Mr D Lewis v Together for Mental Wellbeing Ltd: 1401197/2025

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Case No 1401197/2025

Venue CHAMBERS AT Plymouth

Hearing 6 November 2025 THE TIME FOR PRESENTING A RESPONSE HAVING EXPIRED AND NO VALID RESPONSE HAVING BEEN PRESENTED JUDGMENT UNDER RULE 22 1. The correct name of the respondent is Together for Mental Wellbeing Limited, and the record is amended accordingly; and 2. The claimant was constructively dismissed on 12 March 2025. He has insufficient service to qualify for the right to pursue a claim for unfair dismissal under section 94(1) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (“the Act”) by reason of section 108(1) of the Act; and 3. The claimant’s claim for breach of contract in respect of the non-payment of his one week’s statutory notice period is well-founded and the respondent is ordered to pay the claimant the sum of £449.66 being one week’s net pay; and 4. The claimant’s claim that he suffered victimisation contrary to section 27 of the Equality Act 2010 is not well-founded and it is dismissed; and 5. The claimant’s claim for unfair dismissal for health and safety reasons under section 100 of the Act 1996 is well-founded. The respondent is ordered to pay the claimant compensation for unfair dismissal in the sum of £12,705.58. The Employment Protection (Recoupment of Jobseeker’s Allowance and Income Support) Regulations 1996 (“the Recoupment Regulations”) do not apply in this case. 6. The claimant’s claim for detriment for health and safety reasons under section 44 of the Act 1996 is dismissed on withdrawal by the claimant; and 7. The claimant’s claims for detriment and/or unfair dismissal arising from protected public interest disclosures under sections 47B and 103A of the Employment Rights Act 1996 are dismissed on withdrawal by the claimant. REASONS 1. In this case Mr Demetri Lewis pursues claims that he has been constructively unfairly dismissed; that he is due one week’s notice pay; that he has suffered detriment and/or dismissal by reason of having made public interest disclosures and/or for health and safety reasons; and for unlawful victimisation. The claimant’s previous employer was Together for Mental Wellbeing Ltd, which is referred to as the respondent in this Judgment, but which company has failed to submit a response. 2. The claimant named Together For Mental Wellbeing as the respondent to these proceedings and gave the address as 52 Walnut Tree Walk London SE11 6DN. The correct legal entity is in fact a limited company (registered number 463505) and is also a registered charity (number 211091). The address given is the registered office of the limited company. I am satisfied therefore that the respondent has been correctly served, although the name of respondent should be changed to Together For Mental Wellbeing Limited and I make that order. This prospective respondent has failed to enter a response. 3. I have heard from the claimant

Between

Mr D LewisClaimant

Together for Mental Wellbeing LtdRespondent

Date 6 November 2025

JUDGMENT

[1]The correct name of the respondent is Together for Mental Wellbeing Limited, and the record is amended accordingly; and

[2]The claimant was constructively dismissed on 12 March 2025. He has insufficient service to qualify for the right to pursue a claim for unfair dismissal under section 94(1) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (“the Act”) by reason of section 108(1) of the Act; and

[3]The claimant’s claim for breach of contract in respect of the non-payment of his one week’s statutory notice period is well-founded and the respondent is ordered to pay the claimant the sum of £449.66 being one week’s net pay; and

[4]The claimant’s claim that he suffered victimisation contrary to section 27 of the Equality Act 2010 is not well-founded and it is dismissed; and

[5]The claimant’s claim for unfair dismissal for health and safety reasons under section 100 of the Act 1996 is well-founded. The respondent is ordered to pay the claimant compensation for unfair dismissal in the sum of £12,705.58. The Employment Protection (Recoupment of Jobseeker’s Allowance and Income Support) Regulations 1996 (“the Recoupment Regulations”) do not apply in this case.

[6]The claimant’s claim for detriment for health and safety reasons under section 44 of the Act 1996 is dismissed on withdrawal by the claimant; and

[7]The claimant’s claims for detriment and/or unfair dismissal arising from protected public interest disclosures under sections 47B and 103A of the Employment Rights Act 1996 are dismissed on withdrawal by the claimant.

