Ms A Hope v Ola Electric UK Private Ltd: 1306178/2024

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Case No 1306178/2024

Between

Ms A HopeClaimant

Ola Electric UK Private LimitedRespondent

Before

Employment Judge Maxwell

In person for claimant

Mr Wyeth (instructed by Counsel) for respondent

Date 25 January 2026

JUDGMENT

[1]The Claimant's claim of unfair dismissal is not well-founded and is dismissed.

[2]The Claimant's claim of direct sex discrimination is not well-founded and is dismissed.

[3]The Claimant's claim of pregnancy and maternity discrimination is not well-founded and is dismissed.

[4]The Claimant's claim of harassment related to sex is well-founded and succeeds, to the extent set out in the reasons.

[5]The Claimant's claim of pregnancy and maternity detriment is not well-founded and is dismissed.

[6]The Claimant's claim of unlawful deductions is not well-founded and is dismissed. Case Number: 1306178/2024 2 CORRECTED REASONS Claims

[1]By a claim form presented on 20 June 2024, the Claimant brought claims of:1.1 Unfair dismissal;

1.2 Direct sex discrimination;

1.3 Pregnancy and maternity discrimination;

1.4 Harassment related to sex;

1.5 Detriment by reason of pregnancy or maternity;

1.6 Unlawful deductions.

[2]The claims and issues arising were clarified at a case management hearing before EJ Wedderspoon on 3 January 2025. Evidence and submissions

[3]I was provided with:3.1 An agreed bundle of documents;

3.2 Additional documents provided by both sides during the first tranche of hearing days and put together in a supplemental bundle.

[4]I was provided with witness statements and heard oral evidence from:4.1 Amy Hope, the Claimant;

4.2 David Rouse, the Respondent's Design Operations Manager;

4.3 David Lippett, the Respondent’s Studio Engineering Lead;

4.4 Edmund Willis, the Respondent’s Chief Program Designer;

4.5 Ramkripa Ananthan, OLA’s Senior Vice President Vehicle Design.

[5]The Claimant made oral closing submissions, reading from notes she had prepared. Mr Wyeth provided written closing submissions, briefly adding to this orally. Case Number: 1306178/2024 3 Procedural Matters

[6]By an email of 29 September 2025, the Respondent applied for a postponement of the final hearing. This was explained on the basis that a key witness, Ms Ananthan, who is based in India, would no longer be able to travel to the UK to give evidence. This was because she was the primary carer for her mother, who had recently been taken ill. A doctor’s letter was attached. The Claimant opposed this application, citing its lateness, the suggested lack of importance in the evidence of the witness and the efforts she herself as a new mother had made to be able to attend. I caused a letter to be sent to the parties seeking further information and indicated the matter would be addressed at the start of the hearing. During the morning on day 1, I sought further information from the Respondent and then heard the parties’ submissions. Whilst reading in and considering the question of postponement, a middle way occurred, namely hearing the evidence of the Claimant and the Respondent's witnesses during the current listing and then going part-heard to a separate 1-day hearing, at which the missing witness could give her evidence and the parties make their closing submissions. I canvassed the parties at the beginning of the afternoon session and both were willing to agree this course. A suitable date was found, 12 January 2026, and I decided to proceed in that way. I made it clear the Respondent should ensure the witness had made appropriate backup care arrangements to avoid any repetition of this position in January.

[7]On the start of day 2, the Respondent sought to introduce additional documents. The Claimant did not oppose their admission. On the morning of day 3, both parties put forward further documentary disclosure.

[8]The Claimant provided additional WhatsApp messages, with the colleagues about whom she was complaining and her partner. Mr Wyeth objected to the Claimant providing incomplete disclosure in this regard. I explained to the Claimant that she had to provide all messages that were relevant to her claims. In the case of messages with her former colleagues, the Claimant said she would export the entire chat. As far as her partner was concerned, quite properly, she would only disclose those messages where she was talking about work. The Claimant also, reasonably, asked why the Respondent had not disclosed the messages with colleagues, given some of its witnesses were party to the same. I decided that an adjournment was necessary and asked Mr Wyeth to explore this latter point with the witnesses. I had specifically asked the Respondent for an unredacted copy of a document that was already in the bundle relating to the reason for the Claimant's dismissal and that was provided. The Respondent provided other material as well, including a document setting out legal advice in which privilege was waived inadvertently. Subsequently, mindful of the principle which prohibits selective waiver, the Respondent provided the entirety of the email exchange in which advice was given by its solicitors.

[9]I adjourned the proceedings for the preparation of a supplementary bundle of documents to be prepared and for the parties to take stock. In the afternoon of day 2, Mr Wyeth applied for the Claimant to be recalled to answer questions arising from the new documents. The Claimant did not disagree and this course was followed. Thereafter, I heard from the Respondent's witnesses. Case Number: 1306178/2024 4

[10]Prior to the resumed hearing on 12 January 2026, the Respondent served a supplemental witness statement from Ms Ananthan. The Respondent said this was necessary to address the additional documents disclosed during the last hearing. The Claimant opposed admission saying it raised new matters and was factually incorrect. She referred to documents in the bundle which were said to contradict the account given by Ms Ananthan. I was satisfied it was in the interests of justice to admit this new evidence. On the Respondent's case, Ms Ananthan made the decision not to continue with ergonomics in the UK, which resulted in the Claimant's dismissal for redundancy. Her short supplemental statement ran to three pages, although the substantive content covered only two. For the most part this addressed the additional documents disclosed by the parties during the first tranche of hearing days. The content was clearly relevant to the issues, indeed the complaint about dismissal was central to the matters before the Tribunal. The Claimant herself had been recalled and asked further questions after the new documents were introduced. Whilst the supplemental statement was provided at a late stage, I was satisfied the Claimant had enough time to read it and prepare questions, not least given she referred me to documents which she said contradicted the evidence of Ms Ananthan. Where additional documentary evidence is introduced at a final hearing, this may be a proper ground for a party to seek permission to ask supplemental questions (examination in chief) of its own witness. Where allowed, this will often result in the other party being taken by surprise if it had not anticipated the answers given. Far better that such evidence be contained in a supplemental statement provided in advance, so the other party has an opportunity to consider this and any questions it might wish to ask. That the Claimant disputed the factual accuracy of Ms Ananthan’s evidence was not a good reason to oppose its admission. I was satisfied there was no prejudice to the Claimant by admitting the supplemental witness statement into evidence. Facts Witness evidence

[11]The witness evidence I received was rather mixed. Whilst the Claimant gave clear and at times impassioned testimony, this was not in all respect satisfactory and persuasive. Despite my having emphasised the importance of answering the specific question asked, the Claimant often failed to do so. On a number of occasions, the Claimant provided indirect responses, saying something in the general area of the question rather than addressing the specific point. Such answers tended to come forth when a direct response might have seemed unlikely to support her position. I was also struck by some wholly unrealistic answers.

[12]My concerns about the quality of witness evidence were not, however, limited to the Claimant’s side. Mr Rouse on behalf of the Respondent, gave evidence in a very hesitant and uncertain way. He too, frequently, appeared to be avoiding the question. His account on a number of points was not credible. Mr Rouse’ denial of being the Claimant's line manager was especially unimpressive, given the overwhelming evidence demonstrating that he was. Case Number: 1306178/2024 5

[13]Mr Willis’ testimony was not persuasive. This included a most unlikely explanation for a comment he was accused of making to the Claimant, which I did not accept.

[14]Mr Lippett was a more straightforward witness. He engaged with the Claimant’s questions rather more directly than either Mr Lippett or Mr Willis. He gave credible responses on a number of points relating to the disputed claims. Whilst I was generally satisfied by the accuracy of his account of events, it seemed to me he was unable to put himself in the Claimant's shoes. Mr Lippett did not demonstrate much insight into how things might have appeared from her perspective, as a pregnant woman experiencing sometimes unwelcome behaviour from senior male colleagues.

[15]I found Ms Ananthan to be a reliable witness. She held a senior position with the Indian parent company. Her contact with the Claimant had been far more limited than other witnesses. Whilst the Claimant sought to cross-examine Ms Ananthan on a number of matters that were either not within her knowledge or only marginally so, the relevance of her evidence was to explain the decision of the parent company to cease carrying on the ergonomic activity in the UK and instead, employ such expertise in India. Ms Ananthan’s focus was the business and not the Claimant’s personal circumstances.

[16]Given the inconsistent quality of the witness evidence in many respects, I looked to the contemporaneous documentary evidence where this was available in connection with the disputed matters I had to determine. Background, Personnel and History

[17]The Respondent's parent company, OLA, is a large electric vehicle (“EV”) manufacturer, based in India. The focus of that business had been on 2-wheeled vehicles. In January 2022, OLA established the Respondent design studio in Coventry. This was further to a programme to develop 4-wheeled vehicles (i.e. cars) and access UK talent. The West Midlands is recognised as a centre of excellence in this regard. It was envisaged the Coventry studio would work alongside and with OLA’s existing design team in Bangalore, supporting all automotive design disciplines, including creative design, digital modelling, digital visualisation, colour and materials, studio engineering, user experience (“UX”) and user interface (“UI”).

[18]The Claimant commenced employment with the Respondent in March 2022 as Lead Human Factors Designer, at grade 25. At this time, the workforce stood at circa 28. The Claimant’s role was to ensure that vehicle dimensions and the user experience met ergonomic, brand, safety, and legal standards. This would include assessing matters such as visibility, reach of controls and the display. Her work was closely connected with UX and UI. Various other individuals were recruited at about the same time in related roles, including: Alex Jarvis, Chief UX/UI Designer; Claudia Krehl, also Lead Human Factors Designer; and John O'Connor, Product Design Chief.

[19]Wayne Burgess was Vice President Design UK. From July 2022, he reported to Ramkripa Ananthan. Ms Ananthan was not an employee of the Respondent, rather she was OLA’s Senior Vice President Vehicle Design. Case Number: 1306178/2024 6

[20]Edmund Willis was the Respondent’s Chief Program Designer. He agreed with the Claimant's proposition that he was Mr Burgess’ “right-hand man” and I accept that was so. Mr Willis was the line manager of the creative designers. His role included responsibility for creative 3D design development. He also worked with the Claimant, requiring her technical input to assist in developing parts of the 3D design proposals put together by the design team.

[21]David Rouse, Design Operations Manager, had various supporting responsibilities, including managing the facilities, dealing with IT, financial matters and HR. Mr Rouse was not an HR professional, he relied upon OLA’s team and acted as a conduit for communication in that regard. The Respondent did not have its own HR function. Notwithstanding he was also employed at grade 25, Mr Rouse was the Claimant’s line manager and in substance, a more senior employee. Notably, Mr Rouse was invited to regular management meetings and the Claimant was not. In the course of his evidence at the Tribunal, Mr Rouse sought to deny responsibility for the Claimant, suggesting that Mr Burgess managed everyone. Whilst Mr Burgess may have been very hands-on, the contemporaneous evidence strongly suggests Mr Rouse was the Claimant’s line manager. At this hearing he was, as the Claimant put to him, attempting to shirk that responsibility.

[22]With respect to HR matters, the Claimant in her witness statement describes a litany of alleged failures to follow UK law or comply with good practice, affecting employees of both sexes and on occasion the workforce as a whole. It is unnecessary for me to make findings about these matters where they do not form the subject of a claim. I do, however, accept the Claimant had a very poor opinion of OLA’s HR department.

[23]The Claimant was afforded a degree of flexibility about her place of work and was not expected to be primarily based in the Respondent’s Coventry office. Following a challenge in cross-examination to this effect, the Claimant produced rail tickets and created a schedule of her travel in June and July 2022. Over the course of seven weeks, she attended 10 times. This equated to once or twice a week at most, which frequency tended to support rather than contradict the Respondent's proposition.

