submitting a claim to the Employment Tribunal.

[23]I find that the Claimant was already represented by her Trade Union, at the latest, by early May 2024. This is because her Trade Union representative accompanied her to her appeal hearing on 8 May 2024 and she said in oral evidence that she was told she was being represented by her Union around April or May 2024. She was also being assisted by her husband.

[24]When she was asked in oral evidence why she did not submit the claim form shortly after the 8 May 2024 (which is when she was accompanied by her Trade Union representative to her appeal meeting), she said she was focused on one bit at a time. She also said that her representative at Thompsons was dealing with the delays and that he knew there were delays.

[25]I accept that the Claimant was ‘not in a good place’ at this time. I accept that the Claimant’s medical records make generic references to her mood. But it was accepted by both parties that there is no medical evidence to show that the Claimant was too unwell to submit a claim form.

[26]The Claimant was being supported by ACAS, her Trade Union representative and her husband. She was also able to participate in other similar issues, such as her appeal proceedings. I do not accept that the co-existence of the dismissal appeal meant that it was reasonable to simply park the issue of submission of a claim form whilst that was ongoing. And it is also relevant that this litigation does not even concern her dismissal.

[27]There is a public interest in applying time limits strictly, and they are there for a reason.

[28]I find no basis on which to exercise my broad discretion to extend time under the ‘just and equitable’ test, which is intended to be the exception Case No: 1401661/2024 5 rather than the rule. The Claimant’s explanation for the delay – that the period following her becoming aware of the emails from 11 April 2024 was a difficult time for her – does not amount to a good reason. She could reasonably have submitted her claim form shortly after 11 April 2024, particularly given the support available to her from ACAS, her trade union representative, and her husband, rather than waiting until 17 July 2024. Doing so would have substantially reduced the length of the delay.

[29]I do not consider that the Respondent would be at a significant prejudice if I did extend time as the whole claim rests on three uncontested emails so I do not have any concerns about an adverse impact on reliability of forensic evidence. Nonetheless, this is not a reason, in and of itself, to extend time.

[30]Accordingly, I find that both claims of unlawful discrimination arising from disability contrary to section 15 of the Equality Act (EA 2010) and unlawful harassment related to disability contrary to section 26 of the EA 2010 were submitted out of time, that it is not just and equitable to extend time, and the employment tribunal has no jurisdiction to hear this claim.

[31]These claims are therefore dismissed. Approved by: