Mr J Bazinaw v Royal United Bath NHS Foundation Trust: 1401592/2025
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Case No 1401592/2025
Between
Mr J BazinawClaimantRoyal United Bath NHS Foundation TrustRespondent
Before
Employment Judge David HughesIn person for claimantMs O’Halloran (instructed by counsel) for respondentDate 16 July 2025
JUDGMENT
[1]The Claimant’s application for interim relief brought under section 128 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (“ERA”) is dismissed.
REASONS
[1]This is an application by the Claimant for interim relief. This was a summary procedure. An oral decision was given at the end of the hearing. The Claimant having requested written reasons, these reasons are provided with the judgment.[2]The Claimant was employed by the Respondent between 24.05.2022 and 30.06.2025, at least latterly as a Band 3 Security Officer.[3]The Claimant’s case is that he made a series of disclosures to the Respondent. These include an allegation of assault by a colleague and allegations of retaliation against him for making that disclosure. The Respondent does not dispute that these disclosures could be protected disclosures.[4]The Respondent’s case is that the Claimant was dismissed for gross misconduct, following an incident which occurred on 29.12.2024.
Law
[5]ERA ss128 & 129 provide as follows: 128.— Interim relief pending determination of complaint.(1) An employee who presents a complaint to an employment tribunal that he has been unfairly dismissed and— (a) that the reason (or if more than one the principal reason) for the dismissal is one of those specified in— (i) section 100(1)(a) and (b), 101A(1)(d), 102(1), 103 or 103A, or (ii) paragraph 161(2) of Schedule A1 to the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992, or (b) that the reason (or, if more than one, the principal reason) for which the employee was selected for dismissal was the one specified in the opening words of section 104F(1) and the condition in paragraph (a) or (b) of that subsection was met, may apply to the tribunal for interim relief.(2) The tribunal shall not entertain an application for interim relief unless it is presented to the tribunal before the end of the period of seven days immediately following the effective date of termination (whether before, on or after that date).(3) The tribunal shall determine the application for interim relief as soon as practicable after receiving the application.(4) The tribunal shall give to the employer not later than seven days before the date of the hearing a copy of the application together with notice of the date, time and place of the hearing.(5) The tribunal shall not exercise any power it has of postponing the hearing of an application for interim relief except where it is satisfied that special circumstances exist which justify it in doing so. 129.— Procedure on hearing of application and making of order. (1) This section applies where, on hearing an employee's application for interim relief, it appears to the tribunal that it is likely that on determining the complaint to which the application relates the tribunal will find— (a) that the reason (or if more than one the principal reason) for the dismissal is one of those specified in— (i) section 100(1)(a) and (b), 101A(1)(d), 102(1), 103 or 103A, or (ii) paragraph 161(2) of Schedule A1 to the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992, or (b) that the reason (or, if more than one, the principal reason) for which the employee was selected for dismissal was the one specified in the opening words of section 104F(1) and the condition in paragraph (a) or (b) of that subsection was met. (2) The tribunal shall announce its findings and explain to both parties (if present)— (a) what powers the tribunal may exercise on the application, and (b) in what circumstances it will exercise them. (3) The tribunal shall ask the employer (if present) whether he is willing, pending the determination or settlement of the complaint— (a) to reinstate the employee (that is, to treat him in all respects as if he had not been dismissed), or (b) if not, to re-engage him in another job on terms and conditions not less favourable than those which would have been applicable to him if he had not been dismissed. (4) For the purposes of subsection (3)(b) “terms and conditions not less favourable than those which would have been applicable to him if he had not been dismissed” means,as regards seniority, pension rights and other similar rights, that the period prior to the dismissal should be regarded as continuous with his employment following the dismissal. (5) If the employer states that he is willing to reinstate the employee, the tribunal shall make an order to that effect.(6) If the employer— (a) states that he is willing to re-engage the employee in another job, and (b) specifies the terms and conditions on which he is willing to do so, the tribunal shall ask the employee whether he is willing to accept the job on those terms and conditions.(7) If the employee is willing to accept the job on those terms and conditions, the tribunal shall make an order to that effect.(8) If the employee is not willing to accept the job on those terms and conditions— (a) where the tribunal is of the opinion that the refusal is reasonable, the tribunal shall make an order for the continuation of his contract of employment, and (b) otherwise, the tribunal shall make no order.