Employment Judge MensahIn person for claimantNot represented for respondentDate 1 April 2026
JUDGMENT
[1]The Tribunal orders:(1) The first respondent’s response was struck out due to a failure to actively pursue a defence and comply with Tribunal orders. The first respondent had been warned twice and not complied. He did not comply with disclosure, bundle preparation or exchange of witness statements. He sought to adjourn the hearing at the start of the first day by written application filed after 5pm on the previous working day. We refused his adjournment request. They did not attend the hearing.(2) The second respondent had never filed a response and instead sought to file documents and make submission by email. They also did not comply with disclosure, bundle preparation or exchange of witness statements. They did not attend the hearing.(3) The Claimant’s claims for Unfair Dismissal succeeds and is made out. The second Respondent dismissed the Claimant on the 1 April 2023 by refusing to accept she was an affected employee who transferred with the business he bought from the first respondent.(4) The Claim for wrongful dismissal is also successful and is made out as no notice was given to terminate the Claimant’s contract.(5) The claim for sexual harassment has been proven and is made out as we found the first respondent’s behaviour and comments targeted the Claimant were of a sexual nature.(6) The claim for victimisation is made out as the first respondent did refuse to permit the Claimant to work and failed to pay her.(7) The claim for failure to inform and consult is made out as neither respondent complied. The failure was wholesale and aggravated.(8) Failure to provide particular has been proven and succeeds. There was an absolute failure to provide any written particulars.(9) Failure to provide pay slips is successful and we make a declaration given the failure to provide payslips and then the provision of unreliable and inaccurate retrospective pays slips only covering six months. Remedy a) We have awarded the gross pay as per the pay slip as ££912.00 per week x 52 /[2]Two years full service at gross pay of £210.46 aged 58 when dismissed is £2 x 1.5 = £631.38.00 b) We have awarded 4.75 months of loss of pay until the Claimant found alternative employment at a gross figure of £4332.00£4332.00 c) We have awarded £500 for loss of statutory rights. £500.00 d) We have awarded an uplift for failure to comply with the ACAS code in any fair procedure and lack of any right of appeal at 20% The total figure: £5956,60 e) Injury to feeling: We awarded the middle band of Vento at £15,000. £15000 Total £20,956.60 f) Under section 86 of the Employment Rights Act 1996, we awarded a minimum of two weeks’ notice. g) Due to the failure to inform and consult we awarded 13 weeks gross pay as there was an absolute and complete failure and aggravated by the behaviour, as against both respondents which is £210.46 x 13 weeks. £2735.98 h) Lack of contract of employment 4 weeks x £210.46 = £841.84 i) Declaration of failure to pay slips. TOTAL AWARD £24,534.42 net. The Recoupment Regulations apply to this award. The prescribed element is net. The period prescribed is the 2 April 2023 to the 23 July 2023. The excess of the prescribed element is £3951.90. The annex to this judgment explains the operation of the Recoupment Regulations. Notice to Respondents 2. Both respondents are joint and severely liable for all the claims. The first Respondent for his personal conduct and as an employer and the second respondent because the liability transferred. Background[3]The claims are ordinary unfair dismissal, sex discrimination, victimisation and failure to pay notice pay. There is also a claim of failure to provide a contract of employment and failure to provide pay slips.[4]By amendment dated 17 November 2023 the Claimant added claims for failure to consult under the TUPE provisions. The Claimant says she has discovered the first Respondent sold the business on the 15 March 2023 and she was not consulted.[5]The ACAS period runs from the 19 May 2023 to the 22 May 2023 for the second Respondent Mr Amanrreet Bhatia Singh. The ACAS period runs from the 21 April 2023 to the 24 April 2023 for the first Respondent Mr Kolin Sahota[6]The Claim form is dated 26 May 2023. Therefore, anything that happened before the 22 January 2023 may not be in time. The first Respondent, Mr Sahotra filed a response to the claim in which he says the Claimant was “casual 21-25”, says he has anxiety, diabetes and high blood pressure. He claims the Claimant resigned on the 26 May 2022 and continued a zero-hour contract.[7]The second Respondent failed to file a response. On the 18 October 2023 the Tribunal wrote to the second Respondent because of the failure, the Second Respondent was only entitled to participate in the final hearing “to the extent permitted by the Employment Tribunal Judge who hears the case.”[8]On the 23 October 2023 the Tribunal held a preliminary hearing. The second respondent did not attend. The Claimant and the first Respondent attended. Judge Choudry listed the final hearing for September 2024 for five days and gave case management orders to final hearing. The first Respondent told the Judge he was not interested in Judicial mediation. The Claimant indicated she wished to amend her claim to add claims for unlawful deduction of wages and failure to consult under the TUPE provisions. In the end the amendment application was not pursued for the unlawful deduction.[9]By letter dated 12 December 2023 the second Claimant told the Tribunal they did not intend to attend the final hearing but sought to file documentary evidence they sought to rely upon. Vulnerable witness/Private hearing and Reporting Restrictions Order[10]Having read the papers, we decided to treat the Claimant as a vulnerable witness in accordance with the Precedence Guidance dealing with the same. Treating the Claimant as a vulnerable witness is not acceptance of her credibility or reliability as a witness, it is to provide the appropriate adjustments to allow for the Claimant to give her best evidence.