REASONS

[1]In this case Mr Demetri Lewis pursues claims that he has been constructively unfairly dismissed; that he is due one week’s notice pay; that he has suffered detriment and/or dismissal by reason of having made public interest disclosures and/or for health and safety reasons; and for unlawful victimisation. The claimant’s previous employer was Together for Mental Wellbeing Ltd, which is referred to as the respondent in this Judgment, but which company has failed to submit a response.

[2]The claimant named Together For Mental Wellbeing as the respondent to these proceedings and gave the address as 52 Walnut Tree Walk London SE11 6DN. The correct legal entity is in fact a limited company (registered number 463505) and is also a registered charity (number 211091). The address given is the registered office of the limited company. I am satisfied therefore that the respondent has been correctly served, although the name of respondent should be changed to Together For Mental Wellbeing Limited and I make that order. This prospective respondent has failed to enter a response.

[3]I have heard from the claimant, and I have heard from Mr Mr Smallwood his friend who has represented him in these proceedings. The claimant has produced a detailed written witness statement, and a bundle of the relevant documents, which I have considered. With this information I am able to make a determination of this claim pursuant to Rule 22(2). I found the following facts proven on the balance of probabilities after considering the whole of the evidence, both oral and documentary, and after listening to the factual and legal submissions made by and on behalf of the claimant.

[5]The respondent is a mental health charity, and the claimant was employed by the respondent from 13 August 2024 as a Support Worker. Many of the respondent’s service users are psychiatrically ill and the working environment can be dangerous. The claimant resigned his employment with immediate effect on 12 March 2025. In early February 2025 the claimant was in dispute at work with his supervisor, in connection with what he perceived as being placed in an unsafe working environment with the respondent’s service users. He raised these concerns with his supervisor, but was dissatisfied with the response, and he therefore raised them again with the Unit Manager by email dated 6 February 2025. He only received a holding response, and by email dated 8 February 2025 the claimant then raised a formal complaint to a more senior manager relating to: “Managerial Failure and Workplace Undermining at Clifton House.” This was a detailed email which complained of “inappropriate vague and unsubstantiated feedback given to me by my supervisor … The failure of … The Unit Manager to address this issue fairly or assertively, instead shifting the burden onto me to “informally”; the subsequent escalation caused by this inaction which led me to be placed in an unsafe and untenable work environment; the unit manager’s attempts to reframe this issue as a staffing problem, rather than a failure of leadership and professional standards.” The complaint relating to working in an unsafe working environment in paragraph 5 was explained as: “After this resolved meeting I was expected to work overnight in a high risk environment with [my supervisor]. Given that [my supervisor] had shown a clear unwillingness to engage constructively or professionally, I raised concerns about how I was expected to work alongside someone who had undermined and dismissed my concerns.”

[6]The claimant did not receive a response to this formal complaint, and on 17 February 2025 he emailed a different senior manager to complain that he had not received a response and asked for advice on the next steps. The claimant still did not receive a detailed response, and did not return to work. He subsequently received a letter dated 6 March 2025 from the Operations Manager inviting him to a disciplinary hearing to face allegations of gross misconduct, namely leaving work without the permission of his line manager; taking a period of leave without authorisation; and declining to return to work without reason. The claimant responded with a copy of his formal complaint and notified it had still not been resolved. The Operations Manager responded by email dated 12 March 2025 explaining the complaint that gone to his “clutter” folder but that he was prepared to appoint an investigator and defer the disciplinary hearing until after the grievance investigation.

[7]The claimant responded by email on 12 March 2025 and he resigned his employment with immediate effect. The reasons for his resignation were set out clearly. He complained that the respondent had failed to follow fair procedures and guidelines within its staff handbook; had acted in bad faith by failing to acknowledge and address his grievance in a timely and appropriate manner; and created an unsafe working environment which made it impossible for him to continue in his role.

