“On25 September 2012 , you lodged a formal grievance against IBM United Kingdom Limited… On23 November 2012 , IBM provided its response to the Grievance… On5 December 2012 , you appealed against the Respondent… On1 March 2013 , IBM responded to the Appeal… In the Grievance, the Appeal and elsewhere you allege that you have or may have potential claims arising from your employment with IBM which include: unlawful deductions from wages, breach of contract, disability discrimination and other claims referred to in the Grievance and Appeal (“Employment Claims”). This Agreement settles the Employment Claims. In addition, it reflects the intention of you and IBM and all of the Group Companies that this Agreement should also settle any other claims that you may have against IBM or any other Group Company, subject to and in accordance with the terms set out below.”
“It is a condition of this Agreement that you agree: a. to, and will comply with, the terms of the IBM UK Disability Plan Guidelines Document (the “Disability Plan Guidelines”) (as set out in Schedule 2) and b. that whilst in receipt of the disability benefit described in paragraph 1 above, you will not: (i) accrue annual leave; or (ii) be entitled to any car allowance, fuel allowance, outer London allowance or any other allowance and such allowances will not form part of your OTE or basic salary.”
“Paragraph 8 does not extend to: a. Any claim to enforce the terms of this Agreement; or b. Any claim to enforce any pension rights which you have accrued up to the date of this Agreement under the Lotus Development Pension Investment Plan; or c. Any personal injury claim of which you are not aware as at the date of this Agreement or any personal injury claim in respect of which you have already made a claim against IBM (or IBM’s insurer); or d. Any claims which arise after the date of this Agreement and which: (i) are not connected to the matters set out in the Grievance or Appeal; or (ii) do not arise out of the Claimant’s transfer to the Plan.”
“IBM UK DISABILITY PLAN PAYMENTS Upon transfer from their current manager’s headcount and budget to the Plan the employee will become an ‘inactive’ employee in receipt of a monthly disability salary payment advance on 6th of each month… The Plan benefit is payable from the date of transfer to the Plan, until the 5th of the month following the employee’s 65th birthday. It is payable at the rate of 75% of on target earnings… From time to time, IBM United Kingdom Limited…may exercise its discretion to award an increase to the disability salary payable to members of the Plan…There is no guarantee of such increases being awarded, either in terms of timing or amount.”
“The respondent position is that the entirety of the claimant’s claims should be struck out because the Employment Tribunal has no jurisdiction to hear any of them as there is a legally binding settlement agreement between the respondent and the claimant which compromises all of the contractual and statutory claims pleaded.”
“46.1 Do each or any of the claimant’s claims below fall within the terms of the Compromise Agreement? 46.2 If so, are such claims compromised by the Compromise Agreement such that the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to hear them and the claimant is precluded from pursuing them?”
“The Respondent applies for strike out on the basis that the Employment Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to consider the entirety of the claim, save for one allegation (see further below), as all other aspects of the claim have been validity compromised by virtue of a compromise agreement entered into by the parties on10 April 2013 … The one remaining element of the claim is the Claimant’s right to accrue statutory annual leave, which cannot be contracted out of by virtue of the… [WTR]. However, as the Claimant remains a member of the Respondent’s disability plan, he is not entitled to any payment in lieu of annual leave, as he alleges. Therefore, the Claimant’s claim of unlawful deductions from wages in this regard has no or little reasonable prospects of success and therefore should be struck out and/or the Claimant should be ordered to pay a deposit of£1,000 as a condition of him continuing to advance that allegation…” (Emphasis in the original.)
“1. Both parties accept that they entered into a valid and legally binding compromise agreement in accordance with…section 147(3) of the…[EQA]…dated10 April 2013 . A IMPACT OF THE COMPROMISE AGREEMENT 2. What affect do the terms of the Compromise Agreement (and in particular clauses 1, 5, 8, 9 and 18) have on the following: …… 2.5 The Claimant’s right to bring future claims relating to his disability benefit being reviewed and/or increased after6 April 2013 ? B CLAIMANT’S CLAIMS 3. Accordingly, do the Claimant’s claims (set out below) fall within the terms of the Compromise Agreement. 4. The Claimant brings the following claims: [the discrimination arising from disability, direct discrimination and indirect discrimination claims were then summarised]. 5. If the Claimant’s claims are within the terms of the Compromise Agreement, are they compromised such that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to hear the claims and they should be dismissed? C UNLAWFUL DEDUCTION OF WAGES CLAIM 6. Does the Claimant have no or little reasonable prospects of success in relation to his claims for unlawful deduction from wages given that r13(9)(b) WTR prohibits any amount of annual leave being paid in lieu of untaken leave when the Claimant remains a member of the disability plan? 7. If so, should the Claimant’s claim of unlawful deduction of wages be a) struck out or b) subject to a deposit order?”