[11]The pleadings indicated the Claimant alleged she had suffered multiple instances of sexual harassment at the hands of her employer. Given the power imbalance in the employer versus employee relationship, the sensitive nature of the evidence and the circumstances (the Claimant had attended with her daughter who provided her with emotional support to attend and participate) we decided it was right to adjust.[12]The Claimant appeared fearful of encountering the first respondent and we felt there was a risk of her feeling intimidated and this interfering in the proceedings. The Claimant and her daughter expressed concern if the first respondent attended the hearing. He had applied for an adjournment of the hearing citing a lack of notice and we address that elsewhere. We were told by the Claimant and her daughter there was some form of non-molestation order or injunction in place which prohibited the first respondent being within a certain proximity of the Claimant’s daughter and the Claimant and her daughter.[13]We decided to hold the hearing in private and address that herein. We also offered breaks throughout the hearing and when it came to giving judgment, we agreed for the Claimant to attend via video on day two. When the Claimant was visibly upset recounting the allegations in the presence of her daughter, and seeing her daughter’s distress, we also offered a private room for the daughter to wait if that would be helpful, but it was not required.[14]Given the nature of the sexual allegations, we also decided to order a reporting restriction order to protect the Claimant as required under the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act as addressed in the order and reasons. When the Claimant gave evidence, we observed and were content she had been given the adjustments to allow her to give her best evidence in these proceedings. Adjournment request[15]The notice of hearing was sent to the parties dated 29 January 2025. This had been relisted after an earlier postponement due to the Claimant’s ill health. We checked and we find proper service of the notice of hearing which was sent by email and address to the parties. We note the email for the first Respondent remains the same email he has continued to engage with the Tribunal on. This gave the parties almost a full year notice of the hearing. We reject the claim by the first Respondent that he did not have notice of the hearing.[16]Prior to the dates for final hearing being sent out the Tribunal held a preliminary hearing on the 23 October 2023 which was attended by the Claimant and the first respondent and held by telephone. In that hearing the Judge had given very clear orders for the Parties to liaise to create a bundle of documents and exchange +witness statements. The first Respondent did not engage with the Claimant’s representatives Citizens Advice for the purposes of disclosure, bundle creation or exchange of witness statements, in breach of the Tribunal order. This led to citizens advice applying for an unless order to try and compel the first Respondent to comply with the Tribunal orders. There was no response to this by the first Respondent and so on the 2 August 2024 the citizens advice applied for the response of the first Respondent to be struck out. A strike out warning was issued by Judge Meichen on the 10 September 2024 and again on the 18 September 2024. Unfortunately, the failure of the first respondent to comply was not then addressed by way of strike out because the Claimant suffered ill-health which triggered a postponement of the hearing.[17]On the 12 December 2025, the Friday before the final hearing commencing on the 15 December 2025 the first Respondent emails the Tribunal at 17.37pm, asking for a postponement and claiming he only had six days’ notice of the hearing and suffers with his health. We applied the overriding objective and used our case management powers to refuse the adjournment request.[18]We addressed this on the first day of the hearing. We find the first Respondent has consistently failed to comply with Tribunal orders, has even failed to respond to the threat of strike out by a Judge and we do not accept he had any intention of actively pursuing his defence or attending the hearing. The first Respondent has failed to file a shred of evidence about his claimed medical problems to demonstrate they reasonably prevented him from actively pursuing his defence. He has had ample time to serve and file any documentary evidence he seeks to rely upon, given he understood the allegations as they were discussed in detail in the preliminary hearing he attended over two years ago. He had failed to engage in exchange of witness statements. He has sought to postpone the hearing at the very last minute. We have considered the impact of adjourning on the hearing. It would cause significant disruption to the Tribunal schedule and would waste allocated resources and delay justice. Delay undermines public confidence in timely justice.[19]We find his behaviour is no more than an attempt to derail the proceedings. The reasons are not exceptional. We note in any event, his response fails to plead any defence or refute any of the allegations of sexual harassment made against him and in fact his defence is to assert the Claimant was on a zero-hour contract by the time he sold the business. He therefore did not file a response which sought to defend his liability for sexual harassment. Strike out of Response and non-attendance[20]Given what is said above, in accordance with Rule 38 of the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024, we find the first Respondent has not actively pursued these proceedings under 38(1)(d) and for non-compliance with the Tribunal orders under 38(1)(c). The second Respondent has not attended the hearing. He has not complied with multiple Tribunal orders including the threat of strike out (twice) for non-compliance. To dare he has still not complied and instead of seeking to comply (even at the door of the hearing) he sought to further delay the hearing.