“193 Reference of price control matters to the Competition Commission (1) Tribunal rules must provide in relation to appeals under section 192(2) relating to price control that the price control matters arising in that appeal, to the extent that they are matters of a description specified in the rules, must be referred by the Tribunal to the Competition Commission for determination. (9) For the purposes of this section an appeal relates to price control if the matters to which the appeal relates are or include price control matters. (10) In this section “price control matter” means a matter relating to the imposition of any form of price control by an SMP condition the setting of which is authorised by- (a) section 87(9); (b) section 91; or (c) section 93(3).”
“Reference of price control matters to the Competition Commission 3. - (1) For the purposes of subsection (1) of section 193 of the Act, there is specified every price control matter falling within subsection (10) of that section which is disputed between the parties and which relates to- (a) the principles applied in setting the condition which imposes the price control in question, (b) the methods applied or calculations used or data used in determining that price control, or (c) what the provisions imposing the price control which are contained in that condition should be (including at what level the price control should be set).”
“2.6… The SMP/Price Control Decision constitutes an error of law and/or assessment as to the facts and/or analysis relied upon and/or the reasons given. It further tilts the playing field against the recent entrant and makes it more difficult to compete in the retail market. This is unnecessary and/or disproportionate. There are a number of reasons for this including: the price control imposed on the 2G/3G MNOs has a TAC that is not justified by the underlying cost model and is too high (both for mobile-to-mobile calls and fixed-to-mobile calls); and it generally ignores or fails to take sufficient account of the impact of the price controls in terms of payments by H3G to its competitors and the resulting distortion of competition and dynamic incentives. Any remedy should have mitigated or eliminated distortion to competitive conditions if at all possible ( Appendix, Sections 4, 6, 10-12 ). 2.7 In addition or in the alternative, OFCOM errs in the SMP/Price Control Decision regarding its decision to impose a price control on H3G in that: (a) The price control is a disproportionate or inappropriate remedy ( Appendix, Sections 3 and 4 ). (b) OFCOM uses a methodology, “economic depreciation”, which requires assumptions to be made regarding levels of demand over a period of more than 50 years [20] … ( Appendix, Section 5 and “Commentary” ). [20] OFCOM's model has an explicit forecasting period of 14 years from 2007/08 to 2020/21, together with an assumption (i.e. an implicit forecast) that all parameters including demand stay constant into perpetuity beyond 2020/21. References to forecasts “over 50 years” are made herein as a shorthand description of this approach to add clarity of expression. 6 (c) OFCOM has erred in its choice of glide path … ( Appendix, Section 7 ). (d) OFCOM has failed to allow for H3G's customer acquisition, retention and service (“CARS”) costs when this is appropriate given its new entrant status, its low market share, and the assumptions made about it by OFCOM in the cost model ( Appendix, Section 8 ). (e) OFCOM fails to properly address the distortion created by the current arrangements as to MCT rates chargeable for calls to “ported” numbers (where customers have switched network and taken their number with them) … ( Appendix, Section 9 ).”
“4.1. (c) The “price control matters” (described in the attached Appendix) should be referred to the CC as soon as possible with a direction that the CC determines the issues by reference to the notice of appeal (i.e. determining only those issues raised in this notice of appeal) …”
“23. The Tribunal considers that the issues raised in these appeals which do not comprise price control matters are as follows: i) In the BT appeal … ii) In the O2 appeal … iii) In the H3G appeal – whether OFCOM was right to conclude that H3G had or has SMP in the wholesale MCT market in the United Kingdom as defined; and iv) In the H3G appeal – whether the imposition of a price control with effect from April 2007 is an appropriate response to the finding of SMP.”
“ Question 1 Whether on the proper interpretation ofsection 193 of the Communications Act 2003 and rule 3 of theCompetition Appeal Tribunal (Amendment and Communications Act Appeals) Rules 2004 , the following is a specified price control matter: Whether in the light of the matters relied upon in Section 3 of the Appendix to H3G’s Notice of Appeal, the imposition of a price control on H3G with effect from April 2007 is an appropriate and proportionate response to the 11 finding of SMP, or whether a remedy short of price control would be sufficient. Question 2 Whether on the proper interpretation ofsection 193 of the Communications Act 2003 and rule 3 of theCompetition Appeal Tribunal (Amendment and Communications Act Appeals) Rules 2004 , any and if so which of the particular matters relied upon in Section 3 of the Appendix to H3G’s Notice of Appeal is a specified price control matter. Question 3 Whether on the proper interpretation ofsection 193 of the Communications Act 2003 and rule 3 of theCompetition Appeal Tribunal (Amendment and Communications Act Appeals) Rules 2004 , any and if so which of the particular matters relied upon in the Appendix to H3G’s Notice of Appeal is a specified price control matter.”
“Vodafone wishes to have the opportunity to argue that there are issues raised not only in section 3, but also in sections 4 to 12 of the Appendix to H3G’s Notice of Appeal that are non-price control matters and that therefore fall to be determined by the Tribunal. By way of example, section 8 of the Appendix to H3G’s Notice of Appeal appears to raise a factual issue as to whether, as a “late” entrant into a “saturated” market, H3G is at a competitive disadvantage and, in particular must incur additional levels of CARS [that is, customer acquisition, retention and service] costs in order to attract subscribers to its network. Vodafone considers that this factual issue is a non-price control matter to be determined by the Tribunal and will make full submissions to that effect in due course.”
“Whether and if so the extent to which, on a proper interpretation ofsection 193 of the Communications Act 2003 and rule 3 of theCompetition Appeal Tribunal (Amendment and Communications Act Appeals) Rules 2004 any matters arise in the Appendix to H3G’s Notice of Appeal that are not specified price control matters.”
“Whether and if so which, on a proper interpretation ofsection 193 of the Communications Act 2003 and rule 3 of theCompetition Appeal Tribunal (Amendment and Communications Act Appeals) Rules 2004 , any of the grounds of appeal in the Appendix to H3G’s Notice of Appeal are specified price control matters.”