“This hearing was to consider whether to strike out the claim in whole or in part, either as precluded by a compromise agreement of13 April 2013 [sic], or as having no reasonable prospect of success”
“…the Plan is a self-insured scheme run by the Respondent. It is akin to an insurance policy, but the person who is unable to work is not dismissed and remains an employee. It is a particular status, because there is no obligation to work (and only people unable to work can be transferred to the Plan), and no reciprocal obligations. The only significant employment feature of the Plan is that there is a right, until recovery, retirement or earlier death to be paid 75% of agreed earnings at the date of transfer into the Plan, with the Respondent having a discretion to review payments from time to time.”
“22. The CA was the result of a detailed negotiation…It brought to an end a lengthy process of grievance and appeal. It conformed to all the statutory requirements for compromise agreements to be enforceable. The result was that sought by the Claimant – a transfer to the Plan, based on a salary he agreed. ….. 24. To settle future claims requires the clearest of intentions, on the Respondent’s submission, and is not possible on the Claimant’s submission. 25. It cannot be the case that a Claimant can settle, for example, a sexual harassment claim and be bound by a term that sexual harassment claims that may arise in the future are also settled. That would inevitably be contrary to public policy, dooming an employee to suffer future harassment without remedy. 26. However, I see nothing in case law, and every reason of public policy for a claim that, for example, a claim about holiday pay can be settled for the past and can include a binding agreement about the way holiday pay is to be calculated in future… ….. 28. Accordingly, there are two reasons why the holiday pay claim has not reasonable prospects of success. First, the future claims for holiday pay were expressly settled in the CA. I do not consider that Bathgate is contrary to that conclusion. In paragraph 25 the judgment indicates that a future matter cannot be a particular complaint because it has not yet arisen, and so was unknowable. In this case the issue of holiday pay was known – it was one of the subjects of the Grievance and of the Appeal. That distinguishes this claim from that in Bathgate…The question of holiday pay was settled for the future as well as for the past. 29. However, whether future claims can be settled as a matter of principle is an academic dispute in the context of this case. This is because from the documents supplied to me there can be only one conclusion as to the effect of the transfer of an employee to the Plan. It is a consensual variation of contract. The employee becomes an inactive employee, who is expected never again to work for the Respondent…All the normal features of employment contract disappear. There is only the right to be paid 75% of previous salary…The contract was varied so that from06 April 2013 the Claimant’s salary was reduced to 75% of what it was before. 30. This meets all the requirements for a contractual variation, of invitation to treat, offer and acceptance… … 36. There is a difference between settling claims that might arise in the future on the same basis to new future claims. It would be remarkable if a person the victim of a sexual harassment at work could settle a claim on the basis that no claim could be brought for future sexual harassment. That would leave such an individual at risk of sexual harassment with no remedy. I see it as entirely different to come to an agreement where the Claimant achieved his main aim, to be transferred to the Plan and to settle his holiday pay claim, only for the Respondent to be faced with a new similar claim afterwards. To that extent, I find the carve out from the exception clause in the CA valid. The new holiday pay claims are similar…I find that the statutory conditions for a compromise agreement are met, and that the Claimant is precluded from bringing claims in respect of holiday pay by reason of the CA. 38. I note that in the Court of Appeal decision of Arvunescu…This is clear authority for future claims to be settled by a compromise agreement. Bathgate is more recent, but either it was decided per incuriam on this point, or I should prefer the authority of the higher Court. ….. 40. The same logic applies to the claims for not having pay increases since 2013. That claim was part of the Grievance and Appeal: no pay rises while on sick leave from 2008 – 2013. This claim is a repetition of that claim for the subsequent period of 2013 to 2023. The Claimant agreed that he waived any claims of a similar type, which this is, I can see no reason why that was not a valid waiver, as set out above.”