[21]We have noted he has no defence before us to the alleged sexual harassment and so even if we had not struck out his response we would have no response to those claims. Furthermore, his response fails to provide any response to the permitted amendments regarding his failure to provide information and consult under the TUPE provisions. We return to that below. We therefore strike out his response. We treat his response as if no response had been filed. In any event, even if we had not taken this decision, given his lack of compliance, his failure to participate in the hearing and the defence he filed, we would have found against him. We address this below. Late enquiry of the first Respondent[22]On the morning of day two the Tribunal received a phone call from the first respondent asking about his adjournment request. The Tribunal emailed the first respondent and informed him the Tribunal gave an oral decision on his application yesterday, were in deliberations and would be giving oral judgment on day two. We invited him to indicate if he wished to join for the oral judgment and he did not respond.[23]The second Respondent failed to file a response. On the 18 October 2023 the Tribunal wrote to the second Respondent as a result of the failure, the Second Respondent was only entitled to participate in the final hearing “to the extent permitted by the Employment Tribunal Judge who hears the case.”[24]On the 10 September the Tribunal issued a strike out warning to the second Respondent. The second Respondent did respond on the 15 September 2024 and so their ability to respond was not stuck out. In that email dated 15 September 2024 the second Respondent effectively seeks to rely upon an asset purchase agreement which he says excludes his liability under TUPE and he claims he was given a letter dated August 2022 which suggested the Claimant was no longer employed at the time he purchased the business. Other than this, he has not filed a formal response to the claims, and he did not attend the hearing. As with the first respondent, the second respondent does not engage in disclosure, finalising a bundle or exchange of witness statements. They do not attend the hearing and so they seek to simply rely upon what they have said in the email and the limited documents they have filed. We return to those documents in our findings. The Law a. Time limits[25]It is for the Claimant to show that it would be appropriate to extend time. The exercise of discretion has been said to be the exception, not the rule (Bexley Community Centre (t/a Leisure Link) v Robertson [2003] EWCA Civ 576). LJ[26]Simple ignorance of the primary limitation or the law is no excuse. It is also right that the Tribunal should focus not simply on the early stages in that three-month time limit but on the closing stages. Schultz v Esso Petroleum Ltd [1999] IRLR. However, the test is not simply whether it was reasonable to miss the deadline for the claim, but whether it was not reasonably practicable to meet that initial time limit. Further, the Tribunal will have to examine the extent to which each factor relied upon impacted on the failure to present the claim in time. Overall, considering what was the substantial cause of the employee's failure to comply.[27]If the Claimant does satisfy the Tribunal on the balance of probabilities it was not reasonably practicable to bring the claim in the primary time limit, then secondly, the Tribunal must be satisfied that the further time beyond the primary time limit within which the claim was in fact presented was reasonable. Considering all factors contributing collectively to the general reasonableness of the time it had taken to lodge the claim after the primary time limit had expired. 2. Unfair dismissal “2.1 Was the reason or principal reason for dismissal that the claimant made a protected disclosure? If so, the claimant will be regarded as unfairly dismissed. 2.2 If not, what was the reason or principal reason for dismissal? The respondent says the reason was conduct. The Tribunal will need to decide whether the respondent genuinely believed the claimant had committed misconduct. 2.3 If the reason was conduct, did the respondent act reasonably in all the circumstances in treating that as a sufficient reason to dismiss the claimant? The Tribunal will usually decide, in particular, whether:2.3.1 there were reasonable grounds for that belief;2.3.2 at the time the belief was formed the respondent had carried out a reasonable investigation;2.3.3 the respondent otherwise acted in a procedurally fair manner;2.3.4 dismissal was within the range of reasonable responses.”[28]The test of fairness is tied into the reason for dismissal. The size and administrative resources of the employer’s undertaking are something to which the Tribunal must have regard. It can be reasonable for a large employer to do things which a very small employer could not do. When it comes to decide fairness, the Tribunal should remind itself of the Respondent’s position in that respect.[29]The key question is whether the employer acted reasonably or unreasonably in treating the reason as a sufficient reason to dismiss the employee. This effectively imports a “band of reasonable responses” test. It is generally an error of law for the Tribunal to decide the case on the basis of what it would have done had it been the employer. The question must be whether this employer acted in a reasonable way given the reason for dismissal. Dismissal can be a reasonable step even if not dismissing the employee would also have been a reasonable step. Sexual Harassment[30]The Tribunal should be guarded against any argument the Claimant engaged in or accepted certain behaviour. As a proposition, the fact a person may appear to go along with a state of affairs or not openly reject the conduct or take a formal grievance; does not necessarily mean it was not unwanted. Particularly on the sensitive topic of sexual harassment by the owner of the company upon whom all their employment depends.