[24]Having assembled a UK-based design team, OLA made two decisions which had a bearing upon the size and composition of the Respondent’s workforce. Despite having put together a team in Coventry to access UK talent, OLA came to the conclusion that its existing Bangalore design studio was able to undertake many of the UI and UX tasks it had been intended would be carried out in the UK. As a result, such work began to be reallocated to India. Furthermore and shortly thereafter, OLA made an about turn and decided not to proceed with the 4–wheeled programme and instead concentrate its attentions on further developing 2–wheeled vehicles for the Indian market. These choices made by the Respondent’s parent company led to a reduced workload in the UK. Whilst there may be a dispute between the parties as to the circumstances in which certain individuals employment came to an end – the Claimant says Mr Jarvis was fired in a parking lot – it is quite clear that both he and Ms Krehl left the business and were not replaced, or at least not by the recruitment of anyone in the UK. Case Number: 1306178/2024 7

[25]On 13 December 2022, the Claimant told Mr Burgess and Mr Rouse of her pregnancy but asked them not to pass this on. She did not wish for anyone else at the Respondent or OLA to be told at this stage. The Claimant was anxious about her pregnancy and wished to wait until the three-month scan, before anyone else was told. Mr Burgess and Mr Rouse respected her confidence.

[26]In her witness evidence the Claimant said the initial response to her news from Mr Burgess was disheartening, asking whether her partner could support her financially. The Claimant says she found this upsetting, in particular because it implied that a pregnant woman should be dependent upon the father of her child. The Claimant made no note or complaint about this matter at the time. Mr Wyeth pointed to the absence of any reference to this in the contemporaneous WhatsApp messages and challenged her in cross-examination. The Claimant explained that financial matters were sensitive between her and her partner. Mr Wyeth also put to the Claimant that her messages that day were positive and this was inconsistent with her receiving a disheartening response.

[27]Having carefully considered the WhatsApp messages on 13 December 2022, it is apparent they were sent before the Claimant spoke with Mr Burgess. The Claimant had been worried about losing her job as a result of work being reallocated to India and the departure of her colleague, Ms Krehl, who had been doing the same job. Having spoken to Mr Rouse about her pregnancy, the Claimant’s mind was put at rest. She wrote to her partner immediately thereafter: Since Claudia they've acknowledged that they still need the skills in our studio So happy I'm not leaving […] And happy for me

[28]I find the Claimant did, on the same day but subsequent to the exchange set out immediately above, tell Mr Burgess about her pregnancy and one of the things he said in response, along with congratulating her, was to ask whether her partner would support her. I also accept the Claimant found this disheartening. I am not, however, persuaded by her description of this being “demeaning and insulting”. This may reflect how the Claimant feels about the matter now, but I do not accept it was her reaction at the time. Nor do I accept that Mr Burgess made it clear he had no intention of supporting her request for enhanced redundancy pay. I do not find the conversation went that far. It seems unlikely Mr Burgess would even have known what OLA would say the Respondent's policy was. Furthermore, when at a later stage OLA put forward the UK statutory scheme, Mr Burgess encouraged the Claimant to obtain evidence making the case for an enhancement on this, which would seem to be inconsistent with his asserted negativity on 13 December 2022. The Claimant is conflating events. She has also, as is not uncommon once parties are embarked upon litigation, tended to recollect certain events or her reaction to them in a more severe way (and therefore helpful to her claim) than appears objectively likely.

[29]On 12 January 2023, the Claimant sent a WhatsApp message to Mr Rouse explaining that she would be late for work because of pregnancy sickness. She Case Number: 1306178/2024 8 attached a scan image, saying: “Fortunately, the symptoms are because of a happy and healthy little potato […] alls looking good.” The Claimant also sent a message to Mr Burgess, with a video from her scan and saying “I'd like to keep it under my hat still with OLA until Feb, and then see what they say [anxious face emoji]”. Mr Burgess responded: Aww, that's fantastic news Amy, I'm really pleased for you. I'm ok for you to keep this a private matter until Mid Feb, but it would be good for you to understand OLA's position ref maternity leave and pay sooner rather than later, for your own benefit more than anything.

[30]By this stage, it is clear there had been some discussion between the Claimant and Mr Burgess about maternity benefits. The conclusion I draw from the contemporaneous exchange, is that Mr Burgess did not know what OLA’s position would be and, therefore, what the Respondent would be able to offer. In this context, it does seem likely and I accept the Claimant’s evidence that Mr Burgess asked whether her partner would be able to provide financial support.

[31]On 26 January 2023, the Claimant looked on the OLA portal for information relating to maternity leave. I pause to note that whilst the Claimant had access to the OLA portal, she was employed by the Respondent. The Claimant took a screenshot of a document she found on the portal, which set out the provisions of the Maternity Benefits Act 1961. This is a reference to Indian rather than UK legislation. In her witness evidence, the Claimant said this was the Respondent’s policy, it applied to her and she was surprised when an alternate came forth, namely the UK statutory regime. In cross-examination, Mr Wyeth, suggested the Claimant could easily have discovered this was not a reference to domestic law by searching online. Whether the Claimant took this step or not, I am not persuaded she believed at the time this document reflected her entitlements as an employee of the Respondent in the UK. The message from Mr Burgess suggested it would be good for her to find out what OLA’s position on maternity pay would be. If the Claimant thought what she now says, she would have told Mr Burgess she already knew and referred him to this screenshot. Whilst I accept the Claimant was sometimes reluctant to complain about things that were said or done, because she worked in a male-dominated environment and did not want to be thought of as making a fuss, this did not apply to her financial package. When OLA decided the Respondent would offer only the UK statutory regime the Claimant was incensed. She adopted a robust stance in response, as set out below. The one thing she did not do was assert that the policy in the screenshot applied to her, less still that it was a contractual benefit. Had she believed this at the time, I have no doubt she would have said so.

[32]On 3 February 2023, the Claimant announced her pregnancy to her colleagues and informed OLA.

[33]In certain circumstances, employers are obliged to carry out a risk assessment of pregnant employees. This involves identifying potential risks to the health of the employee and her unborn baby, arising from the duties or work environment. Such risks must be removed or controlled. This can require adjusting duties, finding suitable alternative work, or even suspending the employee. No steps in this regard were taken. Mr Rouse described this as an oversight on the Respondent’s part, which I accept it was. He was, however, less inclined to Case Number: 1306178/2024 9 accept any personal responsibility. Mr Rouse was the nearest thing the Respondent had to an HR presence in the UK. He was also the Claimant’s line manager. The need for a risk assessment is a matter Mr Rouse should have considered as soon as he learned of the Claimant’s pregnancy. To the extent he was unaware of the Respondent’s duties in this regard, then advice ought to have been obtained. Mr Rouse’ insistence upon using the formulation during cross-examination “the Respondent overlooked” was far from impressive. I do, however, accept the genuineness of his evidence that this matter simply did not occur to him.

[34]On 5 February 2023, the Claimant sent a message to a group of friends saying “The vinyl wrap on the clays is not great when it's being applied so I needed them to tell me the schedule of that”. This was a reference to the film applied by the Respondent to the clay models of vehicles. The Claimant was expressing a concern about the fumes given off when this was done and whether it was safe during pregnancy. From her WhatsApp message, it is apparent the Claimant’s plan was to avoid attending the studio when this was being applied. Avoiding the office on those days would appear to avoid any risk. The Claimant told Mr Rouse about this on 7 February 2023. I accept the Claimant's evidence that hers was not a straight forward pregnancy and she was worried about the development of her baby. In light of this and also the Claimant's undoubted ability to speak up robustly when she believed this was necessary, I am not remotely persuaded she would, knowingly, have taken any risks with the safety of her unborn child. If the Claimant had remained concerned about the film being applied or any other perceived safety risk in the office, she would have taken this further and put something in writing. She did not do so. Certain matters pertaining to the Claimant's claims appear to have assumed a far greater significance in her mind now than they did contemporaneously. The lack of a pregnancy risk assessment is one such matter.

[35]Whilst no express statement to this effect had been made by Mr Burgess or Mr Rouse, during her pregnancy the Respondent did not expect the Claimant to attend the Coventry studio otherwise than when it suited her to do so. In the course of cross-examining Mr Rouse, the Claimant challenged him on failing to communicate this position. Notably, however, the Claimant did not produce any evidence of her rail travel in the period from February 2023 and it is likely she attended less rather than more frequently then.

[36]On 6 February 2023, OLA’s HR department sent the Claimant a link to the Respondent’s maternity policy. This provided for only statutory benefits. The Claimant was extremely disappointed.

[37]The Claimant responded to this email by writing to Mr Burgess asking if there would be push back. Mr Burgess responded agreeing that what was proposed looked “completely uncompetitive for the UK marketplace”. He asked the Claimant to pull together some examples of the maternity benefits offered by other large automotive employers in the region, so they could go back to OLA HR with this. It is clear from this exchange that the Claimant and Mr Burgess were surprised by OLA’s stance and he supported her in challenging this.

[38]The Claimant later responded to Mr Burgess with details of the benefits offered by a number of large employers, commenting that more generous packages Case Number: 1306178/2024 10 were offered in this sector to retain highly trained female talent. She made the case for enhanced maternity benefits. Reference to the policy she had found on the OLA portal is notable by its absence.

[39]On 28 February 2023, the Claimant sent a WhatsApp message to Mr Rouse explaining why she would not be attending the office that day: Hi Dave, I was due up to the office today but I’m still not well. Turned out after tests it was a magnesium deficiency this time, it’s getting better with increased supplements but still at its worst in the mornings and just can’t face that journey yet. I have a follow up and midwife appointment tomorrow and will aim to come up on Thursday. Hope that’s ok.

[40]Notwithstanding the representations made about the lack of competitiveness in the Respondent’s maternity leave policy, OLA did not change it. The decision in this regard was communicated to the Claimant on 7 March 2023. She was incensed.

[41]On 21 March 2023, Mr Willis and the Claimant spoke. In his witness statement, Mr Willis said he could not recall his exact words. He said the Claimant had drawn his attention to her appearance by saying she was “surprised you are not able to tell from my figure” (i.e. that she was pregnant). Mr Willis said he was embarrassed by this approach and to move the conversation along, he referred to the weight gain and physical discomfort suffered by his wife when pregnant. The evidence given by Mr Willis on this point and his answers to a number of relevant questions asked by the Claimant were far from clear. Only in response to my direct question did he admit saying “boob fairy”. He said this was his wife’s description of increased breast size as part of weight gain in pregnancy. Given the use of this expression had been alleged in the list of issues, I was surprised Mr Willis had no recollection of saying it when preparing his witness statement, yet recalled it when answering questions at the Tribunal. This suggested avoidance and a lack of candour on his part.

[42]I prefer the Claimant’s evidence in this regard. I find that in response to her telling Mr Willis that her baby bump was not growing – a cause of concern to her – Mr Willis said “never mind the bump, the boob fairy hasn’t been either”. This is a far more credible sequence. The Claimant having innocuously commented that her pregnancy was not showing, Mr Willis made a gratuitous remark about her breast size not increasing either (i.e. the “boob fairy” had not visited and bestowed this). Whilst she sought to laugh this off in front of Mr Willis, she felt insulted, disgusted and objectified that at a time when she was sharing her pregnancy with colleagues, a senior manager was looking at the size of her breasts. The Claimant’s evidence is supported by a WhatsApp message she sent to a group of friends the same day: "Never mind bump, the boob fairy hasn't been either" Things I don't even register at work [facepalm emoji] I will take great satisfaction from applying for new jobs when the time is right Case Number: 1306178/2024 11

[43]in response to one of her friends expressing their great surprise that someone actually said this to her, the Claimant responded: Welcome to working with 40 blokes

[44]Whilst the Claimant is capable of speaking up for herself, I find the lack of a complaint at the time does not lead to a conclusion that she was not upset or offended, rather it reflected a strong desire on her part to maintain a good working relationship with colleagues in an overwhelmingly male team.

[45]On 29 March 2023, the Claimant sent another WhatsApp message to Mr Rouse explaining why she could not make it to the studio: Hi Dave, was supposed to come to the office today, got about 45 mins into my journey and the driving is making me feel awful [sad face emoji] Had the 20 week scan yesterday and indeed he’s laying out relaxing taking up plenty of space, and I don’t have a bump so my digestive system is just squished up into a corner [feeling sick emoji] and extra squished with driving. We’re moving house on Saturday so should be back to train journey instead of driving from next week. I also got my mat1b form yesterday I need to submit to you, I’ll also send a copy to Akila and cc you. I’ll be stretched out working from home but if I need a doctors note or anything to explain the lack of face time should be able to arrange.