“42. The disability discrimination claims are based on the comparator being someone not disabled. This is a flawed comparator. Only someone so affected by a disability that they will never work again at any job for any employer can be eligible to be transfer to the Plan. Disability discrimination occurs when a disabled person is treated less favourably than a comparator who is not disabled. Those who do not have a disability cannot receive 75% of salary for their entire working life without having to do any work. The Plan is a benefit available only to those with severe disability. 43. It follows that the non-disabled comparator is treated less favourably than those disabled, not the other way round. 44. That active employees may get pay rises, but inactive employees do not is a difference, but it is not, in my judgment, a detriment caused by something arising from disability. The transition to inactive employee status means that there is no comparison with active employees. The Plan is described as a self-insured plan…Had the Respondent contracted with a major life company for such benefits for its’ employees in return for a premium the position would not be in doubt. The Claimant would get whatever benefits were included in the insurance policy, which would not (absent an express term) be connected to the pay of people not in receipt of insurance benefits under such a policy. That the Respondent self-insures does not seem to me to alter that position. 45. The Claimant points out that over the 30+ year period until he would reach the age of 65 would mean that inflation [sic]. The Bank of England’s inflation calculator shows that the value of£50,000 in 1993 is now almost£100,000 . The value of the benefit will diminish over time…The Claimant’s case is that it is disability discrimination not to review and vary upwards the salary payable under the Plan. The comparators he chooses are those who are active employees who, while not entitled to annual pay rises invariably get one. 46. This is not a true comparator. Active employees cannot be transferred to the Plan. The complaint is in fact that the benefit of being an inactive employee on the Plan is not generous enough… ….. 48. The claim is that the absence of increase in salary is disability discrimination because it is less favourable treatment than afforded those not disabled. This contention is not sustainable because only the disabled can benefit from the plan. The disabled transferred to the Plan are treated more favourably than those not disabled, for they do not have to work. That this is by reason of disability does not alter that fact. 49. It is not disability discrimination that the Plan is not even more generous… 50. Accordingly, I conclude that the remaining claims about the Plan, have no reasonable prospects of success, and so I dismiss those claims also.”
“9. A party may, at any rate in a compromise agreement supported by valuable consideration, agree to release claims or rights of which he is unaware and of which he could not be aware, even claims which could not on the facts known to the parties have been imagined, if appropriate language is used to make plain that that is his intention… 10. But a long and in my view salutary line of authority shows that, in the absence of clear language, the court will be very slow to infer that a party intended to surrender rights and claims of which he was unaware and could not have been aware…”
“In our judgment, the law as to contracts for release is pretty straightforward. The law does not decline to allow parties to contract that all and any claims, whether known or not, shall be released. The question in each case is whether, objectively looking at the compromise agreement, that was the intention of the parties, or whether in order to correspond with their intentions some restriction has to be placed on the scope of the release. If the parties seek to achieve such an extravagant result that they release claims of which they have and can have no knowledge, whether those claims have already come in existence or not, they must do so in language which is absolutely clear and leaves no room for doubt as to what it is they are contracting for. We can see no reason why as a matter of public policy a party should not contract out of some future cause of action. But we take the view that it would require extremely clear words for such an intention to be found.”
“(1) This section applies for the purposes of this Part. (2) A qualifying settlement agreement is a contract in relation to which each of the conditions in subsection (3) is met. (3) Those conditions are that – (a) the contract is in writing, (b) the contract relates to the particular complaint, (c) the complainant has, before entering into the contract, received advice from an independent adviser about its terms and effect (including, in particular, its effect on the complainant’s ability to pursue the complaint before an employment tribunal), (d) on the date of the giving of the advice, there is in force a contract of insurance, or an indemnity provided for members of a profession or professional body, covering the risk of a claim by the complainant in respect of loss arising from the advice, (e) the contract identifies the adviser, and (f) the contract states that the conditions in paragraphs (c) and (d) are met.”
