Mr T Hancox v National Farmers Union and others: 1304294/2020 and others Mr T Hancox v National Farmers Union and others: 1304294/2020 and others

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Case No 1304294/2020

Between

Mr T Hancox – In PersonClaimant

National Farmers Union – Ms J Shepherd - CounselRespondent

Before

Employment Judge Hindmarch

Date 28 April 2021

JUDGMENT

ON AN APPLICATION FOR INTERIM RELIEF The judgment of the Tribunal is that the application for interim relief is dismissed. Reasons.

[1]This is a claim which involves dismissal on the grounds of making a public interest disclosure under s47B Employment Rights Act 1996 (ERA) and s103 A in respect of dismissal. The effective date of termination is 7 February 2020 and the claim was issued on 14 February 2020. The application for interim relief is made under s128 ERA.

[2]The hearing was held by Cloud Video Platform. In advance of the hearing I receiveda. An agreed bundle running to 581 pages.

b. A bundle of witness statements; 1 for the Claimant and 5 for the Respondent. Where I refer to the Respondent's witnesses (and other connected parties) I do so by initial.

c. A Skeleton Argument and bundle of authorities from the Respondent’s Counsel.

[3]The Claimant is a litigant in person and represented himself. The Respondent was represented by Counsel Ms J Shephard and the Respondent’s solicitor Ms Boyle and a trainee solicitor Ms Foster were also present at the hearing.

[4]At the outset of the hearing I established that the parties had access to all of the documents. I explained, as this was a summary application, that under Rule 95 Employment Tribunal (Constitution and Rules of Procedure Regulations) 2013, schedule 1, it was not usual to hear witness evidence but that I had read the 6 witness statements and the bundle.

[5]We agreed that the Respondent’s Counsel would make submissions first so that the Claimant could understand the Respondent’s objection to the application. We then had a break of two and a half hours to allow the Claimant to prepare his submissions. I allowed the Claimant over two hours to make his submissions.

[6]My role was to consider the paperwork before me and the submissions of both parties and to make a broad assessment as to whether the Claimant's application for interim relief should succeed. My role was not to attempt to decide the issues as if it were the final substantive hearing. This is the approach endorsed in Raja v Secretary of State for Justice

UKEAT/0364/09/CEA

. Issues

[7]The issue for the Tribunal was whether under s129 ERA it appeared that it was likely that on determining the complaint to which the application related, the Tribunal will find that the reason ( or if more than one the principal reason) for dismissal was specified under s47B of the same Act. The law

[8]The Respondent's Skeleton Argument helpfully set out the law. The Claimant did not address me on the law but in an email he sent to the Tribunal on the evening before the hearing he accepted he had a “high bar” in making his application.

[9]S128 ERA 1996 provides “An employee who presents a complaint to an employment tribunal that he has been unfairly dismissed anda. that the reason for dismissal (or if more than one the principal reason) for the dismissal is one of those specified in: (i) Section 103 A may apply to the tribunal for interim relief.”

[10]Section 47B ERA sets out the type of disclosure which may qualify for protection. “In this Part a “qualifying disclosure” means any disclosure of information, which in the reasonable belief of the worker making the disclosure, tends to show one or more of the following:a. That a criminal offence has been committed, is being committed or is likely to be committed,

b. That a person has failed, is failing or is likely to fail to comply with any legal obligation to which he is subject;

c. That a miscarriage of justice has occurred, is occurring or is likely to occur;

d. That the health and safety of any individual has been, is being or is likely to be endangered;

e. That the environment has been, is being or is likely to be damaged; or.

f. That information tending to show any matter falling within any one of preceding paragraphs has been or is likely to be destroyed.”

[11]It appears the Claimant is relying on a, b and/or d above.

[12]An application for interim relief will only be granted if “it appears to the tribunal it is likely that on determining the complaint to which the application relates the tribunal will find that the reason (or if more than one, the principal reason) for the dismissal is one of those specified in…” section 103 A, S129 ERA.

