Mr M Rullo v Bournemouth Transport Ltd (in Creditors’ Voluntary Liquidation) and Secretary of State for Business and Trade: 1401400/2024
EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS
Case No 1401400/2024
Between
Mr M RulloClaimant(1) Bournemouth Transport Limited (in Creditors’ Voluntary Liquidation) (2) Secretary of State for Business and Trade (Rule 95 Interested Party)RespondentDate 26 November 2025
REASONS
[1]The application is made pursuant to rule 68 of The Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024, which provides as follows.(1) The Tribunal may, either on its own initiative (which may reflect a request from the Employment Appeal Tribunal) or on the application of a party, reconsider any judgment where it is necessary in the interests of justice to do so.(2) A judgment under reconsideration may be confirmed, varied or revoked.(3) If the judgment under reconsideration is revoked the Tribunal may take the decision again. In doing so, the Tribunal is not required to come to the same conclusion.[2]The application for reconsideration is made under rule 69 of the rules. The process under rule 70 is for the tribunal to consider the application and determine, first, whether it considers that there is no reasonable prospect of the original decision being varied or revoked. If the judge is of that view, the application must be refused otherwise the views of the other parties to the case must be sought.[3]In approaching the application for reconsideration I have considered the cases of of Flint v Eastern Electricity Board [1975] ICR 395 and Outasight VB v Brown [2015] ICR D11. The principles set out in those judgments are helpfully summarised in the more recent case of Ministry of Justice v Burton [2016] ICR 1128, where at paragraph 21 the Court of Appeal stated “An employment tribunal has a power to review a decision “where it is necessary in the interests of justice”: see rule 70 of the Employment Tribunals Rules of Procedure 2013. This was one of the grounds on which a review could be permitted in the earlier incarnation of the rules. However, as Underhill J pointed out in Newcastle upon Tyne City Council v Marsden [2010] ICR 743, para 17 the discretion to act in the interests of justice is not open-ended; it should be exercised in a principled way, and the earlier case law cannot be ignored. In particular, the courts have emphasised the importance of finality (Flint v Eastern Electricity Board [1975] ICR 395) which militates against the discretion being exercised too readily; and in Lindsay v Ironsides Ray & Vials [1994] ICR 384 Mummery J held that the failure of a party’s representative to draw attention to a particular argument will not generally justify granting a review. In my judgment, these principles are particularly relevant here”[4]In this case Employment Judge Ferguson had given directions for the claimants to provide a witness statement setting out the factual basis for saying that their claims were presented within a reasonable period. Mr Rullo presented a witness statement and I analysed it in my judgment at paragraphs 68-70. Mr Rullo now explains that he did not word his statement very well and gives a more detailed explanation for the delay in submitting his claim.[5]If I were to reopen the judgment to allow Mr Rullo to make the further arguments which he seeks to make, I would be failing to give proper weight to the principle that the interests of justice are not open-ended and finality of litigation is important. To the extent that I have rejected the arguments previously advanced by Mr Rullo in my judgment, if I am wrong then the proper remedy is to appeal that judgment. To the extent to which Mr Rullo is seeking to rely upon new evidence, he had the chance to put forward that evidence at the trial. It is not appropriate to reopen the decision now.[6]In those circumstances, I do not consider that there is any reasonable prospect of the original decision in this case being varied or revoked and, therefore, I refuse the application for reconsideration[7]Mr Rullo may wish to note that the judgment he seeks to have reconsidered does not prevent him from pursuing a claim against the Secretary of State for a protective award. He is named within paragraph 1 of the judgment. Whether the Secretary of State is required to accept any such claim is not, at this stage, in issue before the tribunal. Case Number: 1401400/2024