“(1) The legislative policy is to protect employees from signing away the right to bring employment tribunal proceedings under the 1996 Act except in cases where a number of closely defined conditions are satisfied. The most obvious target of the section is the blanket or sweep-up form of general waiver or release covering all future claims and inserted into a contract of employment issued to an employee on his engagement. The elaborate code of employment protection in the 1996 Act would be worthless if, at the stroke of a pen, it could be removed by a general waiver or release of rights. (2) As it is the policy of the law to encourage the settlement of disputes an exception to the general rule is made for ‘compromise agreements’. In the absence of an exception they would be caught by the general rule of invalidity, as the compromise agreement normally includes an agreement by the employee not to bring proceedings in the tribunal. If such an agreement is always void, employers would be deterred from settling disputes. (3) …What proceedings are being compromised is, in the first instance, simply a matter of contract. Ordinary principles of contractual interpretation apply. If the compromise agreement does not, on its proper construction, cover the particular proceedings which an employee has brought or later brings, the employee is not contractually precluded from bringing or continuing the proceedings. The statutory safeguards only operate when the employee is contractually precluded from bringing or continuing the proceedings. (4) The employee’s safeguards are to be found in the statutory conditions regulating compromise agreements. They must be satisfied in relation to the agreement. If they are not satisfied the exception does not apply and the agreement is void. On general principles of statutory interpretation the conditions should be construed, so far as possible, to promote the purpose for which they are imposed, that is to protect employees when agreeing to relinquish the right to bring proceedings under the 1996 Act in the employment tribunal. (5) Although the language of the exception is not as clearly drafted as it might have been, it is reasonably plain that a compromise agreement may be validly made even if there are no actual employment tribunal proceedings… (6) The dispute centres on the case where there are no actual employment tribunal proceedings at the time of the compromise agreement. It might be though that, if there are no actual proceedings, there could be no “particular proceedings” falling within section 203(3)(b). It was correctly argued by the university, however, that the exception applies to the compromise of anticipated proceedings in relation to a claim or complaint raised between the parties prior to the compromise, though not the subject of any actual proceedings.”
“22. …The opening part of clause 9.1 on which the university relied, is very general indeed…It relates to proceedings, but not to ‘particular proceedings’. Particularity on this is required but it is missing from clause 9: no particular statute is stated expressly; no particular description is supplied of the legal nature or the factual basis of proceedings ‘arising under statute’; no mention is made of public interest disclosures or any determinant suffered by [the claimant] as a result of making them. 23. This approach to the construction of section 23 is consistent with the policy of the section and its language. Its practical consequences should not give rise to difficulties and it should provide clear guidance to the parties and their legal advisers.”
“33. …in my judgment, the purpose of section 203 is clear. It is to protect claimants from the danger of signing away their rights without a proper understanding of what they are doing. In order to achieve that purpose, I consider that section 203(3)(b) must be construed as requiring the particular proceedings to which the agreement relates to be clearly identified. It is not sufficient to use a rolled-up expression such as ‘all statutory rights’. In my view Mr Hare went too far when he conceded that it might be sufficient to identify the proceedings only by reference to the statute under which they arise. In my judgment that is not sufficient. Many employment rights arise, for example, under [ERA 1996] and, to comply with section 203(3)(b), the particular proceedings to which the agreement relates must be more clearly identified. In my judgment, in order to comply with section 203 the particular claims or potential claims to be covered by the agreement must be identified… either by a generic description such as “unfair dismissal” or by reference to the section of the statute giving rise to the claim. 34.
“Firstly, no compromise agreement can have the effect of excluding a future claim under the Equal Pay Act unless it complies with the requirements of the provisions of s.77 of the Sex Discrimination Act… Secondly, the statutory requirement that a compromise agreement ‘must relate to the particular complaint’ does not limit its cover to complaints that have already been presented to an Employment Tribunal (Hinton). Thirdly, a ‘blanket agreement’ simply signing away all an employee’s Tribunal rights will not do (Lunt, a case which does not however determine, as was suggested by the Claimant, that as a matter of general law, a party can never contractually compromise a future claim of which he as no knowledge). The actual or potential claim must at least be identified by a generic description or a reference to the section of the statute giving rise to the claim (Hinton). Fourthly, whilst parties may agree that a compromise agreement is to cover future claims of which an employee does not and could not have had knowledge, to do so effectively, the terms of their agreement must be absolutely plain and unequivocal…[The passage from Howard that I cited earlier was then set out].”
“It seems to me clear that the purpose of the ‘particular complaint’ requirement is to see to it that there is adequate specification in the compromise agreement itself and is nothing to do with specification or communication of any complaint at any earlier stage: the provision is not temporal in nature.”