[13]The meaning of likely as meaning “a pretty good chance of success” was decided in Caplin v Shippam Ltd (1978) 1CR 1668 EAT. That test was reaffirmed in Dandpat v University of Bath and Others UK EAT 0408/09/LA. London City Airport Limited v Chacko (20) 1RLR 610 confirmed the test is higher than the balance of probabilities.

[14]Dandpat above established that a higher burden of proof than the standard of proof of balance of probabilities is required in an application such as this as the granting of relief will prejudice the Respondent who is obliged to treat the contract as continuing until the conclusion of proceedings. That is not a consequence that should be imposed lightly.

[15]Mr Justice Underhill, then President of the EAT, laid out guidance for cases such as these. He confirmed that Claimants must persuade a tribunal in relation to all the elements that fall to be considered at the substantive hearing. In that case Ministry of Justice v Sarfraz (2011) 12LR S62 he stated “In order to make an order under Ss 128 and 129 the Judge had to have decided that it was likely that the Tribunal at the final hearing would find five things;(1) the Claimant had made a disclosure to his employer;

(2) the disclosure tended to show one or more things itemised at section 47B;

(3) that the belief was reasonable;

(4) that the disclosures were made in good faith (now whether the Claimant believed the disclosure to be in the public interest) and

(5) that the disclosure was the principal reason for his dismissal.

[16]The Claimant relies on two disclosures which are set out in as follows:a. In writing on 13th of January 2020.

b. Orally at a meeting on 14 January 2020.

c. The disclosure(s) concern an alleged rodent infestation at the Respondent's premises and the alleged in effectiveness of the Respondents heating ventilation and air conditioning contractors MCES.

[17]Although it is not the function of the Tribunal at the hearing for interim relief to bind any future hearing it is useful to set out some background information to understand the parties positions.

[18]The Claimant began working for the Respondent through agency working in September/October 2019. On 7 November 2019 the Respondent made an offer of direct employment to the Claimant and this was subject to a probationary period of 6 months. His employment began on 18 November 2019 and the Claimant was employed as a facilities services handyperson.

[19]The disclosures appear to concern rodent infestation at the Respondent's premises and the alleged ineffectiveness of the Respondent's heating ventilation and air conditioning contractors, MCES.

[20]The Respondent's heating and ventilation contract was with an organisation called MCES. The relationship between the Respondent and MCES was managed by a consultancy agreement between the Respondent and Boarder Consultancy through its agent CJ.

[21]It appears that before joining the Respondent the Claimant had (and possibly still has) his own business. This was /is called Midlands HVAC (heating, ventilation and air conditioning) and it is common ground the Claimant has contacts in the area and that he made introductions of such contacts to the Respondent during his employment as he believed his contracts might be able to give a better service to the Respondent than MCES and/or CJ.

[22]The Claimant was initially line managed by VJ the Respondents health and safety manager. On 6 January 2020 TT joined the Respondent and became the line manager. On 14 January 2020 it was decided to allow the Respondent‘s Head of Compliance to become the line manager of the Claimant.

[23]After the Claimant made what he relies on as a protected disclosure on 13 January 2020 the Respondent's then commercial services manager BC was appointed to investigate the subject matter of the disclosure. BC met with the Claimant to discuss further on 14 January 2020 accompanied by SH, HR advisor.

[24]On 17 January 2020 the Respondent suspended the Claimant from duty. KS the Respondent's director of finance and business services had received communications from TR on 15 February 2020 reporting concerns for her safety in the presence of the Claimant. Before suspending the Claimant KS took statements from TR, TT and VJ regarding the Claimant's conduct and behaviour. The letter of suspension sent by KS to the Claimant dated 17 January 2026 releases gives the reasons for or suspension as: “That you displayed threatening, intimidating behaviour with TR that made her feel vulnerable, upset and threatened during week 13th of January 2020. That you displayed threatening, intimidating behaviour with TT during week commencing 6 January 2020 The allegations constitute a breach of the NFU bullying and harassment policy and Procedure” The suspension letter further stated “You should not contact any member, employee, or supplier other than your appointed representative, SH, HR Adviser or myself.”