(9) If on the hearing of an application for interim relief the employer— (a) fails to attend before the tribunal, or (b) states that he is unwilling either to reinstate or re-engage the employee as mentioned in subsection (3), the tribunal shall make an order for the continuation of the employee's contract of employment.[6]The Respondent does not dispute that this case is one in which interim relief could, in principle, be granted. It does not dispute that the Claimant applied in time, or that it has had the notice to which it is entitled.[7]I am required to decide whether or not it is likely that the Claimant’s complaint will succeed.[8]Ms O’Halloran, counsel for R, contended to me that “likely” is a high bar – citing MoJ -v- Sarfaz1. In that case, Underhill J, President of the EAT, said:[16]The meaning of “likely” in the context of these sections, and of the analogous provisions of earlier legislation dealing with dismissal by reason of trade union membership or activity, has been the subject of a certain amount of authority. The leading case is Taplin v C Shippam Limited [1978] ICR 1068 (see also [1978] IRLR 450). In the judgment of the Tribunal in that case Slynn J recited the self-direction by the industrial tribunal chairman as follows (taking the paragraph numbers from the IRLR report): “13. In his decision, the Chairman of the Tribunal directed himself as to the meaning of ‘likely in s.78(5). He referred to a previous decision of the Industrial Tribunal of which he had been Chairman in the case of Johnson v Great Clowes Discount Warehouse Ltd (unreported) . In that case the Tribunal had drawn a distinction between ‘possible’ (where the Tribunal considered that there would be a less than 50% chance of success), ‘probable’, which was regarded as being more 1 UKEAT/0578/10/ZT [2011] I.R.L.R. 562 likely than not, when the chance of success would be more than 50%, and ‘likely’, where the Tribunal said that this meant ‘that the chances have to move a degree nearer certainty than would be the case if the word “probable” had been used’. They referred to the Shorter Oxford Dictionary definition of ‘likely’ as ‘seeming as if it would prove to be as stated’. They concluded that the word ‘likely’ is a degree nearer certainty than would be the case if only the word ‘probable’ had been used.” On the basis of that direction the industrial tribunal had refused the application for interim relief. The applicant argued on appeal that the approach taken by the tribunal involved imposing too high a standard and that “likely” should be treated as equivalent to “having a reasonable prospect of success”. After setting out that submission Slynn J proceeds: “21. Having considered all these matters which have been urged before us we are unanimously of the view that the test proposed by Mr Hands of a ‘reasonable prospect of success' is not one which should be adopted. The phrase can have different shades of emphasis, the lowest of which we do not think is sufficient. We do not consider that Parliament intended that an employee should be able to obtain an order under this section unless he achieved a higher degree of certainty in the mind of the Tribunal than that of showing that he just had a ‘reasonable’ prospect of success. The employee begins with a certificate from the trade union official certifying that there appear to be reasonable grounds for supposing that the reason for his dismissal was the one alleged. We consider that the Tribunal is required to be satisfied of more than that before it can appear ‘that it is likely’ that a Tribunal will find that a complainant was unfairly dismissed for one of the stated reasons.[22]On the other hand we are not persuaded that there is a dichotomy between ‘probable’ and ‘likely’ as expressed by the Chairman of the Industrial Tribunal. We find it difficult to envisage something which is likely but improbable or probable but unlikely and we observe that the Oxford Dictionary definition does define ‘likely’ as ‘probable’. Nor do we think that it is right in a case of this kind to ask whether the applicant has proved his case on a balance of probabilities in the sense that he has established a 51% probability of succeeding in his application, as has at one stage been contended before us. Nor do we find Mr Hands' alternative suggestion of a real possibility of success to be a satisfactory approach. This again can have different shades of emphasis. It seems to us that the section requires that the employee shall establish more clearly that he is likely to succeed than that phrase is capable of suggesting on one meaning. On the other hand it is clear that the Tribunal does not have to be satisfied that the applicant will succeed at the trial2. It may be undesirable to find a single synonym for the word ‘likely’ but equally, we think it is wrong to assess the degree of proof which has to be established in terms of a percentage as we have been invited to do.[23]We think that the right approach is expressed in a colloquial phrase suggested by Mr White. The Tribunal should ask itself 2 My emphasis. whether the applicant has established that he has a ‘pretty good’ chance of succeeding in the final application to the Tribunal3.