“…it would appear to me that the inclusion of a claim in a compromise agreement defined merely by reference to its legal character or its section number does not satisfy the language of section 147. The words ‘the particular complaint’ suggest that Parliament anticipated the existence of an actual complaint or circumstances where the grounds for a complaint existed. I do not consider that the words ‘the particular complaint’ are apt to describe a potential future complaint…in my opinion the precise of the statutory language excludes this possibility. The Act uses the definite article in the combination with the words ‘particular complaint’. I consider this does not permit clauses that list a series of types of complaint by reference to their nature or section number. It does not seem to me that there is any difference in principle between a ‘rolled-up’ waiver and a waiver which lists a variety of possible claims by reference to their nature or section number. Both are general waivers. All that distinguishes them is the particularity with which they have been drafted. I do not consider that one provides any more protection than the other…”
“A compromise agreement cannot, therefore, seek to exclude potential complaints that have not yet arisen on the off-chance that they might be raised; it cannot, in other words, be used to sign away all the employee’s tribunal rights, as can be done in the case of a negotiated settlement drawn up with the assistance of a conciliation officer.”
“In s 144(4)(b) Parliament allowed an exception to the prohibition on contracting out of claims to the tribunal in respect of settlements negotiated by the parties. It follows that there must be room for a compromise agreement to cover future claims of some kind otherwise there is no impact on the terms of s 144(1).”
“31. We have not found support for the EAT’s approach in the words of the legislation. One would expect a Parliamentary intention to lay down rules limiting parties’ freedom of contract to be expressed in clear and unequivocal terms. For the following reasons we consider that the various protections for the employee built into s 147 do not exclude the settlement of future claims so long as the types of claim are clearly identified and the objective meaning of the words used is such as to encompass settlement of the relevant claim. The requirement that the contract must ‘ relate to the particular complaint’ does not mean that the complaint must have been know of or its grounds at least in existence at the time of the agreement…in our view these words simply require one to ask whether the complaint being made is or is not covered by the terms of the contract. They import no temporal barrier to post-employment claims of the kind now being pursued against the Respondents. 32. It would seem that the EAT accepted that s 147(3)(b) would be met if, though unknown at the time, the complaint was based on facts and circumstances which pre-dated the agreement. We can identify no logical or principled basis for giving effect to an agreement in these circumstances but not those of a case such as the present.”
“37. …Thus a contract of employment cannot prevent an employee from enforcing his rights in the future, but a privately negotiated compromise agreement can do so if the safeguards are met. It is not easy to understand why, in a provision which disapplies a prohibition on the waiver of future claims, one of the safeguards would be that the ‘particular complaint’ to which the contract must relate is confined to one either known of at the time of the agreement or at least the subject of existing facts and circumstances. And it would be even harder to understand why potential future complaints could be settled where a conciliation officer has assisted, but not by an agreement, which has all the protections regarding independent advice and insurance set out in s 147(3).”
“39. In Hilton Hotels Lady Smith said that the EAT decision in [Lunt] did not determine that a party can never compromise a claim of which he has no knowledge. In Lunt it was said that a compromise agreement cannot exclude potential claims that have not yet arise on the off-chance that they might be raised. However, that was in response to a submission that, in effect, blanket waivers were valid. Having regard to the specific facts of the case, the crux of the decision was that Mrs Lunt had given notice of claims that might be made arising out of the termination of her employment and that the term ‘particular complaint’ was not restricted to claims that had been presented to a tribunal. The more general remark relied on by the appellant cannot be reconciled with subsequent authority including that of the Court of Appeal in Hinton which in our view confirms that a contract can relate to a future complaint if there is a sufficient description of it in the claims waived…”
“At any stage of the proceedings, either on its own initiative or on the application of a party, a Tribunal may strike out all or part of a claim or response on any of the following grounds – (a) That it is scandalous or vexatious or has no reasonable prospect of success…”
“A claim or response may not be struck out unless the party in question has been given a reasonable opportunity to make representations, either in writing, or if requested by the party, at a hearing.”
“(1) A person (A) discriminates against a disabled person (B) if – (a) A treats B unfavourably because of something arising in consequence of disability; and (b) A cannot show that the treatment is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. (2) Subsection (1) does not apply if A shows that A did not know, and could not reasonably have been expected to know, that B had the disability.”
“(1) A person (A) discriminates against another (B) if A applies to B a provision, criterion or practice which is discriminatory in relation to a relevant protected characteristic of B’s. (2) For the purposes of subsection (1), a provision, criterion or practice is discriminatory in relation to a relevant protected characteristic of B’s if – (a) A applies, or would apply, it to persons with whom B does not share the characteristic, (b) it puts, or would put, persons with whom B shares the characteristic at a particular disadvantage when compared with persons with whom B does not share it, (c) it puts, or would put, B at that disadvantage, and (d) A cannot show it to be a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.”