[31]It would be a significant injustice to place a burden on a victim to have formally rejected each incident of sexual harassment in a formal grievance in order to be able to establish it to the Tribunal’s satisfaction. Historic sexual harassment complaints are not uncommon, particularly where there is a power imbalance as here.[32]The scope of the unwanted conduct definition is widely drafted given the topic. Sexual Harassment may be intentional or unintentional. In the well-known quote Martin v. Devonshires Solicitors [2011] ICR 352, “The devil himself knoweth not the mind of man”[33]Sexual Harassment is often compounded by hidden and/or subconscious discrimination. It may not be immediately overt and sometimes not deliberate, see Anya v University of Oxford [2001] IRLR 377, CA. Victimisation[34]The existence of a mixed motive for the complaint does not preclude a finding of victimisation, as shown by the leading judgment of Potter LJ in O'Donoghue v Redcar & Cleveland Borough Council [2001] EWCA Civ 701, paragraph 26, “The Industrial Tribunal, in our judgment, correctly directed itself in accordance with the passage in the judgment of the Employment Appeal Tribunal (presided over by Knox J.) in Nagarajan v Agnew & Others [1994] IRLR 61, paragraph 45, which the Industrial Tribunal set out at paragraph 19 of its decision. The Industrial Tribunal were clearly of the view that the panel, in arriving at their decision to appoint Mr Cookson, were actuated by mixed motives, i.e. Mr Frankland's "not improper" advice and by the appellant's strong feminist views expressed over a period of years. That was a conclusion of fact by the Industrial Tribunal for which there was evidence as we have set out. Having heard almost everyone on the panel, the Industrial Tribunal were not satisfied that the sole reason for the panel's decision was Mr Frankland's advice; it was a mixture of two reasons, and the unlawful reason was of sufficient weight to be treated as a cause of Mr Cookson being preferred to the appellant.” Burden of proof[35]The two-stage test set out in Igen Ltd v Wong [2005] EWCA Civ 142 and Section 136 of the EA 2010, requires primary facts from which an inference of discrimination is possible. At this stage the burden is on the Claimant. The Employers explanation is disregarded but may be considered on matters such as whether comparators are truly comparable, or whether the claimant really was treated differently from others.[36]The Tribunal at this stage is considering the “eloquence of the whole” – it is important that the tribunal stands back from the detail and looks at the cumulative picture: see Anya. This is a good reason for the Claimant to give her evidence first because only if the Claimant passes the first stage does the Tribunal, then go on to Stage two where the burden of proof shifts to the Respondent to prove with “cogent evidence” on the balance of probabilities the treatment was not because of the proscribed reason or in the direct discrimination claim, to prove that the reason for the treatment was not the forbidden reason. There is no need for the employer to show that they acted fairly or reasonably. It can be permissible for a Tribunal to go to Stage two first, but it risks the Tribunal not giving proper weight to the Claimant’s evidence and the dangers of assessing the subconscious mind before making its positive findings. Geller & Anor v Yeshurun Hebrew Congregation [2016] UKEAT 0190/15 Transfer of Undertakings Protection of Employment[37]The Claimant brings claims for a failure of the first and second Respondent’s duty to inform and (where “measures” are envisaged) consult affected employees when a business is going to be sold to a separate legal entity (Regulation 13).[38]There is no dispute there is a relevant TUPE transfer. The two respondents accept the first respondent sold the legal entity to the second respondent. The dispute is not whether there would be an assignment of the Claimant as part of the economic entity affected by the sale, but the first respondent claims the Claimant was on a zero hours contract at the point of transfer of the business to the second respondent and the second respondent says the agreement for sale did not identify the Claimant, or in fact any staff. As a result, neither Respondent argues they met the requirements for meaningful consultation under Regulation 13 or any special defence.[39]The burden of proof is on the Claimant to prove the failure to inform and consult. The employer bears the burden to prove special circumstances. If we find the claim is made out the Tribunal can find both the transferor and transferee may be liable; the tribunal can order either or both to pay (Joint and several exposure), under Reg. 15.[40]The remedy the Tribunal can consider is addressed in Regulation 15 as a protective award: A just and equitable award up to 13 weeks’ pay per affected employee often assessed by reference to the gravity and impact of the failure on a just and equitable basis. We will consider what period reflects the seriousness of the breach.[41]We have removed or anonymised information to seek to prevent jigsaw identification in light of our orders with “XX” to replace details. Findings of fact[42]The Claimant was employed part time from at least from the 1 November 2020 through to the 1 April 2023. There is a bank statement showing a payment for a month in December 2020 and the original claim form stated she was employed from 2018. We accept she found the date difficult to recall and we prefer the bank statement as a reliable source of information and only independent source of evidence we have showing the Respondent paying the Claimant’s wages.