[46]In April 2023, the Claimant and Mr Lippett were discussing her maternity leave. In the course of this, Mr Lippett referred to the experience of his wife, who had intended to return to work after becoming a mother, but in the event decided not to. The Claimant's evidence is that Mr Lippett said she “would” not want to return to work after having a baby, she would “just want to be a mum”. Mr Lippett’s account was that he said she “may” not want to return. He also disputed saying “just a mum”. I prefer Mr Lippett’s evidence on this. Very many women wish to return to work after maternity leave and decide to do so. Some do not wish to come back. Others who had intended to return, change their mind. The choice is that of the woman, to be made at the relevant time. Mr Lippett was merely referring to the latter possibility. It is unlikely and I do not find he was so dogmatic as to say the Claimant “would not” or “will not” return, simply because that is what his wife decided. I do not accept the Claimant's description of this as being “insulting and degrading” reflects how she felt at the time. Whilst this may be her current recollection, it is likely her contemporaneous reaction was more modest, being somewhat irked by Mr Lippett’s comment, because she believed she would return and did not want a manager thinking there was any other possibility.

[47]On 17 April 2023, the Claimant sent her MAT1B to OLA HR. Her covering email included: Due to the absence of any company maternity policy, I will aim to begin maternity leave at the latest possible date in the week of my due date beginning Sunday 13/8/23, unless exemptions listed in the policy apply. Case Number: 1306178/2024 12

[48]On 26 May 2023, the Claimant sent a WhatsApp message to Mr Rouse explaining her non-attendance at the office: Hi Dave, my scarring pain has kicked off again today so won't make it to the office today. Happy to catch up online though. Not sure which days I'll be in next week, at the midwife appointment this week they were concerned about how small my bump is so having to have a growth scan on Tuesday. They're also trying to get me in for physio too. Will keep you posted!

[49]On 13 June 2023, Mr Rouse wrote to the Claimant chasing up her end of year goals document. He conducted the end of year review meeting with her on 16 June 2023, which was very positive. Mr Rouse carrying out the end of year review was consistent with him being the Claimant’s line manager. I did not accept his evidence that he was simply doing this for Mr Burgess.

[50]On or about 16 June 2023, the Claimant, Mr Lippett and Mr Burgess, were discussing her maternity leave. Mr Lippett repeated his earlier observations. Mr Burgess joined in saying that the same had been true for his wife. For like reasons as set out above in connection with the discussion with Mr Lippett in April 2023, I do not find the Claimant was told she “would not” or “will not” return. Nor do I accept that her reaction to this discussion at the time was as severe as she now recalls.

[51]By an email of 20 June 2023, the Respondent’s employees were invited to a work go karting activity. The Claimant was included in the circulation list. She did not sign up or otherwise respond. In her evidence, the Claimant said go-karting was contraindicated in pregnancy. She did not say this or raise any concern with the Respondent at the time.

[52]On 21 June 2023, the Claimant wrote to the Respondent with her intended maternity leave dates, putting forward 12 August 2024 as the proposed return date, but saying she would provide more than 8 weeks’ notice if that were not the case. The exchange of emails on this point, reflect a degree of misunderstanding or uncertainty on the part of OLA HR with respect to the Claimant's leave and UK maternity rights. The Claimant sent a WhatsApp message to her partner the same day saying: I think have fixed my maternity to be a year again, gosh ola are awful

[53]On 26 July 2023, Mr Lippett sent a message to the Respondent’s group chat, saying: Women say that giving birth is way more painful than a bloke getting kicked in the bollocks. Here is proof that they are wrong. A year or so after giving birth a woman will often say "It'd be nice to have another baby". You never hear a bloke say " I wouldn't mind another kick in the bollocks". Case closed. Saw this and thought of you Amy... [crying with laughter emoji]

[54]Several employees gave a thumbs up to this message. The Claimant responded: Case Number: 1306178/2024 13 Although, suggesting child birth isn't as bad may well be interpreted as indeed asking for a kick in the bollocks...

[55]I accept the evidence of Mr Lippett, to the effect that he and the Claimant had a good relationship which included exchanging humorous remarks. He was not expressing a view that the Claimant would want to have another baby after her first, he was merely trying to be funny, in which endeavour he failed. Whilst the Claimant gave a robust response, she was not amused. Mr Lippett was cross-examined on this remark and his answers did not demonstrate much insight into how this might have been received. The Claimant’s anxiety about pregnancy, the growth of her unborn child and giving birth, is corroborated by several messages sent to her employer. She was only two weeks away from her due date and this was much on her mind. Her male colleagues and senior managers laughing about childbirth did not seem very funny to the Claimant. I accept that she was upset and hurt by this comment, which also made her feel belittled and this was compounded by others in the group giving it a thumbs up. The Claimant's message in response was again part of her effort to maintain good working relationships.

[56]On 4 August 2023, Mr Lippett posted a message to the Respondent’s WhatsApp group about the risk of a driving ban for a speeding offence, referring to the amount of the fine paid, the length of the ban, the importance of mitigating circumstances and needing a good solicitor. Mr Rouse responded to this saying: Just blame the Mrs [crying with laughter emoji]

[57]Mr Rouse was, light-heartedly as opposed to seriously, suggesting the person facing a ban say that their wife had been driving the car at the time of this offence, so as to avoid the ban. Mr Rouse was not suggesting driving characteristics or the risk of speeding were attributable to sex. It seems unlikely the Claimant's reaction to this comment – referring to a practice which although unlawful is not unknown – was as described in her witness statement, namely to feel isolated and disrespected by it.

[58]On 13 August 2023, the Claimant began her maternity leave.

[59]Mr Burgess and Ms Ananthan had regular weekly discussions about the staff needs and structure of the Respondent business. A number of functions and positions which had been contemplated or created, were not continued with. The UK studio operated by the Respondent was originally created by OLA when it envisaged designing and building 4-wheeled vehicles. When a decision was made not to continue with that project and instead concentrate on 2-wheeled vehicles for India, OLA looked again at its UK subsidiary. These discussions included the ergonomics function, which had comprised both Ms Krehl and the Claimant at one stage. Ms Krehl’s employment terminated because of a lack of work. She was not replaced. In the period from September 2023, Mr Burgess and Ms Ananthan came to the conclusion that there was no need for ergonomics to continue with the Respondent in the UK and this function should instead be based with OLA in India. The factors they took into account included: the associated functions with which ergonomics liaised were already located in India; the business was intending to focus on the Indian market; anthropometric differences between Indian people and those of British or European origin meant Case Number: 1306178/2024 14 assessing the interaction between individuals and “bucks” (physical replicas of vehicles) was better undertaken in India. To this end, OLA decided to recruit an ergonomist in India. The relocation of this activity would mean there was no continuing need for the Claimant's role with the Respondent. She was, however, on maternity leave and, therefore, no immediate decision about her employment was required. This business had changed course previously and might have done so again before she returned.

[60]There was a delay in bonuses, affecting the whole team. The amounts were eventually agreed in August and then paid on 8 September 2023.

[61]On 10 October 2023, Mr Burgess sent the Claimant a WhatsApp message, which resulted in a short exchange, including: Hi Amy, Hope you're enjoying parenthood and all is well with all of you…x [thumbs up emoji] Starting as we mean to go on over here Dave!! [attaching photo of the Claimant on the beach with her baby and a surfboard] [Mr Burgess hearted the previous message] It's been wonderful so far, he's a lovely chilled little lad. Really can't complain! [attaching phot of her baby and a pet dog] Brilliant! Glad to see you're obviously chilled and loving it. Proper parenting Hope all is well at the studio, with whatever electrified milk float hoverboards you're designing!

[62]On 23 October 2023, Mr Rouse posted a gif on the Respondent’s WhatsApp group showing a cow being milked by a man and saying: Confirmed - Envisage cow will be milked a little further from tomorrow onwards to keep up with demand

[63]The Claimant, who was then struggling to establish breast feeding, thought this was aimed at her. She found it hurtful and humiliating.

[64]In cross examination, Mr Wyeth referred the Claimant to an email sent by Mr Rouse 20 minutes beforehand, to the Respondent’s landlord Envisage, which was responsible for providing milk to the tenants: Sorry to be trivial but the guys here are all moaning at me again that there's no milk Polestar seem to absolutely batter it on a Monday & Tuesday currently tbh Are you able to milk the Envisage cow a little further to keep up with demand

[65]Mr Wyeth suggested the Claimant had got the “wrong end of the stick” and asked whether, in light of the above email she had now seen, she still said this was aimed at her. The Claimant did, she said there was a level at which this was Case Number: 1306178/2024 15 intended to humiliate her. I do not agree. Quite clearly, this WhatsApp message had nothing whatsoever to do with her and was simply about shortage of milk at work. Furthermore, I am surprised by the Claimant’s reluctance to make an appropriate concession. I do not doubt the Claimant’s ability to recognise the significance, objectively, of the email sent to the landlord she has now seen but was not privy to at the time.

[66]On 17 November 2023, the Respondent sent an email to its employees asking them if they wished to attend the Christmas party. The Claimant was on the circulation list. On 29 November 2023, Mr Willis sent a follow-up to those who had expressed interest, inviting their food menu requests. On 1 December 2023, Mr Willis also sent the menu and a chaser on WhatsApp. The Claimant says at this time, she was not reading the WhatsApp group and did not have access to her work email. The Respondent was not made aware of this by her.

[67]On 15 December 2023, the Claimant received a WhatsApp message seeking her help with the recruitment of an ergonomist in India. Mr Jennings-Hulme wrote: Hey Amy ... Hope (see what I did there?!) ... you and your little family are doing well? I have a quick request. I've been asked to support in an interview with a candidate for the human factors/ergo role in India. As our "resident" expert., do you have 2 or 3 questions which you may pose, to maybe get an understanding of his/her/them knowledge and experience in HF? Thank you in advance., if you can advise :)) [thumbs up emoji]

[68]The Claimant sent a detailed reply: Course! I guess depends if the candidates are coming in from automotive or elsewhere. Bringing in from elsewhere will require considerable training as they won't have the automotive specific experience. I would ask a situational question like for HF "how would you assess a new user interface for safety? Expecting an answer to include eye tracking or occlusion study, interactions to take less than 2 seconds eyes off road time for each interaction and 10 seconds in total. This should be simulator scenario first and then on test road for latter stages. For the ergonomics portion I would ask something around "how would you assess a new vehicle package to be suitable for a family" I would expect the answer to include reference to anthropometries for the geographical area, maybe something about physical capability of users, RAMSIS or other software in the initial stages, reach studies, vision studies, then real life testing with physical properties or a buck. Definitely we need someone who can use RAMSIS in India unless UK has a license yet. That's THE big ergo blocker at the moment.

[69]After sending this message, the Claimant began to suspect the recruitment exercise was intended to find a replacement for her. She became upset and anxious. As a result, the Claimant decided to bring forward her return to work. Case Number: 1306178/2024 16 The inference I draw is that she was hoping to head-off the prospect of her position in the UK being dispensed with.

[70]On 28 December 2023, the Claimant wrote to the Respondent indicating that she wished to return from maternity leave in eight weeks, which she said was 21 February 2024. The email said she wished to take her accrued holiday, so that she would actually return to the workplace on 2 April 2024. Her email also included: Sorry I am sending this from a personal email address but I no longer have access to my work email or success factors from home.

[71]In her evidence the Claimant suggested that she had told the Respondent about her lack of work email previously. Whilst there was some evidence of an occasion when all of the Respondent’s employees appear to have been affected by an IT outage, there was nothing to support the Claimant’s proposition that she had told the Respondent of her particular ongoing difficulty with a lack of email access. The terms in which she wrote on 28 December 2023, in particular apologising and explaining why her email was coming from a personal email address, are consistent with this being the first time she had told the Respondent of the problem. The obvious way to have alerted the Respondent would have been an earlier email from her personal address or a WhatsApp message, neither of which were in evidence.

