Mr G Cummings v Sandmaster (UK) Holdings Ltd and Others: 1300031/2025 and Others

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Case No 1300031/2025, 6015184/2024

Between

Mr G CummingsClaimant

Sandmaster (UK) Holdings Ltd and OthersRespondent

Before

Employment Judge Bansal

In person for claimant

Date 26 February 2026

JUDGMENT

ON APPLICATION FOR INTERIM RELIEF The Claimant’s application for interim relief is not well founded and is refused.

REASONS

[1]This hearing was listed to determine the claimant’s application for interim relief and, if appropriate, to order the claimant’s re-instatement or re-engagement or grant a continuation of his contract of employment pending the hearing of the complaints of ordinary unfair dismissal, discrimination on the grounds of age, race, sexual orientation, religion or belief and other payments.

[2]The claimant was employed by the respondent as a General Worker from 22 February 2021 and resigned effective on 8 October 2024. The claimant presented a Claim Form to the Tribunal on 15 October 2024, which is within 7 days of the effective date of termination of the claimant’s employment. Case Number: 6015184/2024 2 It appears the claim was accepted as a complaint of constructive unfair dismissal for making a protected disclosure pursuant to s103A Employment Rights Act 1996. If so, the claimant did not need an ACAS early conciliation certificate. In fact in the Claim Form at Para 2.3, the claimant ticked the box that he did not have an Acas early conciliation certificate as his claim contained an application for interim relief. Accordingly, this hearing was listed by Notice of Hearing dated 23 October 2024.

Hearing

[3]The claimant represented himself, and the respondent was represented by Mr. Simon Gill (Director).

[4]The claimant presented a bundle of documents of some 519 pages. He provided no witness statement.

[5]The respondent produced a short witness statement of Mr. Simon Gill to which were attached documents. The respondent did not provide a draft response as this was not due until 20 November 2024.

[6]At the start of the hearing I explained to the claimant the purpose of this hearing and the issue to be determined, namely to assess the prospects of his “whistleblowing” unfair dismissal application for the purposes of granting, or not, the interim relief sought. This meant that I would have to be satisfied that he was likely to succeed in his whistleblowing complaint (in the sense it had a “pretty good” chance of succeeding) I also clarified that I would not be deciding the merits of his claim or making findings of fact. I also explained the procedure to be followed. The claimant confirmed his understanding what I told him.

[7]I first heard from the claimant and sought clarification of his complaint as pleaded. I then heard representations from Mr. Simon Gill. The Law Interim relief

The Law

[8]An interim relief application may only be made if the reason or principal reason for dismissal is alleged to be one of the falling narrowly defined categories under section 128(1) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (“ERA 1996”) and section 161 of Trade Union & Labour Relations Act 1996.

[9]Section 128(1) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (“ERA 1996”) provides that an employee who presents a complaint of unfair dismissal, and alleges that the reason for his dismissal is the making of a protected disclosure under section 103A of the Employment Rights Act, may apply to the Tribunal for interim relief. The claimant's application in this case has been brought in time, pursuant to section 128(2) ERA 1996. Case Number: 6015184/2024 3

[10]The procedure on hearing an application for interim relief is set out in section 129 ERA 1996, namely that interim relief shall be granted where it appears to the Tribunal it is likely that, on determining the complaint of unfair dismissal, the Tribunal will find that the reason or principal reason for the dismissal was that the claimant made a protected disclosure and so was unfairly dismissed for doing so.

[11]The task for the Tribunal is to make a broad assessment of the case on the basis of the material available to it at the interim relief hearing, and to consider what is likely to be the result at the final hearing of the claimant's claim. (London City Airport Ltd v Chack

(2013) IRLR 610

EAT. The statutory test does not require the Tribunal to make any findings of fact. (Ryb v Nomura International Plc EAT 3202174/2009).

[12]The leading case of Taplin v C Shippam Limited

[1978] IRLR 450

held that “likely” in section 129 ERA 1996 does not mean simply “more likely than not”. The test is one of likelihood of success; that is to say whether the claim has more than reasonable prospects of success, or a “pretty good chance” of success at a final hearing.

[13]In the case of Ministry of Justice v Sarfraz

[2011] IRLR 562

the Employment Appeal Tribunal confirmed that the word “likely” in section 129 ERA does not simply mean “more likely than not”, it connotes a significantly higher degree of likelihood, something nearer to certainty than mere probability. The test is therefore set comparatively high.

[14]To succeed with an interim relief application, therefore, the burden of showing there is a “pretty good chance of success” is on the claimant, who must show that he has a good case for saying his dismissal was because of a protected disclosure on the basis that there are more than reasonable prospects of succeeding with that contention. Whistle-blowing dismissal

[15]Section 103A ERA 1996 provides that an employee who is dismissed shall be regarded as unfairly dismissed if the reason (or, if more than one, the principal reason) for the dismissal is that the employee made a protected disclosure as defined in section 43A ERA 1996.

