"Ofcom intends to contend that both as a matter of principle and for reasons of public policy, evidence should not ordinarily be admitted on such an appeal, particularly where it relates to analyses that could have been undertaken before Ofcom reached its decision and submitted in sufficient time for it to be taken into account, or to arguments that could have been made below. Ofcom has a limited four month period in which it [is] obliged by the legislation to complete its determination, save where there are exceptional circumstances. It would, it is suggested, subvert Ofcom's decision making process and role were evidence which could have been submitted below, but which was excluded as not being capable of being considered in accordance with the legislative constraints, be routinely or ordinarily admitted on appeal. It would, effectively, turn the Tribunal into a primary decision maker. The issue is thus, as Ofcom sees it, a significant one."
"BT apparently contends that, as a "full merits appeal", the Tribunal is concerned with "the correctness of Ofcom's decision at the time it is before the Tribunal" (see Written Submissions of Appellant for Case Management Conference on13 May 2010 , paragraph 6). It appears to envisage no constraint on the nature of the "merits" arguments which may be deployed to attack Ofcom's decision, other than that such arguments must be made by reference to grounds set out in the notice of appeal. They may be entirely distinct from, and unrelated to, the arguments which were advanced to Ofcom. As a necessary corollary of such an approach, an appellant may adduce whatever evidence it considers necessary to support its case on appeal, regardless indeed of whether that evidence was adduced below. In effect, the appeal to the Tribunal would be akin to a de novo hearing, albeit framed by reference to the correctness of Ofcom's decision."
"(5) Except in exceptional circumstances and subject to section 187(3) [which provides for court-imposed stays on the Dispute Resolution Process], OFCOM must make their determination no more than four months after the following day – (a) in a case falling within subsection (1)(a), the day of the decision by OFCOM that it is appropriate for them to handle the dispute; and (b) in a case falling within subsection (1)(b), the day on which the dispute is referred back to them. (6) Where it is practicable for OFCOM to make their determination before the end of the four month period, they must make it as soon in that period as practicable."
"The Tribunal may admit or exclude evidence, whether or not the evidence was available to the respondent when the disputed decision was taken."
"(1) An appeal to the Tribunal must be made by sending a notice of appeal to the Registrar so that it is received within two months of the date upon which the appellant was notified of the disputed decision or the date of publication of the decision, whichever is the earlier. (2) The Tribunal may not extend the time limit provided under paragraph (1) unless it is satisfied that the circumstances are exceptional. (3) The notice of appeal shall state – (a) the name and address of the appellant; (b) the name and address of the appellant's legal representative, if appropriate; (c) an address for service in the United Kingdom; (d) the name and address of the respondent to the proceedings, and shall be signed and dated by the appellant, or on his behalf by his duly authorised officer or his legal representative. (4) The notice of appeal shall contain – (a) a concise statement of the facts; (b) a summary of the grounds for contesting the decision, identifying in particular: (i) under which statutory provision the appeal is brought; (ii) to what extent (if any) the appellant contends that the disputed decision was based on an error of fact or was wrong in law; (iii) to what extent (if any) the appellant is appealing against the respondent's exercise of his discretion in making the disputed decision; (c) a succinct presentation of the arguments supporting each of the grounds of appeal; (d) the relief sought by the appellant, and any directions sought pursuant to rule 19; and (e) a schedule listing all the documents annexed to the notice of appeal. ... (6) There shall be annexed to the notice of appeal – (a) a copy of the disputed decision; and (b) as far as practicable a copy of every document on which the appellant relies including the written statements of all witnesses of fact, or expert witnesses, if any."
"(1) The Tribunal shall dispose of an appeal under section 192(2) in accordance with this section. (2) The Tribunal shall decide the appeal on the merits and by reference to the grounds of appeal set out in the notice of appeal. (3) The Tribunal's decision must include a decision as to what (if any) is the appropriate action for the decision-maker to take in relation to the subject-matter of the decision under appeal. (4) The Tribunal shall then remit the decision under appeal to the decision-maker with such directions (if any) as the Tribunal considers appropriate for giving effect to its decision. (5) The Tribunal must not direct the decision-maker to take any action which he would not otherwise have power to take in relation to the decision under appeal. (6) It shall be the duty of the decision-maker to comply with every direction given under subsection (4). ..."
"However, this is an appeal on the merits and the Tribunal is not concerned solely with whether the 2007 Statement is adequately reasoned but also with whether those reasons are correct. The Tribunal accepts the point made by H3G in their Reply on the SMP and Appropriate Remedy issues that it is a specialist court designed to be able to scrutinise the detail of regulatory decisions in a profound and rigorous manner. The question for the Tribunal is not whether the decision to impose a price control was within the range of reasonable responses but whether the decision was the right one."
"After all it is inconceivable that Article 4 [of the Framework Directive], in requiring an appeal which can duly take into account the merits, requires Member States to have in effect a fully equipped duplicate regulatory body waiting in the wings just for appeals. What is called for is an appeal body and no more, a body which can look into whether the regulator had got something materially wrong. That may be very difficult if all that is impugned is an overall value judgment based upon competing commercial considerations in the context of a public policy decision."