[24]Although the Chairman of the Tribunal expressed the burden of proof differently from the way which we have done we do not consider that there is any real difference of emphasis. He thought that ‘likely’ meant more than ‘probable’ and he regarded ‘probable’ as being ‘51% or more’.” The discussion in Taplin was complicated by Slynn J having to address the unusual way in which the chairman had directed himself. A caviller might also say that “a pretty good chance of success” is not very obviously distinguishable from the rejected formula “a reasonable chance of success”. Nevertheless, the basic message of the judgment read as a whole is clear. In this context “likely” does not mean simply “more likely than not” — that is at least 51 per cent — but connotes a significantly higher degree of likelihood. Slynn J understandably declined to express that higher degree in percentage terms, since numbers can convey a spurious impression of precision in what is inevitably an exercise depending on the Tribunal's impression. … 19. Mr Rowell submits that that passage shows that the Judge misunderstood the effect of Taplin . I accept that it is not very well worded. The Judge seems to have found some difficulties with Slynn's J judgment which, with respect, I do not think are present. To say that Slynn J was saying not that the standard of proof required is “higher” than the balance of probabilities but that it is “different” is a little difficult to understand, but I agree that it could, out of context, suggest that a less than 50 per cent chance of success would, or in any event could, suffice. However, the concluding sentence of the passage seems to me to make clear that the Judge had understood the essential point which emerges from Taplin : “likely” connotes something nearer to certainty than mere probability. I can accordingly see no misdirection on the part of the Judge as regards this point. 9. That invites the question, how much nearer? After all, 52% is closer to certainty than 51% is. 10. The case of Parsons v Airplus International Ltd4 is perhaps a caution against too deep a dive into contested caselaw on an application such as this. In that case, HHJ Shanks sitting in the EAT said: 17. In ground 1 the Claimant says that the Judge misdirected herself about the law relating to interim relief because (in effect) she should have resolved a legal issue about separability based on (possibly) conflicting authorities in favour of the Claimant and (I suppose) have reached the view that the Claimant was therefore likely to succeed on the complaint. I do not think it is appropriate at this stage for me to attempt to resolve the conflicts (if any) in the authorities or to reach a final view on the law on separability in the context of protected disclosures. Likewise it seems to me that the Judge’s approach of saying that detailed factfinding and an analysis of the case law would be required and that she could not say at 3 My emphasis 4 UKEAT/0023/16/JOJ this stage that the Claimant was likely to succeed on the point was entirely understandable and correct. 18. Ground 2 complains (in effect) that the Judge failed to decide the case on the material she had and was wrong to say that matters were not clear cut or needed to be weighed. As I have said above in my summary of the law, it is not for the Judge to decide the case but to assess the chances of the Claimant succeeding. That is exactly what the Judge did; she cannot possibly be criticised for saying that matters were not sufficiently clear cut at that stage for her to have sufficient confidence in the eventual outcome to grant interim relief. 11. I approach the application on the basis that I have to decide whether the Claimant’s complaint is likely to be upheld, likely meaning something more than him having a 51% of success, but I am not persuaded that it I am required to be approaching certain of his eventual success. He must have, in words endorsed by the EAT, a pretty good chance of success. 12. Given that the Respondent admits that disclosures have been made that could be qualifying disclosures, and that the Claimant was dismissed thereafter, that may be thought a promising start for the Claimant. It makes sense – as I canvassed with the parties, without demur – to concentrate on the Respondent’s explanation, and ask myself, what is the likelihood that the Respondent will persuade the Tribunal that;(a) the Respondent’s conclusion that the Claimant guilty of gross misconduct one reasonably open to it;(b) that conclusion was reached after a reasonable investigation;(c) the Respondent’s decision to dismiss was within a range of reasonable responses, and(d) that was, in fact, the reason why the Respondent took the decision to dismiss. 13. I recognise that in framing the above, I have worded it in a way that concentrates on the likelihood of the Respondent succeeding in showing what it would have to show, when the burden for interim relief is on the Claimant to show that he is likely to succeed. I am mindful of that difference, do not think that how I have framed the test for convenience’s sake leads me to materially misunderstand what I have to consider, and Ms O’Halloran did not suggest otherwise. 14. In a summary exercise such as this, it is not appropriate to set out at length all of the material before me. 15. The Respondent upheld allegations that the Claimant had used obscene, aggressive language towards an elderly and confused patient, and partially upheld that he acted unprofessionally and aggressively when challenged by a colleague. It dismissed an allegation that he made a threat of violence towards an elderly and confused patient. Video footage 16. Both parties invited me to view video footage of the incident on which the Respondent relies. After some technical difficulties, I did so. 17. I remind myself that it is not for me to decide the case. I must ask myself about likely findings of an eventual Tribunal at a final hearing. 