[43]Initially she was working as a Shop Assistant in the shop side of the business in the same building and in the same room with a booth for the “XX”. When her colleague ‘M’ left, the Claimant began to step into “XX” duties when it was busy during the Christmas of 2021/22 at the “XX”. At commencement she told us she was not given any paperwork and was told she was working sixteen hours per week and was not given any pay slips.[44]The first Respondent wanted to pay her in a brown envelope, but she requested payment into her bank and that is how she was paid. We accept her evidence regarding a complete failure on the part of the first respondent to provide the Claimant with a contract of employment. We accept she was never given any documentation regarding the particulars of her employment such as her role, hours of work, pay and other terms we would expect to see an employer provide. The first respondent did not file any documentary evidence to counter the allegation.[45]The Claimant told us she had received about six pay slips which she filed in the bundle. In discussion with the first Respondent, she was told she would work 16 hours a week until “M” left, thereafter she worked extra hours to twenty-six hours from around Christmas of 2021. As she had experience in shop work the Claimant did not need training. The Claimant told us she was working for the first Respondent.[46]The Claimant told us the pay slips she had filed (which we dated in 2022 and running for about six months) were provided to her after she asked for some for the purposes of supporting a benefit claim for her partner in 2023 and first Respondent gave them all together. The Claimant told us she had never noticed the name at the top of the pay slips until we asked her about it in the hearing. It says, ““XX” limited.” The Claimant told us she had always known the business as “XX”. The Tribunal noted that “XX” Limited was a registered company on companies’ house which identified the first respondent as the Director, and which dissolved on the 12 January 2021. Therefore, the fact the first respondent supplied the Claimant with pay slips in the name of a company which he has been a director and which he would have known was dissolved is a serious concern.[47]The pay slips misrepresent the legal entity responsible for the Claimant’s employment. They purport to represent the legal entity as a dissolved company. We find the first respondent was not acting as a company at this time but on his own behalf as a sole trader. We find the Claimant was employed by the first respondent. We also note the pay slips do not accurately reflect the pay the first respondent paid directly into the Claimant’s bank account. For example, all that transactions in the bank statements are for £900 and yet the pay slips show varying sums paid between £900 through to £911.81. We do not know what happened to the difference. Furthermore, the pay slips appear to show that first respondent did not pay national insurance on multiple occasions.[48]The Claimant told us there were other staff who worked “casual” and were paid £5.00 per hour and had no paperwork. The Claimant recalled another staff member called Dot asking the first respondent for pay slips and a rise in pay, and the first respondent laughing about it.[49]One of the duties the Claimant was given on an ad hoc basis was to draft handwritten letters dictated by the first respondent. In May 2022 the Claimant told us he called her into the back room and asked her to take a letter he dictated. She wrote the letter on his instructions. She told us she was quite scared of him, and she wrote the letter thinking it was for him. When she questioned the letter, she told us he told her it was for a solicitor and the post office and not to worry. He did not provide a copy of that letter to her and he kept the letter. The Claimant told us she did not know why he would have asked her to put the date of the letter as the 26 May 2022 but for a resignation said to have taken effect on the 1 May 2022. She told us the words are not Her’s, she would have put her address on a letter she had drafted (as she did in another letter before us when asking for holiday), and she would not have resigned retrospectively. The Claimant told us she the first respondent would dictate the letter breathing down her neck and she just wanted to get the letter done and get out of the situation.[50]We accept the Claimant’s evidence on the circumstances in which the resignation letter was drawn up. We accept the letter was the work of the first respondent and did not represent an intention on the part of the Claimant to resign. The first respondent claims this letter shows that the Claimant resigned and went from a normal employee to one on a zero-hours contract. Not only does he not file any contract, but we consider the timing of the letter and the way it has been drafted strongly supports the Claimant’s account. We believe this is part of a pattern of controlling and manipulative behaviour on the part of the first respondent to enable him to seek to dispose of the business without accounting for the staff he employed.[51]We accept there was no discussion between the Claimant and the first respondent regarding resignation letter He did not discuss the basis upon which she would continue to work but she says she continued to work for him. She did not question this. Previously the police had been involved and attended the shop and shut it down for a while, so the Claimant did not question the involvement of a solicitor and felt it was nothing to do with her. We find the Claimant did not resign in May 2022 and was not put on a zero-hours contract. Instead, she continued to work to the same terms and conditions she had always worked as an employee of the first respondent.