[25]Despite the above during suspension the Claimant sent text messages to a colleague SE. In one such message on the 20 January 2020 he stated” they have had it mate. I've lined them up like skittles”.

[26]The Claimant also sent emails to colleagues whilst suspended.

[27]On 27 January 2020 BC prepared a report into the investigation into the Claimant's alleged disclosures. He concluded there was no wrongdoing. It is unclear whether his report was shared with the Claimant at the time (he was of course suspended) although he had seen it by the time of this hearing.

[28]On 7 February 2020 following a disciplinary hearing the Respondent dismissed the Claimant for conduct issues within the probationary period, citing an irretrievable breakdown in working relations. The Respondent provided witness statements from VJ, TT and TR, evidencing what it says were the Claimant's aggressive and demanding behaviours, and from KS who was the decision maker who concluded that the Claimant should be dismissed. KS accepted he was aware of the Respondent’s separate investigation by BC into the Claimant's alleged disclosure(s) but that he disregarded that matter when coming to his conclusions regarding the Claimant's conduct and his decision to dismiss. Submissions

[29]The Claimant did not address me on the law but made lengthy submissions concerning his belief that as the disclosures came at the start of the week in which he was suspended, effectively the conduct allegations against him were trumped up to remove him from the business. He referred at length to what he believed to be inconsistencies between his positive relationships with colleagues prior to the disclosures and the changing tone after such disclosures were made.

[30]The Claimant raised concerns about the nature and timing of the investigations carried out by KS. The Claimant pointed to circumstances where he demonstrated good relations with female colleagues. The Claimant accepted texting and emailing colleagues whilst suspended but said he was signed off sick at the time.

[31]The Claimant believed there were genuine concerns about rodent infestation and the performance of MCES. He informed me there were issues with flies due to decomposing rats and that persons had suffered breathing difficulties. The Claimant believed BCs report into his disclosures was flawed and that there had been a cover up by TT, in cahoots with CJ.

[32]After the hearing the Claimant sent a number of emails to the Tribunal which were forwarded to me and which I considered. These were emails that clarified matters he referred me to in his submissions but do no change my findings.

[33]In the Respondent's submissions the Claimant could not meet the threshold for any application for interim relief because he could not demonstrate he had a “pretty good chance” of establishing that the sole or principal reason for dismissal was that he had made disclosures. Instead the Respondent contended the only reason for dismissal was the Claimant’s conduct. The Respondent relied on its witness statements and some contemporaneous documentation. The Respondent had to accept that suspension and investigation into the alleged conduct occurred after the alleged disclosures, but contended there is ample witness evidence and documentary evidence to demonstrate the Claimant was inappropriate towards colleagues before the disclosures were made and afterwards. The dismissal also concerned the Claimant’s refusal to follow what the Respondent said was a reasonable management instruction during suspension (by contacting colleagues).

[34]The Respondent does not accept the Claimant’s alleged disclosures disclosed information which in his reasonable belief tended to show one of the matters in section 47B (a) to (f). The Respondent argued the test of reasonable belief applies to each strand of the test, so that the Claimant must establish that an relevant criminal offence, legal obligation or health and safety obligation actually existed.

[35]In the Respondent's submission the disclosure related to the MCES contractors was made by the Claimant purely because he was motivated by obtaining work instead for his friends or contacts and that he was motivated by a desire to discredit MCES. The Respondent points to the Claimant reporting concerns about MCES and introducing his contacts to the Respondent from very early on in the employment relationship.

[36]As regards the Claimant's alleged disclosure regarding the rodent infestation the Respondent accepts that rat droppings were located on its premises in November 2019. The Respondent said it was not overly concerned as the droppings were not said to be new and it engaged a pest controller to attend its premises regularly. On 6 December 2019 the Claimant reported a decomposed rat carcass located on the premises. The Respondent obtained a quotation from Rentokil and on 23 December 2019 TR emailed the Claimant instructing him to make arrangements to engage Rentokil. The Claimant did not it appears contact Rentokill. Instead he reported the rodent issue to the local authority on 14 January 2020. The Respondent contends the Claimant cannot have had a reasonable belief in the health and safety issue having been tasked only the previous month to resolve it.