18. The Claimant had prepared a commentary on the video footage. He told me, and I accept, that he did so late last night. Although his commentary was not complete, I take account of the fact that he prepared it late last night, and I draw no inference or conclusion against him on the basis of any omissions from the commentary. 19. The video footage shows the Claimant attending with a colleague, Shane Hughes, and a nurse. They are dealing with a man, to whom I will refer as P, and attempting to persuade him to go inside. 20. P appears to be elderly. A Tribunal is likely to find that P is somewhat cantankerous, but also appears to be somewhat confused. It is also likely to find that it is plain from the conversation that he has suffered a head injury of some sort. 21. The Claimant was at pains to emphasise to me that the fact that a person is old does not mean they cannot be a danger. He has taken, so he told me, knives from elderly people. 22. A Tribunal may well accept that. But it is likely to consider that to be a possibly misleading truth. A Tribunal is likely to find that dealing with a man who appears to be elderly, confused and to have sustained a head injury reasonably requires one to take account of all those facts. 23. The Claimant was keen to tell me that he respected the virility of P, whom he did not accept was confused. The Claimant appeared to me to want to engage in legalistic definitions in an effort to avoid what I think a Tribunal is likely to find obvious – that P is confused. 24. Mr Hughes and nurse attempt to persuade P to go inside the hospital building. The position appears to be that P wants to leave, but has a catheter in his arm still, and the nurse may be under the impression that medical investigations had not concluded. The Claimant asks about whether he is subject to DOLS5, and is told that he is not. That the patient was free to leave is likely to be found, but I also think it likely that the Tribunal will conclude that what was happening was persuasion to get him to enter the hospital, on what appears to be a cold morning, rather than anything approaching compulsion.[25]The Claimant says that, early on in matters, P said to him “you’re not even English”. This I did not hear in the video footage, and if necessary, I find that it is unlikely that a Tribunal will find that this was said. 5 Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards.[26]P can be heard saying to the Claimant, the latter having contributed to the discussion, “are you Australian”. The Claimant responds, “It’s none of your fucking business where I’m from.” The Claimant accepts that he said this. This was the basis for the Respondent finding that the Claimant had used obscene, aggressive language towards an elderly and confused patient.[27]It seems to me that a Tribunal is likely to find that this was a conclusion open to the Respondent. I have seen the footage. Tone of voice can change the meaning of words used considerably. Having seen the footage, I think it likely that a Tribunal will find that it was open to the Respondent to conclude that the language used was obscene, was aggressive, and was used towards an elderly and confused patient.[28]After they left the patient, Mr Hughes spoke with the Claimant about what had happened. In the course of their discussions, the Claiamnt can be heard to say: “Fuck him. People don’t get fucking personal with me that early in the morning. As soon as I said hello, he said ‘you’re not even English.’ I get tired of this fucking racist shit.” “I know what the fucking… what the Polish people fucking deal with…” He adds in his commentary, “This is not aggression. This is contextualization: the Claimant invoking empathy for others and grounding his own response in lived experience.” “There ain't no fucking problem, don't fucking teach me, you don't know what the fuck I'm dealing with, this motherfucker comes at me, early in the morning about where I'm from, that's getting personal. I don't owe him an explanation about where I'm from” “He’s not just telling me he’s gonna kick my ass or anything like that. He's after my nationality, after a protected characteristic and I don't deal so well with it at 7:00am on Sunday.”[29]Having heard how these words were spoken in the video footage, I think it is likely that the Tribunal will find that it was reasonably open to the Respondent to find that the Claimant had acted unprofessionally and aggressively when challenged by his colleague.[30]The Claimant’s complaint about the investigatory process were that he was immediately suspended, there was no fact-finding process, no conversation between him and his manager, and that a Mr Savage had taken the decision to suspend him, conducted an investigatory meeting with him, and then given evidence to the final panel hearing.[31]I think the Tribunal is likely to find that the decision to suspend him does not detract from the investigation. In the light of the video footage, the Tribunal may be unsurprised by it.[32]I think the Tribunal is likely to find that there was a fact-finding process. The Claimant was interviewed in that process. And the Tribunal is likely to find that the fact that Mr Savage gave evidence to the disciplinary panel both unsurprising and unobjectionable.[33]As to the decision to dismiss, the Tribunal seems to me to be likely to find that it was within a range of reasonable responses. The Claimant’s answers to me, and as recorded in the disciplinary decision letter, are likely to be thought to show a significant lack of insight into what had happened.