"50. BT apparently contends that, as a "full merits appeal", the Tribunal is concerned with "the correctness of Ofcom's decision at the time it is before the Tribunal"...It appears to envisage no constraint on the nature of the "merits" arguments which may be deployed to attack Ofcom's decision, other than that such arguments must be made by reference to grounds set out in the notice of appeal. They may be entirely distinct from, and unrelated to, the arguments which were advanced to Ofcom. As a necessary corollary of such an approach, an appellant may adduce whatever evidence it considers necessary to support its case on appeal, regardless indeed of whether that evidence was adduced below. In effect, the appeal to the Tribunal would be akin to a de novo hearing, albeit framed by reference to the correctness of Ofcom's decision. 51. Ofcom submits this cannot be the correct approach to the ambit of the right of appeal conferred by section 195(2) CA 2003. 52. First, it is contrary to the overall role of the Tribunal as envisaged by the legislature in enacting CA 2003, namely to function as an appellate body and to determine "appeals" to decisions taken by Ofcom. Once the Tribunal conducts a de novo investigation and adjudication of the correctness of the decision, it ceases to be a genuine appellate body of the kind envisaged by the legislation and as contemplated by the European Union legislation which the relevant provisions of CA 2003 sought to implement... Instead, the Tribunal becomes a primary decision-maker. 53. Second, and following naturally from that conclusion, it would be contrary to public policy to endow the Tribunal with this kind of function. The practical effect would be to usurp Ofcom's role as decision-maker (as the national regulatory authority) and render its role sterile. There would be no real necessity for a party to engage with Ofcom's dispute resolution processes because the whole matter could effectively be re-heard in front of the Tribunal. 54. Quite apart from constituting a waste of public resources, such an approach cannot be reconciled with the clear intention behind the statutory time limits contained in section 188 CA 2003. These were obviously designed to ensure that a determination proceeds speedily to a conclusion... There would be little purpose in placing such onerous time constraints on Ofcom if its determinations could so easily be overtaken by allowing a party to proceed to an appeal which, given the constraints on the Tribunal and allowing for the practicalities of litigation, would almost certainly take longer than the initial determination and in which entirely new arguments and evidence could be advanced."
"Essentially the NCCN 956 charges imposed a sliding scale of payments upon [communications providers] according to how much the [communications providers] were charging their own customers for 080 calls. Thus if the [communications providers] charged their callers nothing (in line with Ofcom's preferences), BT would make payments to the [communications providers] in respect of those calls. If the [communications providers] were charging 080 callers but up to no more than 8.49 pence per minute ("ppm") [including VAT], BT would make no charge to the [communications providers] (but also make no payment to the [communications providers]). Only if the [communications providers] were charging their callers 8.5ppm or more, would the [communications providers] start paying BT an element of the charges it imposed on callers (although the [communications providers] would still retain the majority of the charge). In fact the only [communications providers] charging callers of 080 numbers significant sums for making the calls are Mobile Network Operators…"
"It was always understood [by BT] that Ofcom had expressly excluded from the scope of the Dispute any consideration of the specific charges contained in NCCN 956. BT was thus required to address only whether it was fair and reasonable for any termination charge for calls to 080, not the specific ones in NCCN 956."
" 2) Level of charges notified in NCCN 956 T-Mobile stated in its response to the scope of this dispute that it considered it ought to be adjusted so that it not only consider whether BT is entitled to impose any charge, but also whether the specific charges (including the possibility that different amounts are charged to different operators for the same call termination service) are fair and reasonable. We do not consider it appropriate to amend the scope of this dispute to include consideration of whether specific charges introduced by BT are fair and reasonable. The main issue in dispute is BTs [ sic ] imposition of a new termination charge for 080 calls. Our first task, as set out in the published scope of the dispute, is to consider whether it is fair and reasonable for BT to impose any termination charge for calls to BT-hosted 080 numbers. We therefore consider that T-Mobiles [ sic ] request for us to consider the specific charges notified in NCCN 956 is premature. Should we determine that it is fair and reasonable for any payments to be made by either party, we would expect the parties to enter into commercial negotiations following determination of this dispute to consider, what, if any, charges may be justifiable and only bring the matter back to Ofcom should these discussions fail."
"Can you let me know in what context these questions are posed as we are aware that the 080 charges themselves are not part of the 080 termination rate dispute scope?"
"While we are not directly considering 080 charges, it is helpful to have this information to help us get an indicative view of the MNO retention on a 080 call (we are considering retention by MNOs as relevant and therefore the average retail price is relevant). I hope this helps a little with the context."
"[e]ach of these economists [being a reference to statements Dobbs 1 to 3, Maldoom 1 to 3, Reid 1 and Richards 1] analyses the benefit to consumers from a different perspective. From each of these different perspectives, the answer is the same: NCCN 956, far from being likely to increase the price that the 2G/3G MNOs charges callers to 080 numbers, has in fact the clear incentive for the 2G/3G MNOs to reduce their charges to 080 caller. The evidence analyses the issue in great depth from many angles: but whichever way one looks at it through the prism of economic analysis, NCCM 956 has the incentive to benefit consumers and Ofcom's analysis cannot stand."
"[t]he distinction between matters of fact and matters of opinion is not always easy to draw. For example, in many competition cases it will be necessary for the court or the CAT to have a detailed understanding of matters relating to the industry in question, often including matters of a technical nature. However, a witness who gives evidence (albeit based on his industry experience) of the characteristics of a particular industry or the likely costs of particular activities is providing factual, not expert evidence."