[72]The Claimant’s email about returning to work came to the attention of the Respondent on 2 January 2024. there was an exchange of emails between Mr Burgess, Mr Rouse, Ms Ananthan and others at OLA. Mr Burgess wrote: I thought there was a discussion regarding relocating the ergonomics role to India?

[73]Ms Tewari replied: Yes, we were having the discussion for the same. However, we need to figure out possible ways to terminate Amy, which can be done upon her return only. For now, we should be acknowledging her email and figure out next steps, in the meantime. I will speak to the legal team and understand our options for the same.

[74]On 5 January 2024, Mr Burgess wrote: As discussed, here is the context for the ergonomics role in the UK becoming redundant. The UK Design studio was established in Coventry around the end of January 2022 and, at that time, the understanding was that the UK studio would work in partnership with the Bangalore studio, but with more of a focus on 4 wheel programs due to there being a strong UK talent pool for these roles. The initial operating assumption was that the UK studio would support all disciplines of Automotive Design, so Creative Design, Digital Modelling, Digital Visualisation, Colour & Materials, Studio Engineering, UX/UI, Case Number: 1306178/2024 17 Ergonomics. Hence, we embarked on recruitment for all of these roles. *Please note we recruited Amy Hope and Claudia Krehl as Lead Ergonomists and Alex Jarvis as our Chief UX/UI designer in the period of March/April 2022. There was also a business assumption that a full R&D facility would be established alongside the Design Studio in the UK and a PD Chief, John O'Connor, was recruited to support this in the same time frame. As time passed, and after regular visits to the Bangalore studio, it became evident that there was a strong, established UX/UI team in Bangalore and that all UX/UI work could/would be handled by them. Alexis Jarvis consequently left around June '22 as a result of this. Similarly, as the Ergonomics roles are intrinsically linked to UX/UI, Claudia Krehl elected to leave the UK business in Autumn '22 (HR please confirm all of these dates) as the workload in the UK reduced accordingly. Please note that we also agreed to not recruit for any Colour & Materials roles in the UK at this time as, again, there was a good capability in the Bangalore studio. In early '23 (Q1) the business re-focussed it's Product Development activities onto 2 wheel programs and, around that time, John O'Connor left his role as PD Chief in the UK, having not recruited any Engineering or R&D roles for the UK operation. The initial 4 wheel program (against which the original UK team had been recruited) was postponed to allow us to concentrate on the 2 wheel programs. Core Engineering remained fully located in India and the business decided it was necessary to recruit for Ergonomics roles in India in Sept '23 since the majority of functions with which ergonomics liaise are now fully based in India. Hence, the ergonomics role in the UK studio has, through the course of both studios evolving over the last 2 years, become redundant (as has the CMF roles, the UX/UI roles and the majority of the physical/ clay modelling roles). @All, please 'fact check' this for dates and accuracy, and do add any of your own inputs which may further support this perspective, but this is my general appraisal of the situation.

[75]Dates of employment for Ms Krehl and Mr Jarvis were provided. I am not persuaded there is anything in this correspondence which suggests the rationale set out above was other than genuinely believed in by Ms Ananthan and Mr Burgess.

[76]In her cross-examination of the Respondent's witnesses, the Claimant attached particular importance to certain words in this email traffic such as “ways to terminate Amy”, suggesting this was sinister and the reason for her dismissal was not as elsewhere set out. I do not agree. When discussing matters privately – and this correspondence was not intended to be seen by the Claimant – employers and their lawyers will often write in a blunt manner or matter of fact way about ending an individual’s employment. That was the case here. Case Number: 1306178/2024 18

[77]On 9 January 2024, the Respondent’s solicitor provided advice, including: 1. Amy's employment began on 21 March 2022. This means she does not yet have service to bring a claim for unfair dismissal. She will accrue this right once she has 1 year and 51 weeks' service, and so I suggest you ensure that her employment has ended by 11 March 2024 at the very latest. 2. Despite her not having unfair dismissal rights, she can still purse a discrimination claim against you. Often these are attractive claims for employees to bring, as unlike with unfair dismissal, there is no minimum service requirement, and compensation for discrimination claims is uncapped (though still based on loss of earnings and injury to feelings). 3. Having talked through the rationale for the proposed redundancy, discrimination, whilst she may allege it, does not seem like a very high risk claim in this scenario. You have plausible grounds for the proposed redundancy of the role, and they appear unrelated to her maternity leave. My main concern is timing- i.e should the discussion have been had with her sooner, but I don't consider this to be a hugely material point on the facts. You will however need to remember to refer to the "proposal" to make her redundant, throughout your discussions with her. 4. As she is on maternity leave, Amy has the right to be offered a suitable alternative vacancy (where one is available) to start immediately after her existing contract ends. This gives her priority over other employees who are also at risk of redundancy and is a rare example of lawful positive discrimination. Having discussed this with you- it seems there are simply no such roles available. […] 7. In terms of process, as she doesn’t have unfair dismissal rights yet, you don't legally need to carry out a formal redundancy consultation process. However in the circumstances, I recommend you do (for PR reasons and to help limit your legal risk). This can take the form of a short form process in which you write to Amy putting her at risk of redundancy and inviting her to a consultation meeting (using the attached draft letter), have the consultation meeting (ideally run by Wayne with someone from HR in attendance), and then later confirm her employment will end by reason of redundancy. The notice of termination of employment will also need to be in writing. If she raises any concerns during the consultation process, you will then have the opportunity to address them.

[78]Mr Burgess asked whether Mr Rouse should be invited “as he is actually Amy’s direct manager?” The solicitor said that if the Claimant had two years’ service, it would make sense for Mr Rouse to conduct the meeting, so that Mr Burgess would be free for any appeal. But in the circumstances it was thought unlikely the Respondent would be allowing appeals (i.e. affording the Claimant a right of appeal against dismissal). The solicitor also advised that whilst the Claimant did not have the right to be accompanied at the upcoming meeting, it would be good practice to permit this. Amendments were made to the letter to be sent to the Claimant about her redundancy. At the Tribunal, the Claimant pointed to the abbreviated process and lack of an appeal as suggesting the Respondent had Case Number: 1306178/2024 19 another reason for dismissal. I do not agree. The qualifying period for the right to complain of unfair dismissal is intended to afford an employer the ability to dismiss an employee, without first having to follow a procedure which is fully compliant with ERA section 98(4). That the Respondent took this opportunity does not support the drawing of an adverse inference.

[79]On 9 January 2024, the Respondent wrote to the Claimant saying that her position was at risk of redundancy. The letter included: By way of background, the UK Design studio was established in Coventry around the end of January 2022, and at that time, the understanding was that the UK studio would work in partnership with the Bangalore studio, but with more of a focus on 4-wheel programs due to there being a strong UK talent pool for these roles. The initial operating assumption was that the UK studio would support all disciplines of Automotive Design, so Creative Design, Digital Modelling, Digital Visualisation, Colour & Materials, Studio Engineering, UX/UI, Ergonomics. As you know, we recruited you and another Lead Ergonomist, as well as a Chief UX/UI designer in the period between March- June 2022. There was also a business assumption that a full R&D facility would be established alongside the Design Studio in the UK and a PD Chief was recruited to support this in the same time frame. As time passed, and after regular visits to the Bangalore studio, it became evident that there was a strong, established UX/UI team in Bangalore and that all UX/UI work could/would be handled by them. The Chief UX/UI designer left the business in around August 2022 as a result. Similarly, as the Ergonomics roles are intrinsically linked to UX/UI, the other Lead Ergonomist elected to leave the UK business in February 2023 as the workload in the UK had reduced accordingly. In QI of 2023, as you will be aware, the business re-focussed its Product Development activities onto 2 -wheel programs and, around that time, the PD Chief in the UK left, having not recruited any Engineering or R&D roles for the UK operation. The initial 4-wheel program (against which the original UK team had been recruited) was postponed, to allow us to concentrate on the 2-wheel programs. Core Engineering remained fully located in India. Having conducted a review, we are now proposing to base all ergonomics roles in India, since the majority of functions with which ergonomics liaise are now fully based in India. Hence, it is proposed that the Lead Ergonomist role in the UK studio will become redundant (as has previously been the case with the CMF roles, the UX/UI roles and the majority of the physical/ clay modelling roles). […] Before any decision about your potential redundancy is made, we want to discuss this with you and consider anything you think may be relevant to the decision, including as to how the Company can avoid redundancies. Case Number: 1306178/2024 20 We will also be considering whether there are any alternative positions which may be suitable for you - we are happy to discuss the possibility of vacancies in India if you would consider relocating, but of course appreciate that that may not be of interest to you. I appreciate that this will be particularly unsettling for you whilst you are on maternity leave. However, we did want to let you know of the proposals as soon as possible

[80]Joining details for a Zoom call on 12 January 2024 were sent to the Claimant.

[81]On 10 January 2024, the Claimant wrote to the Respondent saying she may need to reschedule their call (i.e. meeting) in order to speak to her employment lawyer beforehand. The Claimant’s partner is a lawyer, but not one specialising in employment. The Respondent's solicitor advised it would make sense to accommodate the Claimant getting her own advice.

[82]On 11 January 2024, the Claimant sent a WhatsApp message to Mr Rouse about her upcoming meeting: Hi Dave, I have a call with Wayne and HR tomorrow @10am, just wondering if you could join? might be interesting for you to see. Also if you could give me a call at some point this Arvo/ evening I'd really appreciate it It's an OLA classic

[83]In the course of cross-examination, Mr Wyeth suggested to the Claimant that her invitation to Mr Rouse to join this meeting was inconsistent with her allegations of harassment or discrimination against him, as it suggested she trusted him. The Claimant disputed this, saying that Mr Rouse was very outspoken, her intention was that he would tell everyone else in the office about what had gone on and she hoped this would mean that others would not be treated the same way in future. I doubt the latter part of this explanation. In the course of her evidence, the Claimant gave her views on the poor way in which various former colleagues had been dealt with by OLA. None of this appears to have been kept a secret. Indeed, in one of her earlier WhatsApp messages, the Claimant spoke of her belief that Mr Burgess did not want to have to deal with her “kicking up a fuss” about what had happened to Ms Krehl. My conclusion is that the Claimant did want her colleagues to know what happened to her, but did not expect this would lead to a changed approach in future. The Claimant characterised what was being done to her as an “OLA classic” (i.e. a very good example of the poor way in which she perceived OLA dealt with staff matters generally). She also trusted Mr Rouse. It does not, however, follow that the Claimant had not been upset by any of his previous comments.

[84]The Claimant attended a rescheduled meeting with Mr Burgess and Ms Tewari on 16 January 2024. The minute, which I accept as accurate included: Wayne - explained that Ola had planned to set up an engineering team in the UK studio and thus, also hired for UX/UI and Ergo roles. However over time it was realized that the engineering and UX/UI teams will remain in the India studio. This led to the exits of Alex Jarvis and Claudia Krehl over Case Number: 1306178/2024 21 time. We tried to keep Amy occupied but there is no more work left for her role. We aren't able to justify keeping this role in the UK anymore and thus, the Ergo role in the UK has become redundant.

[85]The Respondent did not put forward any alternatives to redundancy and proceeded directly to the mechanics of her termination. The Claimant did not suggest there was or might be any such position that may be suitable for her. Rather she advised that her lawyer would be writing to the Respondent complaining of unfair dismissal and with a list of her grievances. The evidence does not suggest there was any UK vacancy that was suitable for the Claimant. If she had believed there was, she would have said so.