[34]Any Tribunal will inevitably view racism as an evil thing. Questions about nationality can be innocuous, or highly loaded. To be asked about one’s nationality can become irritating, as can mistakes about it – I referred in the course of argument to personal experience, as a Welsh person, of being called or described as English.[35]All that said, the Tribunal, it seems to me, is likely to find that the question as to whether the Claimant was Australian did not reasonably merit the reaction it got. Elderly people who have sustained head injuries are, of course, capable of engaging in offensive, racist behaviour. But the Tribunal is unlikely to find that P’s question merited the Claimant’s response – which, as I have indicated, is likely to be found to have been aggressive.[36]That leaves the question of whether the Respondent’s decision to dismiss was made, wholly or principally, because of the Claimant’s disclosures.[37]In the circumstances of this case, I cannot say that I find it likely that the Tribunal will decide that the decision was caused, wholly or principally, by the disclosures.[41]The vital point in exercising the discretion to order costs is to look at the whole picture of what happened in the case and to ask whether there has been unreasonable conduct by the claimant in bringing and conducting the case and, in doing so, to identify the conduct, what was unreasonable about it and what effects it had. The main thrust of the passages cited above from my judgment in McPherson’s case was to reject as erroneous the submission to the court that, in deciding whether to make a costs order, the employment tribunal had to determine whether or not there was a precise causal link between the unreasonable conduct in question and the specific costs being claimed….[42]On matters of discretion an earlier case only stands as authority for what are, or what are not, the principles governing the discretion and serving only as a broad steer on the factors covered by the paramount principle of relevance. A costs decision in one case will not in most cases pre-determine the outcome of a costs application in another case: the facts of the cases will be different, as will be the interaction of the relevant factors with one another and the varying weight to be attached to them. 13. It is for a party seeking a costs order to establish that the jurisdiction to grant one is engaged, in which case it is then for the Tribunal to satisfy itself that it is right and proper to exercise the discretion to make such order – see Haydar -v- Pennine Acute NHS Trust5. 14. “Vexatious” was defined in Attorney-General -v- Barker6 as follows: …"Vexatious" is a familiar term in legal parlance. The hallmark of a vexatious proceeding is in my judgment that it has little or no basis in law (or at least no discernible basis); that whatever the intention of the proceeding may be, its effect is to subject the defendant to inconvenience, harassment and expense out of all proportion to any gain likely to accrue to the claimant; and that it involves an abuse of the process of the court, meaning by that a use of the court process for a purpose or in a way which is significantly different from the ordinary and proper use of the court process….7 3 [2004] EWCA Civ 569 [2004] I.C.R. 1398 4 Yerraklava per Mummary LJ @ para 39 – 42. 5 UKEAT/0141/17/BA @ para 37 6 [2000] 1 F.L.R. 759 7 Per Lord Bingham of Cornhill LCJ @ para 19. 15. The above has been applied in the context of this Tribunal in Scott -vRussell8. 16. Regarding the meaning of “Abusively or disruptively”, these terms do not appear to have been authoritatively defined. IDS Employment Law Handbook9 refers to Garnes -v- London Borough of Lambeth & anor10 as an example of behaviour that was unreasonable, vexatious and disruptive, rather than a case defining such terms. I take “abusively or disruptively” to carry their ordinary meaning in the English language. 17. “Unreasonably” carries its ordinary English meaning, and is not to be interpreted as meaning something similar to vexatious – see Dyer -vSecretary of State11. 18. It is appropriate to judge a litigant in person less harshly than a professionally-represented one – see AQ Ltd -v- Holden12. Consideration 19. The first question I have to ask is, did the Claimant behave vexatiously, abusively, disruptively or otherwise unreasonably in bringing and pursuing his application for interim relief? 20. The Respondent’s assertion that “It was quite clear before the interim relief hearing that he was dismissed on the grounds of his gross misconduct, of which there is overwhelming evidence”, must be understood as a statement of its position, rather than of any finding yet made. It may – or may not – be a conclusion reached at the final hearing. But it is emphatically not what I determined when hearing the application for interim relief. I could not, and did not, make a finding as to why the Claimant was dismissed. I made an assessment of the likelihood of the Tribunal making findings at a final hearing. That is what I was required to do, on hearing an application for interim relief. 8 [2013] EWCA Civ 1432 [2014] Costs LR 95, per Beatson LJ @ para 30. 9 Vol 10, Chpt 18, para 18.57. 10 EAT 1237/97 11 EAT 183/83 12 [2012] IRLR 648 21. It is important that I do not stray beyond that, into treating the application for interim relief as a mini final hearing. It was also not an application that the Claimant’s case be struck out, or an application for a deposit order. 