[37]The Respondent contends the Claimant’s disclosures were disingenuous, particularly in light of the text he sent to SE on 27 January 2020 and referred to at paragraph (36) above. My conclusions

[38]My first consideration is whether it is likely the tribunal at the substantive hearing would find the Claimant had made protected and qualifying disclosures.

[39]The Claimant came across as passionate about health and safety matters in making his submissions but that this is not enough. The Respondent raises legitimate arguments about the Claimant's reasonable belief, and asserts ulterior motives may have been at play. Having looked all the evidence before me I cannot find the Claimant has met the higher standard of proof required. I cannot say he has “a pretty good chance”.

[40]Turning to the reason for dismissal I have some sympathy with the Claimant's position that the allegations leading to dismissal came after he made what he says are protected and qualifying disclosures. Nevertheless these matters should be tested at trial. The Respondent has put forward substantial evidence as to the Claimant’s behaviours, conduct and demeanour really from the outset of his employment which gave it cause for concern and which it says lead to his dismissal.

[41]I therefore do not find the Claimant has proven before me at this juncture that he has met the higher burden of proof required. Even where the Claimant may be able to persuade me there is a “pretty good chance” that any disclosures he made were protected, I do not find there to be “a pretty good chance” of showing the disclosures were the sole or principal reason for dismissal.

[42]I therefore dismiss the application accordingly.

REASONS

Conclusion

[1]On 4 September 2020 the Claimant submitted an application for reconsideration of the Judgment. The application was in the form of letters sent by email.

[2]The power to reconsider a judgment is contained in Rule 70 to 73 Employment Tribunals Rules and Procedure 2013. The rules enable a tribunal to reconsider a judgment where it is necessary in the interests of justice to do so. Rule 72 provides that an Employment Judge shall consider the application. If the judge considers that there is no reasonable prospect of the decision being varied or revoked she shall refuse the application.

[3]The letters amounting to the application for consideration run to 13 pages. Much of the correspondence details the Claimant’s analysis of the Respondent’s evidence, matters on which he gave detailed submissions at the interim relief hearing and which I have already considered. In deciding this reconsideration application I have read my Judgement carefully and referred to my own detailed notes of the submissions made. I have due regards to those submissions when reaching my Judgement.

[4]I have distilled the grounds for the application as best I can below. a) I failed to consider ‘false statements’ made by the Respondent’s witnesses (also said by the Claimant to be perjury), b) I referred in my judgment to an incorrect chronology of events and/or failed to consider the chronology of events, c) That my judgment allows ‘unscrupulous Employers to target … disabled employees’, d) That I interrupted the Claimant during his submissions, causing him to have insufficient time to make the points he wished.

[5]I deal with each of the grounds above following the numbering above as follows:- a) I had a large bundle of documents and 5 witness statements from the Respondent. My role was to make a broad assessment, it was not to find the truth or otherwise of the witness evidence which was untested, it being an application for interim relief decided on submissions. I acknowledged sympathy with the Claimant’s case in my judgment, him being suspended the very week in which he made what he relies on as protected and qualifying disclosures. Nevertheless the Respondent produced evidence demonstrating the Claimant’s behaviour had been less than satisfactory before any such disclosures were made, I found therefore that the threshold of interim relief was not met. I did refer in my judgment to the fact the Claimant referred me at length to what he believed to be inconsistences in the Respondent’s witness evidence. Of course he may make these points at the substantive trial. b) I did indeed consider the chronology of events and expressed some sympathy, as stated above and in my judgment, for the Claimant’s position. The Claimant appears to make a particular point about a text he sent to a colleague and my mistaken reference to it being sent on 27 January 2020, when he in fact he sent it on an earlier date. I was using the date supplied in the chronology to the bundle and on the document in that bundle. Even if the Claimant is correct, it is the timing of that text message (during suspension and against management instruction not to contact colleagues) and the content of that message that I was referring to in relation to the Respondent’s submissions. Any correction that might need to be made to the date of the message does not affect my conclusions as regards the application for interim relief. c) My judgment was in relation to an application for interim relief. I was not deciding matters at a substantive hearing, I was not required to consider whether the Respondent had behaved in an ‘unscrupulous’ way. I am satisfied the Claimant did not meet the higher burden of proof required. This is not to say he cannot pursue these allegations at the substantive trial. d) As set out in my judgment I allowed the Claimant a lengthy break to prepare his submissions of 2 and a half hours after he first had the benefit of hearing Counsel for the Respondent’s submissions. After the Claimant had been addressing me for 2 hours we had a break and he did indeed say he would be another 2 hours which would have taken the hearing to past 6pm. I enquired with the Respondent’s Counsel and Instructing Solicitor if they would be prepared to sit until 5 pm (6pm being too late for all and 5pm being later than usual) and they agreed. I gave the Claimant a further 20 minute break to collect his thoughts. The Claimant therefore had almost 3 hours to make submissions and did not contend this time was insufficient. I am satisfied I had heard sufficiently from both parties to reach the decision I was required to make.