[8]The claimant was paid by the respondent until the date of his resignation on 12 March 2025. The exact hours work by the claimant varied, but his average net weekly pay was £449.66. He was not paid his statutory minimum period of one week’s notice.

[9]Having established the above facts, I now apply the law.

[11]Under section 95(1)(c) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (“the Act”), an employee is dismissed if he terminates the contract under which he is employed (with or without notice) in circumstances in which he is entitled to terminate it without notice by reason of the employer’s conduct

[12]Section 94(1) of the Act provides the right for employees not to be unfairly dismissed. Section 108(1) of the Act generally requires a qualifying period of not less than two years’ continuous employment before this Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear such a claim. There are a number of exceptions, which include where the dismissal arises from having a protected public interest disclosure, and health and safety cases.

[13]Under section 44 of the Act an employee has the right not to be subjected to any detriment for limited specific health and safety reasons. Similarly, under section 100 of the Act, an employee is to be regarded as unfairly dismissed if the reason (or, if more than one, the principal reason) for dismissal is one of these limited specific health and safety reasons. The specific provision relied upon in this instance is section 100(1)(d), namely that in circumstances of danger which the employee reasonably believed to be serious and imminent and which he could not reasonably have been expected to advert, he … refused to return to his place of work …

[14]This is also a claim alleging victimisation under the provisions of the Equality Act 2010 (“the EqA”). The definition of victimisation is found in section 27 of the EqA. A person(a) (A) victimises another person

(b) (B) if A subjects B to a detriment because B does a protected act, or A believes that B has done, or may do, a protected act. The following are all examples of a protected act, namely bringing proceedings under the EqA; giving evidence or information in connection with proceedings under the EqA; doing any other thing for the purposes of or in connection with the EqA; and making an allegation (whether or not express) that A or another person has contravened the EqA.

[15]The claimant’s claim for breach of contract is permitted by article 3 of the Employment Tribunals Extension of Jurisdiction (England and Wales) Order 1994 (“the Order”) and the claim was outstanding on the termination of employment

[17]In the first place I find that the claimant was constructively dismissed when he resigned on 12 March 2025. As alleged in his reasons for his resignation the respondent failed to follow fair procedure with regard to the grievance which he had raised, and it failed to deal with his grievance in a timely and appropriate manner. It is an implied term of any contract of employment that the employer shall not without reasonable and proper cause, conduct itself in a manner calculated or likely to destroy or seriously damage the relationship of confidence and trust between employer and employee: see, for example Malik v Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA

[1998] AC 20

. The respondent’s actions amounted to such a breach.

[18]The claimant did not appear to have made any protected public interest disclosures, and the claims for detriment and/or unfair dismissal in that respect were withdrawn at this hearing.

[19]With regard to the claimant’s claim for victimisation under section 27 EqA, the claimant relies on his formal grievance dated 8 February 2025. However, this does not satisfy the definition of a protected act under section 27 EqA because(i) proceedings had not been issued under the EqA;

(ii) evidence or information had not been given in connection with proceedings under the EqA;

(iii) no other thing had been done for the purposes of or in connection with the EqA; and

(iv) no allegations were made that anyone had contravened the EqA. In the absence of any protected act which meets the requirements of section 27 EqA, the claim for victimisation is not well-founded and it is dismissed.

[20]The claimant had insufficient continuity of service to pursue a claim for unfair dismissal under general principles under sections 94 and 98 of the Act, by reason of section 108(1) of the Act. He relies on section 100, which does not require two years’ continuity of service.

[21]The claimant’s remaining claims relate to health and safety matters. The claim for detriment was withdrawn at this hearing and the claimant relies upon the claim of automatically unfair dismissal under section 100(1)(d) of the Act.