[86]In her evidence at the Tribunal, the Claimant complained that she was not offered the opportunity to relocate and take up the job in India. I asked her whether she would have seriously contemplated such a move. She said she would, describing India as the sixth most beautiful country in the world. The Claimant’s evidence in this regard was not satisfactory. She had never lived in India. She had no family in or connections with India. Her witness statement included reference to the dangers she had faced as a woman travelling alone in India for business. She had just given birth to her first child. The Claimant's oral evidence included a graphic description of the difficulty she had in establishing feeding. Her partner was a lawyer in London. Uprooting herself and travelling with her baby across the world for work would be an incredibly challenging proposition at the best of times, which this was not for her. This situation cannot, realistically, be compared with 6 months spent travelling by the Claimant overseas at an earlier point in her life when she had no dependants. If the Claimant had any real interest in this option then the obvious thing to do would have been to tell the Respondent. The Claimant complains the Respondent failed to raise the possibility at their meeting. The explanation for this is, however, quite obvious. In the letter putting her at risk, the Respondent expressly and reasonably anticipated that a job in India would not be of interest to her. If the position was otherwise, the dismissal meeting was obviously the time for her to say so. The Claimant’s evidence in this regard is not credible. Not only do I not accept it reflects her thoughts contemporaneously, I do not accept the Claimant now believes that is how she felt at the time. Her evidence on this was wholly unrealistic.

[87]The Claimant’s dismissal was confirmed in writing on 17 January 2024, the letter sent to her included: As I explained in that meeting, having conducted a review, we are now proposing to base all ergonomics roles in India, since the majority of functions with which ergonomics liaise are now fully based there. There are obvious benefits in terms of efficiency and integration, as well as cost. Hence, I discussed with you the proposal that your role of Lead Ergonomist in the UK studio will become redundant. During our meeting yesterday, you mentioned that you had several grievances, and that we would shortly be receiving a legal letter from your lawyers. However, you did not explain how these might be linked to the proposal to make your role redundant and I was unaware of these before the proposal was put forward. You had no specific comments to make in Case Number: 1306178/2024 22 relation to the subject of the meeting, i.e. the proposal to make your role redundant. We had delayed this meeting in order to allow you to prepare for, and attend it. I have considered ways in which your redundancy could be avoided, including trying to identify any suitable alternative roles within the Company. Unfortunately, this has not been successful.

[88]The Respondent did not subsequently recruit a replacement for the Claimant. Ergonomic work is now undertaken by OLA in India.

[89]In cross-examining Ms Ananthan, the Claimant suggested for the first time that with appropriate training she could have undertaken a Vis role for the Respondent. Ms Ananthan’s evidence was that she was unaware of any opening in the UK structure. This proposition had not been included in the Claimant's witness statement or her answers to questions at the Tribunal. Nor was I referred to any documentary evidence in this regard. There was no evidence to support a finding that the Respondent was recruiting for the Vis team at the point of the Claimant's dismissal, less still that it would have been suitable employment for her. Had this been so, one or both would have raised it at the time of the Claimant's dismissal.

[90]At the point of the Claimant's dismissal, the Respondent’s workforce had reduced to circa 24. Ms Krehl, Mr Jarvis and Mr O’Connor had all left. Whether they were dismissed or resigned, none of them were replaced, at least not by the recruitment of a worker by the Respondent in the UK. OLA had decided not to continue these roles. This was because of business decisions regarding the utilisation of resources in Bangalore generally and the cessation of the 4-wheeled programme in particular. Law Unfair Dismissal – Pregnancy and Maternity

[91]Dismissal for certain reasons connected with pregnancy, maternity and parental or adoption leave will be automatically unfair. So far as material, Section 99 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (“ERA”) provides:(1) An employee who is dismissed shall be regarded for the purposes of this Part as unfairly dismissed if— (a) the reason or principal reason for the dismissal is of a prescribed kind, or (b) the dismissal takes place in prescribed circumstances.

(2) In this section “prescribed” means prescribed by regulations made by the Secretary of State.

(3) A reason or set of circumstances prescribed under this section must relate to— (a) pregnancy, childbirth or maternity, Case Number: 1306178/2024 23 […] (b) ordinary, compulsory or additional maternity leave, (ba) ordinary or additional adoption leave, […]

[92]Reasons in this regard were prescribed by Maternity and Parental Leave etc. Regulations 1999 (“MAPLE”). Regulation 20, in so far as material provides:(1) An employee who is dismissed is entitled under section 99 of the 1996 Act to be regarded for the purposes of Part X of that Act as unfairly dismissed if— (a) the reason or principal reason for the dismissal is of a kind specified in paragraph (3), or (b) the reason or principal reason for the dismissal is that the employee is redundant, and regulation 10 has not been complied with. […] (3) The kinds of reason referred to in paragraphs (1) and

(2) are reasons connected with— (a) the pregnancy of the employee; (b) the fact that the employee has given birth to a child; […] (d) the fact that she took, sought to take or availed herself of the benefits of, ordinary maternity leave or additional maternity leave; […]

[93]Insofar as material, MAPLE Regulation 10 provides:(1) This regulation applies where it is not practicable by reason of redundancy for an employer to continue to employ an employee under her existing contract of employment during— (a) the protected period of pregnancy; (b) the statutory maternity leave period; or (c) the additional protected period. […]

(2) Where there is a suitable available vacancy, the employee is entitled to be offered (before the end of her employment under her existing contract) alternative employment with her employer or his successor, or an associated employer, under a new contract of employment which Case Number: 1306178/2024 24 complies with paragraph (3) (and takes effect immediately on the ending of her employment under the previous contract).

(3) The new contract of employment must be such that– (a) the work to be done under it is of a kind which is both suitable in relation to the employee and appropriate for her to do in the circumstances, and (b) its provisions as to the capacity and place in which she is to be employed, and as to the other terms and conditions of her employment, are not substantially less favourable to her than if she had continued to be employed under the previous contract.

[94]Redundancy is defined by ERA section 139, which provides insofar as material:(1) For the purposes of this Act an employee who is dismissed shall be taken to be dismissed by reason of redundancy if the dismissal is wholly or mainly attributable to— (a) the fact that his employer has ceased or intends to cease— (i) to carry on the business for the purposes of which the employee was employed by him, or (ii) to carry on that business in the place where the employee was so employed, or (b)the fact that the requirements of that business— (i) for employees to carry out work of a particular kind, or (ii) for employees to carry out work of a particular kind in the place where the employee was employed by the employer, have ceased or diminished or are expected to cease or diminish.

(2) For the purposes of subsection (1) the business of the employer together with the business or businesses of his associated employers shall be treated as one (unless either of the conditions specified in paragraphs (a) and (b) of that subsection would be satisfied without so treating them).

[95]An associated employer for these purposes may, per ERA section 231, include the position where one company controls another, or both are controlled by a third.

[96]In effect, an employee whose position is made redundant whilst she is on maternity leave is entitled to be offered suitable alternative employment with her employer or an associated employer. In effect, the employee gets first refusal on vacant positions.

[97]The correct approach to whether there was suitable alternative employment was addressed by the EAT in Simpson v Endsleigh Insurance Services

[2011] ICR 75

, per HHJ Ansell: Case Number: 1306178/2024 25 27. […] The requirement of the suitability set out in regulation 10(2) can only sensibly be tested by the requirement that it is coupled with a new contract of employment, which complies with regulation 10(3) . To suggest that regulation 10(3)(a) can be looked at, apart from regulation 10(3)(b) , seems to import a two-stage process into the regulation which is not apparent from its wording. The regulation itself, in our view, protects those on maternity leave in preference to those who are in fact still working and the necessity to provide an equivalent post is protected by the requirement as to term, this being not less substantially favourable. […]30. […] The key passage as far as we are concerned is in para 10(7) when the tribunal said: “So far as the insurance consultant post which was hers for the asking in Cheltenham is concerned, looked at objectively, and taking into account her circumstances, this was substantially less favourable to her in terms of place of employment than if she had continued to be employed under the previous contract.”

31. It seems to us that the tribunal were absolutely correct to focus on an objective decision made by the employers, since under the Regulations there is no requirement on the claimant to actually engage in this process, although clearly the employers would have to consider what they knew about the claimant's personal circumstances and work experience. It seems to us that at the end of the day it is up to the employers, knowing what they do about the claimant, to decide whether or not a vacancy is suitable. […] Detriment

[98]Insofar as material, ERA section 47C provides: (1) An employee has the right not to be subjected to any detriment by any act, or any deliberate failure to act, by his employer done for a prescribed reason. […]

[99]The reasons prescribed by MAPLE in this regard mirror those as for automatic unfair dismissal under ERA section 99.

[100]As to the meaning of any detriment, the Claimant must establish that by reason of the act or acts complained of a reasonable worker might take the view that they had thereby been disadvantaged in the circumstances in which they had thereafter to work. An unjustified sense of grievance cannot amount to a detriment for these purposes; see Shamoon v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary

[2003] IRLR 285

HL.

[101]Whereas for the purposes of an automatic unfair dismissal claim the Tribunal must be satisfied that reason or principal reason for dismissal was a prescribed one, the causation test in a detriment cases is whether the prescribed reason materially influences, in the sense of being more than a trivial influence, the Case Number: 1306178/2024 26 employer's treatment of the worker; see Fecitt v NHS Manchester

[2012] IRLR 64

CA. Pregnancy Risk Assessment

[102]The EAT in O'Neill v Buckinghamshire County Council

[2010] IRLR 348

considered the circumstances in which the duty to carry out a pregnancy risk assessment arises, per HHJ Ansell: 36. […] Mr Hignett argued that Madarassy made it clear that there was no general obligation to carry out a risk assessment on pregnant employees with the result that failure to carry out such a risk assessment was discrimination per se, and he contended that whilst it may be prudent for employers to carry out risk assessment for all pregnant workers, it was clear from the language of the Directive and the UK Regulations that we have set out above that the obligation to carry out a risk assessment of a pregnant worker would only be triggered in certain circumstances. He suggests therefore that the following preconditions would have to be met.(a) that the employee notifies the employer that she is pregnant in writing […],

(b) the work is of a kind which could involve a risk of harm or danger to the health and safety of a new expectant mother or to that of her baby,

(c) the risk arises from either processes or working conditions or physical biological chemical agents in the workplace at the time specified in a non-exhaustive list at Annexes I and II of Directive 92/85/EEC. We agree with that analysis.

[103]If the duty to conduct a pregnancy risk assessment did arise and the employer failed to carry it out, the next question is one of causation. This was considered by the EAT in Hardman v Mallon

[2002] IRLR 516

, a case decided under the Sex Discrimination Act 1975, per HHJ McMullen: 14. In our judgment the proper approach is to construe those statutes by reference to the Equal Treatment Directive and to the Pregnant Workers Directive. It is not necessary for the treatment by the Respondent of the Applicant to be compared with the Respondent's treatment of a comparable male employee, or a non pregnant female employee – see Webb v EMO Air Cargo (UK) Ltd (No 2)

[1995] IRLR 645

. In the context of the dismissal of a pregnant employee on the grounds of her pregnancy the House of Lords, applying the judgment of the European Court of Justice on a reference by the House, found that pregnancy was a relevant circumstance within the meaning of Section 5(3), with the consequence that no comparison with a male employee was necessary. Thus, if the basis of the treatment is pregnancy, it is unlawful, irrespective of the Respondent's comparable treatment of men, or for that matter, non pregnant women. Application of the Webb principle was provided in Brown v Rentokil Limited

[1998] ICR 790

and Pederson

[1999] IRLR 55

. The former is a dismissal case; the latter is a case of disparate treatment of, on the one hand illness, and on the other, pregnancy. 15. The proper approach in the construction of applicable treatment is to consider not just dismissal but working conditions. We hold that the scope of the judgment of the European Court in Pedersen, albeit directed at dismissal, is wide enough to include working conditions and to require consideration of the special protection which is to be given to women during and after pregnancy – see paragraphs 14 to 22 of the judgment. As Case Number: 1306178/2024 27 the Court puts it, the protection of a woman's biological condition during and after pregnancy indicates a special relationship which has to be protected. One way in which it is protected is by carrying out a risk assessment pursuant to the Management Regulations. Failure to do so impacts disparately on pregnant workers. It is, of course, a duty on all employers to carry out a risk assessment but in respect of a pregnant worker a failure to carry out such a risk assessment, in our judgment, is discrimination. It is the application of the same rule in different situations having an unfavourable impact on a particularly protected worker, here, a pregnant worker. Thus, direct application of the second part of the European Court's judgment to the answer to the first question in paragraphs 30 and 31 indicates discrimination.