[6]For the reasons above I refuse the Claimants application for reconsideration.

[1]The Claimant failed to attend the Preliminary Hearing at 10am on 22 April 2021, having sent an email to the Tribunal at 23.30 on 21 April 2021 explaining the reasons for his non-attendance. Efforts were made on the morning of the hearing by the Tribunal clerk to contact the Claimant by telephone on the number provided by the Claimant, but there was no response.

[2]As a consequence of the Claimant’s non-attendance, the hearing could not proceed today, and the Tribunal has therefore adjourned the hearing to 7 May 2021 at 10am for an open Preliminary Hearing. That adjourned hearing will consider the Respondents’ applications to strike out claims 1300129/2021 – Mr T Hancox v Minette Batters and 1300232/2021 – Mr T Hancox v Sarb Heer that are set out in the Respondent’s letters dated 18 March 2021 and in the Grounds of Resistance to those claims. The adjourned hearing will also deal with any case management issues arising in relation to those claims should they proceed.

[3]The Respondents made an application for the costs thrown away by the Claimant’s failure to attend the hearing today. In considering that application, the Tribunal has taken account of the Claimant’s correspondence of 21 April 2021. The Tribunal notes that it was sent at 23.30 prior to the day of the hearing and that it does not disclose reasonable grounds for failing to attend. No medical evidence was provided to support any assertion that the Claimant is not fit to attend a hearing. The Claimant has also been able to send the Tribunal significant amounts of correspondence in recent days. The Tribunal is therefore not satisfied that the Claimant had reasonable grounds for failing to attend the hearing, having given short notice of his non-attendance. The Claimant’s failure to attend the hearing amounts to unreasonable conduct of the proceedings and the hearing has had to be adjourned less than 7 days before the date on which the hearing began (see r.76 ETs (Constitution & Rules of Procedure) Regs 2013, Sch 1). The Tribunal therefore orders the Claimant to pay the Respondent’s costs of today in the sum of £3,000, representing Counsel’s brief fee for today’s hearing.

[4]The Tribunal has grounds to make an unless order in the terms set out at 3) above. Signed electronically by

[1]Pursuant to r.37(1)(b) and (e) of the Employment Tribunals (Constitution & Rules of Procedure) Regs 2013, I forthwith strike out all the claimant’s claims against all respondents, on the grounds: a) That the manner in which the proceedings have been conducted by the claimant has been scandalous, unreasonable or vexatious. b) The tribunal considers that it is no longer possible to have a fair hearing in respect of the claims.

[2]The claimant’s applications to this preliminary hearing are dismissed. Signed electronically by

[1]A schedule of the claims is annexed to this judgment at page 6.

