“If the employment tribunals are firm and fair in their management of cases pre-hearing and in the conduct of the hearing, the appeal tribunal and this court should, wherever legally possible, back up their case management decisions and rulings.” 6. Mummery J, as he then was, commented in the context of appeals against decisions refusing applications to amend in Selkent Bus Co Ltd v Moore[1996] ICR 836 , 843B: “On an appeal from such a refusal, the appellant would have a heavy burden to discharge. He would have to convince the appeal tribunal that the industrial tribunal had erred in legal principle in the exercise of the discretion, or had failed to take into account relevant considerations or had taken irrelevant factors into account, or that no reasonable tribunal, properly directing itself, could have refused the amendment: see Adams v West Sussex County Council[1990] ICR 546 .” 7. It will be difficult for a party, especially if represented, to criticise an employment judge for failing to take account of a factor that was not raised in argument. 8. In considering reasons for case management decisions, which often, necessarily, will be brief, the appeal tribunal must be astute to avoid an excessively minute analysis. Mummery LJ warned in Fuller at para 30: “The reading of an employment tribunal decision must not, however, be so fussy that it produces pernickety critiques. Over-analysis of the reasoning process; being hypercritical of the way in which the decision is written; focusing too much on particular passages or turns of phrase to the neglect of the decision read in the round: those are all appellate weaknesses to avoid.” 9. This passage is so often quoted that I have reminded myself that it is insufficient to quote it; I must think about it and avoid the pitfall of which Mummery LJ warns. 10. Nonetheless, if an employment judge has, on a fair reading of a judgment, failed to take account of a relevant matter or failed properly to apply the law, even if quoted in the judgment, it is necessary to interfere. 11. Sedley LJ succinctly stated at para 26 of Anya v University of Oxford[2001] ICR 847 : “The courts have repeatedly told appellants that it is not acceptable to comb through a set of reasons for hints of error and fragments of mistake, and to try to assemble these into a case for oversetting the decision. No more is it acceptable to comb through a patently deficient decision for signs of the missing elements, and to try to amplify these by argument into an adequate set of reasons. Just as the courts will not interfere with a decision, whatever its incidental flaws, which has covered the correct ground and answered the right questions, so they should not uphold a decision which has failed in this basic task, whatever its other virtues.” 12. The key test for considering amendments has its origin in the decision of the National Industrial Relations Court in Cocking v Sandhurst (Stationers) Ltd[1974] ICR 650 , 657B–C: “In deciding whether or not to exercise their discretion to allow an amendment, the tribunal should in every case have regard to all the circumstances of the case. In particular they should consider any injustice or hardship which may be caused to any of the parties, including those proposed to be added, if the proposed amendment were allowed or, as the case may be, refused.” 13. No consideration of an application for amendment is complete without a reference to Selkent[1996] ICR 836 . It is so familiar that it is especially easy to quote it without reflecting on the core principle it elucidates. The key passage is at p 843D: “Whenever the discretion to grant an amendment is invoked, the tribunal should take into account all the circumstances and should balance the injustice and hardship of allowing the amendment against the injustice and hardship of refusing it.” 14. Mummery J reiterated this point at p 844B: “Whenever taking any factors into account, the paramount considerations are the relative injustice and hardship involved in refusing or granting an amendment.”