[104]Whilst Hardman and the subsequent case of Stevenson v JM Skinner and Co EAT [2007] 0584/07 appear to suggest that causation is automatically established in a case where the employer has failed in this regard, a different approach was taken in Indigo Design Build and Management Ltd v Martinez

[2014] EAT 0020/14

. It does not appear the earlier decisions were put before the EAT on this occasion; per HHJ Richardson: 29. The Tribunal was required by section 13(1) and sections 18(2) and thereafter to consider whether the alleged treatment of Mrs Martinez was "because of' the protected characteristic in question or "because of' pregnancy or maternity leave. The use of the term "because of' is a change from terms used in earlier discrimination legislation, but it is now well-established that no change of legal approach is required: see Onu v Akwiwu

[2014] ICR 571

at paragraph 40, Underhill LJ. The law requires consideration of the "grounds" for the treatment. 30. Onu also contains a concise statement of the law concerning what will constitute the "grounds" for a directly discriminatory act. In that case the worker concerned had no proper immigration status. She was subjected to ill-treatment at work. Underhill J said: "42. What constitutes the ‘grounds’ for a directly discriminatory act will vary according to the type of case. The paradigm is perhaps the case where the discriminator applies a rule or criterion which is inherently based on the protected characteristic. In such a case the criterion itself, or its application, plainly constitutes the grounds of the act complained of, and there is no need to look further. But there are other cases which do not involve the application of any inherently discriminatory criterion and where the discriminatory grounds consist in the fact that the protected characteristic has operated on the discriminator’s mind - what Lord Nicholls in Nagarajan called his ‘mental processes’ (p. 884 D-E) - so as to lead him to act in the way complained of. It does not have to be the only such factor: it is enough if it has had ‘a significant influence’. Nor need it be conscious: a subconscious motivation, if proved, will suffice. Both the latter points are established in the speech of Lord Nicholls in Nagarajam see pp. 885-6. 43. The distinction between the two kinds of case is most authoritatively made in the judgment of Lady Hale in R (E) v Governors of the JFS

[2010] 2 AC 728

, at paras. 61-64 (pp. 759-760), though it is to be found in the earlier case-law: I would venture to refer to my own judgment, sitting in the EAT, in Amnesty Case Number: 1306178/2024 28 International v Ahmed [2009| ICR 1450, at paras. 32- 35 (pp. 1469-70). 44. The present case is plainly not of the ‘criterion’ type. Mr Robottom in his skeleton argument contended otherwise, but the contention is, with all respect to him, unsustainable. The various acts of which Ms Onu complains - underpayment, being required to work excessive hours etc. - are not inherently based on her immigration status. If her immigration status was (part of) the grounds for those acts it is only because, in the mental processes which led to their doing them, Mr and Mrs Akwiwu were significantly influenced by it."31. It was not in dispute before me that this approach is appropriate in a direct discrimination claim under section 18 just as under section 13. I am sure that this is the case. There is, in fact, authority in the Employment Appeal Tribunal following this general approach: see Johal v Commissioner for Equality and Human Rights [2010]

UKEAT/0541/09

, HHJ Peter Clark. The question is whether the tribunal applied this approach.

32. I have reached the conclusion that the tribunal did not apply this approach in respect of the section 18 findings. My reasons are as follows. There is a very plain difference between the way the Tribunal reasoned in respect of the sex discrimination claim and the way it reasoned in respect of the pregnancy and maternity discrimination claim. The reasoning in respect of the sex discrimination claim involves a two-stage process entirely appropriate where the Tribunal is considering whether to find direct discrimination established in a case where the mental processes of the alleged discriminator are in issue. No such reasoning is found when the Tribunal considered the pregnancy and maternity discrimination claim.

33. This difference is particularly stark when the Tribunal considered the failure of Indigo to address the grievance of Mrs Martinez. The Tribunal found the very short period of delay at the outset to be maternity discrimination, without any reference to the burden of proof and despite acknowledging that the period was very short and not at all unusual. The Tribunal then adopted the conventional two-stage approach in determining whether the much longer period of delay amounted to sex discrimination.

34. The difference also appears to my mind from the use of the phrase "based on the premise that she is pregnant" in paragraphs 8.1.1 and 8.2.1. The reasoning seems to be that, since a notification and risk assessment were required under statutory regulations to do with pregnancy or maternity leave, failure to provide them, or even in the case of the notification providing it a few days late, must be direct discrimination. This is not the law. Failure to provide a notification or a risk assessment relating to pregnancy or maternity leave may be, but is not necessarily, "because of' pregnancy or maternity leave. It may, for example, be a simple administrative error. The same process of reasoning is required in such a case as is required in any other discrimination case.

[105]I am satisfied the correct approach is as set out in Indigo Design. Whilst per Webb, the Claimant does not need a male comparator, she must still establish the detriment was because of her pregnancy. That causal connection is Case Number: 1306178/2024 29 required. The Tribunal must look at the mental processes of the alleged discriminator. Direct Discrimination

[106]In the employment field and so far as material, section 39 of the Equality Act 2010 (“EqA”) provides: (2) An employer(a) (A) must not discriminate against an employee of A's

(b) (B) - (a) as to B's terms of employment; (b) in the way A affords B access, or by not affording B access, to opportunities for promotion, transfer or training or for receiving any other benefit, facility or service;

(d) by subjecting B to any other detriment.

[107]As to the meaning of any other detriment, the employee must establish that by reason of the act or acts complained of a reasonable worker might take the view that they had thereby been disadvantaged in the circumstances in which they had thereafter to work. An unjustified sense of grievance cannot amount to a detriment for these purposes; see Shamoon v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary

[2003] IRLR 285

HL.

[108]EqA section 13(1) provides: (1) A person (A) discriminates against another (B) if, because of a protected characteristic, A treats B less favourably than A treats or would treat others.

[109]The Tribunal must consider whether:109.1 the claimant received less favourable treatment;

109.2 if so, whether that was because of a protected characteristic.

[110]The question of whether there was less favourable treatment is answered by comparing the way in which the claimant was treated with the way in which others have been treated, or would have been treated. This exercise may involve looking at the treatment of a real comparator, or how a hypothetical comparator is likely to have been treated. In making this comparison we must be sure to compare like with like and particular to apply EqA section 23(1), which provides: (1) On a comparison of cases for the purposes of section 13, 14 or 19 there must be no material difference between the circumstances relating to each case.

[111]Evidence of the treatment of an actual comparator who is not close enough to satisfy the statutory definition may nonetheless by of assistance since it may Case Number: 1306178/2024 30 help to inform a finding of how a hypothetical comparator would have been treated.

[112]As to whether any less favourable treatment was because of the claimant’s protected characteristic:112.1 direct evidence of discrimination is rare and it will frequently be necessary for employment tribunals to draw inferences from the primary facts;

112.2 if we are satisfied that the claimant’s protected characteristic was one of the reasons for the treatment complained of, it will be sufficient if that reason had a significant influence on the outcome, it need not be the sole or principal reason;

[113]In the absence of a real comparator and as an alternative to constructing a hypothetical comparator, in an appropriate case is may be sufficient to answer the “reason why” question - why did the claimant receive the treatment complained of.

[114]The definition in EqA section 13 makes no reference to the protected characteristic of any particular person, and discrimination may occur when A is discriminated against because of a protected characteristic that A does not possess; this is sometimes known as ‘discrimination by association’.

[115]The burden of proof is addressed in EqA section 136, which so far as material provides: (2) If there are facts from which the court could decide, in the absence of any other explanation, that a person (A) contravened the provision concerned, the court must hold that the contravention occurred. (3) But subsection (2) does not apply if A shows that A did not contravene the provision occurred.

[116]When considering whether the claimant has satisfied the initial burden of proving facts from which a Tribunal might find discrimination, the Tribunal must consider the entirety of the evidence, whether adduced by the claimant or respondent; see Laing v Manchester City Council

[2006] IRLR 748

EAT.

[117]Furthermore, a simple difference in treatment as between the claimant and his comparators and a difference in protected characteristic will not suffice to shift the burden; see Madarassy v Nomura

[2007] IRLR 246

CA.

[118]The burden of proof provisions will add little in a case where the ET can make clear findings of a fact as to why an act or omission was done or not; see Martin v Devonshires Solicitors

[2011] IRLR 352

EAT, per Underhill P: 39. This submission betrays a misconception which has become all too common about the role of the burden of proof provisions in discrimination cases. Those provisions are important in circumstances where there is room for doubt as to the facts necessary to establish discrimination generally, that is, facts about the respondent’s motivation (in the sense defined above) because of the notorious difficulty of knowing what goes on inside someone else’s head “the devil himself Case Number: 1306178/2024 31 knoweth not the mind of man” (per Brian CJ, YB 17 Ed IV f.1, pl. 2). But they have no bearing where the tribunal is in a position to make positive findings on the evidence one way or the other, and still less where there is no real dispute about the respondent’s motivation and what is in issue is its correct characterisation in law […] Harassment

[119]Insofar as material, EqA section 26 provides:(1) A person (A) harasses another (B) if— (a) A engages in unwanted conduct related to a relevant protected characteristic, and (b) the conduct has the purpose or effect of— (i)violating B's dignity, or (ii)creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for B.

(2) A also harasses B if— (a) A engages in unwanted conduct of a sexual nature, and (b) the conduct has the purpose or effect referred to in subsection (1)(b).

(3) A also harasses B if— (a) A or another person engages in unwanted conduct of a sexual nature or that is related to gender reassignment or sex, (b) the conduct has the purpose or effect referred to in subsection (1)(b), and (c) because of B's rejection of or submission to the conduct, A treats B less favourably than A would treat B if B had not rejected or submitted to the conduct.

(4) In deciding whether conduct has the effect referred to in subsection (1)(b), each of the following must be taken into account— (a)the perception of B; (b)the other circumstances of the case; (c)whether it is reasonable for the conduct to have that effect.

[120]Whilst the unwanted conduct need not be done ‘on the grounds of’ or ‘because of”, in the sense of being causally linked to, a protected characteristic in order to amount to harassment, the need for that conduct be ‘related to’ the protected characteristic does require a “connection or association” with that; see Regina (Equal Opportunities Commission) v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry

[2007] ICR 1234

QBD. Notwithstanding it was decided under the prior legislation including the formulation “on the grounds of”, the observations made by by the EAT in Nazir v Asim

[2010] ICR 1225

may still be of some relevance: 69 We wish to emphasise this last question. The provisions to which we have referred find their place in legislation concerned with equality. It is not the purpose of such legislation to address all forms of bullying or anti-social behaviour in the workplace. The legislation therefore does not prohibit all harassment, still less every argument or dispute in the workplace; it is concerned only with harassment which is related to a characteristic protected by equality law—such as a person’s race and gender. Case Number: 1306178/2024 32

[121]In relation to the proscribed effect, although C’s perception must be taken into account, the test is not a subjective one satisfied merely because C thinks it is. The ET must reach a conclusion that the found conduct reasonably brought about the effect; see Richmond Pharmacology v Dhaliwal

[2009] IRLR 336

EAT.

[122]Guidance on the threshold for conduct satisfying the statutory definition was given by the EAT in Betsi Cadwaladr University Health Board v Hughes [2014] 2 WLUK 991; per Langstaff P:10. Next, it was pointed out by Elias LJ in the case of Grant v HM Land Registry

[2011] EWCA Civ 769

that the words “violating dignity”, “intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating, offensive” are significant words. As he said: “Tribunals must not cheapen the significance of these words. They are an important control to prevent trivial acts causing minor upsets being caught by the concept of harassment.”

11. Exactly the same point was made by Underhill P in Richmond Pharmacology at paragraph 22: “..not every racially slanted adverse comment or conduct may constitute the violation of a person's dignity. Dignity is not necessarily violated by things said or done which are trivial or transitory, particularly if it should have been clear that any offence was unintended. While it is very important that employers, and tribunals, are sensitive to the hurt that can be caused by racially offensive comments or conduct (or indeed comments or conduct on other grounds covered by the cognate legislation to which we have referred), it is also important not to encourage a culture of hypersensitivity or the imposition of legal liability in respect of every unfortunate phrase.”