[2]The application came before Employment Judge Hindmarch on 7 May 2021

[3]The claimant duly attended before Employment Judge Hindmarch on 7 May 2021. Judge Hindmarch will give a reserved judgment on 14/06/21 subject to the parties’ compliance with directions. 2.5 I have had before me the case papers which set out the history of the Claimant’s claims. I have read the preliminary orders of Employment Judge Hindmarch, of 27 August 2020 and 11 December 2020, and of Employment Judge Self of 19 October 2020. I have considered the Respondents’ draft list of issues, revised on 4 December 2020. 2.6 The respondent’s counsel has submitted to the Tribunal and the Claimant a skeleton argument of the Respondents’ case in the present application to strike out. Decision: Law, Discussion and Findings3.1 By letter of 31 March 2021 the Respondents made an application to strike out the Claimant’s claims pursuant to Rule 37(1)(b) ETs (Constitution and Rules of Procedure) Regs 2013, Sch 1.

3.2 I accept, having regard to the substantial documentary evidence placed before me, that since March 2021 the Claimant has embarked upon a campaign, specifically on the social media website, Linked-In, criticising the NFU and the individual Respondents. Further, and although he vehemently disputes this, in some of his posts, he has publicised information relating to the subject matter of his ET claims and has also attached documentation disclosed to him by the Respondents during the course of these proceedings. On 29 March 2021, the Respondents’ solicitor wrote to the Claimant requesting that he immediately cease his behaviour as described above.

3.3 The Claimant was properly put on notice that the Respondents considered that his recent posts on social media amounted to conducting these proceedings in a scandalous, unreasonable, and vexatious manner. The Respondents’ solicitors reminded him in clear terms that documents disclosed in this litigation are not to be used for any purpose other than the litigation itself.

3.4 In the face of all that I accept and find on the evidence, that the Claimant continued his behaviour and posted a large number of posts on Linked-In in the following days.

3.5 After receiving the Respondents’ strike out application on 31 March 2021, setting out the clear impact his behaviour was having on the individual Respondents in this case, the Claimant has nevertheless persisted. After receiving the witness statement of Kenneth Sutherland, a senior officer of the NFU, and the emails of the individual Respondents setting out in their own words the impact the Claimant’s conduct was having upon them, the Claimant has continued his personal campaign with an air of impunity. He has been without remorse or genuine apology.

3.6 In my finding his scandalous, vexatious, and unreasonable behaviour has persisted. Relevant Law 4.1The Tribunal must consider whether a fair trial is still possible as part of its consideration of this strike out application. I have referred to De Keyser Ltd v Wilson

2001 IRLR 324

, EAT. 7. Counsel for the Respondents, Ms Shepherd, has rightly, analysed the relevant case law on that issue in her submissions to this Tribunal, and also in her written skeleton argument. The Claimant was provided with copies of that before the hearing together with other material. The Claimant says he has not had time to read it. Yet he has taken the time to engage in hurried email correspondence with the Tribunal and has also had time to submit substantial additional documentation to the Tribunal shortly before the hearing today. In particular, some 16 separate pieces of email documents were received by the Tribunal of the morning of this hearing. 4.2 In Bolch v Chipman

2004 IRLR 140

the EAT set out the steps that a Tribunal must ordinarily take when determining whether to make a strike-out order:

4.2.1 Before making a striking-out order under what is now rule 37(1)(b), an Employment Judge must find that a party or his representative has behaved scandalously, unreasonably, or vexatiously when conducting the proceedings.

4.2.2 Once such a finding has been made, he or she must consider, in accordance with De Keyser v Wilson, whether a fair trial is still possible as, save in exceptional circumstances, a striking-out order is not regarded simply as a punishment. If a fair trial is still possible, the case should be permitted to proceed.