[22]I am satisfied that the claimant’s working environment was potentially very dangerous. He was required to work with his supervisor, effectively as a team, in this dangerous environment. He raised a formal grievance about the conduct of that supervisor which had not been resolved by any of the three managers to which it had been referred. The claimant generally feared returning to what would be an unsafe working environment in circumstances where he had no confidence in his supervisor and those issues had not been appropriately addressed. At the time of his resignation, he reasonably believed that there were circumstances of danger which he believed to be serious and imminent and which he could not reasonably expected to avert while he was required to work with his supervisor in whom he had no faith. This formed a significant part of the claimant’s reasons for his resignation and constructive dismissal as explained at the time. I find the principal reason for the claimant’s resignation and constructive dismissal were these circumstances, which satisfy s100(1)(d) of the Act. I find that the claimant was unfairly dismissed for this reason.

[23]Compensation 24. in the first place the claimant’s claim for breach of contract in respect of one week’s notice pay is well-founded and the respondent is ordered to pay claimant the sum of £449.66.

[25]I calculate the compensatory award for unfair dismissal for the claimant as follows. There are 34 weeks from the date of dismissal to this hearing. The starting point for the claimant’s net loss is therefore 34 weeks at £449.66, which is £15,288.44. The claimant did not claim any benefits. He was able to obtain alternative employment from 10 July 2025 and earned on average £427.21 net per week. This lasted for 13 weeks until 6 October 2025, which is a sub-total of £5,553.73. He then obtained different alternative employment and has received net pay of £1,546.00 for the remaining month before the date of this hearing. These alternative earnings give a sub total of £7,099.73 and they fall to be deducted from the sum of £15,288.44. The claimant’s net loss to date is therefore £8,188.71.

[26]There is a shortfall between the claimant’s net pay with the respondent, and his net pay with his new employment. In my judgment he should be in a position to eradicate this ongoing future loss after, say, 26 weeks. I therefore award future loss in the sum of £2,409.94. This is total compensation for unfair dismissal in the sum of £11,048.31. I make no award for loss of statutory rights because the claimant did not have two years’ service at the time of his dismissal.

[27]I have also considered section 207A of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992, and in particular section 207A(2), (referred to as “s. 207A(2)”) and the ACAS Code of Practice 1 on Disciplinary and Grievance Procedures 2015 (“the ACAS Code”).

[28]The claimant has applied for an uplift on his compensation of 25%, the maximum available under these provisions. I do not agree that there has been a complete failure on the part of the respondent to apply the appropriate procedures, not least because the respondent offered to commence a grievance process just before the claimant resigned. However, there was a continuing a lengthy breach and failure to deal with the claimant’s grievance appropriately. I consider that an uplift of 15% is just and equitable in the circumstances.

[29]I apply an uplift of 15% to the unfair dismissal compensation of £11,048.31. Accordingly, the respondent is ordered to pay the claimant compensation for unfair dismissal in the sum of £12,705.58

[30]The Employment Protection (Recoupment of Jobseeker’s Allowance and Income Support) Regulations 1996 (“the Recoupment Regulations”) do not apply in this case

[1]The respondent has sought a reconsideration of the judgment entered under Rule 22 dated 6 November 2025 which was sent to the parties on 27 November 2025 (“the Judgment”), and it has made an application for an extension of time to serve its response. The grounds are set out in its e-mail letter dated 4 December 2025. That letter was received at the tribunal office on 4 December 2025. The claimant sent an email later that day opposing the application and requesting a hearing for the contested application to be determined. Notice of this hearing pursuant to Rule 70(4) was issued on 18 December 2025, and the respondent was ordered to file its proposed grounds of resistance to the claimant’s successful claims, which it has done.

[2]This has been a remote hearing on the papers which has been consented to by the parties. The form of remote hearing was by video (CVP). A faceto-face hearing was not held because it was not practicable, and all issues could be determined in a remote hearing.

[3]I have heard evidence from Ms L Raine on behalf of the respondent, and I have heard submissions from Mr Gibson who made the application on behalf of the respondent, and from Mr Smallwood who opposed the application on behalf of the claimant.

[4]The Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024 contain the Employment Tribunal Rules of Procedure (“the Rules”). Under Rule 69 an application for reconsideration under Rule 68 must be made within 14 days of the date on which the decision (or, if later, the written reasons) were sent to the parties. The application was therefore received within the relevant time limit.