[52]The Claimant alleges throughout her employment she observed the first respondent had a habit of making sexually inappropriate comments to herself and other female members of staff identified as “D” and “A”. The Claimant says “D” left in July 2022 telling the Claimant she had found another job and was “sick to death of his dirty filthy comments.”[53]The Claimant says after “D” left, she was alone and the focus of the first respondents’ comments. The Claimant told us the first respondent said, “You do things to my manhood.” Which the Claimant told us was said many times to her. She told us when she was working with “D”, he would say things which she thought was banter, but it was worse for her when “D” left as she felt uncomfortable. She told us she went into work and it was not just the comments. The first respondent would sit in a big chair and drop money or a rubber band on the floor and say, “I only want to see your arse when you bend over” and the same with the lottery tickets where they were located would result in bending, so she devised a way to get them without bending. The Claimant told us he would say similar things to customers.[54]The Claimant told us he would grab her arm to make her sit on his lap. He would say there is something in the fridge that is “big, long and brown in the back and it has cream in it and it was just for you.”[55]Turning to the claim he said “You have nice jugs” she told is this was said “all the time” to her in 2022. He also is alleged to have said “I’m going to tune the radio with your nipples” in 2022 and more than once. The Claimant told us his comments were constant and he could not switch off.[56]We accept with little hesitation, the evidence of the Claimant regarding the behaviour of the first respondent. We do not underestimate the gravity and seriousness around these findings. The Claimant’s evidence is consistent with her pleaded case; she gave evidence we recognised she found highly embarrassing and upsetting. She apologised to the Tribunal when giving the evidence, which was explained was not necessary. We find she is an entirely honest and reliable witness whose account of her history of employment and sexual harassment is genuine, sufficiently detailed and true. As we have already noted herein, the first respondent did not plead any response to these allegations.[57]On the 9 August 2022 the Claimant asked for holiday and was told to write a letter or then rewrite the letter to both Directors. She told us the first Respondent did not like to give holidays, but this was her partner’s surprise holiday. She told us he even called her into work for an hour or so when on holiday and would not let her have the week off. The Claimant told us she had to request holiday in writing. The Claimant pointed to the fact she put her address on that letter on not on the resignation letter. We find the fact the Claimant was required to seek permission to take holiday is a further strong indication she remained employed on the same terms and conditions as before the resignation letter and the way she was being treated a continuation of the manipulative behaviour of the first respondent.[58]The Claimant says when alone and, on the 14 January 2023, the first respondent backed her into corner of a room by the kiosk on the shop side of the “XX”. He made a habit of touching her knee to ask her to move so he could get to the safe but this time he moved and forced her into the corner of the room. The claimant says she grabbed a parcel and tried to squeeze it between them, but he was so close she was pushed up against the wall and he said, “I can show you a good time.” She says used the parcel “push” the first respondent away. She described the first respondent as a large man.[59]In another incident whilst cleaning the bottom of the fridge to replace the milk he approached her and said, “whilst you are down there you can do me another job.” This occurred in 2022. She confirmed the above incidents made her feel badgered and frightened. The Claimant told us the behaviour of the first respondent made her feel “dirty, uncomfortable, cheap and this led to be having panic attacks.”[60]The Claimant told us she went to the Doctors because she was panicking about the job, but she needed the money, her partner was ill and not working and she felt cheap and dirty as although she was not doing anything she felt bad inside as if she was being unfaithful to her partner. She had counselling until last Christmas having just got over “XX” and the counsellor helped her stand up for herself. In work she would keep herself busy to try and avoid the situation, she would have panic attack and hot sweats. She wore three layers of clothing so when he touched her leg it was her clothing he touched and not her leg and she still wears the same layers of clothing now.[61]In terms of panic attack, she described sweats, difficulty breathing, heart going “Ninety to the dozen” and she feels like “someone is wrapping her in clingfilm.” The Claimant confirmed her GP did offer her anti-depressants, but she didn’t want to take medication so went to counselling. She told us she could not move when she felt him breathing at the back of her neck. Her counselling sessions have gone on for about two years, she told us she could not see, say or be near a “chocolate éclair” because of the connotations of her experience with the first Respondent.[62]We found this evidence compelling. The level of descriptive detail from the Claimant about matters which indicated to us she was reliving the experience, and it was a genuinely traumatic one. We accept a pattern of behaviour on the part of the first respondent beginning before 2020, increasing in gravity and focus on the Claimant during 2022 and culminating in what followed.