12. We wholeheartedly agree. The word “violating” is a strong word. Offending against dignity, hurting it, is insufficient. “Violating” may be a word the strength of which is sometimes overlooked. The same might be said of the words “intimidating” etc. All look for effects which are serious and marked, and not those which are, though real, truly of lesser consequence. Unlawful Deductions

[123]So far as material, section 13 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (“ERA”) provides: 13 Right not to suffer unauthorised deductions.(1) An employer shall not make a deduction from wages of a worker employed by him unless— (a) the deduction is required or authorised to be made by virtue of a statutory provision or a relevant provision of the worker’s contract, or (b)the worker has previously signified in writing his agreement or consent to the making of the deduction. Case Number: 1306178/2024 33

(2) In this section “relevant provision”, in relation to a worker’s contract, means a provision of the contract comprised— (a) in one or more written terms of the contract of which the employer has given the worker a copy on an occasion prior to the employer making the deduction in question, or (b) in one or more terms of the contract (whether express or implied and, if express, whether oral or in writing) the existence and effect, or combined effect, of which in relation to the worker the employer has notified to the worker in writing on such an occasion.

(3) Where the total amount of wages paid on any occasion by an employer to a worker employed by him is less than the total amount of the wages properly payable by him to the worker on that occasion (after deductions), the amount of the deficiency shall be treated for the purposes of this Part as a deduction made by the employer from the worker’s wages on that occasion.

(4) Subsection (3) does not apply in so far as the deficiency is attributable to an error of any description on the part of the employer affecting the computation by him of the gross amount of the wages properly payable by him to the worker on that occasion.

[124]The primary question is, therefore, whether the worker received less than was properly payable on the occasion complained of. In determining what was properly payable, account must be taken of properly authorised or agreed deductions and also genuine computational errors; see Morgan v West Glamorgan County Council [1994]

UKEAT/560/92

, per Mummery P: […] it must be(a) an 'error' on the part of the employer and

(b) it must be an error which affects 'the computation' of the gross wages. As neither the word 'error' nor the word 'computation' are defined by statute, they must be given their ordinary meaning. In its ordinary and natural meaning an 'error' is a mistake, something incorrectly done through ignorance or inadvertence. 'Computation' of wages is a matter of reckoning the amount, of ascertaining the total amount due by a process of counting and calculation. In our view, this case does not fall within the exception for "errors of computation" because, on the facts found by the Industrial Tribunal, the reduction in Mr Morgan's wages was attributable to a deliberate decision made by the Disciplinary Panel of the Governing Body on 23rd December to demote Mr Morgan and reduce his salary. […] Conclusion

[125]For the avoidance of doubt, the conclusions I set out below are specific to the facts as I have found them in this case. They do not amount to rulings of general application that conduct of the sort complained of here either will or will not, generally, result in an unfair dismissal, or amount to detriment, discrimination or harassment. Case Number: 1306178/2024 34 Unfair Dismissal

[126]The reason for dismissal was a business decision made by Mr Burgess and Ms Ananthan, that the Respondent would no longer perform the ergonomic activity. Going forward, OLA would carry out this work by way of employing suitable expertise in India. This business decision was made in or shortly after September 2023. Whilst the Respondent decided upon this course during the period when the Claimant was on maternity leave, it did not do so because of her pregnancy, the birth of her child or her taking maternity leave. The decision was not made for any reason connected with the Claimant or her personal circumstances. The Respondent's rationale is set out above and included the associated functions being in India, focusing on the Indian market, anthropometric differences between Indian and European people, along with the location of the bucks. This business decision did not, however, lead to an immediate dismissal of the Claimant. As she was on maternity leave, there was no need to act swiftly upon the disappearance of her role. There was also the possibility of a change of course in the many months ahead. When the Claimant came back to work, the effect of the business decision on her role and employment crystalised.

[127]The reason for dismissal was redundancy. Whilst I am satisfied the Respondent and OLA were associated employers for these purposes and the latter would continue to carry out the ergonomic activity, the requirements of the business for employees to carry out work of the particular kind undertaken by the Claimant in the place where she was employed had ceased, within the meaning of ERA section 139(1)(b)(ii).

[128]MAPLE regulation 10(1) applied. This was a case where it was not reasonably practicable for the Respondent to continue to employ the Claimant under her existing contract by reason of redundancy. The question then, is whether there was a failure to comply with regulation 10(2), with respect to a failure to offer suitable alternative employment.

[129]My conclusion is there was no suitable alternative employment when the Claimant was dismissed. There is no evidence of a vacant position within the Respondent at all, let alone one that would have suited her. It is, of course, necessary to widen the scope given that OLA was an associated employer. There was, however, no suitable alternative vacancy there either. The ergonomics role in India was wholly unsuitable.

[130]Per Simpson, the requirement of suitability set out in regulation 10(2) can only sensibly be tested by the requirement that it is coupled with a new contract of employment, which complies with regulation 10(3). Even if the salary package and day to day duties offered by OLA were the same or better than those the Claimant enjoyed with the Respondent – a matter on which there was no evidence – the alternative role was manifestly unsuitable because it was based in India. I have already rejected the Claimant's evidence on this as lacking in credibility and being wholly unrealistic. The position must, in any event, be looked at objectively. New permanent employment in India would not have been suitable for the Claimant for the reasons to which I referred when rejecting her evidence in this regard: the Claimant had never lived in India before; she had no family there or other connections; she spoke to the dangers of travelling alone in Case Number: 1306178/2024 35 that country; she was a new mother who had only just given birth and was struggling to establish feeding; her partner was a lawyer employed in London; and I found the Claimant had no interest in such a move.

[131]Accordingly, there was no failure to comply with regulation 10 because there was no suitable alternative vacancy.

[132]Specifically addressing the question in the list of issues, the reason or principal reason for dismissal was not because the Claimant was on maternity leave.

[133]This claim is not well-founded and is dismissed. Direct Sex Discrimination

[134]I will address each of the alleged detriments in turn. Failed to undertake a risk assessment when the claimant raised concerns about the vinyl in the workplace to her manager Mr Rowse on 7 February 2023

[135]Irrespective of whether the statutory duty to carry out a risk assessment was triggered, it is factually correct to say the Respondent did fail to carry out a risk assessment following the Claimant raising her concerns, which amounted to her telling Mr Rouse that she needed to be told when the vinyl wrap was being applied so that she would not be in the office.

[136]I have some doubt as to whether that amounted to a detriment per Shamoon. I am not satisfied the Claimant was much exercised about the absence of an assessment contemporaneously. This is one of the matters about which the Claimant has become more concerned since bringing her claim.

[137]Assuming without at this stage making a finding, that the statutory duty was triggered and this failure amounted to a detriment, the question of causation would then be at large.

[138]Whether this claim were considered strictly within section 13 or – to which course I did not understand Mr Wyeth to object – as if it had been identified as a claim under section 18, it would still be necessary for the Claimant to show the reason for the failure was sex of her pregnancy.

[139]Per Indigo, a failure under regulations to do with pregnancy or maternity leave, may be because of pregnancy or maternity leave, but is not necessarily so. It may be for another reason. The Tribunal must be satisfied the failure was because of her protected characteristic, or pregnancy or maternity.

[140]One factor present here which might suggest a connection with pregnancy or maternity is the context of a relevant statutory duty. Given, however, the emphasis in Indigo on the need for causation to be shown, it would seem contradictory to then proceed on the footing that the context alone were sufficient to discharge the initial burden. Something more is necessary. Mr Rouse subsequently gave a thumbs up to Mr Lippett’s crude joke about childbirth. He also disputed being the Claimant's line manager, which evidence I did not accept. Even in the absence of an explanation, however, I am not satisfied this would allow for a finding to be made that the failure was because of Case Number: 1306178/2024 36 sex, pregnancy or maternity. As such, the Claimant has not discharged the initial burden.

[141]Further and separately, I accepted Mr Rouse’ non-discriminatory explanation. A risk assessment was not carried out because it never occurred to him that one might be necessary. There is no evidence to support a conclusion that this gap in his knowledge was in some way tainted. Whilst his attempt to shirk responsibility for management of the Claimant was unimpressive, the parties agree he was not an HR professional, he depended upon OLA HR and acted as a conduit. There was no UK-based HR function. Nor was this a case where the evidence demonstrated the employer was usually well-versed in employment law and good practice, from which its treatment of a pregnant employee could be seen as a striking departure. On the Claimant's case, the opposite was true. Her evidence spoke to multiple and repeated failures affecting staff of both sexes and the workforce as a whole.

[142]This claim is not well-founded and is dismissed. Failed to undertake a risk assessment when the Claimant complained about her discomfort in the workplace by reason of her pregnancy to Mr Rouse on 21 and 29 March 2023.

[143]There was no evidence of the Claimant complaining about discomfort in the workplace on either 21 or 29 March 2023. On that latter date, the Claimant sent an email to Mr Rouse explaining that she would not be coming into the office because the driving was making her feel awful (i.e. in conjunction with her pregnancy).

[144]Once again, assuming without making a finding that the duty arose and the failure amounted to a detriment, the Claimant has failed to discharge the initial burden and in any event, I accept the Respondent's non-discriminatory explanation. My reasons are the same as set out above in connection with the Claimant's complaint about 7 February 2023.

[145]This claim is not well-founded and is dismissed. Pregnancy and Maternity Discrimination

[146]The unfavourable treatment was done, the Claimant was dismissed.

[147]I am satisfied the Claimant has discharged the initial burden. The Claimant was working satisfactorily in her UK ergonomics role before she went on maternity leave. Only at the point of telling the Respondent she wished to return to work earlier than had been expected, was she warned for the first time that her position was at risk of redundancy. The Claimant had previously been subject to harassment related to sex by the Respondent, to the extent and for the reasons set out below. These are facts from which in the absence of an explanation I could find the decision to dismiss was tainted and discriminatory, in the sense that pregnancy and maternity was a material factor in the decision to dismiss.

[148]The burden therefore shifts to the Respondent to show that the Claimant's dismissal was to no extent whatsoever, because of pregnancy or maternity. The Case Number: 1306178/2024 37 Respondent has discharged the same. I accepted the non-discriminatory explanation which emerged from the documents and the witness evidence of Ms Ananthan.

[149]The Respondent decided not to continue with ergonomics in the UK and made the Claimant's position redundant for this reason. My findings of fact about the matters bearing upon this decision are set out above and did not include pregnancy, childbirth or maternity leave. Whilst this decision impacted upon the Claimant's role, it was not made because of her or her personal circumstances. The Claimant's dismissal was not to any extent whatsoever, because of her pregnancy or exercise of maternity rights.

[150]This claim is not well-founded and is dismissed. Harassment related to sex

[151]I will address each allegation of unwanted conduct in turn. On 13 December 2022 at a meeting following the claimant informing him of her pregnancy, Mr. Burgess, stated “can your partner look after you financially?

[152]This treatment was done, it was unwanted by the Claimant and it related to sex. The question then is whether it had the proscribed purpose or effect.

[153]Having been told of her pregnancy, along with offering his congratulations Mr Burgess enquired into the Claimant's financial circumstances. The Claimant did not say she believed Mr Burgess was intending to be hurtful and there is no evidence to support such a conclusion.

[154]In terms of effect, I am satisfied the Claimant found it disheartening that Mr Burgess would immediately think of her being supported by the father of the child, rather than being able to look after herself. Whilst the Claimant's reaction, as I have found it, is entirely understandable, it does not meet the test in EqA section 26(1)(b). Per Betsi Cadwaladr University Health Board, not every slight or inappropriate comment, even if related to sex or pregnancy, will violate dignity, or create an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment. These are strong words and Tribunals are cautioned not to find them satisfied too easily.

[155]This claim is not well-founded and is dismissed. On or around 16 June 2023 David Lippett said you won't want to return to work after having kids you will just want to be a mum. Mr. Burgess stated my wife didn't want to return to work either

[156]Mr Lippett said the Claimant “may” not want to return to work after the birth of her child. He did not say she would just want to be a mum. His comment was unwanted by the Claimant and related to sex.