[16]A disclosure which qualifies as a “protected disclosure” is a disclosure of information to the employer or to a prescribed person which, in the reasonable belief of the worker is in the public interest and tends to show one or more matters set out in section 43B(1) ERA 1996.

[17]The disclosure must be of information, that is to say of facts but not mere opinion or allegations. (Kilraine v LB Wandsworth

(2016) IRLR 422

). In Cavendish Munro Professional Risks Management Ltd v Geduld

(2010) ICR 325

, Slade J Case Number: 6015184/2024 4 stressed that the protection extends to disclosures of information, but not to mere allegations. Disclosing information means conveying facts.

[18]The Claimant must therefore show that it is likely that the Tribunal at the final hearing will find that:a. He made the disclosure(s) to the employer (or in accordance with any of the sections 43C – 43H ERA 1996);

b. He believed that it or they tended to show one or more of the factors listed in s.43B(1) ERA 1996;

c. His belief in that was reasonable;

d. The disclosure(s) was or were made in the public interest; and

e. The disclosure(s) was or were the principal cause of the dismissal. The Application

[19]For this hearing the claimant did not present or prepare a witness statement in support of his application. It was difficult to discern from the claimant’s supporting 519 documents submitted with this application. I therefore had to tease out from the claimant the grounds of his application.

[20]I ascertained the application is made on two grounds;(a) The principal ground is that on 13 June 2024 he was denied the right to have someone independent with him at the proposed meeting that day. He claimed that was a breach of his contract and statutory right to be accompanied at a grievance meeting. The claimant accepted that at a further grievance meeting held on 15 July 2024 he was accompanied by the work colleague who he wanted to be present at the meeting on 13 June 2024.

(b) The other ground which the claimant confirmed was secondary, is that he made a protected disclosure on 8 August 2024 about the CCTV footage taken on site. The claimant explained he made a written complaint to Marcus Crone (Director) by email on 8 August 2024. His complaint was about the way the CCTV footage was used. He explained that it was used improperly in that live footage was watched to monitor employees. He gave an example, where it has been used in capability meetings although not with him. He also mentioned how on 10 June 2024 at a meeting with Brian Nairn (Production Manager) he was shown the video footage of the incident of 6 June 2024, and according to the claimant Brian tried to talk him out of presenting a grievance. According to the claimant the use of the video footage was a breach of his terms of his contract of employment.

[21]Mr. Simon Gill explained the reason for the use of the CCTV footage was mainly for security; health and & safety purposes, and its use was limited to employee issues, for example like the incident on 6 June 2024, and disciplinary hearings.

[22]In relation to the claimant’s resignation, although the respondent has not submitted a response, Mr Simon Gill, deny the claimant made a protected Case Number: 6015184/2024 5 disclosure at all and that his decision to resign was voluntarily and made no mention of his making any disclosure.

Conclusion

[23]My starting point was to understand the claimant’s reasons for resigning, I therefore considered the claimant’s resignation letter. The letter is headed “Unfair constructive dismissal resignation acceptance.” It is 7 pages in content. The reason for resignation clearly stated to be because of the loss of trust and confidence in the respondent arising from their alleged conduct and actions, and in the manner his grievance about the alleged conduct was dealt with.

[24]More importantly, there is no reference that he had made a disclosure of information (whether protected or not) on the 8 August 2024 or that his decision to resign was because the respondent’s conduct towards him was in consequence of having made the alleged disclosure. Based on the contents of this letter, the claimant did not resign because he made a disclosure. That is fundamental to this complaint.

[25]For completeness I also considered the alleged disclosure relied upon. In my assessment the claimant was not able to identify how the alleged disclosure fell within s43(B) ERA 1996. Furthermore, the claimant failed to identify and articulate how the alleged disclosure was made in the public interest, and that he was likely to succeed in establishing a causal link between the alleged disclosure and his constructive dismissal.

[26]I therefore determined this application for interim relief was misconceived, and there was no basis to conclude that the claimant had a ‘pretty good chance of success’ at a full hearing.

[27]I explained to the parties that I made a broad brush assessment and the position may change at a final hearing when all of the evidence is tested in cross- examination. At this hearing I was required to make a summary assessment and having done so based on the information before me, I concluded the claimant was unlikely to establish he made a protected disclosure at all, or even if he is able to persuade a Tribunal that he did make a protected disclosure, the reason for his resignation was not because of the protected disclosure. The claimant failed to meet the threshold for the granting of interim relief. Accordingly, I dismissed this application. Approved By