[63]In 2023 “D” and A”” told the Claimant they had gone to the police. On the 2 February 2023 the Claimant was visited by the police who told her “D” and “A” had made allegations against the first respondent. They asked about his behaviour in the workplace and if the Claimant was prepared to make a statement, which she did. She gave the statement in front her partner and son at home. The police told the Claimant they would examine the CCTV from the “XX”. She did not know if it was used in criminal proceedings. She was contacted by the police multiple times to check on her welfare.[64]The Claimant returned to work on the 3 February 2023 saying nothing about the police visit and the first respondent’s behaviour continued as he did not know about the investigation at this stage. The Claimant told us the first respondent had no idea she had given a statement to the police and so he continued with his behaviour until he had been arrested. She told us he would often say “What goes on in the post office stays in the post office” and she described him as a controlling man who watched them on the CCTV all the time.[65]On Sunday 26 February 2023, just over three weeks after the police visit, the Claimant received a phone call at 8pm from the police who informed her the first respondent had been arrested. She was advised to go to work as normal and was told he had been bailed and a condition of his bail was, he was not allowed to discuss the case with the Claimant. The Claimant told us she could not afford to give her job up and did not want to burden her partner who had been ill and lost his own job. The Claimant returned to work on the 28 February 2023. On arrival the first respondent asked her what she was doing at work. He told she was banned from the shop, to get out and if she didn’t, he would call the police. He told her “You’re not supposed to be here. This was witnessed by his silent partner she described as Kul and a woman called “S”. We note Garcia Kuldip Singh is named as a second Director on companies House in the former dissolved company. The Claimant asked if she had been sacked and he didn’t respond and told her to get out or he would ring the police. The Claimant told us Kul was the first Respondent’s back up, but she didn’t know a lot about him. We accept the first respondent would have known once arrested and interviewed by the police the Claimant had given a statement against him.[66]The Claimant rang ACAS and upon advice wrote to the first respondent on the 3 March 2023 stating he was obliged to continue to pay her wages and was denying her rights as an employee. The Claimant says she got no response.[67]The Claimant discovered he had sold the business and thought the police had told her. On the 8 March 2023 the police advised the Claimant to wait a few days and then go and see the new owner about returning to work. The Claimant rang the second Respondent Mr Singh and, on the 16 March 2023, went to the premises to meet him at 6pm. He told the Claimant she did not work there, and the business had no employees. The Claimant said to him “You know I work here” albeit this was not because she had met him before. He denied the same. He told her the sale agreement did not contain any provision to take on staff. The words used were said to be “It wasn’t in the agreement to take staff on.”[68]We have seen what appears to be a draft or template form of sale agreement. It is not signed or dated. It has been filed by the second respondent. He says lawyers were involved but we have no formal agreement before us and he did not attend or disclose anything else to demonstrate the final agreement was signed off. There is an email dated 11 January said to be from the second respondent’s solicitor to the second respondent stating there was no staff transferring with the business. There is no documentation to show any discussion between the first and second respondent regarding the business or any legal documentation regarding due diligence on the company such as accounts and payment of staff.[69]There is what appears to be a text message which suggests replies were provided to the second respondent which generated various documents, none of which were supplied to us such as the pre-contract business enquiry. We noted the second respondent had set up a company on company’s house on the 7 March 2022 called Dovedale Stores Limited which remained dormant until he took over the business. It gives the appearance this company was set up for the sole purpose of the transfer. This aligns to the attempt by the first respondent to create documentation showing the Claimant had resigned in May 2022. It gives the impression the discussions about the sale of this business to the second respondent had been ongoing for several months or more before the actual transfer.[70]We find the second respondent’s behaviour towards the Claimant indicative of culpability on his part in the attempts to remove trace of the Claimant as an employee. We would have expected a genuine transferee to have been shocked and surprised to be confronted by a person who claimed to be an employee in a business they had just purchased. We would have expected them to have been more cooperative with the Claimant in seeking to get to the bottom of the circumstances in which she was so employed. The complete absence of any action on the part of the second respondent and his response to the Claimant is in our view devoid of credibility. The Claimant told us the second respondent was both dismissive and she sensed an urgency on his part to get her off the premises.[71]The Claimant, on advice from ACAS, wrote to Mr Amanpreet Singh Bhatia in the March of 2023 explaining he was still liable to employ her and if she did not hear back by the 1st of April 2023, she would take it he had dismissed her. The Claimant says she got no response. This is the date we take as the date of dismissal.[72]We accept there was no information or consultation with the Claimant about the business sale and the assignment of her employment. We find the first time she became aware of the sale was after it had already taken place. The second respondent has failed to show the Claimant did not transfer to him and we do not accept the documentary evidence filed is reliable. The second respondent has failed to advance his defence.