[157]My finding is that the Claimant was irked by this remark, because she believed she would return and did not want her managers thinking there was any other possibility. Her reaction at the time was far more modest than her recollection of it now. Mr Lippett certainly did not intend his comment to be hurtful and my Case Number: 1306178/2024 38 finding as to the Claimant's contemporaneous reaction is such that it did not cause the proscribed effect.

[158]Further and separately, it would not have been reasonable for this conduct to cause the proscribed effect. A manager with whom the Claimant had a good and friendly relationship merely referring to the possibility she might make a different decision after the birth of her child, without more, would not be enough.

[159]This claim is not well-founded and is dismissed. In about April 2023 when Mr. Lippett stated you won't want to return to work after having kids you will just want to be a mum

[160]My findings with respect to April 2023 are the same as for the similar complaint about 16 June 2023, in terms of what was said and how the Claimant reacted. Whilst the treatment was unwanted and related to sex, it did not have the proscribed purpose or effect, and it would not have been reasonable for it to have the latter.

[161]This claim is not well-founded and is dismissed. On 26 July 2023 in a WhatsApp group message to design colleagues Mr Lippett wrote women say that giving birth is way more painful than getting kicked in the bollocks he is proof that they are wrong the year or so after giving birth a woman will often say it has been nice to have another baby you would never hear a bloke say I wouldn't mind another kick in the bollocks case closed saw this and thought of you Amy with two crying laughing emojis

[162]This treatment was done, it was unwanted and related to sex.

[163]Mr Lippett did not intend his message to be hurtful, on the contrary he thought the Claimant would find it funny.

[164]Notwithstanding Mr Lippett’s intentions, this message did cause the proscribed effect and it was reasonable for it to do so. The Claimant had a difficult pregnancy. She was anxious about her unborn child and the prospect of her impending labour, which was only two weeks away. Mr Lippett’s message was crude and made light of the Claimant's circumstances and the risks she faced. This ill-judged attempt at humour also came after several other unwelcome comments, which although they did not amount to harassment, are relevant to the context. The Claimant was very upset, she felt hurt and belittled by Mr Lippett.

[165]This claim is well-founded and succeeds.

[166]On 26 July 2023 Mr Rouse replying to the message above on the WhatsApp studio group sent a thumbs up emoji

[167]This treatment was done, it was unwanted and related to sex.

[168]Whilst there is no evidence to suggest Mr Rouse intended to upset the Claimant, thumbs up from her line manager tended to compound the proscribed effect and it was reasonable for this to be so. Case Number: 1306178/2024 39

[169]This claim is well-founded and succeeds.

[170]On 4 August 2023 David Lippett having sent a message to the WhatsApp studio group about an impeding driving ban for speeding, David Rouse responded “Just blame the missus”

[171]This treatment was done.

[172]The treatment was not related to sex. It was not a joke about women being bad drivers or something of that sort. It was a non-serious suggestion that a man avoid a driving ban by falsely claiming that his wife was driving the car. This was not a gender-based comment. A speeding driver with a male partner could do exactly the same thing.

[173]There is no evidence to support a finding that Mr Rouse intended this message to be hurtful. With respect to the effect on the Claimant, I did not accept the description of that in her witness statement.

[174]For the sake of completeness, it would not have been reasonable for this message to have caused the proscribed effect. It refers to a practice that although unlawful is not unknown amongst couples who are in a position to credibly, albeit falsely, assert the other was behind the wheel at the time of a driving offence in order to avoid a totting-up disqualification.

[175]This claim is not well-founded and is dismissed.

[176]On 23 October 2023 (the claimant having given birth on 29 August and contends Mr Rowse was aware she was breastfeeding) sent a WhatsApp message to the group of pictures of a cow being milked

[177]This treatment was done.

[178]The treatment was not related to sex. The landlord of the Respondent's premises was responsible for providing milk and there was not enough. The message and picture were sent once it was agreed that more would be provided. They were not a reference to or sent for any reason connected with the Claimant.

[179]Mr Rouse did not intend either the message or picture to be hurtful.

[180]Further and separately, whilst I am satisfied the treatment did, subjectively, cause the proscribed effect, it was not reasonable for that to be so. Viewed objectively, there was nothing in the message and picture of the cow to suggest this was a reference to the Claimant, who was not at work during this period. Envisage was the Respondent's landlord and the Claimant must have known it provided milk. Even without sight of the earlier email, it should have been obvious this was a reference to the adequacy of the milk supply at work. The connection the Claimant made appears to stem from the difficulty she was having at the time with feeding. There were no grounds for her to suppose that such considerations were in the mind of Mr Rouse, or that this message was at all referable to her circumstances.

[181]This claim is not well-founded and is dismissed. Case Number: 1306178/2024 40

[182]On 21 March 2023 Mr Willis chief designer when discussing the claimants baby bump stated “never mind the bump, the boob fairy hasn't been there either”

[183]This treatment was done.

[184]The treatment was related to sex. Mr Willis was commenting on the Claimant's breast size.

[185]Whilst I do not find Mr Willis intended his comment to be hurtful, it plainly was. The treatment caused the proscribed effect and it was reasonable, objectively, for this to do so. There was no relevant context that might have explained or justified such a remark. The Claimant had said or done nothing to suggest that such commentary would be welcome. On the contrary, the Claimant had been anxious about her pregnancy and shared this only with Mr Burgess and Mr Rouse in the first instance. Subsequently, she reported being pregnant to the Respondent and colleagues more generally. The Claimant was, however, still concerned about the development of her unborn child. She shared this with Mr Willis. His comment that the boob fairy had not visited (the implication being that larger breasts would have been bestowed had that occurred) was entirely gratuitous. The Claimant felt insulted, disgusted and objectified. At a time when she was sharing her pregnancy and concerns, a senior manager was focusing on and judging the size of her breasts.

[186]This claim is well-founded and succeeds. Detriment by reason of pregnancy/maternity section 47 C of the ERA 1996 Excluded from the social activity of go karting on 10 August 2023 (because it was contraindicated in pregnancy)

[187]Whilst I accept the Claimant's evidence that go-karting was contraindicated in pregnancy, I am not satisfied the Respondent organising such an activity amounted to a detriment. The Claimant's sense of grievance in this regard is unjustified.

[188]It is wholly unsurprising and reasonable that the Respondent, a business concerned with the design of motor vehicles and which employs personnel who are deeply immersed in that industry, should choose to organise a social event based on motor racing. The Claimant was invited to that event. She did not complain about it at the time or suggest the consideration of an alternative. Whilst the Claimant may have been unable to drive, as suggested in cross-examination she could have gone to watch, cheer on her colleagues and have something to eat, which she did not.

[189]Further and separately, even if this had amounted to a detriment, it was not done (i.e. the Respondent did not decide on this) to any extent whatsoever because of the Claimant's pregnancy or maternity. The Respondent chose go-karting because it was connected with the business and thought to be fun. This decision was not made because of the Claimant or her circumstances.

[190]This claim is not well-founded and is dismissed. Case Number: 1306178/2024 41

[191]Deliberately not invited to the Christmas function on 14 December 2023

[192]This detriment was not done. The Claimant was invited to the Christmas function. She was included on the circulation list of the email. She was also a member of the WhatsApp group in which Mr Willis subsequently chased this up. Whilst the Claimant says she was then unable to access her work email and was not reading WhatsApp, she did not tell anyone of this at the time. As such, the Respondent would have expected one or both of these invitations to come to her attention. There was no reason for the Respondent to suppose it was necessary to send an invitation to the Claimant's personal email address, as she suggested at this hearing. Not reading correspondence that includes an invitation does not amount to the sender having failed to extend the same.

[193]Further and separately, the mode of invitation decided upon by the Respondent had nothing whatsoever to do with the Claimant, her pregnancy or maternity. The practice was consistent with the Respondent's usual approach to social events, which the Claimant had no prior difficulty in receiving notification of.

[194]This claim is not well-founded and is dismissed. Unauthorised deductions 9.1 Was the wages paid to the claimant in or about September 2024 less than the wages they should have been paid namely she was not paid her bonus from April to August 2023?

[195]The reference in the issues to September 2024 is a typo, the Claimant's employment having ended in January 2024. Plainly, this should refer to September 2023.

[196]The wages paid to the Claimant were not less than they should have been in September 2023. On the contrary, they included a bonus payment.

[197]Further and separately, even if this complaint were construed as being about an unlawful deduction between April and August 2023, the Claimant has not shown the crystallisation of a contractual entitlement to a specific sum during that period and in any event, it was paid shortly thereafter and long before she commenced these proceedings. Even if this claim had succeeded on a technical basis, it would not have resulted in a remedy.

[198]This claim is not well-founded and is dismissed. Limitation

[199]The Claimant contacted ACAS on 8 April 2024, received a certificate on 20 May 2024 and presented her ET1 on 20 June 2024. Any EqA complaint about an event occurring prior to 9 January 2024 was, therefore, presented after the primary limitation period had expired.

[200]There being no extension for ACAS conciliation where the primary limitation period has already expired, the Claimant's complaint about Mr Willis in March 2023 was just over a year late. The complaints about Mr Lippett’s joke and Mr Rouse’s response, were 9 months late. Case Number: 1306178/2024 42

[201]I am satisfied it is just and equitable within EqA section 123(1)(b) to extend time for the Claimant's harassment claims with respect to Mr Willis’ 21 March 2023 “Boob Fairy” remark, Mr Lippett’s 26 July 2023 WhatsApp group message and Mr Rouse’s immediate thumbs up.

[202]The principal reason for the lateness of the Claimant's Tribunal claim is that she worked in an overwhelmingly male workplace, was doing her best to fit in and did not want to be seen as kicking up a fuss. The Claimant sought to avoid damaging the career she had worked so hard to establish. The Claimant was dismissed in January 2024. There was then a further period of delay until April before the claim was presented. She was at that time a new mother with a baby, who had only brought forward her return to work because she feared for her employment. Whilst these factors did not mean the Claimant was unable to present a claim, her delay is understandable.

[203]I did not find either the availability or cogency of relevant evidence had been materially diminished by the passage of time. Mr Willis, Mr Lippett and Mr Rouse, were all called by the Respondent to give evidence. As far as Mr Willis’ remark is concerned, the Claimant recorded it contemporaneously in a WhatsApp message sent to her friends. Notwithstanding an apparent lack of recollection on his part initially, in response to a direct question Mr Willis was able to recollect using the words and put forward an explanation for the same. Indeed, given this most unusual formulation, it would likely be difficult for either party to forget. With respect to Mr Lippett’s joke, given this and Mr Rouse’ response were both made on WhatsApp, there is no scope for doubt about what was said or done at the time. Mr Lippett and Mr Rouse were both able to speak to this in evidence and there was nothing to suggest their ability to put forward an explanation was impaired because the claim was late. With respect to all of these matters, the Respondent's witnesses spoke to both the act itself and the context. There is nothing to suggest the Respondent was less able to defend these allegations as a result of the Claimant presenting her claim in June 2024, as opposed to the position it would have been in had the Claimant brought more timely claims in 2023.

[204]Whilst I am mindful that time limits are exercised strictly, there is no presumption in favour of exercising discretion and the burden is on the Claimant, I am satisfied it is just and equitable to extend time. The Claimant has an understandable reason for her delay, the availability and cogency of relevant evidence was not materially diminished, and aside from losing a jurisdictional defence, there is no prejudice to the Respondent.

[205]The remaining claims were without merit. To the extent these complaints were made outwith the relevant primary limitation period, the questions of whether there was a continuing act or it is just and equitable to extend time (or reasonable practicability for her maternity detriment claim) do not arise. Approved by: EJ Maxwell Date: 25 January 2026 Case Number: 1306178/2024 1 EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS Claimant: Ms A Hope Respondent: Ola Electric UK Private Limited Under Rule 67, the reserved judgment and reasons sent to the parties on 21 January 2026, are corrected as set out at paragraphs 199 to 205 of the corrected reasons. Approved by: EJ Maxwell Date: 25 January 2026 Sent to the parties on: 26/01/2026 For the Tribunal Office: Jelena Trifonova