[5]Under Rule 22(1) judgment can be issued where no response has been presented within the time limit in Rule 17(1), or a response has been rejected and no application for reconsideration is outstanding, or the respondent has stated that no part of the claim is contested.

[6]Under Rule 5(7) the Tribunal may, on its own initiative or on the application of a party, extend or shorten any time limit specified in the Rules or in any decision, whether or not (in the case of an extension) it has expired.

[7]This is unusual matter in two main respects. In the first place, the respondent concedes that it was correctly served with the relevant tribunal pleadings and notice of hearing, and the claimant’s evidence and bundle of documents for the prospective hearing. Its difficulty was that these papers were received and effectively hidden by one of its employees who suffers from mental illness. The respondent’s managers were thus unaware of these proceedings. The second unusual aspect is that the Judgment was entered not by way of a simple paper process in default of a response, but only after a forensic examination of the claimant’s evidence and the contemporaneous documents.

[8]The grounds for reconsideration are only those set out in Rule 68, namely that it is necessary in the interests of justice to do so.

[9]The grounds relied upon by the respondent are effectively that it is a mental health charity, and that it was unaware of these proceedings until after judgment had been entered, and it has been deprived of an opportunity to dispute the findings. It accepts that the papers were properly served, but they were unfortunately hidden by an employee who suffers from mental illness. The claimant was successful in two claims only, as confirmed in the Judgment. The respondent concedes the first successful claim that the claimant was constructively dismissed by reason of his resignation, and it has paid the claimant the amount awarded in this respect in the Judgment (effectively amounting to one week’s unpaid notice pay). It only disputes the second successful claim, namely that of automatically unfair dismissal for health and safety reasons. It asserts that as a mental health charity a public finding to this effect could well affect its future funding. It argues that it is in the interests of justice for the respondent to have the opportunity to defend this claim merits.

[10]The application is opposed by the claimant. The claimant asserts that the respondent has been correctly served and that it was aware of the proceedings, and that the claimant has complied with all necessary directions and steps to pursue the matter responsibly through to the Judgment. This resulted from a detailed forensic analysis of the available evidence the contemporaneous documents, was not a simple paper process of “rubber-stamping” the claimant’s claim in default of a response. It will be a disadvantage to the claimant if has to go through the process again, and to do so will cause further delays when there is a public interest in finality in litigation.

[11]Under previous Rules of Procedure (relating to the review of what were called Default Judgments) the EAT gave guidance on the factors which tribunals should take into account when deciding whether to review (what was then termed) a default judgment in Moroak t/a Blake Envelopes v Cromie

[2005] IRLR 535

. The EAT held that the test that a tribunal should apply when considering the exercise of its discretion on a review of a default judgment is what is just and equitable. In doing so, the EAT referred to the principles outlined in Kwik Save Stores Ltd v Swain and others

[1997] ICR 49

[12]In the Kwik Save decision, the EAT held that “… the process of exercising a discretion involves taking into account all relevant factors, weighing and balancing them one against the other and reaching a conclusion which is objectively justified on the grounds of reason and justice". The case established that an Employment Judge should always consider the following three factors. First, the explanation supporting an application for an extension of time. The more serious the delay, the more important it is that the Employment Judge is satisfied that the explanation is honest and satisfactory. Secondly, the merits of the defence. Justice will often favour an extension being granted where the defence is shown to have some merit. Thirdly, the balance of prejudice. If the employer's request for an extension of time was refused, would it suffer greater prejudice than the employee would if the request was granted?

[13]This guidance in Kwik Save was approved by reference to the subsequent 2013 Rules in Office Equipment Systems Ltd v Hughes UKEAT 0183/16/ JOJ.

[14]I have also considered the case of Pendragon Plc (trading as C D Bramall Bradford) v Copus

[2005] ICR 1671

EAT which confirms that in conducting a reconsideration of a Rule 22 Judgment (which was formerly a review of a default judgment under a previous Rule 33) an Employment Judge has to take account of all relevant factors, including the explanation or lack of explanation for the delay and the merits of the defence, weighing and balancing the possible prejudice to each party, and to reach a conclusion that was objectively justified on the grounds of reason and justice. I apply these principles in this case.