[73]Regarding her counselling she told us the counselling was because she was having trouble coping with work, her mother-in-law passed away, her partner had fallen and lost work and she had “XX”. She told us she didn’t know how to cope as she had never been in that situation before. She told us it was a combination of things, but she felt ill by what was going on in the shop and was low in mood which was not her norm.[74]The Claimant explained she didn’t feel as impacted when she had “D” in the workplace as it was “woman together” but when she left it was the Claimant and first respondent whose behaviour was constant and she could no get away from him, and she felt vulnerable and alone. The Claimant confirmed she secured a job on the 24 July 2023 and at no stage did either Respondent ever raise with her anything to do with the sale of the business. Application of the facts to the law[75]Both respondents are joint and severely liable for all the claims. The first Respondent for his personal conduct and as an employer and the second respondent because the liability transferred. Time[76]The behaviour of the first respondent is a continued course of conduct from 2020 through to termination and so the claims were brought in time for sexual harassment, The victimisation claim was brought in time. The unfair dismissal and wrongful dismissal were brought in time as where the claims for Failure to inform and consult was in time. Unfair Dismissal and TUPE[77]The Claimant was unfairly dismissed by the second respondent on the 1 April 2023. The Claimant was dismissed because the first and second respondent had sought to circumvent the application of the TUPE provisions by seeking to remove the Claimant as an employee prior to the transfer and then denying her existence. We have found she did transfer despite the attempts to evade this. We find the transfer took place between the 28 February 2023 and the 8 March 2023. The Respondents conduct in these proceedings has prevented the Tribunal from pinpointing the exact date but for the purposes of the claims brought we find she did transfer and the second Respondent is her employer at the date of termination.[78]The failure of the second Respondent to accept responsibility for continuing the Claimant’s employment once she confronted him, is an unfair dismissal. This is not a potentially fair reason, and we find the second respondent did not act reasonably in all the circumstances in treating it as a sufficient reason for dismissal. Wrongful dismissal[79]As a result of the above the Claimant was wrongfully dismissed as no notice was given. Sexual Harassment[80]We have found the Claimant was subject to the comments and behaviour she has described to us and set out above and in the List of Issues. We accept this is unwanted conduct which meets the definition under section 26. We accept and it is fairly clear to any reader; the conduct is of a sexual nature. It did have the purpose of violating the claimant’s dignity and it did create an environment that is intimidatory, hostile, degrading, humiliating and an offensive environment for the Claimant.[81]We accept the first respondent did treat the Claimant less favourably because of her sex and he could get away with the behaviour given his position of authority and the way he abused it. Victimisation[82]We accept the Claimant made a statement to the police in February 2023 following complaints made by former employees of sexual harassment against the first respondent. We accept the only reason the first respondent refuses to allow the Claimant to attend work after his arrested he because he knew she had supported the criminal allegations by giving a statement to the police and he sought to use this as a basis to refuse her entry to the workplace and pay her. We find this did subject the claimant to a detriment. She was not able to work and receive pay and was being ostracised by her employer. Failure to provide a contract of employment[83]We find the first respondent failed to provide a contract of employment and any or any genuine and reliable pay slips correctly itemising her pay. In fact, he failed to make payments into her bank account that accord to the pay slips he did provide. Failure to inform and consult[84]We find a complete failure to inform and consult with the Claimant regarding being an affected employee of the business. We have found both Respondents played their part in seeking to circumvent the application of the transfer provisions. Remedy Middle band Vento for Injury to feelings[85]In this case there were two and a half years of sexual comments and at least three instances of sexual physical contact. We have taken into account two and a half years is a significant period, suggesting sustained harassment. There were sexual comments plus physical contact increases seriousness. There was psychological harm, distress, and an effect on her career. The conduct is persistent and includes physical contact, which elevates it beyond the lower band. There is no evidence of extreme psychological harm or career-ending consequences, it likely does not reach the upper band. There has been an abuse of power. We considered the middle band and concluded £15,000 is appropriate. The respondent failed to take adequate steps to prevent or address the harassment. Notice Pay[86]We found the Claimant is entitled to a minimum of two seeks notice under section 86 of the Employment Rights Act 1996, but this did not result in any further award to prevent double recovery. Failure to inform and consult[87]Failure to consult led us to award thirteen weeks gross pay given the absolute and complete failure and the aggravated by the behaviour as against both respondents. There is no contact of employment, so we award four weeks pay. Pay slips[88]We declare the Claimant was entitled to pay slips and they were not provided. Approved by