4.2.3 Even if a fair trial is unachievable, the Tribunal will need to consider the appropriate remedy in the circumstances. It may be appropriate to impose a lesser penalty, for example, by making a costs or preparation time order against the party concerned rather than striking out his or her claim or response. 4.3 In Force One Utilities Ltd v Hatfield

2009 IRLR 45

, a Tribunal was justified in striking out an employer’s defence to a claim of unfair dismissal in circumstances where a witness had threatened the Claimant. Although the Claimant had indicated a willingness to continue with the case, the Tribunal did not feel that he was free of the fear that had been caused to him, nor was it satisfied that the Claimant could give reliable evidence if that evidence were to come into conflict with that of the employer. It therefore concluded that a fair trial was no longer possible and struck out the response. The EAT held that the conduct of the witness had made a fair trial of the issues impossible, and that striking out the defence was a proportionate response to that conduct. It rejected the idea that Tribunals should carry out a ‘balancing act’ in determining whether striking out is a proportionate response. 4.4 The critical question is whether a fair trial remains possible. 4.5 In Jones v Wallop Industries Ltd. ET Case No. 17182/81, the Tribunal found that the Claimant was ‘hell-bent on causing the respondent company and a number of individuals as much inconvenience, distress, embarrassment and expense as possible’ and ordered the whole claim to be struck out as being largely scandalous or vexatious. Findings 4.6 I conclude on what is put before me, that the Claimant has made it plain even at this hearing today that he is determined to cause the NFU and the individual Respondents as much inconvenience, distress, embarrassment, and expense as possible. He is completely unapologetic about his campaign on social media. He refers frequently to his right of free speech and even his right to offend people if he thinks that is called for. The Claimant has made over 145 posts on Linked-In relating to the subject matter of his Tribunal claims since 15 March 2021. 4.7 In my finding, it can clearly be seen from the written witness statement of Mr Sutherland, and the correspondence from the other individual Respondents, that the Claimant’s conduct has had, and continues to have, a significant adverse impact upon the individual Respondents to these claims. As a consequence of the Claimant’s recent behaviour, they are anxious about facing the Claimant in Tribunal. They are fearful of the action that the Claimant will continue to take on public forums both in the lead up to, and following the final hearing, which is not listed to take place until May 2022. 4.8 In my conclusion, creating this culture of fear and intimidation with his efforts to publicly ridicule the individual Respondents will affect the ability of the individual Respondents to give evidence. In some cases, they may feel simply unable to appear to give evidence. In other cases, even if they are able to attend to give evidence, being fearful of the public repercussions against them if they give evidence that conflicts with the Claimant’s point of view will undoubtedly impact upon the way in which they give their evidence, and whether they feel able to disagree with the Claimant’s views. 4.9 The claimant has persisted in spreading inaccurate and distressing information to the colleagues of the individual Respondents, whilst at the same time insisting that he has, and will continue to, approach some of those former colleagues to give evidence on his behalf. Conclusion

5.1 In seeking to influence the opinions of the Respondents’ colleagues in the way that is described in the evidence before the Tribunal, the Tribunal proceedings will themselves be prejudiced if some of those individuals should give evidence on the Claimant’s behalf having been influenced by the material he has posted on social media.

5.2 I accept the submission of Counsel, Ms Shepherd, that there can be no confidence that any action less than a strike out of the Claimant’s claims will have any impact upon his scandalous, vexatious, and unreasonable conduct of these proceedings, further prejudicing a fair trial in this matter.

5.3 I strike out the Claimant’s claims in their entirety. Schedule of claims Case Number Claimant Respondent/s 1304294/2020 Mr T Hancox National Farmers Union 1306006/2020 Mr T Hancox National Farmers Union 1306228/2020 Mr T Hancox Kenneth Sutherland Ben Coates Catherine Cooper Vicky Jones 1306229/2020 Mr T Hancox Tamsin Richards Tony Taunton Short Judgment Signed electronically by Employment Judge B Lloyd Signed and Dated 28 April 2021 Reasons Judgment Signed electronically by

[1]By Friday 28 May 2021 the claimant shall confirm in writing to the tribunal and to the respondent whether the reconsideration application can be determined without a hearing and can be considered on the papers.

[2]Subject to direction 1) above, the claimant shall be at liberty, by Friday 11 June 2021, as part of a paper re-consideration to make any further written representations as to why the costs order shall be reconsidered and should be Case No.1300129/2021 1300232/2021 varied or revoked: and in particular by reference to paragraph 7 of the respondent’s response to the claimant’s application dated 18 May 2021. Signed electronically by