“28. …It is necessary first to identify the relevant ‘treatment’ to which the section is to be applied. In this case it was the award of a pension. There was nothing intrinsically ‘unfavourable’ or disadvantageous about that…Ms Crasnow’s formulation, to my mind, depends on an artificial separate between the method of calculation and the award to which it gave rise. The only basis on which Mr Williams was entitled to any award at the time was by reason of his disabilities. As Mr Bryant says, had he been able to work full time, the consequences would have been, not an enhanced entitlement, but no immediate right to a pension at all…It is enough that it was not in any sense ‘unfavourable’, nor…could it reasonably have been so regarded.”
“In the leading cases cited to us the ‘treatment’ complained of has been an act which itself disadvantages the claimant in some way… Mr Williams’ case does not turn on a question of reasonable perception. His pension is undoubtedly less advantageous or less favourable than that of a hypothetical comparator suddenly disabled by a heart attack or stroke. But it is far more advantageous or favourable than it would be if he had not been permanently incapacitated from his job. The Shamoon case is not authority for saying that a disabled person has been subject to unfavourable treatment within the meaning of section 15 simply because he thinks he should have been treated better.”
“78. …there was no general requirement on the claimants to use TOIL and/or leave at a time of the respondent’s choosing; rather the specific requirement to exhaust any accrued TOIL and/or leave arose only when, and to the extent that, the claimants sought to access paid special leave. It would be artificial to consider the requirement to use TOIL and/or annual leave separately from the entitlement to paid special leave because the two were thus inextricably linked. 79. The error made by the ET was…to effectively approach its assessment of the ‘treatment’ in this case as if this was to be defined by the claimants’ complaint. The claimants may have complained of the preconditions that had been imposed, but the ET was wrong to focus solely on the acts thus identified rather than having regard to the factual matrix it had itself found which included its findings of fact that the acts complained of by the claimants were ‘preconditions in obtaining or consequences of paid special leave’, which it had held to be ‘clearly favourable’…Although the policy was subject to conditions for entitlement (the prior use of accrued TOIL/annual leave) that could not detract from the favourable nature of that treatment. 80. Viewing the facts of this case with the guidance in Williams in mind, similar points can be made to those identified as relevant in that case. The s 15 claimants were granted an entitlement to paid special leave during the period of time they were unable to work due to their disabilities; that was an advantage they would otherwise not have enjoyed during those periods of absence. The claimants complained of the conditions of entitlement to that paid special leave, but those conditions could not be viewed in isolation from the benefit thus provided: the conditions in question were only applied because the claimants were being granted an entitlement to paid special leave and it would be wholly artificial to separate out the two elements, the benefit and the conditions of accessing that benefit…it did not amount to ‘unfavourable treatment’ by virtue of the fact that it could hypothetically have been even more favourable…”
“85. In this case, the employment tribunal had found that the claimant’s dismissal for unsatisfactory attendance was related to his disability… 86. It was, moreover, the claimant’s underlying health condition, arising from his disability, that gave rise to his entitlement under the CSCS. As such, the relevant treatment – being treated as entitled to a payment under the CSCS – was not unfavourable treatment; if anything it was more favourable than would have been the position if the claimant had been dismissed for a reason other than his disability…on the facts found by the employment tribunal, the claimant’s entitlement arose solely by reason of his disability. That, in my judgment, puts this case on all fours with Williams and to conclude otherwise, as the employment tribunal did, would be to make the error of artificially separating out the entitlement to the award (the relevant treatment, which did not constitute a disadvantage), from the calculation of that award; the latter would not have arisen but for the initial entitlement.”
“(1) A person (A) discriminates against another (B) if, because of a protected characteristic, A treats B less favourably than A treats or would treat others.”
“Comparison by reference to circumstances (1) On a comparison of cases for the purposes of section 13, 14 or 19 there must be no material difference between the circumstances relating to each case. (2) The circumstances relating to a case include a person’s abilities if- (a) On a comparison for the purposes of section 13, the protected characteristic is disability; …..”
“A settlement agreement cannot seek to include, by a blanket waiver, potential complaints that have not yet arisen on the off-chance they might be raised in the future”