22. In considering the Respondent’s application, I can most conveniently deal with the words “abusively or disruptively”. It seems to me that, in bringing the application and in his conduct in the hearing of the application, the Claimant did not act disruptively or abusively. Indeed, his behaviour in the hearing itself was largely courteous. It is true that I perceived him to be attempting to cross-examine me about my findings after I had delivered my decision, but he is not a lawyer, may not have been aware that that is not appropriate, and also appeared surprised by my decision. 23. Was his bringing of the application “vexatious”? I see no reason to believe that it was brought with the intention of subjecting the Respondent to inconvenience, harassment and expense, still less to such an extent that they were out of all proportion to any gain likely to accrue to the Claimant. I see no reason to believe that the Claimant made his application other than in the hope of obtaining interim relief. 24. The intention is not, however, the relevant consideration. Indeed, Lord Bingham in Baker spoke of the effect, whatever the intention. 25. The Claimant’s application might fairly be described as an optimistic one. The Respondent, to its credit, acknowledged that the Claimant had been dismissed after making potentially (at least) protected disclosures, and focussed instead on what it considers to be a strong case that the Claimant was fairly dismissed for gross misconduct. I set out my findings on the position in my judgment of 16.07.2025, and it is not necessary to attempt to summarise them here. 26. Looking at Lord Bingham’s definition of “vexatious”, I find that:(a) The Claimant’s application for interim relief did have a basis in law. He had been dismissed shortly after making potentially protected disclosures. As I observed in my judgment on the application, this was a promising starting point for the Claimant;(b) The weakness of the Claimant’s application lay in the apparent strength of the Respondent’s case in response. However, I assessed the prospects of a Tribunal making findings at a final hearing, in a hearing before me that was summary in nature;(c) The Claimant’s application did put the Respondent to inconvenience and expense. But I have no reason to believe that such was out of all proportion to the benefit the Claimant stood to gain. On the contrary, had the Claimant succeeded in obtaining interim relief, the benefit to him would have been real;(d) It does not seem to me that there is any basis for saying that the Claimant’s application was made for a purpose, or in a way, significantly different from the ordinary and proper use of the Tribunal’s process. ERA s128(2) provides that an application for interim relief must be made within 7 days from the effective date of termination, if the Tribunal is to entertain the application. That does not allow a great deal of time for reflection. 27. I therefore find that the Claimant’s application was not vexatious. 28. Was the Claimant’s application brought “unreasonably”? 29. As I have observed, the application was optimistic. But, given the tight timescale for bringing an application, and the leeway to be permitted to a litigant in person, I am not satisfied that the application was brought unreasonably. 30. It follows that I do not find that the requirements of Rule 74(2)(a) are met. 31. The Respondent also applies under Rule 74(2)(b). But this provision applies in respect of a claim, response or reply that has no reasonable prospect of success. I have not found the Claimant’s claim to have no reasonable prospect of success. Dismissal of an application for interim relief is not the same thing as finding that the underlying claim has no reasonable prospect of success. 32. I note that IDS Employment Law Handbook states, at para 18.84, that “Case law had established that, for example, an interim relief application under S.129 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 could be the subject of a costs award”, when discussing whether an application for a stay could be met with a costs award. However, it does not cite the authority referred to, and the Respondent has not directed me to it. Without the benefit of authority, I would accept that an application for interim relief can result in a costs award, under Rule 74(2)(a), if the provisions of that rule are met. However, and without the benefit of submissions on whether I can make a costs award under Rule 74(2)(b), I am not satisfied that I can. 33. If I am wrong on the foregoing, I would not exercise my discretion to award the Respondent its costs. 34. The Claimant’s application was an optimistic one, as already observed. But he was entitled to make an application. He was required to make it within a short time. The starting point for him was promising. As an unrepresented party, he is not to be held to the same standards as one professionally represented. Although the Respondent has been put to expense answering his application, an award of costs is the exception in this Tribunal. 35. The Respondent’s application for costs did not refer me to the relevant authorities. This left the Claimant at a disadvantage. He is an unrepresented party. His task in addressing the Respondent’s arguments would have been facilitated had the Respondent referred me to the relevant authorities. This was particularly disappointing, given the helpful approach taken by the Respondent at the hearing on 16.07.2025. That said, I do not think this was relevant to the exercise of my discretion, had I had to exercise it.