[16]There are a number of factors which are persuasive in refusing the respondent’s application for reconsideration. In the first place there has been no suggestion that the claimant has ever done anything wrong or inappropriate, and it is clear that he and his representative Mr Smallwood have engaged fully and responsibly in the tribunal process. Secondly, the Judgment is not a simple paper judgment without consideration of the merits of the various claims. The Judgment in favour of the claimant followed a forensic examination of his evidence and the relevant contemporaneous documents, and it is limited to those claims which were strong and supportable, and which were not withdrawn or dismissed. Thirdly, allowing the application would require the claimant to continue when the matter can be concluded by refusing the application, and there is a public interest in the finality of litigation. Finally, it is not in the interests of justice to require the claimant to re-litigate this matter, particularly in circumstances where the interests of justice apply to other tribunal users, who face long delays for hearings, and allowing this matter to continue and to list another hearing will add to these continuing delays.

[17]Equally there are a number of factors which are persuasive in allowing the respondent’s application. First, the respondent has given a credible explanation for its failure to engage in the tribunal process thus far, which is accepted by the claimant, namely that a rogue employee received then hid from view the relevant documents. This was the correspondence from the tribunal (the original claim and the notice of hearing) and the correspondence from the claimant relating to his evidence and the bundle of documents. No other employees or managers of the respondent were ever aware of these proceedings until after receipt of the Judgment. Secondly, as soon as it was notified of the Judgment, the respondent acted promptly in unearthing the relevant documents, discovering the reason for their disappearance, and in making a prompt application for reconsideration within the relevant time limit. The respondent has filed its proposed grounds of resistance to the one remaining disputed claim, namely that of automatically unfair dismissal for health and safety reasons. The proposed response is not fanciful, and it is at least arguable. Next, the respondent is a registered charity which relies on funding, and it is not a wealthy organisation. In addition, the public finding of unfair dismissal relating to the health and safety of its staff in the context of potentially dangerous service users is a serious matter, which might affect its future funding, and it should be afforded the opportunity of disputing this finding. Notwithstanding all of the above, the respondent has now conceded the wrongful dismissal claim amounting to one week’s pay, and it has paid this to the claimant. With regard to the sole remaining disputed claim, that of unfair dismissal for health and safety reasons, this is the only claim in respect of which the respondent now seeks reconsideration, but nonetheless it has paid to the claimant in full the amount set out in the Judgment. The respondent will seek to recover that sum from the claimant only in the event that he is unsuccessful in establishing this claim as being well-founded at a contested hearing. This means that there is no current prejudice to the claimant other than having to argue his claim on its merits. This would require a short hearing without substantial delay or inconvenience to the parties in this case or other tribunal users.

[18]This is a difficult matter but on balance I prefer the arguments put forward on behalf of the respondent. In my judgment the balance of prejudice favours allowing the respondent’s application. The claimant has one remaining disputed claim in respect of which he has already been paid. The disadvantage which the claimant faces is having to re-argue this claim which can be listed without substantial delay. The prejudice and disadvantage to the respondent if the application were to be refused is in my judgment more serious, because it will be deprived of disputing the claim of which its managers had no notice, in circumstances where it has an arguable defence, and the public finding in the Judgment against it is likely to be disadvantageous in respect of its future funding. Given that the matter can be resolved promptly without considerable delay in my judgment the balance of prejudice favours allowing the respondent’s application and allowing the matter to proceed to a hearing to determine the one remaining disputed claim.

[19]Accordingly, I allow the application for reconsideration pursuant to Rule 70 and the Judgment is hereby partly revoked, but only in respect of the claimant’s successful claim under section 100(1)(d) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 for unfair dismissal for health and safety reasons. Otherwise, the Judgment is affirmed. I also allow the application for an extension of time and the respondent’s response is accepted. Case management orders will follow so that the matter progresses.